Fuck those boxes and the game. Steal the computer. Any computer that can predict individual human behavior with 99% accuracy would be worth billions. If such a thing existed and could be controlled, it'd be a total waste to have it running grad school human lab experiments.
Asklemmy
A loosely moderated place to ask open-ended questions
Search asklemmy π
If your post meets the following criteria, it's welcome here!
- Open-ended question
- Not offensive: at this point, we do not have the bandwidth to moderate overtly political discussions. Assume best intent and be excellent to each other.
- Not regarding using or support for Lemmy: context, see the list of support communities and tools for finding communities below
- Not ad nauseam inducing: please make sure it is a question that would be new to most members
- An actual topic of discussion
Looking for support?
Looking for a community?
- Lemmyverse: community search
- sub.rehab: maps old subreddits to fediverse options, marks official as such
- !lemmy411@lemmy.ca: a community for finding communities
~Icon~ ~by~ ~@Double_A@discuss.tchncs.de~
Unfortunately it knew you would do that and already contacted the police. The moment you steal it, you get arrested
Assuming I knew that my behaviour was being modelled and this model would influence the outcome, I'd remove myself from the decision making process and flip a coin.
I think the numbers are a little off for this to be tempting, if Iβm getting $1,000,000 then a K is a rounding error and I see no reason to make the mil any less likely for it. Like if I wanted that extra grand throwing 10% of the mil into a short GIC would be how Iβd get it personally, for a risk free $1,001,000
It means that the people in the experiment have $1,001,000 to give way, for free.
What if I rob them first?
What if I convince them to unionize and they redistribute all the money fairly among the workers and force management to not conduct shitty social experiments on people?
this guy thinks outside the box
Mmmm, this sounds like an idealist hypothetical problem that in reality canβt exist, so to engage with it is to engage with nonsense.
The predictor rarely makes mistakes becauseβ¦ just because. Itβs axiomatic. The predictor runs on the magic of unsupported assertion.
Some version of it could exist. Not with the big numbers and not with the high degree of certainty in the problem, but you could have, say, somebody who's on average 70% accurate at reading people and the boxes are $1 and $10.
It is somewhat idealist in that it's a contrived scenario, but it's really just idle curiosity on my part. Maybe it could reflect something about people's thought processes, or maybe it's just people interpreting the question differently.
Even if it were to exist in the short run, it wouldnβt be stable. The predictor must be predicting somehow, which eventually could be at least partially sussed out, and future decisions would change as a result. Unless the predictor runs on literal magic, it would eventually no longer fit its own definition.
You can flip the problem around and have it be mathematically the same. The predictor has some knowable accuracy, you can run the experiment many times to determine what it is. Let's also replace the predictor with an Oracle, guaranteed 100% always correct, and we'll manually impose some error by doing the opposite of its prediction with some probability. This is fully indistinguishable from our original predictor.
Now, instead of the predictor making a prediction, let's choose our box first, then decide what to put in the mystery box afterwards, with some probability of being "wrong" (not putting the money in for the 1 box taker, or putting the money in for the 2 box taker). This is identical to having an Oracle, we know exactly what boxes will be taken, but there is some error in the system.
Now we ask, should you take one box or two? Obviously it depends on what the probability is. There's no more "fooling" the predictor. So, you do the EV calculation and find that if the probability is more than 50% accurate (in other words, if the probability of error is less than 50%), you should always take 1 box
The real question involves a perfect predictor, and asks whether it's even possible to intend to only take one box. After all, when you get to that table, the money is already in the boxes. You necessarily will get either the same amount or more money by taking both, so there is no logical argument against taking both boxes.
It's definitely a hypothetical problem that can't really exist, but to say that that makes it nonsense seems silly to me. Plenty of unrealistic hypothetical problems are worth thinking about.
I already opened the mystery box before you finished explaining.
Just the mystery box. If the computer rarely guesses wrong, then Iβm $1,000,000 richer.
A rule of thumb I think is good for most sorts of investment is, what choice can you feel good about making whether or not it works out? I can handle not getting 1k, but I would feel like a real chump missing out on an easy 1m without giving my best effort. If I pick just the mystery box and win, I feel like that win is deserved. If I pick just the mystery box and I walk away with nothing, then at least I don't have to live with the shame of being a 2-boxer, which is more valuable than $1k. If I pick both boxes, I most likely get a little bit of money and a lifetime of bitter regrets, or in the less likely case get 1.001 million dollars and a sense of having barely avoided disaster and not really "deserving" it. Choosing only the mystery box is the clear choice because it is the choice I am more able to handle having made, on an emotional level.
I'll take the guanteed $1000 and not the mystery box so the prediction is always wrong :)
two-boxers are why we cant have nice things. and they themselves cant either.
Their machine should be able to predict how dumb and irrational I am. Even if there is necessarily no downside to taking both boxes, I only take the mystery box.
If I end up taking both boxes, then the machine may or may not have predicted that. But if I end up only taking the mystery box, then I doubt the machine would have predicted that I'd take both. I'm walking away with that cool mil
I'm the kind of person who would ask for their definition of "rarely". How many 9s are we talking? If it's at least three nines, I'm one-boxing it.
The answer depends entirely on what "rarely makes mistakes" means.
If the prediction is correct more than 50.05% of the time, then I would take the mystery box. Expected value = 0.5006 * 1,000,000 = 500,600
If the prediction is correct less than 50.05% of the time, then I would take both: expected value = 1000 + (1 - 0.5004) * 1,000,000 = 500,600
Since "rarely" usually means some value much less than 50%, I would definitely take the mystery box.
Take out my gun, pistol whip the researcher, and steal the $1,000,000.
I only know about this because of zero escape lol.
One box, I'm not messing with anything powerful enough to predict the future.
An angle I don't see people looking at is to reframe the problem with amounts that are much more understandable, there is one thousand times more money in the mystery box, so let's do the following:
The Open box has 1 cent in it, and the mystery box might have $10, what do you do?
Y'all are telling me you'd rather take a penny and have a tiny Chance at $10, rather than taking $10 with a tiny Chance of getting zero?
It obviously depends on the computers mysterious ability to predict what I'm going to do.
once the prediction has been made, your choice no longer influences the outcome.
This statement doesn't make sense. The computer would predict that you would think that.
1 box
I'm playing with the house's money.
If I get nothing, I'm no worse off than I was before.
Besides, the mystery box is a mystery, and I love a mystery.
my favorite flavor of Dum-Dum
This feels like the poison scene from the princess bride, so I'll approach it with that level of intellectual derangement.
Which means the obvious first step is to recognize that the house is a cheater who wants you to stay poor so your choice doesn't matter. There is poison in both cups and I will lose either way. Money no longer influences my decision.
Next, I flip a coin ten times and note my reaction to the choices. That's my gut instinct and obviously what the model predicted unless it's either not smart enough to know my gut or smart enough to predict my double bluff, therefore useless.
Next, I decide which variables are most likely to influence the prediction (gender, age, education level, big 5 personality score) and realize this is the adult marshmallow test. I obviously think I'm smart and want the model to know that, so it obviously predicted that I would take one box because I'm a good little goodie two shoes who delays instant gratification for the potential bigger payoff. Therefore I choose two boxes because the model would never expect someone as smart as I to make such a dumb greedy move. Surely, I have outsmarted the supercomputer with my quadruple bluff and have won.
And then I remember I am dumb and the model knows that, because in my excitement, I forgot that the house is a cheater who always wins (and there was likely never any money in the mystery box because researchers never get that kind of funding). I am forced to believe that the model accurately perceived me to be a greedy idiot who took two boxes against my better judgement, shattering my ego.
But hey, I at least got $1k out of it.
I am, admittedly {confused by the premise|too hypothetical to warrant reasoning about}, but, I am interested in how there is ever a possible downside to taking both?
It's {$1000|one box}, {$x|one box}, {$1000+$x|two boxen}. $1000+$x > $1000 because the hungry alligator eats the bigger number
That's what has me confused. I thought I was misreading something cause I couldn't see a downside to not taking both boxes. If the box is empty, you still have the $1000 and if it's not then you get even more money.
9/10 times I take the second box. I've lost $1k on dumber investments.
I don't need $1M. I'll take just the $1000, if the other box has a million in it they can put it towards the next experiment.
One box. I might be unlucky and lose out on $1000 in that other box, but I wouldn't be too bothered. On the other hand, if I were to grab both and get $1000, the thought of what if I took just one box and got a million dollars would gnaw at me for the rest of my life.
The decision changes dramatically if the box with less money were closer to a million though.
One box
I don't need the 1000, so the mio-gamble would be my choice.
If I'd really need 1k right now, those would be the choice. Gambling is stupid.
As the values are already settled, I take both boxes.
This. Iβll take a guaranteed $1,000 with a chance at a million every single time.
I'd just walk away entirely.