this post was submitted on 17 Feb 2026
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tl;dr:
and an observation or two:
How would I know if my own server isn't compromised? Any of the online password managers have a hell of better chance spotting intrusion than I do.
No, not "duh". The right way to do this is client-side encryption/decryption. The server then does not at any moment know anything about your passwords.
This is what Bitwarden claims to do, and yet we have a paper showing that with a compromised server there exists a vulnerability.
What they claim to do and what they do is not necessarily the same. If done properly, the server does not need to be trusted.
What do you mean "duh"? The password managers claim that the exact opposite is true.
This would be true for a properly implemented end-to-end encryption scheme.
"Properly implemented" is doing the heavy lifting in that sentence.
Four paragraphs down from your quote is this:
If E2EE were properly implemented, the above would be impossible.
And simultaneously less secure because it's up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.
Self hosting a server of some kind or using something like Keepass on a single device (with offline backups) is the most secure option, but as usual with security doing so trades significant convenience for security. For most people who are uninterested in making sure their servers are kept up to date week to week letting professionals handle it is the better option.
I store my keypass database on several flash drives in different physical locations and update them several times per year to make sure that even if I do lose the copy I have, the versions on the flash drives, not at my physical location, are decently up to date, and so if I do lose any of the password data, it will be only for a couple of months worth if that.
If I add things that are extremely important, such as a new mortgage provider, or some sort of financial data into my keypass database, then I do an unscheduled immediate update to all of my flash drives in different physical locations to make sure that they all have that, but if it's just a social media account, and I was to lose access to it, and not have the password for it, then... I wouldn't be too upset about it.
In the absolute worst possible case, I stand to lose 3 months worth of data. It's not often that I have to tweak stuff in my password manager, so that would be very few changes.
Great.
I am now your spouse and you want to give me access to the flash drive. What now?
New requirement: I have several passwords I want to give you access to as well. What now?
As with everything: Your solution may work for yourself and a few others. The majority don't want to collect 5 flash drives in different locations every 3 months to update a file (and making sure it's the correct vault they have copied)
PThe master copy stays on my device. If I need to give somebody access to a specific password, I just give them that password locally and they put it in their password manager for that account.
Same thing occurs if they need to give me a password. They give me the password. I put it in my password manager and then I'm the one who updates the flash drives on the rotating basis like I mentioned above.
Great.
Now your data is (potentially) exactly where you are trying to keep it out of.
So you made it more cumbersome to yourself by keeping your data as local as possible, yet still chosing to give up the tiny sliver of additional security for the comfort of others.
I don't want to be annoying. But I hope you see what I am trying to convey.
Sure, but at the end of the day even if you don't update your vaultwarden server or you rely on an insecure storage sync system like dropbox, your actual vault is encrypted with a key that only you know. Even if your server is hacked or the kdbx is leaked, your passwords are safe until someone breaks AES.
Contrast that with hosted services, who could very easily attach their own keys to your encryption key (whether now or in the future at the behest of the state) and you'd be none the wiser. E2EE doesn't matter much when the other end is controlled by someone else.
I'm not disagreeing that most people just want something to work without thinking about, and for that reason I'm glad that services like bitwarden and lastpass and protonpass exist. My intent was not FUD, just shining a light on the fact that keeping your passwords secure does not require trusting a company.
not really the case: https://lemmy.ml/comment/24008121
how would official Bitwarden be able to accomplish that? apart from this vulnerability, they can't use their servers to add their own keys.
These attacks can happen through server impersonation as well. The actual cloud servers need not be compromised, just the user's browser has to be. This attack can then leak passwords and allow malicious parties to even gain access on the actual cloud servers apparently.