The languages I'm aware of (European ones) are all set up around the structure of talking about things, nouns, verbs, etc, and tenses that modify those things over time. Suzy and John go to the movies. Beans tasted good yesterday. Examples like that. But the concept of a "thing" is a non-dialectical framing, it's trying to take a snapshot of something away from the historical context it exists in, instead of looking at the totality.
For example, we could talk about a book, but the book is more than the paper and ink that it is printed on. There's the author, the machine that printed it, the publishing company, the trees the paper was gathered from, the ink, the language, the method of writing language, the readers who read the book, the whole history of fiction or non-fiction and the social context that creates those methods. The list goes on. Outside of the context of those other things that make up the totality of the book, the true nature of the book becomes difficult to understand. It would be incredibly difficult or even impossible to understand a book outside of any social context at all.
In a way we become alienated from the true properties of the book, the context of the book, not just in the sense of alienation during sale of commodities, but in the sense that by trying to compartmentalize it into a "thing" that exists here and now, we lose connection with what the totality of that "thing" was, is, and will be, and the other things that cause that thing to exist as it is now that are connected to it.
Even writing about dialectical thinking is difficult and hard to make sense of because all of our framing and words and concepts we use are all about trying to put things into tidy little still-frame boxes that can be easily understood at a glance. I think this unironically contributes to the wall of text leftism memes because we have to take time to describe the context of the situation outside of the normal framing and word usage and teach and entire new way of thinking.
I think this is why we end up with a lot of "Is China socialist?" type questions and answers that just look at whether the thing right now fits some abstract definition. It's trying to put the thing into a nice little box that we can understand. And we do that naturally by just talking, by the way we naturally form our words and concepts that are guided by the system of language that we just happen to use.
What I'm trying to say is that the very languages we use predisposes people to think a certain way and to play with concepts in a certain way, and that way happens to align with a non-dialectical thought process and framing. Socialists have to fight an uphill battle to communicate what is often an entirely novel concept using a language that wasn't meant to frame it that way.
This is what Bohm wrote about in Wholeness and the Implicate Order. I agree with the premise that language inherently instills biases towards undialectical thinking, but at the same time, I'm not really convinced of the attempts to replace language with a "dialectical language." My concern is that it seems pretty inherent to the nature of language to begin with the categorization of things, in order to be able to identify anything at all, which inherently breaks things apart into logical, "ideal" categories, and no change in language can possibly overcome that. I don't think the goal of dialectical philosophy should be to change language to make it dialectical, but rather, it is recognize the limitations of language.
That is to say, not to change the language, but to use the language with full awareness of its inherently ideal nature. You can thus still use language, despite its ideal nature, because the material reality is held implicitly in its meaning, as long as all participants in the conversation understand dialectics and thus the limitations of that language.
This, of course, does create a problem, like in questions involving "is X socialist?" when you encounter a leftist who does not understand dialectics, and thus misunderstands the language. For them, they take all the words at face-value and don't understand the implicit limitations of them, and thus they are taken for what they are, and that leads directly to idealist interpretations.
This is hard to correct because they are deriving entirely different meaning from the same sentences, and the difference in meaning depends upon a complicated underlying philosophical background they don't have, and may never have if they do not bother to study. I don't really know of some sort of easy solution to this, but I don't believe at all that a solution can be found just in changing the language, because language is inherently ideal, and changing it up with just replace one set of ideal categorizations with another.
This is, again, a limitation of language itself. Language doesn't carry reality, it is just symbols on a page. The issue is people taking the symbols too seriously. Reality is not symbols, but what those symbols represent. The word "dog" isn't your real dog, but a stand-in for it. Your real dog is the one in the real world you can go look at, pet, hug, etc. People who take the language too seriously get lost in abstractions, take the symbols for the reality, and forget to actually consider what the symbol is referring to in the real, empirical world.
You see this a lot with leftcoms and other kinds of puritans. They quote-mine Critique of the Gotha Programme for some "definition of socialism" and treat some of the characteristics outlines as sort of "true" definition of what socialism looks like in objective reality, then they look for states that perfectly reflect those definitions in pure terms without any blemishes or contradictions. They don't find any societies that fit this puritanical definition, so they declare "true socialism has never been tried."
This, however, again, is a problem I see with language generally, not of a particular language specifically. If I had to talk about everything all at once, I could never have time to talk about anything specific at all. To talk about anything specific, I have to break reality up into categories. Reality does not actually physically exist as broken up categories, so the moment I do that, I have abandoned talking about material reality for what it really is, and am talking about abstract, idealized categories I (or, more specifically, the society I exist within, as language is socially constructed) created for the purpose of communicating something interesting to me.
The moment we break apart reality in this way, we risk, as Bohm warned, to descend into abstract metaphysics and idealism if we start confusing the abstract, human-made categories as literal material reality for what it really is. However, we really cannot escape this process of abstraction and categorization, because otherwise we would not have enough time to talk about anything at all. The only solution is not a new language, but rather, to use language with an understanding of its limitations, and so the material reality we are speaking of is implicitly understood rather than explicitly spelled out.
Indeed, this is what Bohm even meant when he talked about the "implicate order." "Implicate" because it is implicit. You cannot actually capture material reality in language. It's just a logical impossibility. The material reality we are trying to talk about can only ever be implicitly understood by the reader, but since it is not explicit in the language (which is not possible), there always runs a risk of a person not implicitly understanding the reality it refers to.
I also think Jocelyn Benoist's notion of "contextual realism" is somewhat useful here. He also has written extensively on this issue of the disconnect between idealized language and reality. The implicit reality the language refers to, he refers to as the "context." The context refers to the real-world, observable, empirical situation in which the language is actually employed to refer to. Benoist warns that we risk falling into idealism and abstract metaphysics if we use language but forget its context, i.e. we start talking about objects and categories in the abstract as if those abstract categories are actually part of reality.
His solution is, again, not to invent a new language, or to abandon the usage of language, but to recognize that this problem is resolved automatically when all participants in the discussion are implicitly aware of the context being referred to, even though it is impossible to explicitly state the context (as attempting to do so will lead to an infinite regress akin to Wittgenstein's rule-following problem), as context is wholly empirical and not linguistic.
Sadly, it requires some philosophical background, and thus some education, for people to improve their thinking and to think in more concrete and less abstract ways. I don't think there is a way we can achieve this just by changing our language, and I don't think any particular language is at fault (i.e. "bourgeois language"), but it is just inherent to the nature of language, and can only really be helped with education.
Everybody wants to teach Marxism, nobody wants to learn pedagogy.