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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/47017690

Duration - 3:00

Vic Mensa traveled to Cuba with the Nuestra América Convoy, not as an artist, but as a witness.What he found in the streets of Old Havana moved him to his core.

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More importantly, your membership also helps support our on-the-ground reporting that you won’t find anywhere else!

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Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have lifted restrictions on the U.S. military’s use of their bases and airspace imposed after the start of the American operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, according to U.S. and Saudi officials, removing a hurdle that had tripped up President Trump’s effort to move ships through the vital waterway.

The Trump administration is now looking to restart the operation to guide commercial ships with naval and air support that it had paused after 36 hours this week, U.S. officials said. It isn’t clear when that could happen though Pentagon officials gave a timeline of as early as this week.

The U.S. operation to force open the strait relied on an enormous fleet of aircraft to protect commercial ships from Iranian missiles and drones, making Saudi and Kuwaiti bases and airspace critical to its execution.

But the mission set off the biggest dispute in Saudi-American military relations in recent years, triggering a spate of high-level phone calls between Trump and the kingdom’s crown prince and raising the risk of a breakdown of a security deal between Washington and Riyadh.

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submitted 20 hours ago* (last edited 20 hours ago) by zdhzm2pgp@lemmy.ml to c/worldnews@lemmy.ml
 
 

Last week, the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, offered a gloomy appraisal of the war in Iran, a two-month-long conflict that has devolved into a standoff in the Persian Gulf. A ceasefire is now in place, but it’s fragile: the U.S. has blockaded Iranian ports and vessels; Iran has attempted strikes on U.S. ships; and, in the midst of negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump is reportedly considering whether to resume hostilities. “The Iranians are clearly stronger than expected, and the Americans clearly have no truly convincing strategy in the negotiations, either. . . . An entire nation is being humiliated by the Iranian leadership,” Mertz said—a notable shift from his cautious support for regime change in Iran. Trump fired back, vowing to withdraw U.S. forces that have been stationed in Germany for decades. The episode fits a pattern that has played out in Europe and the Middle East, wherein Trump makes new threats, punishes perceived slights, and shows little regard for allies or for the broader fallout from his decisions. His actions have made an impression at home, too: for the first time in more than two decades of polling on the question, the Pew Research Center recently found that a majority of Americans believe their country largely ignores the interests of others.

This is all welcome news in Beijing. For years, the Chinese Communist Party has tried, with middling success, to cast itself as a responsible world power in the face of what it has labelled imperialist America. It has issued one jargon-filled statement after another warning against American “hegemony,” condemning Washington’s “Cold War mentality,” and framing China as the true custodian of a rules-based international order—the same order that the U.S. helped build but now undermines. In 2023, the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, unveiled a grandiose, if vague, project called the Global Civilization Initiative, which proposed an appeal to comity between civilizations and cultures—something of a Chinese counterpoint to the Western status quo. For China’s neighbors, such airy visions are unlikely to assuage fears over China’s own perceived hegemonic designs; meanwhile, smaller countries in the so-called Global South are already seeing their societies and politics bend to Chinese influence. But the war in Iran—and Trump’s disruptive behavior on the world stage, including his chaotic social-media presence—is helping China reframe its geopolitical role, according to Yuen Yuen Ang, a professor of political economy at Johns Hopkins University. “The war in Ukraine left China in an awkward position: narrowly aligned with Russia and viewed with suspicion by Western powers,” she told me. “For China, the Iran conflict brings no economic upside, but it creates diplomatic space. It allows China to step out of a previously isolating alignment and reposition itself more broadly, not just in the Middle East but globally.”

Since the start of Trump’s second term, a parade of Western leaders has filed through Beijing, often in barely disguised signals to Trump that they won’t put up with his bullying. The visits amount to what the Canadian writer and former diplomat Michael Kovrig described as a “political and propaganda bonanza” for China. In mid-April, Xi, sitting across from Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, said that China and Spain, which have condemned the U.S.’s war against Iran, were both “on the right side of history” and that the two countries should “oppose the world’s retrogression to the law of the jungle.”

For China, this rhetoric isn’t just posturing. The country is at the heart of twenty-first-century trade networks, so Beijing’s strategists prioritize geopolitical calm and market predictability. The tumult of Trump’s tenure provides a foil for Xi’s greater ambitions. “For decades we thought of Chinese foreign policy as mainly seeking stability to facilitate economic development, but Xi is projecting confidence in the face of the more volatile, violent world of the second Trump term,” Julian Gewirtz, a senior researcher on China at Columbia University and a former official in the Biden Administration, told me. China, despite its immense strategic oil reserve, isn’t immune to the economic disruptions created by the ongoing impasse over the Strait of Hormuz. Still, Gewirtz argued, Xi “believes that China is better able than the United States to ‘eat bitterness’—that is, to endure hardship and emerge stronger from periods of struggle.”

China’s economy was already sluggish before the war, and new bottlenecks in global logistics are raising costs for the country’s vast manufacturing and export sectors. But the war has offered an upside: Asian countries, which are far more dependent than the U.S. on the fossil fuels coming across the Strait of Hormuz, now have fresh urgency to insulate themselves from future oil shocks and expand their renewable-energy capacity. China already dominates green-energy supply chains, and its exporters of solar systems, batteries, and electric vehicles all posted record sales in March, Ember, a global-energy think tank, reported. There is evidence of a wider reckoning in motion, too: “As we face the second fossil-fuel shock in less than five years, the lesson for our country is clear. The era of fossil-fuel security is over, and the era of clean-energy security must come of age,” the British secretary of state for energy, Ed Miliband, said, calling on the U.K. to wean itself off gas-generated electricity. The Trump Administration, sitting atop its fossil-fuel bounty and contemptuous of investment in renewable energy, seems content to let China steer this global transition.

China has also benefitted from the Iran war simply by sitting on the sidelines. It has watched the Trump Administration relocate major military assets from Asia to the Middle East—redeploying air-defense systems over the objection of South Korea’s President. In just weeks, the United States burned through an arsenal of critical munitions, including stockpiles of Patriot, Tomahawk, and stealth cruise missiles, and of THAAD interceptors. For U.S. partners in the Pacific, these moves deepen the sense of a waning Pax Americana and could reshape their long-term calculations on how to hedge against China.

The war has exposed other vulnerabilities, too. U.S. struggles against Iran, a weaker opponent—and its inability to neutralize Iran’s cheap drone campaign in the Gulf—have cast doubt on any prospect of sustained U.S. military dominance in Asia. Beijing has also gained a front-row seat to new U.S. methods of warfighting, specifically its widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems. Chen Yixin, China’s Minister of State Security and a prominent adviser to Xi, recently published an article mentioning the deep applications of A.I. in intelligence fusion, decision-making, target recognition, combat support, and cognitive shaping on display in the conflict. As it did when the U.S. rallied to Ukraine’s defense after the 2022 Russian invasion, China is watching and taking notes.

The war with Iran—or its uneasy aftermath, should there somehow be a diplomatic breakthrough in the coming days—will loom over Trump’s upcoming summit with Xi, in Beijing. The meeting, initially planned for March, was delayed by the war. The situation has only intensified since: in a bid to put more pressure on both Tehran and Beijing, the Trump Administration placed sanctions on several Chinese oil refineries and forty Chinese-linked shipping firms and vessels involved in trade with Iran. China, meanwhile, laid out new rules that could penalize foreign companies trying to shift from China-based supply chains. The project of “de-risking” from China—encouraged by both President Joe Biden and Trump—had been embraced by various countries in the West, but seems more complicated in Trump’s second term, as those same countries now feel the need to hedge against the U.S., too. It’s another tacit victory for Beijing, whose own soft power is growing just by existing in contrast to Trump’s wrecking-ball politics. “The more that U.S. allies and partners undertake to de-risk from Washington, the less diplomatic capital Beijing has to expend on assuaging their misgivings about its own conduct,” Ali Wyne, a researcher on U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group, told me.

Prior to Trump’s most recent meeting with Xi, last October, the White House made a string of threats, including an additional hundred-per-cent tariff on top of existing levies and sweeping export controls. Ahead of this meeting, it has been much more restrained. The difference could reflect Xi’s stronger hand in the wake of the Iran war, Wyne told me. “The United States will be unlikely to bring Iran back to the negotiating table without China’s support,” he said. “Nor will it be able to replenish its stockpile of missile interceptors in the Middle East without gallium, a critical material whose production China dominates.” Xi wants to use this period of stalemate to boost China’s strength and extract further concessions on trade and tech, Gewirtz told me. “Chinese leaders are hoping that a delayed trip and a distracted, beleaguered President make buying time and extracting concessions even easier,” he said. “They know Trump is hoping to spin the trip as a win, and that gives them leverage.”

China, too, may be in a more conciliatory mood. Its leadership wants to see de-escalation in the Gulf and an end to the blockade that is inflicting real damage on Asian economies, including its own—and the country isn’t aggressively propping up Iran’s war effort or trying to supplant the U.S. in the Middle East. Instead, China has helped nudge Iran toward negotiations with the U.S. and encouraged Pakistan, a neighbor and close partner, to play the role of intermediary.

The war also illustrates the limits of Chinese power. For decades, Beijing relied on U.S.-provided security architecture in the Middle East as it powered its economy on Gulf energy imports. Now it can do little to check U.S. military action in the region, and Xi’s call to open the Strait of Hormuz went unheeded. His stoic image may get a boost every time Trump posts a new absurdity on social media, but China remains in America’s geopolitical shadow. “Maybe we won’t come away from this conflict with any new appreciation for Chinese global leadership,” Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, the head of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, a London-based think tank on the economies of Middle East and Central Asia, told me. “What at least we will come away with is a real, even more diminished view of American leadership.”

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cross-posted from: https://hexbear.net/post/8435184

French national infected while sharing flight with a ships passenger 1 2

Dutch flight attendant infected 1

Little comment from the newsmega about infectivity

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/46974100

https://archive.ph/CmOgV

Israel has failed to arrest a wave of violence against Palestinians, prompting military officials to urge the government to intervene.

May 4, 2026

Villagers might have once driven the attackers away by throwing stones, said Mr. Odeh, 46, but settlers now routinely carry guns. “We are helpless,” he said, “and they know it.”

With the world’s attention focused on the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran and its proxies, extremist settlers acting with seeming impunity have intensified their attacks on Palestinians across the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Their campaign of violence and intimidation is emptying out entire villages and leaving countless Palestinians fearing what each nightfall might bring.

In the Jordan Valley, masked men sexually assaulted Suhaib Abualkebash, 29, and brutalized his extended family, children included.

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Normally I wouldn't post anything from WaPo, but...

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cross-posted from: https://hexbear.net/post/8398417

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/46767

By Teri Mattson  –  Apr 29, 2026

If the border can exist thousands of miles beyond national territory—and hundreds of miles within it—then what defines its limits? Is it geography? Policy? Power?

The modern border is no longer a line.

It does not begin at the Rio Grande, nor does it end at a wall. It is not confined to checkpoints, fences, or even national territory. Instead, it stretches—quietly but forcefully—across continents, embedding itself in foreign security forces, domestic policing, and global surveillance systems.

This is what journalist and author Todd Miller calls the age of “elastic borders.” First articulated in his book Empire of Borders, the concept describes how U.S. border enforcement has expanded both inward and outward, forming a multilayered system that increasingly resembles a global architecture of control.

Today, that architecture is becoming more explicit. Recent political rhetoric about a hemispheric security zone—defined on March 29, 2026 by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth as “Greater North America” stretching from the Arctic to the equator—has brought into the open what has long been under construction.

To understand what is unfolding, one must look beyond immigration policy. The story of elastic borders is also a story about militarization, economic inequality, climate crisis, and geopolitical competition. It is, in many ways, a story about how power is reorganizing itself in an era of instability.

And as Colombian President Gustavo Petro has warned, it may signal the rise of something even more systemic: “Fortress Capitalism.”

From Border Line to Border SystemThe militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border did not emerge overnight. Its foundations were laid decades ago, shaped by Cold War strategies and foreign interventions.

In his book The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home, sociologist Timothy Dunn traced how U.S. military doctrine—particularly “low-intensity conflict” tactics used in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s—was gradually repurposed for domestic border enforcement. Equipment, training, and strategic thinking migrated from war zones abroad to the U.S. frontier.

By the 1990s, this transformation accelerated. Under President Bill Clinton, operations like Operation Gatekeeper reshaped enforcement strategy. Instead of attempting to stop migration everywhere, authorities concentrated infrastructure in urban crossing zones, erecting walls and deploying agents in cities such as San Diego and El Paso.

The goal was not simply interdiction—it was deterrence.

Migrants were funneled away from populated areas into harsh environments like the Sonoran Desert, where the journey itself became a barrier. The logic was stark: if crossing became dangerous enough, fewer people would try.

This doctrine—“prevention through deterrence”—remains central to U.S. border policy today.

The Post-9/11 TransformationThe attacks of September 11 marked a turning point. Border enforcement was rebranded as a matter of national security, and immigration became intertwined with counterterrorism.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 consolidated this shift. Agencies such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection were expanded and empowered, receiving massive increases in funding.

Although no terrorist threats materialized via the southern border, the narrative proved durable. It justified sweeping investments in physical barriers, surveillance systems, and personnel. Legislation like the Secure Fence Act of 2006 authorized hundreds of miles of fencing, while new technologies promised a “virtual wall” of sensors and data.

Many of these technologies originated in foreign conflicts. Surveillance tools and drone systems tested in places such as the Gaza Strip were adapted for border enforcement, blurring the line between military operations and civilian policing.

At the same time, rhetoric evolved. Border agents were increasingly described as operating on the “front lines,” reinforcing a war-like mentality that continues to shape policy and practice.

The Layered Border Comes HomeIf the border once existed at the edge of the nation, it now exists throughout it.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection operates within a 100-mile zone extending from all external boundaries—a region that includes major metropolitan areas such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Approximately 200 million people live within this zone.

Within this space, enforcement increasingly resembles border operations. Joint actions between ICE and Border Patrol have introduced militarized tactics into urban environments, including helicopter deployments and coordinated raids.

The result is what Miller describes as a “layered border”—a system in which the boundary is not a single line, but a series of overlapping enforcement zones.

This internal expansion raises fundamental questions about civil liberties and the normalization of militarized policing. Practices once associated with remote borderlands are now part of everyday life in cities far removed from the frontier.

Exporting the BorderAt the same time that the border has moved inward, it has also been pushed outward.

Through training programs, funding, and equipment transfers, the United States has effectively extended its border enforcement into other countries. Security forces across Latin America increasingly participate in migration control efforts aligned with U.S. priorities.

Former Homeland Security Secretary John F. Kelly once suggested that the U.S. border should begin thousands of miles from its physical boundary. In practice, this has translated into a focus on migration routes in Central America, particularly along the Mexico–Guatemala corridor.

Some officials have gone further. A former CBP commissioner stated explicitly that the functional southern border of the United States lies not at the Rio Grande, but at the boundary between southern Mexico and Guatemala.

This is the essence of border externalization: enforcement occurs long before migrants reach U.S. territory.

It also reflects a broader geopolitical strategy. By projecting enforcement outward, the United States shapes migration patterns, influences regional security policies, and extends its operational reach without formal territorial expansion.

Geopolitics: Resources, Rivalries, and Regional ControlThe expansion of elastic borders cannot be separated from global power dynamics.

Latin America and the Caribbean occupy a strategic position in the 21st century. The region is rich in critical resources—lithium, rare earth minerals, freshwater, and biodiversity—while also serving as a key corridor for global trade.

At the same time, geopolitical competition is intensifying. The rise of China as a global economic power has deepened its engagement across the Americas through infrastructure projects, trade agreements, and investment.

For Washington, maintaining influence in the hemisphere has become a priority.

Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard Shoots and Kills Venezuelan Baby

Border expansion and security integration offer one mechanism for doing so. By embedding U.S. priorities into regional security frameworks—through military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and migration control—the United States reinforces its presence without overtly framing it as geopolitical competition.

Migration, in this context, becomes both a justification and a tool.

At the same time, countries that resist alignment—such as Cuba or Nicaragua—often face increased political and economic pressure, further illustrating how border policy intersects with broader foreign policy goals.

Fortress Capitalism: A System Under PressureFor Colombian President Gustavo Petro, these developments are part of a larger transformation.

He describes the emerging system as “Fortress Capitalism”—a model in which wealthy nations fortify themselves against the consequences of global inequality and environmental collapse, rather than addressing their root causes.

In this framework, borders are not just about controlling movement. They are about preserving a global order in which wealth remains concentrated and mobility is restricted.

As climate change accelerates, this dynamic becomes more pronounced. Rising sea levels, desertification, and extreme weather events are expected to displace millions of people in the coming decades. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) formally identifies climate change as a critical national security threat and a “threat multiplier,” as it exacerbates existing stresses like poverty, political instability, and resource scarcity. It endangers military readiness by damaging infrastructure, disrupting supply chains, and increasing demand for humanitarian missions

Yet instead of prioritizing adaptation, mitigation, or equitable development, governments increasingly invest in containment.

Walls rise. Surveillance expands. Military involvement deepens.

The result is a world in which mobility—once a fundamental aspect of human survival—is increasingly criminalized.

Climate Migration and the Security Paradigm

U.S. military doctrine has long identified climate change as a “threat multiplier.” But the focus is often less on environmental impacts themselves than on their social consequences.

Migration, in particular, is framed as a source of instability.

Policy documents frequently link population movement to security risks, reinforcing the idea that migrants are not just individuals seeking safety or opportunity, but potential threats to be managed.

This framing shapes responses.

Rather than addressing the underlying drivers of displacement—including economic policies, historical emissions, and geopolitical interventions—resources are directed toward enforcement.

In effect, the system treats symptoms while reinforcing the conditions that produce them.

An Invisible WarUnlike conventional conflicts, the expansion of elastic borders does not produce dramatic battlefields or clear front lines.

Instead, it operates in deserts, detention centers, transit routes, and data systems. It is often invisible to those not directly affected.

Yet its consequences are profound.

Migrants are pushed into increasingly dangerous journeys. Families are separated. Entire regions are reshaped by enforcement policies. And within the United States, the normalization of militarized policing raises enduring questions about democracy and rights.

Miller suggests that this system functions as a form of undeclared war—one that maintains global inequalities while minimizing visibility.

“It’s a war without end,” he argues, “and without a clear battlefield.”

**Where Does the Border End?**As the concept of a hemispheric security zone gains traction, the implications of elastic borders become harder to ignore.

If the border can exist thousands of miles beyond national territory—and hundreds of miles within it—then what defines its limits?

Is it geography? Policy? Power?

Or is the border becoming something else entirely: a flexible instrument for managing a world marked by inequality, displacement, and ecological crisis?

The answer may determine not only the future of migration, but the future of global order itself.

In an era of rising instability, nations face a choice.

They can build walls—physical, digital, and geopolitical—or they can address the forces driving people to move.

For now, the trend is clear.

The border is expanding.

And the fortress is rising.

(LA Progressive)


From Orinoco Tribune via This RSS Feed.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/46939438

cross-posted from: https://expressional.social/users/Peter_Link/statuses/116525475377343705

Post by Einat Tempkin on Facebook
May 5, 2026

Some updates from #Israel because someone needs to let you all know how bad things are, and the media isn’t doing it.
Keeping it short as I’m under the weather and this task will definitely will not help:...

Link to text (and some pics) from her post is here:
https://drive.proton.me/urls/KRGRKR4WHC#9jsWcbJX3Rbr

#FreePalestine
#SanctionIsrael
#Palestine #Gaza #WestBank #IsraelElections #GlobalSumudFlotilla #Alt4Me
#news #politics @palestine

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/46975327

Duration - 2:02

[a video about Cuba from the news collective Belly Of The Beast]

Imani Bashir is a Black American activist from Washington D.C. She visited to Cuba following a radical political tradition, one that includes Malcolm X, Assata Shakur, and Kwame Ture, figures who understood the Cuban Revolution as part of a broader struggle for liberation.

For Bashir, visiting Cuba wasn't just political, it was personal. Seeing Afro-Cuban people, she says, was seeing people who look like her, who share her history, who have maintained their culture and dignity under decades of sanctions.

Her argument on the blockade is straightforward: Cuba has never been a threat to the United States. It has never put U.S. safety, its food supply, or resources at stake. "It has only been the other way around," she says.

And on the U.S. government's stated concern for the Cuban people: "I absolutely don't think that the United States government wants to help the Cuban people, because the United States government doesn't want to help the American people.”

U.S. Voices Against the Blockade is a series featuring U.S. citizens who oppose U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Watch Episode 2 and catch up on all previous episodes in the series.

view more: next ›