Onshoring the EV supply chain to Europe would cut the emissions of producing a battery by 37% compared to a China-controlled supply chain, according to new analysis by Transport & Environment (T&E). This carbon saving rises to over 60% when renewable electricity is used. Producing Europe’s demand for battery cells and components locally would save an estimated 133 Mt of CO2 between 2024 and 2030, equivalent to the total annual emissions of Czechia.

But over half of Europe's battery production plans are at risk without stronger government action, the researchers say.

Less than half (47%) of the lithium-ion battery production planned for Europe up to 2030 is secure, the report also finds. This is up from one-third a year ago following a raft of measures put in place to respond to the US Inflation Reduction Act. The remaining 53% of announced cell manufacturing capacity is still at medium or high risk of being delayed, scaled down or cancelled without stronger government action.

Julia Poliscanova, senior director for vehicles and emobility supply chains at T&E, said: “Batteries, and metals that go into them, are the new oil. European leaders will need laser sharp focus and joined-up thinking to reap their climate and industrial benefits. Strong sustainability requirements, such as the upcoming battery carbon footprint rules, can reward local clean manufacturing. Crucially, Europe needs better instruments under the European Investment Bank and EU Battery Fund to support gigafactory investments.”

France, Germany and Hungary have made the most progress in securing gigafactory capacity since T&E’s previous risk assessment last year. [1] In France, ACC started production in Pas-de-Calais last year while plants by Verkor in Dunkirk and Northvolt in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, are going ahead thanks to generous government subsidies.

Finland, the UK, Norway and Spain have the most production capacity at medium or high risk due to question marks over projects by the Finnish Minerals Group, West Midlands Gigafactory, Freyr and InoBat. T&E called on lawmakers to help lock in investments by doubling down on EU electric car policies, enforcing strong battery sustainability requirements that reward local manufacturing, and beefing up EU-level funding.

Securing other parts of the battery value chain will be even more challenging given China’s dominance and the EU’s nascent expertise. The report finds Europe has the potential to manufacture 56% of its demand for cathodes – the battery’s most valuable components – by 2030, but only two plants have started commercial operations so far. By the end of this decade, the region could also fulfil all of its processed lithium needs and secure between 8% and 27% of battery minerals from recycling in Europe. But T&E said processing and recycling plants need EU and state support to scale quickly.

Julia Poliscanova said: “The battery race between China, Europe and the US is intensifying. While some battery investments that were at risk of being lured away by US subsidies have been saved since last year, close to half of planned production is still up for grabs. The EU needs to end any uncertainty over its engine phase-out and set corporate EV targets to assure gigafactory investors that they will have a guaranteed market for their product.”

In the villages surrounding the eastern Serbian city of Smederevo, trouble has brewed over the last eight years. Once a symbol of economic promise, the steel mill acquired by Chinese company HBIS has become synonymous with environmental degradation and health hazards for the local community.

Dubbed the “red village” due to the perpetual crimson hue that coats everything in sight, Radinac is a poignant example of the detrimental effects of industrial Pollution on local life. Concerns about rising cancer cases and the presence of toxic substances like arsenic, chromium, and lead in the dust hang heavily over the community. Residents of nearby villages, such as Radinac, speak of their daily struggles with heavy air pollution and the omnipresent red dust that blankets their homes and streets.

Dragana Milic shares the heartbreaking reality of her grandchildren refusing to venture outdoors, highlighting the profound impact of Pollution on the younger generation’s quality of life. She said, “They won’t play outside.”

The acquisition of the steel mill by HBIS in 2016, amidst high-profile visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping, was initially celebrated as a testament to growing economic ties between China and Serbia. However, the subsequent surge in Pollution levels has cast a shadow over this narrative of progress.

Locals attribute the worsening pollution to the influx of Chinese investment, pointing to throat irritations, persistent soot accumulation, and unpleasant odors as daily reminders of their deteriorating environment.

Activists like Nikola Krstic from NGO Tvrdjava raise alarming concerns about the spike in Pollution since HBIS took over the mill. Despite efforts to address the issue, including a detailed analysis of the dust emissions and legal action against the company, the community’s plight remains largely unresolved.

The Serbian Environmental Protection Agency’s repeated classification of Smederevo as one of the country’s most polluted cities. Data from the Smederevo Health Centre revealing a four-fold increase in cancer cases between 2011 and 2019 further amplifies concerns about the long-term health consequences of unchecked Pollution.

While HBIS has outlined plans to mitigate the environmental impact, skepticism prevails among residents like Milic, who have witnessed promises fall short in the past. The company’s proposed measures, such as constructing a wall around raw material storage and implementing new processing technologies, offer hope but are met with cautious optimism.

[Edit typo.]

Tens of thousands of Georgians have taken to the streets of the capital Tbilisi on Saturday evening to protest a controversial "foreign influence" bill backed by the government.

Protesters marched to the capital's Europe Square holding Georgian and EU flags, chanting “no to the Russian law”.

The law would target civil society organisations and independent media that receive foreign funding.

Massive rallies have gripped the Black Sea Caucasus country for nearly a month after the ruling Georgian Dream party reintroduced the bill.

Despite a campaign of intimidation ahead of Saturday's rally - in which dozens of NGO workers, activists and opposition politicians received threats or were physically assaulted - protesters turned up in their thousands undeterred by the pouring rain.

Opposition parties say the bill - coined "Russian law" after Russia's passing of similar legislation in 2012 - will be used by the government to clamp down on dissent.

The US has said the bill threatens free speech.

In neighbouring Russia, the law has since been used to marginalise voices challenging the Kremlin - including prominent cultural figures, media organisations and civil society groups.

Many Georgians in the rally do not want Russia's authoritarian-style leadership crossing into their country.

"We don't need to return to the Soviet Union," 38-year-old Georgian-language teacher Lela Tsiklauri, said.

"We are protecting our European future and our freedom," said another protester, Mariam Meunrgia, 39, who works for a German company.

The law, if passed, could harm Georgia's attempt to join the EU, which has given it candidate status.

On Friday, foreign ministers of Nordic and Baltic states issued a joint statement urging the government in Tbilisi to reconsider the bill

Last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Georgian people want a "European future".

"Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe," she posted on X.

But the Georgian Dream government has defended the bill, saying it will "boost transparency" over NGOs' foreign funding. It aims to sign the measure into law by mid-May.

If adopted, the law would require that any independent NGO and media organisation receiving more than 20% of its funding from abroad to register as an "organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power".

But the protesters fear it could be used to crush critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections later this year.

The bill cleared its second parliamentary stage by a margin of 83 votes to 23. After a third reading, it has to be signed by President Salome Zurabishvili, who has vowed to veto it - although Georgian Dream has sufficient numbers in parliament to overrule her.

In 2023, mass street protests forced Georgian Dream to drop plans for similar measures.

Archived link.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Europe this week to discuss Ukraine and trade, China remains Russia's leading source of sanctioned dual-use goods, fueling the ongoing war.

"Around 90% of the goods deemed high priority products by the Western countries... (was) supplied by China" as Chinese-made products or re-exported goods in 2023, a sharp rise from 30% in 2021, Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told the Kyiv Independent.

China-based companies pour a range of items – from drones to microchips and machine parts – into Russia, including products made in China and those that bypass Western export controls via Chinese entities.

Beijing has thus far refused to commit direct lethal weapons to Russia's war, and both Kyiv and the EU sought to engage it in peace efforts, hoping to leverage its influence over Moscow.

Bringing China to the Ukraine-led Peace Summit planned in Switzerland for mid-June is among Kyiv's top priorities, a source in the president's office told the Kyiv Independent.

The flow of dual-use goods indicates that China is not as neutral in the war as it wishes to appear.

"More effort is needed to curtail the delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 6 after meeting Xi in Paris.

Washington warned its partners in April that the level of this support is only increasing, extending also to geospatial intelligence and missile propellants.

While the West's options are limited regarding China selling its own products, there are avenues of action when it comes to re-selling Western goods and bypassing sanctions.

A coordinated action by Western partners could help drive up the costs for Russia and China, curtailing this critical lifeline, experts say.

What is Russia buying from China?

In 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90% of Russia's imports of approximately 50 items included in the G7 "high-priority" sanctioned goods list, such as microelectronics, navigation and communication equipment, optics, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools.

China serves both as a producer of these items and as an intermediary for their re-export from other countries, helping to bypass sanctions.

The country's role as Moscow's lifeline for economic output and military production has risen sharply since the West imposed extensive trade restrictions on Russia.

While Chinese overall exports to the rest of the world have grown by 29% since 2021, exports to Russia have spiked by a whopping 121%, underscoring the role of their partnership.

When it comes to individual dual-use items, the sales of semi-conductors – vital for the manufacturing of communication systems, radars, missile guidance, or electronic warfare equipment – jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to the Free Russia Foundation.

Several sectors of Russia's defense industry and military capabilities are boosted by Chinese trade.

"(Russia's) logistics machine is really important. So trucks, spare parts, forklift trucks, all those sorts of things that keep the war machine going," China can provide, said Edward Lucas, a senior advisor at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in a comment for the Kyiv Independent.

Other key components include drone parts and complete off-the-shelf drones, microchips, and other electronics, the expert added.

"When you look at what China is providing to Russia, it is less about (whole) systems, it is more about parts, specifically microelectronics, that China has been increasingly providing to Russia for the past few years… (which are then) integrated into weapon systems," Mathieu Boulègue, a senior fellow at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.

"The core of what China is providing Russia with right now are mostly spare parts, detached parts, microelectronics, components that are cannibalized by the Russian military industry."

Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute focused on the sanctions regime against Russia, told the Kyiv Independent that we can see China playing three different roles when it comes to the dual-goods flow.

"So there are Chinese companies producing goods that Russia imports and needs for its military. The second role… is that there are foreign companies, including Western ones, that have production facilities in China," Hilgenstock said, adding: "These are not goods from Chinese producers, but they're made in China."

"And then the third role is Chinese entities as final sellers of these goods to Russia from Western companies."

Between January and October 2023, 41% of "battlefield goods" (the aforementioned ≈50 goods defined as "high priority" by the U.S., the EU, and other allies) supplied to Russia were produced by China-based firms, a report by the KSE Institute and the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group shows.

The percentage is almost the same for "critical components" (KSE's term for other dual-use goods that go beyond the definition set by the U.S. and other partners), making companies headquartered in China the leading source in both cases, followed by the U.S., Taiwan, and the EU.

Chinese tech giant Huawei was Russia's top provider of critical components for the first 10 months of 2023 ($530 million) and the second most significant source of battlefield goods ($286 million) after the American Intel. China's Lenovo and Hikvision also rank high in both indicators.

China's role as the global manufacturing leader comes into play as well. The KSE's research shows that 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components sent to Russia during much of the last year were produced in China-based plants (including factories owned by foreign companies).

Similarly notable is the role of Chinese companies as final sellers. In terms of battlefield goods, 38% were sold to Russia from China and 30.9% from Hong Kong between January and October 2023. As for critical components, the percentages are 38.9% for China and 18.1% for Hong Kong.

The Chinese share in Russia's dual-use goods supply is not as high in the KSE Institute's report as the 90% figure presented by Carnegie Endowment, but the former examines the individual roles that China plays in this process, which do not always overlap. In the end, both organizations agree that China is Moscow's one source of these products.

Lucas stresses, however, that "it would be a mistake to say that China is the only lifeline of Russia's war machine."

Moscow showed dexterity in circumventing Western sanctions through other intermediaries, like the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. It has obtained wholesale battlefield goods from Iran and North Korea, and its own economy is in war mode, producing more artillery shells than the U.S. or the EU can currently provide to Ukraine.

"If you remove China's help completely, tomorrow, it would indeed impact certain segments of the (Russian) military industry… (but) unfortunately, Russia is fully able to continue waging war by itself without China's support," Boulègue said.

One curious aspect is that even though customs data show extensive Chinese supplies flowing to Russia, they represent a disproportionately small portion of foreign-made components found in Russian weapon systems on Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese products amounted to a mere 4% of the 2,800 foreign parts found in Russian missiles, drones, and armored vehicles and documented by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. This pales in comparison to nearly three-quarters of the sum being U.S.-made parts.

Hilgenstock offers two possible explanations for this discrepancy.

"One hypothesis is that (Russia) hasn't been able to substitute the Western goods" with Chinese products, he said. This would give the West powerful leverage to curb the supplies by its own efforts, but it also indicates that the current export controls are not as effective as hoped.

"The second hypothesis is that Russia does not have to substitute the (Western) parts because it still has access to them," the expert suggested.

What are China's goals?

Unlike other Moscow's partners like Iran or North Korea, Beijing has staved off from supplying direct lethal assistance. This has allowed China to continue supporting Russia under the veil of plausible deniability.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has dismissed criticism against China by the West, saying its exports to Russia fall within the confines of "normal cooperation."

Despite its apparent affinity toward the Kremlin and hostility toward Washington, China's rhetoric has been constrained regarding Ukraine, calling instead for a mutually satisfactory peaceful resolution.

Looking beneath the veneer of pacifist proclamations, Beijing's role in assisting Russia's war machine is hard to deny.

Given the Chinese government's sway over the domestic business sector, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-use goods supplies are happening without its tacit approval.

According to Sher, "Given the size and scope of these transactions, it does seem like it's more than just Chinese companies looking to turn a profit... the Chinese government is likely aware of these transactions."

"If you change the optics a little bit, I would argue that China is providing lethal aid to Russia. It's not direct lethal aid, but military components and parts that are used to kill Ukrainians," Boulègue said.

"Of course, there is a big difference between providing a missile system and electronics that go into a radar used inside that missile. But still… I think we could argue that China is indeed providing a form of indirect lethal aid to Russia," he added.

Chinese companies can capitalize on Russia's growing demand, while Beijing is also likely interested in curtailing Western influence, and its partnership with Moscow is a key piece in this puzzle.

Yet, there are clear limits that Beijing has to respect as a global geopolitical player. While it wishes to support Russia against the West, it does not want to get its hands too dirty, tarnish its international reputation, and attract further costly sanctions from the EU or the U.S., experts say.

"(China) needs to put a critical distance between what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what it hopes to accomplish in the international arena because it brings too much attention, too much heat," Boulègue commented.

"In that sort of… geopolitical battle between the United States and China, they definitely do not want to overreach."

During Xi's visit, EU officials acknowledged Beijing's past efforts to moderate Russia's nuclear saber-rattling or its refusal to provide lethal aid.

Many observers noted that China is playing a careful balancing game, seeking to woo the EU and drive a wedge between it and the U.S. Given Europe's support for Ukraine, this naturally means treading carefully on war-related issues.

"The Americans would love everyone close ranks against Russia and China. China doesn't want that," Lucas noted.

What can the West do?

Shortly after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Western countries imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, aimed at cutting off its crucial supply lanes.

While experiencing a sudden drop in microelectronics imports in 2022, Russia has rebounded to prewar levels since then, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.

As China has played an increasingly important role in Russia's sanctions circumvention, Western efforts have recently zeroed in on Chinese companies.

Following repeated warnings issued toward Beijing, the U.S. announced on May 1 a package of sanctions against almost 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia's war effort.

The EU's 13th sanctions package also included China-based entities helping Moscow dodge restrictive measures.

In a separate effort to pressure Beijing, the U.S. added 37 Chinese entities to the trade blacklist due to security reasons, including 11 of them accused of being connected to last year's espionage incident, the U.S. Commerce Department said on May 9.

Nevertheless, while China's monthly transactions with Russia dropped in early 2024 compared to their peak of $600 million last December, the country remains the leading supplier of high-priority goods, Carnegie Endowment said.

According to Lucas, sanctions can function as a deterrent and make it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade with Russia, but their "record of changing decisions is quite limited."

"The U.S. and Europe are not making China's life easier, but they still find many ways to bypass sanctions. So, honestly, we are several steps behind being efficient in the full sanctions regime," Boulègue said.

While there is little that Kyiv's allies can do regarding trade with Chinese-made products, there is certainly room for improvement in curtailing the re-exports of Western goods.

Under the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule, the U.S. authorities can regulate re-exports not only of American-made products but also of foreign-produced items whose production involves U.S. software or technology.

"And then it becomes a question of enforcement," Hilgenstock noted.

While the EU does not have such a rule, its past sanctions included additional restrictions on further re-exports to Russia from third-party companies.

Sanctioning such entities also has its limits, however. A common practice in Russia's evasion schemes is foreign-based shell companies that can be dissolved and re-registered as formally new entities after being targeted by sanctions.

For this method to be effective, "you have to do it comprehensively. So not just one or two of these intermediaries, but rather all of them, you would have to do it consistently across all of the coalition's jurisdictions," Hilgenstock commented.

One positive impact that may not be apparent at first sight is the change in value of the products rather than their volumes.

Hilgenstock said that there is some evidence that "Russia is paying significantly more money simply because the Chinese know that Russia desperately needs" these supplies.

This mirrors the situation in Russia's oil exports. Sanctions forced Moscow to pivot from European markets to India and China while selling their product at a significant discount.

"We're not going to stop every single battlefield item from reaching Russia, but if we can make them significantly more expensive, that would be a very promising avenue," Hilgenstock concluded.

Archived link

Here is a video (1 min)

Chinese people not only turned up in strength to welcome their President Xi Jinping who arrived for a state visit to Budapest on May 8 evening but also harassed and bullied Tibet protesters and others as well while the country’s police joined force with them, according to various media reports.

Tímea Szabó, co-chairman of the opposition party Párbeszéd, hung a Tibetan flag from his window on May 8 and within minutes received threats from the Speaker of the Hungarian House of Representatives László Kövér and the secret service, reported dailynewshungary.com May 9.

Before the arrival of Xi for a ceremonial welcome on May 9, Tibor Hendrey, president of the Tibet Aid Society (Tibeti Segítő Társaság), stretched the Tibetan flag on the cross fence in Gellért Hill. However, within minutes Chinese activists covered it with the Chinese flag.

The report cited Hendrey as saying later that he was searched by police three times that day. The report also cited witnesses as saying the police only looked for Hungarians at the scene, and no Chinese at all.

Pro-China activists waved at least 16 Chinese flags to hide from view Tibetan flags the protesters were holding, reported the Tibetan service of rfa.org May 9.

Also, Tibetan protesters tried to hoist a “Free Tibet” banner along with the Tibetan flag on the Elizabeth Bridge, under which Xi’s motorcade would have had to pass on its way to the presidential palace in Budapest on May 9 morning. But the Chinese activists disrupted them again, the report said.

“These guys just came and ripped our banner, and they are still allowed to be here, pushing us further and further out,” Chime Lhamo, campaigns director of Students for Free Tibet, has told journalists on the street. “Is this a free country?”

Hungarian police standing nearby did not intervene, the report added.

After the street encounter, the protesters were followed by what appeared to be about eight undercover police officers on their way to the Budapest airport, one of them has said.

In fact, “over the last few days, we were followed, harassed and intimidated by undercover Hungarian police, as well as Chinese people and police everywhere in the city,” Tenzin Yangzom from the International Tibet Network has said. “Everywhere in the city is swarmed by them.”

"We had come here to peacefully protest Xi’s genocidal policies in Tibet, East Turkistan, Hong Kong and beyond and the treatment of Tibetans, Hong Kongers, Uyghurs and Chinese people,” she has added.

Márton Tompos, vice-president of the opposition party Momentum, wanted to place the EU flag at the Elisabeth Bridge in Budapest but was prevented by Chinese volunteers wearing red caps working for their embassy. He was even asked which flags he wanted to put up and why, said the dailynewshungary.com report.

It appears that no flags other than those of China will be displayed in Budapest while Xi is in town, the report added.

“Budapest is full of Chinese volunteer gendarmes wearing red caps to protect Xi Jinping, known as Winnie the Pooh, from the ‘unfriendly’ Tibetan and Taiwanese flags,” Tompos was stated to have written in a video post.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Hungary and the two countries have decided to elevate bilateral relations to an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era during Xi’s meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Frequently at loggerheads with the EU, Orban has been advocating an “Eastern opening” foreign policy since his return to power in 2010, seeking closer economic ties with China, Russia and other Asian countries.

Beijing has invested billions in Hungary and sees the EU member as an important foothold inside the 27-member trading bloc. In December, Hungary announced that one of the world’s largest EV manufacturers, China’s BYD, will open its first European EV production factory in the south of the country — an inroad that could upend the competitiveness of the continent’s auto industry, noted the AP May 9.

The state visit to Hungary is the last leg of Xi’s current European tour after France and Serbia, his first since 2019.

His visit to France, marking 60th year of establishing diplomatic relations, was cordial but also highlighted tensions between Beijing and the EU over the war in Ukraine and global trade.

His visit to non-EU, non-NATO member Serbia, known for its stanch alliance with Russia, took place on the 25th anniversary of NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy at Belgrade during the Yugoslavia conflict, which Xi said his country will never forget despite the issue being settled with payment of compensations.

Archived unpaywalled link (in German)

Leading members of the German Bundestag from the CDU, FDP and Greens are considering the possibility of protecting parts of the airspace over Ukraine from NATO territory with Western air defense.

The example of Israel, where air defense units from the US, Great Britain, France and other countries repelled an Iranian air attack in April, shows that participating states do not necessarily have to become "the war party", they argue.

The idea have been put forward by military experts like Nico Lange from the Munich Security Conference. In Lange's view, this could create a "safe zone of up to 70 kilometres wide" on Ukraine's borders to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

Roderich Kiesewetter German from the conservative party CDU told the German paper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung" that such a deployment at the eastern border of NATO could shoot down 'unmanned Russian missiles' over Ukraine", relieving the Ukrainian air defense and enable it to "protect the front", he says.

Marcus Faber of the ruling party FDP, who is supposed to be the future head of the defense committee, also noted that "the airspace over the Ukrainian border regions" could in principle be protected "by air defense systems on NATO territory".

"I think that this is possible," said Faber.

Agnieszka Brugger from the ruling Green party also supported the idea of "deploying air defense systems at the borders of the neighbouring states so that the western parts of Ukraine can also be protected". Anton Hofreiter from the Green party and chairman of the European Committee shares Brugger's view, according to the paper.

Archived version

Here is the report (pdf)

Security researchers at Insikt Group identified a malign influence network, CopyCop, skillfully leveraging inauthentic media outlets in the US, UK, and France. This network is suspected to be operated from Russia and is likely aligned with the Russian government. CopyCop extensively used generative AI to plagiarize and modify content from legitimate media sources to tailor political messages with specific biases. This included content critical of Western policies and supportive of Russian perspectives on international issues like the Ukraine conflict and the Israel-Hamas tensions.

CopyCop’s operation involves a calculated use of large language models (LLMs) to plagiarize, translate, and edit content from legitimate mainstream media outlets. By employing prompt engineering techniques, the network tailors this content to resonate with specific audiences, injecting political bias that aligns with its strategic objectives. In recent weeks, alongside its AI-generated content, CopyCop has begun to gain traction by posting targeted, human-produced content that engages deeply with its audience.

The content disseminated by CopyCop spans divisive domestic issues, including perspectives on Russia’s military actions in Ukraine presented in a pro-Russian light and critical viewpoints of Israeli military operations in Gaza. It also includes narratives that influence the political landscape in the US, notably by supporting Republican candidates while disparaging House and Senate Democrats, as well as critiquing the Biden administration’s policies.

The infrastructure supporting CopyCop has strong ties to the disinformation outlet DCWeekly, managed by John Mark Dougan, a US citizen who fled to Russia in 2016. The content from CopyCop is also amplified by well-known Russian state-sponsored actors such as Doppelgänger and Portal Kombat. Also, it boosts material from other Russian influence operations like the Foundation to Battle Injustice and InfoRos, suggesting a highly coordinated effort.

This use of generative AI to create and disseminate content at scale introduces significant challenges for those tasked with safeguarding elections. The sophisticated narratives, tailored to stir specific political sentiments, make it increasingly difficult for public officials to counteract the rapid spread of these false narratives effectively.

Public-sector organizations are urged to heighten awareness around threat actors like CopyCop and the risks posed by AI-generated disinformation. Legitimate media outlets also face risks, as their content may be plagiarized and weaponized to support adversarial state narratives, potentially damaging their credibility.

The Hungarian government's invitation to Chinese police officers to patrol in Hungary poses a threat to European security and in particular the freedoms of Europe's Chinese diaspora.

The Commission must urgently assess whether the foreign police activity aligns with the EU's standards for the rule of law, security and protection of minorities, Renew Europe state ahead of today’s debate in the European Parliament, held upon the request of our group. As the Chinese Communist party has a track record of surveiling its citizens abroad, Renew Europe MEPs fear that the authorities in Beijing will use the occasion to keep tabs on their diaspora living in Europe in an attempt to silence dissidents. The Hungarian government must clarify what role they will have and which powers they will possess.

"While the EU has started to address the threat of authoritarian interference— it remains blind to interference originating from our very own authoritarian member states. The fact that Chinese police officers will soon begin patrolling in Hungary is foreign meddling in EU affairs, and a significant risk to EU security. The Commission must have a forceful answer", says Katalin Cseh, a member of the European Parliament from Hungary's Momentum, a centre-right party in Hungary.

The advisory, which also includes French, Canadian and British authorities, says that pro-Russia activists are “targeting and compromising” operational technology platforms that underpin wastewater and water treatment systems, at times posing physical threats to safety.

The NSA, FBI, Department of Energy and Department of Agriculture were also included in the notice.

According to the advisory, this malicious activity "has been observed since 2022 and as recently as April 2024.”

The alert says that water operators are employing poor security standards that have allowed the hackers to breach their networks, including the use of default passwords that are included when the water system management tools are first installed.

The hackers have “manipulated [human-machine interfaces], causing water pumps and blower equipment to exceed their normal operating parameters. In each case, the hacktivists maxed out set points, altered other settings, turned off alarm mechanisms, and changed administrative passwords” to lock real users out of their wastewater treatment systems, it later adds.

Private sector research from mid-April linked a breach of a water facility near the Texas-New Mexico border and marked the first known case where Russian hackers targeted U.S. water facilities.

The research, conducted by Google-owned Mandiant, said the hackers were a possible activist unit of Sandworm, an operation tied to Russia’s military intelligence directorate.

CISA executive director of cybersecurity Eric Goldstein said the U.S. was not linking activity outlined in the advisory to Sandworm or affiliated operatives, though later said that the groups are acting in support of the Kremlin. He declined to name any specific groups.

Russia’s state-centered economy allows Moscow to easily steamroll contracts for military and intelligence operations. A leak last year revealed the intricacies of this relationship, showing a vast network of military consultants working on behalf of the Kremlin, including Sandworm.

The Environmental Protection Agency and National Security Council in March urged states to stay alert for Iranian and Chinese cyber threats targeting water sector infrastructure. “Drinking water and wastewater systems are an attractive target for cyberattacks because they are a lifeline critical infrastructure sector but often lack the resources and technical capacity to adopt rigorous cybersecurity practices,” their missive to states said.

Klein was at the location, and even took part in the opening portion of the dress rehearsal. Israeli-born Luxembourg contestant Tali Golergant performed fourth during Friday's rehearsal in Malmo, Sweden. Klein was supposed to take part after, but the EBU moved on to the next contestant, Israeli Eden Golan. As time went on, rumors began to circulate that Klein was blocked from taking part in the rehersal on Friday afternoon either because of a brief incident with Golan during the press conference after the Thursday semi-final, another momentary confrontation with her entourage on Friday, or an unrelated problem back stage.

The EBU has been criticized over Golan's participation, with protestors saying that it was an attempt to use culture to distract people from Israel's war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which has resulted in extensive civilian casualties and vast destruction. A Polish journalist raised the issue during the press conference that immediately followed the semi-final, asking Golan, "Have you ever thought that by being here, you bring risk and danger for other participants and [the] public?"

The host of the media event, Swedish journalist Jovan Radomir, told Golan she did not have to answer the question. "Why not?" exclaimed Klein? He had a Dutch flag wrapped around his head at the moment, as Golan defended her participation in the competition and safety and security at the event.

But sources told Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet that Klein's Friday afternoon suspension was due to a different incident. Another video surfaced from Israeli television personality Dov Gil-Har, where he was accused of trying to pester Klein to provoke a response. He posted a video he shot of himself backstage, shouting, "Mr. Klein, where were you? We missed you on stage?"

A Belgian broadcaster interrupted its coverage of the Eurovision Song Contest semi-final on Thursday night to display a protest message condemning Israel's war on Gaza. In an act organised by a trade union, the screen briefly went black ahead of the semi-final coverage on VRT, Belgium's public-service broadcaster in Flemish.

It then aired the message: "This is a union action. We condemn the human rights violations by the state of Israel. Moreover, the state of Israel destroys press freedom. Therefore, we are interrupting the broadcast momentarily."

The message concluded with the hashtags "CeasefireNow" and "StopGenocide".

A spokesperson for VRT told Belgian media that the broadcaster was aware the action would take place. "We were informed that it would happen. Trade unions have the right to take action and do not need permission for it. I can only confirm that we have taken note of the action," said spokesperson Yasmine Van der Borght.

Jenny Mathers, a specialist in Russian intelligence services at Aberystwyth University in Wales, said there has been a notable increase in the number and intensity of Russia-linked incidents for the past year, adding that “we are likely to see an acceleration of this trend".

Larger infrastructure networks have been targeted too. Last month, Czech authorities accused Russia of having made “thousands” of hacking attempts to sabotage European railway systems and their ability to transport Western arms and material to Ukraine. According to the country’s transport minister, the campaign began shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has included attacks on signalling and ticketing systems.

Kevin Riehle, an intelligence and security expert at Brunel University in London, said that one of the reasons for the presumed Russian sabotage is that Moscow already sees itself as being at war with the West.

Daniel Lomas, an expert in intelligence services at the University of Nottingham, said the timing for Russia to put pressure on the West in this manner is opportune too, especially as a certain war fatigue – evident in the US's long-delayed aid package for Ukraine earlier this year – has begun to set in. On top of that, Russian attacks on European soil are “an opportunity to sow more divisions” in the West, he said.

The attacks also serve a strategic purpose in Ukraine, in the sense that Russia is trying to coordinate the wider sabotage campaign with its push on the ground in a bid to create a greater military advantage, Mathers said.

“There is a psychological impact [on the West], but also a material one [for Ukraine],” she said, referring to the fact that most of the targets are either ammunition depots intended for the Ukrainian army or infrastructures in the supply and delivery chain, such as rail networks or airports.

Lomas agreed. "One of their key priorities is to stop the flow of weapons to Ukraine."

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Russia’s jamming of GPS signals marks a shift in its non-conventional attacks against the Baltic states, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said on Friday.

“They [Russia] are moving from the cyber domain, disinformation domain, towards a more physical one which affects airplanes, daily lives of people in our region,” he said in a joint news conference with his new Latvian counterpart Baiba Braže in Vilnius.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania warned last month that Russia’s jamming of GPS signal was increasing the threat of aviation incidents.

Estonia on Wednesday summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires to protest the jamming of GPS signals which led to disruptions in Tartu Airport.

The Estonian Foreign Ministry said in a press release that it “has caused serious damage to air traffic in our region, the clearest example of which is the suspension of flights between Helsinki and Tartu”.

Braže told the news conference in Vilnius that “it’s not a new phenomenon but it leaves a certain sort of consequence that is worrying”.

Landsbergis called for sanctions on those responsible for these actions, adding that “it is also very important to send a message to Moscow that they are not operating in a grey zone”.

“If they expect us to be silent, if they expect us to be quiet about the things that are happening, they are definitely not going to get that. We see, we know, and we act against it,” Lithuania’s foreign minister said.

This week, several European countries summoned Russia’s diplomats over hybrid and cyber-attacks orchestrated by Moscow or groups linked to it.

The United States overtook China as Germany's most important trading partner in the first quarter of this year, according to Reuters' calculations based on official data from the German statistics office.

Germany's trade with the United States - exports and imports combined - totalled 63 billion euros ($68 billion) from January to March, while the figure for China was just under 60 billion euros, the data showed.

In 2023, China was Germany's top trading partner for the eighth year in a row, with volumes reaching 253 billion euros, although that was only a few hundred million ahead of the U.S.

"German exports to the U.S. have now risen further due to the robust economy there, while both exports to and imports from China have fallen," said Commerzbank economist Vincent Stamer, explaining the first quarter shift.

Structural reasons are also a factor, he said.

"China has moved up the value chain ladder and is increasingly producing more complex goods itself, which it used to import from Germany," said Stamer. "In addition, German companies are increasingly producing locally instead of exporting goods from Germany to China."

Germany has said it wants to reduce its exposure to China, citing political differences and accusing Beijing in its first China strategy announcement last year of "unfair practises". But Berlin has been vague on policy steps to reduce dependencies.

German imports of goods from China fell almost 12% year-on-year in the first quarter, while exports of goods to China fell just over 1%, said Juergen Matthes, from German economic institute IW.

"The fact that the Chinese economy is performing worse than many had hoped, while the U.S. economy is exceeding expectations, is presumably contributing to this," said Matthes.

The U.S. now accounts for around 10% of German goods exports. China's share has fallen to less than 6%, Matthes said.

"With a clear global economic headwind for the German economic model, a reorientation - also geopolitically motivated - seems to be taking place: away from system rival China and towards transatlantic partner U.S.," he added. It is unclear, however, whether this will continue.

"If the White House administration changes after the U.S. elections in November and moves more in the direction of closing off markets, this process could come to a standstill," said Dirk Jandura, president of the BGA trade association.

Climate activist Greta Thunberg joined thousands of pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Eurovision 2024 host city Malmo on Thursday to protest Israel's participation in the song contest ahead of this year's second semi-final.

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The European Chamber of Commerce in China said in the latest edition of its Business Confidence Survey that the outlook for doing business in China was also at its lowest in the report’s 20-year history, with over a quarter of respondents pessimistic about their current growth potential and 44% downbeat over future prospects.

With China’s economy facing headwinds and President Xi Jinping urging self-reliance and for officials to push on with a production-focused, debt driven development model despite pushback from the West, foreign firms are feeling less welcome than before.

EU Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi on Monday to ensure more balanced trade with Europe, but the Chinese leader showed little sign of being ready to offer major concessions while in Paris.

BASF, Maersk, Siemens and Volkswagen are among the members of the chamber.

Just 13% of firms said they currently see China as a top investment destination, the chamber said, down from 16% in 2023 and far lower than during the pandemic, when Beijing’s strict zero-COVID regime saw that figure fall from one-fifth to 17% in 2019, 19% in 2020, 27% in 2021 and 21% during 2022, the year the curbs were finally lifted.

"The lifting of pandemic-related control measures initially provided companies with a sense of optimism,” the chamber said. “However, it soon become evident there would be no rapid recovery.”

“China’s deeper structural issues – including sluggish demand, high levels of government debt and the continued challenges in the real estate sector – were going to continue affecting the prospects of both domestic and foreign companies,” the chamber added.

The pandemic and a property crisis have laid bare the limits of China’s development model, analysts say. And as China’s investment-consumption imbalance is deeper than that of Japan in the 1980s – before its infamous “lost decades” – the economy risks slowing to such an extent that it feels like it is in recession.

European firms are feeling the pinch, the chamber said, with the number of companies reporting revenue increases also at its lowest on record. In tandem, close to 40% of respondents said China’s ailing economy was their biggest business challenge, with a slowing global economy coming in a distant second at 15%.

“Companies are continuing to shift investments that were originally planned for China to alternative markets that are perceived to be more predictable, reliable and transparent,” the chamber said.

“As investment decisions are made in cycles and are not taken lightly, reversing them will not be possible overnight.”

The European Central Bank will “most likely” lower borrowing costs when it meets in June — should the outlook for consumer prices be confirmed by fresh quarterly forecasts, Executive Board member Frank Elderson said.

“This is a projection meeting so we will look at projections,” he told Bloomberg in Rome on Friday. “If these projections were to solidify the confidence levels that we see today, I think that we will most likely take a step.”

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