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If they want to actually limit Israel's attacks, they should be aiming for the refueling tankers and energy infrastructure. A lot the fighters are in hardened hangers. The tankers are just on the tarmac and the refineries and storage tanks aren't protected. If they can't get the jets within range (or even off the ground) they are just billion dollar statues.

That video of an "air defence site in the Negev" being hit was actually an air defence battery misfiring and hitting the ground, as shown in the full video. Other videos show hits near David's Sling point defence systems, but I haven't seen direct hits on the launchers, some of them even keep firing after missiles hit nearby.

Iranian missiles don't have counterforce capabilities, I did multiple posts on that after Operation True Promise II. I can try find them if you're interested. The accuracy is just not there. This is why they are going for countervalue targets now, to try inflict maximum damage. There's only one missile Iran has with both the range to hit Israel and potential counterforce capabilities, the Qassem Basir unveiled a month ago or so.

Good article on this analysing Iranian ballistic missile accuracy on the strike on Nevatim Airbase, I think I've posted it before or parts of it. From October last year

I highly recommend reading the linked article from October last year. The conclusion is where we are now

Israeli conventional and nuclear forces aren’t in existential danger of Iranian missile strikes unless Iran dramatically increases the scale of attacks against target complexes. Iran may be able to destroy major Israeli ground army bases and major administrative complexes if they are sufficiently tightly packed, but this will likely not sufficiently degrade Israel’s strike capabilities against Iran. This doesn’t mean Iran won’t be able to do significant damage and kill lots of people. Their long-range missiles are simply too inaccurate to match the sort of precision strikes [by Israel against Iran] we saw on October 25th. This suggests – as I think we’ve already seen recently – that there are hard limits on the deterrence benefits of Iranian missile forces. If you can only credibly threaten cities, then you can’t threaten targets that you could hit at lower rungs of the escalation ladder. This means you aren’t really able to effectively deter low level tit-for-tat conflicts like the one Israel and Iran are currently embroiled in. The result is that Iran and Israel may be stuck in a small stability-instability paradox, as Israel is clearly not willing to use nuclear weapons to respond to or deter Iranian missile strikes, and Iranian missile strikes are only really going to be effective at targets you attack at very high levels of escalation and thus are not capable at deterring Israel. This suggests that Israel and Iran trading missiles is going to be a long running problem going forward. Iran getting the bomb is really only going to make this problem worse, as Iran having a dedicated nuclear force would likely lower the number of missiles they need to keep in reserve for escalation, which means more conventional missiles to throw at Israel.