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Liberals hatred of Stalin is unreal (lemmygrad.ml)

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[-] Catradora_Stalinism@hexbear.net 1 points 1 year ago

okay while on beria, is he actually as shit as the libs say

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 2 points 1 year ago

Aaaa I deleted my long-ass reply

Gimme like an hour or two to get off mobile and give you a quality answer.

Quick answer is: a lot of mystery is around beria that's still locked away in the soviet archives, and realistically the best way to gage him would be in the writings of those who were around him during the time he was alive. I'm keeping an equally open mind on him as I do with other Soviet leadership.

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 2 points 1 year ago

Okay I hope you like reading.

Beria wasn't Stalin's first pick for the Job Beria would later assume

In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But the majority of the Politburo recommended Beria for the post.

Getty and Manning. Stalinist Terror. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 38

The Russian historian Boris Starkov has recently written that in Politburo meetings during August 1938 Zhdanov and Andreev stressed the poor quality of party cadres promoted during the mass repressions. Soon Kaganovich and Mikoyan joined them “against Yezhov.” Then in the fall, according to Starkov, Stalin proposed replacing Yezhov with Malenkov. But the rest of the Politburo blocked the Gensec and insisted on Beria, though why is not clear.

Thurston, Robert. Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1996, p. 131

One of Stalin's last living bodyguards liked Beria as much as he liked Kruschev

How can anyone now allow himself the stupidity of criticizing Stalin for repression and crimes? This was a psychosis that was cleverly instituted by Yezhov and other enemies of the State… this psychosis took over the minds of millions of people. Practically all were involved in looking for “enemies.” The Central Committee ACP[B] was against this, fought this tooth and nail—Stalin in particular. People got involved in this, and friends were “drowning” friends in the name of getting rid of “enemies.” Of course, this cannot all be explained as a mass psychosis! In all the examinations that were conducted into this period, we had 30-40 people going over the same documents, but NOWHERE did we EVER find the name of Stalin, or the command of Stalin, or the resolution to do these things which were undertaken by the REAL ENEMIES of the Soviet people. No directives either of Stalin, Molotov, or Voroshilov were to be found in all of these documents. According to my way of thinking, Stalin also bears some blame because he was the Head of the Motherland. His fault was that he was always favoring “collective decisions” and thus was fooled by his “comrades-in-arms.” Yagoda, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, and others. Yezhov, Stalin spotted from the start and took steps to stop him and get rid of him.

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 80

It was likely that Beria played a key role in stopping the greatest excesses of the Ezhovshchina

Beria boldly told Stalin that Yezhov, who had succeeded Yagoda the year before as Chief of the Commissariat of the Interior…had passed all bounds of reason and discrimination in his conduct of the Purge;…

Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 229

Early in 1938, however, Stalin became disturbed by the mounting fury of the Ezhovshchina. His purpose of liquidating the old Bolsheviks and the veterans of the Revolution and the Civil War, and other sources of opposition, had been achieved. But under Yezhov the purge had spread like a malignant plague. Everywhere people were spying and informing against each other and everywhere arrests were on the increase. Terror was raging out of control. Stalin saw the need to call a halt. He showed the same sense of timing and the same authority, which he had displayed nearly eight years earlier with his article “Dizziness From Success.” In January 1938 a central committee passed a resolution which heralded what was to be called the “Great Change.” The title of the resolution was “Concerning the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party, Concerning Formal-Bureaucratic Attitudes Towards the Appeals of Excluded Members of the Bolshevik Party, and Concerning Measures to Eliminate These Deficiencies.” The new orders were passed quickly to the party secretaries at every level and to the command points of the NKVD, and emanating from the Kremlin in Moscow. They were promptly obeyed. The new enemy was identified now as the Communist-careerist. He had taken advantage of the purge to denounce his superiors and to gain promotion. He was guilty of spreading suspicion and of undermining the party. A purge of careerists was launched. At the same time mass repressions diminished and the rehabilitation of victimized party members began. The real halt to the great purge came, however, in July 1938, when Beria was appointed Yezhov’s deputy. He took charge of the NKVD at once, although Yezhov was not removed until December 1938, when he was made Commissar for Inland Water Transport. Soon afterwards he was shot. Many NKVD officers were tried and executed for extracting confessions from innocent people, while others were relegated to labor camps. Loyal party members, emerging from the long nightmare, were relieved by the purging of the NKVD. It confirmed their belief that fascists had insinuated themselves into the security forces and the government and that they were responsible for the cruel persecutions and injustices of the Ezhovshchina. This explanation was encouraged officially, and it absolved Stalin and the Politburo of responsibility. Directly controlling every branch of Soviet society and deeply involved in the buildup of the armed forces and conduct of foreign policy, Stalin could not maintain detailed control over the purge. He was aware that the NKVD had arrested many who were not guilty and that of the 7 to 14 million people serving sentences of forced labor in the GULAG camps many were innocent of any taint of disloyalty…. He resented this waste of human material. The aircraft designer Yakovlev recorded a conversation with him in 1940, in which Stalin exclaimed: “Yezhov was a rat; in 1938 he killed many innocent people. We shot him for that!”

Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 288

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 1 points 1 year ago

Beginning in the summer of 1938 a coalition of Politburo members, reportedly consisting of Zhdanov, Andreev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov, worked to limit Yezhov’s and the NKVD’s powers. In August, Beria was appointed Deputy People’s Commissar of the NKVD without Yezhov’s consent. During the fall, the Politburo restricted the NKVD’s power somewhat and appointed a series of commissions to investigate NKVD operations, arrest procedures, and Yezhov’s performance. The most dramatic move came on 17 November 1938, when it criticized aspects of the NKVD’s work, abolished its troikas that had summarily sentenced so many to death or hard labor, and condemned its excesses. On 23 November 1938, Yezhov submitted his resignation as NKVD chief to Stalin. The Politburo accepted it and replaced him with Beria. Yezhov retained his other party and state positions until he was arrested in April 1939. He was executed on 4 February 1940.

Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 306.

It was Beria’s diagnosis of the danger of Yezhov’s excesses that had induced Stalin to trust him and brought him to power. Throughout the country these excesses had cast their shadow. At one sitting alone, the Central Committee of the Azerbaizhan Party had expelled 279 members, the Ukrainian Stalinsk Provincial Committee 72, the Ordjonikidze Regional Committee 101–it was the same everywhere…. The fear of being suspected of lack of vigilance drove local fanatics to denounce not only Bukharinists, but also Malenkovists, Yezhovists, even Stalinists. It is of course not impossible that they were also egged on to do so by concealed oppositionists! Hence Beria’s task when he was summoned from Georgia by Stalin was to head a secret commission of inquiry into Yezhov’s work.

To give Beria his due, he pulled no punches. At a closed joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party, held in the autumn of 1938, he declared that if Yezhov were not a deliberate Nazi agent he was certainly an involuntary one. He had turned the central offices of the NKVD into a breeding ground for fascist agents. He had scorned citizens’ constitutional rights and used illegal methods of extorting information, to such an extent that he had set quite non-political people against the Government. For a rank-and-file member of the Central Committee to say this was the height of courage.

The impression produced on Stalin and Molotov was tremendous. The Central Committee resolutions dismissing Yezhov (Member of the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the Central Committee, and People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs; were written in Beria’s hand. Beria’s first acts as head of the NKVD, were the arrest of Yezhov and the issue of orders quashing an enormous number of sentences and recently-started proceedings. People who had been unjustly repressed were even indemnified by the State. Special commissions inquired into the past of convicted persons.

Tokaev, Grigori. Comrade X. London: Harvill Press,1956, p. 119

Evgeniia Ginsburg, who was in Yaroslavl Prison and who saw no newspapers, said that the prisoners could tell when Yezhov fell: The draconian regime in the prisons (frequent solitary confinement and deprivation of all privileges) was relaxed one day. The timing was confirmed a few days later when Beria’s name began to appear on official prison notices.

Getty, A. Origins of the Great Purges. Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985, p. 189

… the replacement of Yezhov by Beria was received as a hopeful sign. And in fact, right after Yezhov’s replacement mass repression was discontinued for a while. Hundreds of thousands of cases then being prepared by the NKVD were temporarily put aside.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 465

KGB Deputy Chairman Vladimir Pirozhkov (I think) makes a public comment including Beria as one of the officials sentenced for violations of Soviet Law.

When asked about the fate of the perpetrators of the repressions and about the statute of limitations, Solomontsev answered:

“With regard to those instances of violations of socialist legality in the ’30s, ’40s, and early ’50s that have been revealed, the culprits have already been punished through criminal, legal, and party channels. It is obviously not a secret to everyone that Avakumov, Ryutin, Leonov, Komarov, Likhachev, Shvartsman, and other former leaders and personnel of the USSR Ministry of State Security were sentenced to death for fabricating investigation materials….”

Even more amazing was an interview given by Pirozhkov, deputy head of the KGB. When asked how many hangmen had been brought to trial, he answered that 1,342 NKVD officials had been sentenced for severe violations of socialist legality, including Beria, Yezhov, Kobulov, Frinovsky, Agranov, Avakumov and others.

Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 266

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 2 points 1 year ago

Also some reading on Stalin in Moscow.

Stalin stayed in Moscow. On November 7, 1941, while German guns roared in the suburbs and Hitler announced Moscow already taken, Stalin reviewed the troops in Red Square.

Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 98

In his memoirs, Khrushchev portrays Stalin’s panic and confusion in the first days of the war and later. I saw no such behavior. Stalin did not isolate himself in his dacha until June 30th, 1941. The Kremlin diary shows he was regularly receiving visitors and monitoring the deteriorating situation. From the very beginning of the war, Stalin received Beria & Merkulov [cohead of the Soviet security service] in the Kremlin two or three times a day. They usually returned to NKVD headquarters late at night, or sometimes called in their orders directly from the Kremlin. It appeared to me that the administrative mechanism of command and control was functioning without interruption. In fact, Eitingon and I maintained a deep belief in our ultimate victory because of the calm, clear, businesslike issuance of these orders. On Nov. 6, 1941, I received an invitation to attend the October Revolution anniversary gathering in the Mayakovsky subway station. Traditionally, these celebrations were held in the Bolshoi Theatre, but this time, for security reasons, it was arranged on the subway platform. … Stalin spoke for about 30 minutes. I was deeply moved, because his confidence and self-assurance symbolized our ability to resist the Germans.

Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 134

This excerpt from Izvestia, #6, 1990 confirms Sudoplatov’s contention that Stalin, contrary to Khrushchev’s claims in his memoirs, was not immobilized by panic after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, but rather received a steady stream of visitors at his Kremlin study.

Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks. Boston: Little, Brown, c1993, p. 433

It is worth recording Dimitrov’s attitude toward Stalin. He, too, spoke of him with admiration and respect, but without any conspicuous flattery or reverence…. He recounted: “When the Germans were outside Moscow, a general uncertainty and confusion ensued. The Soviet government had withdrawn to Kuibyshev. But Stalin remained in Moscow. I was with him at the time, in the Kremlin. They were taking out archives from the Kremlin. I proposed to Stalin that the Comintern direct a proclamation to the German soldiers. He agreed, though he felt no good would come of it. Soon after, I too had to leave Moscow. Stalin did not leave; he was determined to defend it. And at that most dramatic moment he held a parade in Red Square on the anniversary of the October Revolution. The divisions before him were leaving for the front. One cannot express how great a moral significance was exerted when the people learned that Stalin was sitting in Moscow and when they heard his words. It restored their faith and raised their confidence, and it was worth more than a good-sized army.”

Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962, p. 37

Moscow was bombed by German aviation. Panic began to seize the city’s population. The Nazis were only 80 kilometres away. Part of the administration was evacuated. But Stalin decided to remain in Moscow. The battles became more and more fierce and, in early November, the Nazi offensive was stopped. After consulting with Zhukov, Stalin took the decision to organize the traditional November 7 military parade on Red Square. It was a formidable challenge to the Nazi troops camped at the gates of Moscow. Stalin made a speech, which was broadcast to the entire country.

Martens, Ludo. Another View of Stalin. Antwerp, Belgium: EPO, Lange Pastoorstraat 25-27 2600, p. 247 [p. 224 on the NET]

[In September 1941] The situation at the front is bad…. If it becomes necessary to abandon Moscow we can’t be sure that [the leadership will stand firm–implied]…. In the Instantsia they are not quite sure either that [Stalin will stand firm–implied]…. Stalin stands for war to the end…. While with others…Brest-Litovsk is in the air.

Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 307

We must get the peasant going and instill in him the hatred of the enemy…. What a brilliant order of Stalin’s to the Army…. “A fighter should not die without leaving the corpse of a German interventionist by his side. Kill him with a machine-gun, or rifle, a bayonet…. If you’re wounded, sink your teeth into his throat and strangle him as you would a wild beast”.

Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich. Notes for a Journal. New York: Morrow, 1955, p. 309

The main blow was aimed directly at the capital, Moscow, whose outskirts were reached by late fall. Almost all the government offices had been evacuated to the east. But Stalin remained in the capital, where he assumed personal command of the war. On Dec. 2, 1941, the Nazis were stopped in the suburbs of Moscow. In December 6, Stalin ordered the first major counterattack to occur in World War II.

Franklin, Bruce, Ed. The Essential Stalin; Major Theoretical Writings. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p. 31

As to Stalin’s nerves, or lack of them, his generals make no criticisms. Rather, Marshal Zhukov told a war correspondent that Stalin had ‘nerves of steel’. The correspondent, author Ehrenburg, wrote that the Marshal repeated these words to him several times when they met at a command post near the front line early in the war. Even General Vlasov who had a great grievance against Stalin and, therefore, cause for resentment, told the Germans upon his capture that Stalin had strong nerves. Speaking to Dr. Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, he said that in the autumn of 1941, when the city of Moscow was threatened by advancing German armies, every one in the Kremlin had lost his nerve but only Stalin insisted on continued resistance to the German invaders.

Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 168

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 2 points 1 year ago

This is what Kraskyn, Stalin’s confidant and the Press Department’s senior war correspondent, wrote regarding the outbreak of the German-Russo war: … “Stalin remained at Sochi until the end of the month. The direct telephone line which connected his villa with the Kremlin was in constant use with Molotov at the other end. Stalin never showed bad temper, remained calm, and determined.”

Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 139

The Wehrmacht’s first offensive was launched against Moscow for Hitler well knew the city had always been a symbol to the Russians, and that if his troops could conquer this political and spiritual center, it would be a milestone on the road to the defeat of the Soviet Union. Stalin realized this too. He attended all meetings of the Committee of the Defense of the City, and addressed his people regularly, but despite superhuman efforts by the Red fighting forces and the Soviet population, the Nazi armies advanced inexorably towards Moscow. Stalin was forced to order the evacuation of women and children from the Red capital. He issued an Order of the Day, declaring that Moscow would be defended to the last, and at the same time, a state of siege was proclaimed. The next day, the Soviet Government and Diplomatic Corps established themselves in Kuibyshev in the middle Volga. Certain Government Departments had been transferred to Kazan and Sverdlovsk. Stalin, Molotov, and other members of the ” Inner Circle,” remained in Moscow.

Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 143

Stalin was affable and had the common touch. He showed courage, particularly during the war. During the war, he preferred to work at the dacha rather than in the Kremlin, even though there were no air-raid shelters at the dacha. During an air attack, he would sometimes watch the planes from the roof of the building. According to Rybin, Stalin did not panic in mid-October 1941 when German forward units had reached the suburbs of Moscow. While Beria gave orders to senior party officials for the evacuation of Moscow on the evening of October 15 and although Malenkov and Kaganovich also recommended the move to Kuibyshev, Stalin, in a Kremlin meeting on Oct. 16, announced that he had decided to stay in Moscow.

Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 148

There were riots in Moscow at the time, and shops were pillaged. According to Rybin, Stalin deliberately showed himself in various parts of the city and talked to people to give a boost to morale. Molotov was sent for three days to Kuibyshev to supervise the transfer of the foreign ministry, but he also confirmed in conversation with Rybin that Stalin had no intention of leaving the capital…. When information was received that an unexploded mine or shell had landed not far from the dacha, Stalin joined the search party–yet another demonstration of personal courage. …On a visit to Oryol in 1946, he walked the streets accompanied by hundreds of citizens. When they thanked him for having defeated the Germans, he replied modestly: “The people defeated the Germans, not I.”

Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 149

I am often asked about Stalin’s role in the battle Moscow. Stalin was in Moscow, in control of the troops and weapons, preparing the enemy’s defeat. He must be given credit for the enormous work in organizing necessary strategic, material, and technical resources which he did as head of the State Committee for Defense with the help of the executive staff of the People’s Commissariats. With strictness and exactingness Stalin achieved the near-impossible. When I am asked what event in the war impressed me most, I always say: the Battle of Moscow.

Zhukov, Georgii. Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape, 1971, p. 361

For a long time now, there are stories, lies, outright falsifications that the war scared Stalin out of his wits. In view of these lies, let me tell of an incident. On May 5, at a meeting in the Kremlin, one of the scared officers said that the Central Committee armored train is ready and hidden. Stalin really let him have it:… What kind of nonsense! What kind of safety armored train, when the enemy is inside the borders of the Soviet Union! You can draw your own conclusion from this statement…. At the beginning of the war with the German attack on the USSR, this news was conveyed to Stalin by Marshall Zhukov. Already at 3 a.m., Stalin came into his office at the Kremlin. After that came in Zhukov and Timoshenko. Stalin regularly walked on the streets of Moscow, even during the flights of German aircraft. But he understood that people must see him amongst themselves, that the leader is with them, that he is in the capital of Moscow, and is heading its defense. Even more effective, he visited command posts on Gorky Street, Zemlianov Valley, Smolensky Square. For the sentries and army personnel, this had a tremendous effect. Sometimes at the beginning of the war, at about 4 o’clock in the morning, Stalin was on Kaluzhki Square. Underneath, you could hear the crunch of broken glass. Around us, there were wooden homes, ambulances were racing to and fro, taking the dead and tending the wounded civilians and soldiers, right in Moscow. We were surrounded by crying women with children in their arms. Looking at them with tears in his eyes, Stalin told Vlasik: We must evacuate the children deep into the interior of the country. All of them stared to ask as to when will the Red Army stop the German Fascists! Stalin tried to console them with these well-known words: There will be, there will be a holiday and dancing on this street of ours! After being bombed by German planes, we went into Gorky Street. A woman with a flashlight came up to Stalin and scolded him: Is it permissible for you to wander on the street, comrade Stalin, during such dangerous times? An enemy could easily drop a bomb on you! Stalin only opened up his arms. Of course, the lady was correct. He was with us near Kubinka when over 400 planes were in the air, bombing while our fighters tried to shoot them down. After successfully repulsing the enemy, Stalin asked for the names of our pilots who did such an outstanding job. He met Victor Talakhin who did an outstanding job of shooting down German planes. The enemy knew exactly where Stalin had his Dacha. Stalin risked his life together with all of us. Stalin always looked at the tremendous dogfights over the Dacha, when the Germans desperately tried to kill Stalin and his entourage, knowing in advance that they were there. They dropped bombs near the Dacha, some exploded, others did not, and we had to diffuse them, knowing full well that if they went off, everyone around the perimeter of the Dacha would be killed.

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 28-30

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 2 points 1 year ago

On Oct. 15, Beria with Shcherbakov called the meeting of the NKVD and secretaries of the districts of Moscow. Beria deceitfully announced: German tanks are already in Oditsovo. Contact with the front is broken. According to the decisions of the Central General Command, we must mine all large factories, industries and other important structures. Leave 500 members in every district to defend Moscow, evacuate older people and children. Give out all the reserves of products to the people, in order that the enemy would not get them. Our surroundings at the Dacha were mined, and the news was told to us, from where, we do not know, that Stalin has left and went to Kalinin front or someplace else, no one knows where. Where was Stalin at this time? Chauffeur to Stalin, Mitriukhin, states emphatically that from the Kremlin, Stalin wanted to go to the Dacha to meet his Politbureau. Rumniatsev started to tell him that there is no water there, there is no heat, there are mines, but Stalin gave the order to open the Kremlin gates and go. Orlov kept the gates closed. Stalin gave another order: At this moment, I want you to take out all the mines, do you understand! Orlov had to open the gates and light a fire at the Dacha. Stalin set to work, preparing the agenda for the meeting, while sappers were digging up the mines…. Going through Moscow on October 16th, Stalin saw people with bread, flour, sausages, macaroni–all goods belonging to the state reserves. He never said a word to these people, but in the Kremlin, he quickly called a meeting, and asked: Who allowed this anarchy to take place in Moscow? All were quiet. Beria even closed his eyes. Sharukhin very briefly told what happened. Stalin commanded Shcherbakov to go on the radio, to tell the people that we are going to be victorious, to make sure that a normal state of affairs came back to the city… to open up all the stores and to get normalcy going again. Then he called to see Zhukov, Artemiev, Shaposhnikov, Voznesensky, Kuztsov, and Kalinin. From Molotov, he demanded that all foreign Diplomatic Corps be evacuated to Kuibyshev. At last, the commandant of the Kremlin arrived, General Spiridonov. Stalin asked him: What is your suggestion? Beria is demanding the evacuation of all to Kuibyshev. Better to go to the Urals or Siberia. It is safer. Stalin did not say anything… kept quiet but you could see that he did not like the hidden “panic” created by Beria and some others. … At midnight when in the Dacha there gathered the whole Politburo, he called in to this high-level meeting, the landlady of the Dacha, Istomina, and asked: Valentina Vasilevna, are you preparing to leave Moscow? Comrade Stalin, Moscow is our mother, our home. It should be defended, she forthrightly told the gathered Politburo. Do you hear how Muscovites talk? With sarcasm in his voice, Stalin looked around at all those present. Everyone kept quiet. In the morning on his way to the Kremlin, talking with the chauffeur Krivchenkov about defending Moscow, Stalin forthrightly said: I always was and will always remain with the Russian people in Moscow. We shall defend it to the death! … In the most critical of times, while the enemy was at the gates of Moscow, Stalin remained calm, collected, and inspired courage in all of us. … Regarding the “special train” for Stalin, it was shunted to another section of the city where there was an enormous storage of building materials. There were two bombs dropped by German aircraft on this train… somehow they were told where this train was hidden. The commandant of the Dacha, Soloviev, under a command from Beria, started to evacuate Stalin’s furniture and other possessions and load them on this train. When Stalin found out, he was livid: Where did my furniture and papers go to? We are getting ready, comrade Stalin, to evacuate to Kuibyshev. No! No evacuation. Do you hear? We are remaining in Moscow until final victory! Suslov, on Oct. 16, came to see if everything was going as planned, heard what Stalin told him: Stalin now gave me such a going over, that you must get this train out of sight and return all the furniture and other things from the train back to the Dacha! As we can see, all sorts of people, even those who wanted desperately, for their own reasons, to have Stalin leave, have told one and the same thing–his decision, his categorical decision was to remain in Moscow…. I want to convince the reader of the falsehood about Stalin’s “cowardliness.” Here are some examples. Even though the territory of the Dacha “Semenovskoye” was heavily mined all around and had anti-aircraft emplacements, Stalin always came here. The NKVD warned Stalin that one of the bombs dropped had not exploded. … Then two enemy aircraft were circling over the Dacha. Aircraft gunners opened fire. Bullets, shells were falling on the ground like hail and Stalin was asked to go inside… but he stood there with the other defenders, urging them on. Finally, Stalin said: Vlasik, do not worry. Our bombs and those of others will not fall near us.

Rybin, Aleksei. Next to Stalin: Notes of a Bodyguard. Toronto: Northstar Compass Journal, 1996, p. 30-35

A question about 22nd June, 1941. Was Stalin confused? It is said that he did not meet anyone? No. It is all lies. We were with him. At night while Molotov was meeting Schulenberg we were there at Stalin’s place. He immediately handed over the responsibilities. I was given – Transport, and Mikoyan – Supplies. And transport was ready! To carry 15-20 million people, the factories… it was not a joke. Stalin was working all the while. Of course, he was surprised. He had thought that he would be able to avert the invasion for some more time as the crisis in Anglo-American relations would deepen. I do not think that this was a miscalculation. It was impossible to provoke us. Perhaps Stalin was over-careful. At that time there was no alternative. At first I thought that perhaps Stalin’s idea at the start of the war was to overcome the crisis diplomatically. Molotov said ‘No’. This was war and nothing could have been done. Hitler was not able to out-smart Stalin. Despite all logic Hitler did not end the war with the British but attacked us. Hitler acted as an imperialist.

THUS SPAKE KAGANOVICH by Feliks Chuyev, 1992

[Footnote]: None of the three main sources for the opinion that Stalin abdicated leadership at the opening of the war were in Moscow at the time, and none reveal how they learned of this alleged abdication. They are Khrushchev, Maisky, and Grechko. Similarly unconvincing is the assertion in Khrushchev Remembers that ‘I’d seen him when he had been paralyzed by his fear of Hitler.’ In fact Khrushchev, who was in Kiev, did not see Stalin at all in the early part of the war. In his speech of 1956 he contradicts this accusation by instead claiming that Stalin’s fault early in the war was interference with military operations, hardly the same as paralysis.

McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York University Press, 1988, p. 369

Khrushchev also said that Stalin on hearing of the invasion acted like a “rabbit in front of a boa constrictor). But a man who was arrested at least six times by Tsarist police between 1902 and 1913, and who escaped five times–as Stalin did, mostly from Siberian and Arctic prison camps–is not likely to act the coward in moments of danger…. Many experts have written that Stalin disappeared for a few days after invasion day, and it is difficult to be accurate as to his whereabouts during the opening days of the invasion. A few years ago his appointments book was found, and several pages detailing visitors to Stalin’s Kremlin study are reproduced in Sudoplatov’s Special Tasks, the Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness–a Soviet Spymaster. And the Stalin biographer Radzinsky, on a visit to London in April 1996, disclosed that he had gained access to the ‘presidential archives’ in the Kremlin and found the journal listing Stalin’s visitors for June 1941. He said this showed that Stalin had not, as previously thought, disappeared for a week or more after the invasion, but rather had received a steady stream of visitors…. That the country was not leaderless at this time is shown by the fact that a number of vital decisions were taken during the first week of the invasion and these had to be approved at the highest level.

Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 167

Marshal Zhukov mentions a telephone call from Stalin on the 26th, the fourth day of the invasion, summoning him to Moscow. ‘In the evening of 26 June I landed at Moscow and went to Stalin’s office directly from the airport.’ Zhukov makes no mention of an incapacitated Stalin.

Axell, Albert. Stalin’s War: Through the Eyes of His Commanders. London, Arms and Armour Press. 1997, p. 168

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 1 points 1 year ago

Yeah sorry for infodumping on ya. just to let you know a lot of my comments have comments that include more reading material.

[-] Alaskaball@hexbear.net 1 points 1 year ago

and since I'm here, hey @GarbageShoot@hexbear.net want to join in on the infodump? Topic's Beria. But if you want to include some baller Stalin facts too, that'd be cool.

this post was submitted on 10 Sep 2023

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dank memes

Rules:

All posts must be memes and follow a general meme setup.
No unedited webcomics.
Someone saying something funny or cringe on twitter/tumblr/reddit/etc. is not a meme. Post that stuff in !the_dunk_tank@www.hexbear.net, it's a great comm.
Va*sh posting is haram and will be removed.
Follow the code of conduct.
Tag OC at the end of your title and we'll probably pin it for a while if we see it.
Recent reposts might be removed.
Tagging OC with the hexbear watermark is praxis.
No anti-natalism memes. See: Eco-fascism Primer

founded 4 years ago

MODERATORS

WhyEssEff@hexbear.net

MiraculousMM@hexbear.net

FidelCastro@hexbear.net

ella@hexbear.net

corgiwithalaptop@hexbear.net

VILenin@hexbear.net

blashork@hexbear.net

EmmaGoldman@hexbear.net

ZoomeristLeninist@hexbear.net