Malaysia’s current geopolitical trajectory
Sitting at one of the most important waterways in the world - the strait of Melaka, the country hosts the 2nd largest Chinese diaspora, 3rd largest Indian diaspora and largest Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Nepali diaspora. One thing to know is that Malaysian foreign policy never strays too far from home.
It has now been a few years since the 2022 General Election, where a lot of the foreign alternative media was highlighting US influence in the opposition coalition and a potential westward turn. But unfortunately to them, lacking in dialectical materialism and influenced by Eurocentrism, they never actually understood the material and historical contexts that shape Malaysian politics.
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To be clear, there is clear evidence of US involvement in aspects of the opposition. This is inevitable, Malaysia has a large professional English educated middle class owing to British colonization and many who aspire to be professional activists in the NGO industrial complex. The government’s continuation of colonial-era policies of unions and radical political organization meant that in modern-day Malaysian society there are really two avenues for those that want to be politically active: fall under the bureaucracy of parliamentary parties or go through ‘independent’ NGOs in “civil society”. However, this also implies that the past ruling coalition of nearly 50 years as somehow the anti-imperialist or atleast anti-US position. This isn’t the case.
Brief background on Malaysian Foreign Policy
Malaysian foreign policy has stayed remarkably consistent despite changes of government. This is due to the position of Malaysia in the global world economy, where through it’s colonial history and subsequent independence through build-up of native industries, it anchors Malaysian foreign policy and dissuades large changes. As such a lot of the country’s foreign policy hedges on free trade and ensuring domestic political stability and openness to foreign investment. This status-quo remains comfortable for most of the national bourgeoisie. That said, continual pressure from the diverse masses and popular classes ensure that the government could never take an outwardly pro-West position.
In practical terms this means broad alignment with Global South and Islamic interests, despite the prevalence of comprador classes. This means a firm anti-Zionist stance, extensive economic and cultural co-operation with China, close historical and cultural ties with Indonesia and India, and engagements with internationalism through the Non-Aligned Movement and others. It has one of the most progressive foreign policies in Southeast Asia, or at-least in the ASEAN-5, especially concerning China.
Back to the present
The government is now in the process of drafting the 13th Malaysia Plan - the next 5-year plan for 2026-2030, which is when Malaysia is finally forecasted to reach high-income status according to World Bank classifications. This economic development is what I attribute to as the cause of the fracturing and instability of the Malaysian political scene - the fall of Barisan Nasional and rise of Pakatan Harapan and Perikatan Nasional. It represents a shift of power from the old ruling classes to the aspiring and modern national bourgeoise and petite-bourgeoisie, represented by the new or rising political parties, who grew and responded to an environment nearing the end of the Cold War, at the midst of neoliberalism’s establishment. The “radical change” as hoped and expected by the NGOs, Western and Alternative media never happened - which was to no one’s surprise except the liberals.
The current government is currently pursuing a lot of fiscal reforms, while echoing neoliberal phrases that has become all too common. This isn’t especially new - this is merely a continuation of neoliberal policies since the 1990s, before any large changes within the Malaysian parliamentary scene. Generally, neoliberalism in the country has never taken a fully radical turn like that found in Argentina. For parts of the national bourgeoisie, privatization means a loss of their own class’s accumulation, and so neoliberalism trickles in targeting particular industries that maximizes their own racial-class gain. The so-called “third position” found in many semi-peripheral global south countries.
The current Prime Minister does have more of an assimilationist foreign policy rhetorically, especially when compared to some of the previous prime ministers. It falls quite well in line to the coalition’s class base of “sensible” and “smart” (read “business friendly”) policymaking, but again this falls quite in line with past precedent of telling the West what it wants to hear but never actually acting on everything said. The “liberal reformer” seemingly is not much of a reformer after all - but he definitely fits the liberal bill though.
To give another example, he echoes decades old refrains from neighbouring Singapore - whereby the Palestinian cause is “divisive” that threatens “social harmony”. The context of this is that there have been continuous protests and mobilizations for Palestine, especially after October 7th, with demonstrations infront of the US embassy in particular. Sometimes organized by left-wing organizations, sometimes by mainstream political parties - often by the new opposition after the liberals gained power (especially that of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia).
This binary understanding of the role of religion and race is part and parcel of the government’s liberal minded coalition when it comes to racial relations - too simple, sometimes naive. Don’t mistake this rhetoric as being pro-Zionist though, for that is an untenable position in Malaysia. Just recently the Prime Minister emphasized the need to speak against Israeli aggression and crimes in Gaza and Iran and maintaining “centrality” (neutrality), not relying on any one country too much.
What holds for the future?
The so-called rise of “protectionism” has put Southeast Asian economies in a somewhat lucrative position through the China+1 strategy and others. This in effect has risen the trade and foreign investment with the US but it remains to be seen if this foreign investment can be sustained or will actually yield long-term benefits. Malaysia will continue straddling this neutral position, but for a majority of Malaysian policymakers, dealing with the US is merely an economic necessity, but does not hold any of the cultural, political or historical significance like it does with China. Over the longer term, Asian trade and investments will only continue to increase in relevance, with the flagship BRI project, the East Coast Rail Link, on track to finish by next year, bringing needed development to deprived east coast communities and enabling another potential rail link to Thailand.
The Malaysian establishment’s continual acquiescence to Western Capital and unwillingness to be at the forefront of a Global South alternative will undoubtedly continue to roadblock further prosperity and harm the country when the middle-ground becomes impossible, giving further ammunition to those outside the current ruling coalition.
To reiterate what I have wrote in the past, this means that Malaysia can only lean more East as time goes on. It is simply unfeasible for Malaysia to shift West. Economically, politically, culturally, and historically. Do not believe the “analysis” of those that have only stepped foot in this country to visit the beaches. All signs are leading to greater Eurasian and especially ASEAN integration.
And to connect it to current events, having never recognized the Zionist Entity, the country has called the “Israeli Zionist regime” strikes on Iran a “flagrant violation of international law” but falls short of naming the key supporter of “Israeli” aggression, the US of A. Furthermore, Malaysia-Iran relations are friendly although minuscule. In the long-term, I do see growth as the US empire weakens due to both being Islamic countries and high potential for co-operation in many industries, but especially in oil and gas.
