Lemdro.id

cross-posted from: https://slrpnk.net/post/42231630

Source

As a longtime Gulf analyst, I believe these two maritime attacks by Iran and its proxies signal that efforts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz — which Tehran has largely shut down since being attacked by Israel and the U.S. on Feb. 28 — is no panacea for regional peace or stability in global energy markets.

Indeed, the incidents have expanded the zone of risk for shipping to two other maritime choke points: the Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, and the Suez Canal and pipeline links between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. At the same time, they have put at risk Saudi Arabia’s strategy of redirecting oil exports away from the Strait of Hormuz through its western ports.

https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Bab-el-Mandeb

In Bab-el-Mandeb, Bab means "gate" or "door" while Mandeb means "lamentation" or "grief". The strait derives its name from the dangers attending its navigation or, according to an Arab legend, from the numbers who were drowned by an earthquake that separated the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa.[2]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.blahaj.zone/post/47435380

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/58507206

Archived

A new regulation took effect in China’s Uyghur region on July 1, 2026: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Promoting Cotton Quality (新疆维吾尔自治区棉花质量促进条例). While the new law makes the cotton supply chain traceable, it does not address longstanding evidence and reports of forced cotton-picking labor. The coercive land and labor transfer system that underpins the automated cotton and agricultural industry may cause irreparable harm to Uyghurs and other Indigenous peoples, as UN human rights experts warned.

The Chinese government describes the regulation with familiar language: “high-quality development,” improved cotton quality, protection of producers’ interests, and stable supply chains. But the regulation’s actual reach extends far beyond technical standards for cotton fiber. It creates a legal framework for supervising the entire production chain — from the farmer and plot of land to the processing plant, warehouse, and final point of sale.

The law covers planting, harvesting, purchasing, processing, sales and storage. It requires producers and businesses to maintain traceability records identifying the grower, the land plot, the cotton variety, and the quantity and date of purchase and processing. These records must be retained for at least five years. Every bale must carry barcode information corresponding to its type, grade, quantity, and processing history.

The regulation also gives authorities extensive supervisory power. Cotton businesses are subject to inspections, credit evaluations and a possible “exit mechanism.” Their evaluation results can affect policy support and access to finance.

[...]

The policy explicitly described the low rate of land transfer in southern Uyghur areas — then below 15 percent of arable land — as a problem [...] This arrangement leaves farmers with a formal connection to land while shifting practical control over cultivation, machinery, inputs, processing, and marketing toward cooperatives and companies. The same policy calls for Communist Party organizations to be established inside the agricultural entities that receive and manage transferred land.

The official language describes this as “reform.” In practice, it restructures rural life by moving Uyghur farmers away from independent cultivation and into organizations that are subject to corporate management and Party supervision.

[...]

Traceability without accountability

China’s cotton industry has rapidly expanded its mechanization process. A 2025 report from Xinhua claimed that the region’s cotton planting, cultivation and harvesting system had reached a 97 percent comprehensive mechanization rate. But this is not evidence of farmers’ economic freedom. It shows the scale at which a highly centralized, standardized production system has been constructed.

Mechanization reduces the need for labor on farms while land-transfer policies channel management rights to cooperatives and companies. Fanghuiju teams simultaneously promote labor transfer, political conformity, and village-level control. As pointed out by a UN report released in January 2026, human rights experts criticized China’s “poverty alleviation through labor transfer” program, saying it coerced Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other Indigenous peoples into jobs in the Uyghur region and elsewhere.

The new cotton-quality regulation completes this structure by making the cotton supply chain traceable, inspectable, and governable through data.

[...]

This matters internationally. Cotton is one of the sectors specifically prioritized under the United States’ Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which presumes that goods made wholly or partly in the Uyghur region are prohibited from import unless importers can meet a high evidentiary standard.

China’s new barcode and traceability system should not be confused with accountability. A barcode may reveal where a bale came from, but it cannot establish whether the farmer who produced it had meaningful freedom to keep their land, reject a transfer, choose their work, or resist the political system governing their village.

For Uyghur farmers, the central question is not the quality grade of a bale of cotton. It is who controls the land, who directs labor, who owns the data, and whether Uyghurs can retain any meaningful economic independence in a system that now tracks every stage of the harvest.

The City Council voted to defund it. Twenty-four hours later they folded.

@willquinart

This is a joke that not only made it into the episodes of tht show, but the movie as well. However, it is Gomez that is playing with the trains, not Pugsley.

As a side note, i always wanted an engine that smoked.

https://x.com/pomju_/status/2095264574001893802

Character: Kaguya Houraisan

Previously unpublished government data reveals the scale of Taiwan’s crackdown on Chinese companies accused of hiding their ties while recruiting chip talent and pursuing sensitive technology.

Archived

[...]

Blue Ocean Smart System is one of the 166 cases investigated by Taiwanese authorities over the past six years for allegedly concealing ties to China, according to exclusive data provided to Rest of World by Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, or MJIB. Another 67 China-related trade-secret probes in the technology sector were completed in the same period, according to MJIB figures that have not previously been made public.

The crackdown remains active. As recently as August 5, the MJIB announced it had raided another 18 technology companies, following operations carried out just days earlier between July 13 and August 4.

Taiwan is a global powerhouse in chip manufacturing. Thanks to companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — known as TSMC — Mediatek, and United Microelectronics Corporation, the island nation produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. But the strength and vibrancy of the industry has also attracted unwanted interference, with Chinese competitors accused of illegal investments and talent poaching. Taiwan’s crackdown reflects a broader trend to limit China’s access to critical technology across the world, and in the U.S.

[...]

In Taiwan, Chinese investments are scrutinized by a unique legal framework due to the political tensions between the two governments. Under the Cross-Strait Act and related investment regulations, Chinese companies — whether they’re a bubble tea shop or a tech company — are required to obtain government approval before operating on the self-ruled island.

Chinese companies have repeatedly skirted these regulations by operating outside official approval, setting up shell companies, or registering their operations under non-Chinese nationals.

[...]

Taiwanese authorities say this Chinese business activity represents a risk to national security. This past April, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau published a report (opens pdf) warning that China continues to use “indirect channels” for “talent poaching, technology theft, and the acquisition of controlled goods” to obtain advanced chipmaking technologies in order to “break through international technological containment.”

[...]

Beyond Taiwan, countries in other regions have also become increasingly alert to Chinese firms’ efforts to acquire critical technologies. The Netherlands, for example, is investigating the national-security implications of the Chinese ownership of Nexperia, a Dutch semiconductor manufacturer which became controlled by Chinese investors through acquisitions. The Dutch and the Chinese governments have been dealing with this issue through diplomatic channels.

[...]