The inner workings of China's notorious secret police unit and how it hunts down dissidents living overseas – including in Australia – have been exposed by a former spy in a Four Corners investigation, raising tough questions about Australia's national security.

It is the first time anyone from the secret police – one of the most feared and powerful arms of China's intelligence apparatus – has ever spoken publicly.

The investigation also found the existence of an espionage operation on Australian soil only last year and the secret return of an Australian resident to China in 2019. Spy speaks out

The spy — who goes by the name Eric — worked as an undercover agent for a unit within China's federal police and security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) between 2008 and early 2023.

The unit is called the Political Security Protection Bureau, or the 1st Bureau. It is one of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) key tools of repression, operating across the globe to surveil, kidnap and silence critics of the party, particularly President Xi Jinping.

"It is the darkest department of the Chinese government," Eric said.

"When dealing with people who oppose the CCP, they can behave as if these people are not protected by the law. They can do whatever they want to them."

Four Corners has chosen not to publish Eric's full name or the identities of his secret police handlers due to concerns for the 39-year-old's safety.

Eric fled China and arrived in Australia last year where he revealed his history to ASIO, Australia's domestic spy agency.

ASIO declined to comment for this story.

Eric revealed to Four Corners how China collects intelligence on those it deems enemies of the state – and in some cases the tactics it uses to see them return to China to face prosecution.

He was tasked by his handlers with hunting down dissidents across the globe, sometimes by using elaborate cover stories — once as a property executive and another as an anti-CCP freedom fighter — to try to gain their confidence and lure them to countries where they could be abducted and returned to China.

Four Corners has seen hundreds of secret documents and correspondence that back up Eric's story about his assignments and targets which covered China, India, Cambodia, Thailand, Canada and Australia. 'Secret agents in Australia'

In 2023, AFP officers raided a Sydney location and uncovered a Chinese espionage operation targeting Australian residents.

One of them was Edwin Yin, a political activist whose online videos have targeted President Xi and his daughter.

The AFP spoke to Mr Yin after the raid.

"They told me ... they had disrupted an intelligence agency in Australia," he said.

"They acquired information and material that indicated the CCP was looking for me in Australia through this intelligence agency."

Four Corners understands the AFP's investigation is ongoing.

In 2021, Mr Yin was the victim of a physical attack in Melbourne that left him with a broken nose. Mr Yin thought the two men who attacked him, and a third who filmed it, were Chinese government agents.

"I don't feel safe in Australia," he said.

Eric was asked to target Mr Yin in 2018.

He told Four Corners he has no doubt Chinese secret agents currently operate in Australia, and that they rely on a network of support organisations and businesses.

"In an area where there are secret agents, a support system is required so when the agents are dispatched there, they can receive the necessary support," he said.

"They certainly have established a support system in Australia."

China says it is seeking Mr Yin's return over several financial fraud allegations. Four Corners spoke to one of his alleged victims who maintained the crimes happened.

Mr Yin says he was framed. China's global reach

Counter-intelligence experts said it was "political security" with which China's vast spying network was most concerned.

Holden Triplett previously led the FBI's office in Beijing where he regularly dealt with the Ministry of Public Security.

"The MPS portrays itself as a police service … but in my mind, they're anything but that," he said.

"Their job is to protect the party's status … and when I say status, I mean control … The party has to remain in control."

Under Mr Xi's rule, that control has become much tighter. Since becoming leader in 2012, Mr Xi has reordered the Chinese security and intelligence services and strengthened the party's grip on the Chinese population overseas.

"Now they're heavily engaged in the world, they need resources from all sorts of places," Mr Triplett said.

"So anyone within the Chinese population internally, or in the diaspora … that could threaten the party's control … that's what they would be investigating, opposing and disrupting if necessary."

MPS works with other elements of China's national state security including the country's foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security, and the CCP's main foreign influence arm, the United Front Work Department (UFWD).

The UFWD is tasked with increasing China's influence abroad and UFWD-associated community groups exist in virtually all countries where there is a significant Chinese population – including Australia.

"United Front work creates tall grass to hide the snakes," said former CIA analyst Peter Mattis.

"The MPS are some of those snakes." Citizens returned

Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaigns Fox Hunt and Sky Net to return more than 12,000 so-called fugitives to China since 2014. Many were returned in covert operations without the knowledge or permission of local authorities.

As part of Fox Hunt, in 2014 two Chinese police officers covertly entered Australia to pursue and return a Melbourne bus driver. When it was made public the following year, it caused a major diplomatic incident and the Chinese government promised it would never happen again.

In 2019, Chinese officers came to Australia again and returned with a 59-year-old Australian resident.

"The MPS sent officials … to Australia to have a so-called heart-to-heart with a female who was then persuaded to come back," said Laura Harth, campaigns director at human rights NGO, Safeguard Defenders.

"They used the [Australian] Chinese consulate-general and embassy to help them."

Four Corners has established that the AFP did approve the 2019 visit, but the Chinese officers didn't follow the agreed protocol and the woman was escorted back to China by them without the AFP's approval.

Do you know more about this story? Contact Four Corners here.

Last month, Safeguard Defenders released a report documenting more than 280 cases of foreign citizens and residents being repatriated to China. The individuals are accused of committing economic crimes.

There were at least 16 successful individual extrajudicial returns from Australia between 2014 and 2023, according to the report, which relied on Chinese state media. Four of those returns took place last year.

"These successful operations — or even the attempts at operations that turn out not to be successful — are a clear violation of Australia's sovereignty," Ms Harth said.

A spokeswoman for the AFP said it "will never endorse or facilitate a foreign agency to come to Australia to intimidate or force foreign nationals to return home".

"Under Australian law, that is a crime," she said.

"It is an offence for foreign governments, or those acting on their behalf, to threaten culturally and linguistically diverse communities, or anyone else in Australia. This includes harassment, surveillance, intimidation and other coercive measures."

An Australian Government spokesperson said defending against malicious foreign interference was "a top priority".

"Australia's law enforcement and intelligence agencies assess, investigate, disrupt and where possible, prosecute acts of foreign interference."

"The ASIO and AFP-led Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce is actively investigating a range of foreign interference cases."

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to a request for comment.

The inner workings of China's notorious secret police unit and how it hunts down dissidents living overseas – including in Australia – have been exposed by a former spy in a Four Corners investigation, raising tough questions about Australia's national security.

It is the first time anyone from the secret police – one of the most feared and powerful arms of China's intelligence apparatus – has ever spoken publicly.

The investigation also found the existence of an espionage operation on Australian soil only last year and the secret return of an Australian resident to China in 2019. Spy speaks out

The spy — who goes by the name Eric — worked as an undercover agent for a unit within China's federal police and security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) between 2008 and early 2023.

The unit is called the Political Security Protection Bureau, or the 1st Bureau. It is one of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) key tools of repression, operating across the globe to surveil, kidnap and silence critics of the party, particularly President Xi Jinping.

"It is the darkest department of the Chinese government," Eric said.

"When dealing with people who oppose the CCP, they can behave as if these people are not protected by the law. They can do whatever they want to them."

Four Corners has chosen not to publish Eric's full name or the identities of his secret police handlers due to concerns for the 39-year-old's safety.

Eric fled China and arrived in Australia last year where he revealed his history to ASIO, Australia's domestic spy agency.

ASIO declined to comment for this story.

Eric revealed to Four Corners how China collects intelligence on those it deems enemies of the state – and in some cases the tactics it uses to see them return to China to face prosecution.

He was tasked by his handlers with hunting down dissidents across the globe, sometimes by using elaborate cover stories — once as a property executive and another as an anti-CCP freedom fighter — to try to gain their confidence and lure them to countries where they could be abducted and returned to China.

Four Corners has seen hundreds of secret documents and correspondence that back up Eric's story about his assignments and targets which covered China, India, Cambodia, Thailand, Canada and Australia. 'Secret agents in Australia'

In 2023, AFP officers raided a Sydney location and uncovered a Chinese espionage operation targeting Australian residents.

One of them was Edwin Yin, a political activist whose online videos have targeted President Xi and his daughter.

The AFP spoke to Mr Yin after the raid.

"They told me ... they had disrupted an intelligence agency in Australia," he said.

"They acquired information and material that indicated the CCP was looking for me in Australia through this intelligence agency."

Four Corners understands the AFP's investigation is ongoing.

In 2021, Mr Yin was the victim of a physical attack in Melbourne that left him with a broken nose. Mr Yin thought the two men who attacked him, and a third who filmed it, were Chinese government agents.

"I don't feel safe in Australia," he said.

Eric was asked to target Mr Yin in 2018.

He told Four Corners he has no doubt Chinese secret agents currently operate in Australia, and that they rely on a network of support organisations and businesses.

"In an area where there are secret agents, a support system is required so when the agents are dispatched there, they can receive the necessary support," he said.

"They certainly have established a support system in Australia."

China says it is seeking Mr Yin's return over several financial fraud allegations. Four Corners spoke to one of his alleged victims who maintained the crimes happened.

Mr Yin says he was framed. China's global reach

Counter-intelligence experts said it was "political security" with which China's vast spying network was most concerned.

Holden Triplett previously led the FBI's office in Beijing where he regularly dealt with the Ministry of Public Security.

"The MPS portrays itself as a police service … but in my mind, they're anything but that," he said.

"Their job is to protect the party's status … and when I say status, I mean control … The party has to remain in control."

Under Mr Xi's rule, that control has become much tighter. Since becoming leader in 2012, Mr Xi has reordered the Chinese security and intelligence services and strengthened the party's grip on the Chinese population overseas.

"Now they're heavily engaged in the world, they need resources from all sorts of places," Mr Triplett said.

"So anyone within the Chinese population internally, or in the diaspora … that could threaten the party's control … that's what they would be investigating, opposing and disrupting if necessary."

MPS works with other elements of China's national state security including the country's foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security, and the CCP's main foreign influence arm, the United Front Work Department (UFWD).

The UFWD is tasked with increasing China's influence abroad and UFWD-associated community groups exist in virtually all countries where there is a significant Chinese population – including Australia.

"United Front work creates tall grass to hide the snakes," said former CIA analyst Peter Mattis.

"The MPS are some of those snakes." Citizens returned

Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaigns Fox Hunt and Sky Net to return more than 12,000 so-called fugitives to China since 2014. Many were returned in covert operations without the knowledge or permission of local authorities.

As part of Fox Hunt, in 2014 two Chinese police officers covertly entered Australia to pursue and return a Melbourne bus driver. When it was made public the following year, it caused a major diplomatic incident and the Chinese government promised it would never happen again.

In 2019, Chinese officers came to Australia again and returned with a 59-year-old Australian resident.

"The MPS sent officials … to Australia to have a so-called heart-to-heart with a female who was then persuaded to come back," said Laura Harth, campaigns director at human rights NGO, Safeguard Defenders.

"They used the [Australian] Chinese consulate-general and embassy to help them."

Four Corners has established that the AFP did approve the 2019 visit, but the Chinese officers didn't follow the agreed protocol and the woman was escorted back to China by them without the AFP's approval.

Do you know more about this story? Contact Four Corners here.

Last month, Safeguard Defenders released a report documenting more than 280 cases of foreign citizens and residents being repatriated to China. The individuals are accused of committing economic crimes.

There were at least 16 successful individual extrajudicial returns from Australia between 2014 and 2023, according to the report, which relied on Chinese state media. Four of those returns took place last year.

"These successful operations — or even the attempts at operations that turn out not to be successful — are a clear violation of Australia's sovereignty," Ms Harth said.

A spokeswoman for the AFP said it "will never endorse or facilitate a foreign agency to come to Australia to intimidate or force foreign nationals to return home".

"Under Australian law, that is a crime," she said.

"It is an offence for foreign governments, or those acting on their behalf, to threaten culturally and linguistically diverse communities, or anyone else in Australia. This includes harassment, surveillance, intimidation and other coercive measures."

An Australian Government spokesperson said defending against malicious foreign interference was "a top priority".

"Australia's law enforcement and intelligence agencies assess, investigate, disrupt and where possible, prosecute acts of foreign interference."

"The ASIO and AFP-led Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce is actively investigating a range of foreign interference cases."

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to a request for comment.

The inner workings of China's notorious secret police unit and how it hunts down dissidents living overseas – including in Australia – have been exposed by a former spy in a Four Corners investigation, raising tough questions about Australia's national security.

It is the first time anyone from the secret police – one of the most feared and powerful arms of China's intelligence apparatus – has ever spoken publicly.

The investigation also found the existence of an espionage operation on Australian soil only last year and the secret return of an Australian resident to China in 2019. Spy speaks out

The spy — who goes by the name Eric — worked as an undercover agent for a unit within China's federal police and security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) between 2008 and early 2023.

The unit is called the Political Security Protection Bureau, or the 1st Bureau. It is one of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) key tools of repression, operating across the globe to surveil, kidnap and silence critics of the party, particularly President Xi Jinping.

"It is the darkest department of the Chinese government," Eric said.

"When dealing with people who oppose the CCP, they can behave as if these people are not protected by the law. They can do whatever they want to them."

Four Corners has chosen not to publish Eric's full name or the identities of his secret police handlers due to concerns for the 39-year-old's safety.

Eric fled China and arrived in Australia last year where he revealed his history to ASIO, Australia's domestic spy agency.

ASIO declined to comment for this story.

Eric revealed to Four Corners how China collects intelligence on those it deems enemies of the state – and in some cases the tactics it uses to see them return to China to face prosecution.

He was tasked by his handlers with hunting down dissidents across the globe, sometimes by using elaborate cover stories — once as a property executive and another as an anti-CCP freedom fighter — to try to gain their confidence and lure them to countries where they could be abducted and returned to China.

Four Corners has seen hundreds of secret documents and correspondence that back up Eric's story about his assignments and targets which covered China, India, Cambodia, Thailand, Canada and Australia. 'Secret agents in Australia'

In 2023, AFP officers raided a Sydney location and uncovered a Chinese espionage operation targeting Australian residents.

One of them was Edwin Yin, a political activist whose online videos have targeted President Xi and his daughter.

The AFP spoke to Mr Yin after the raid.

"They told me ... they had disrupted an intelligence agency in Australia," he said.

"They acquired information and material that indicated the CCP was looking for me in Australia through this intelligence agency."

Four Corners understands the AFP's investigation is ongoing.

In 2021, Mr Yin was the victim of a physical attack in Melbourne that left him with a broken nose. Mr Yin thought the two men who attacked him, and a third who filmed it, were Chinese government agents.

"I don't feel safe in Australia," he said.

Eric was asked to target Mr Yin in 2018.

He told Four Corners he has no doubt Chinese secret agents currently operate in Australia, and that they rely on a network of support organisations and businesses.

"In an area where there are secret agents, a support system is required so when the agents are dispatched there, they can receive the necessary support," he said.

"They certainly have established a support system in Australia."

China says it is seeking Mr Yin's return over several financial fraud allegations. Four Corners spoke to one of his alleged victims who maintained the crimes happened.

Mr Yin says he was framed. China's global reach

Counter-intelligence experts said it was "political security" with which China's vast spying network was most concerned.

Holden Triplett previously led the FBI's office in Beijing where he regularly dealt with the Ministry of Public Security.

"The MPS portrays itself as a police service … but in my mind, they're anything but that," he said.

"Their job is to protect the party's status … and when I say status, I mean control … The party has to remain in control."

Under Mr Xi's rule, that control has become much tighter. Since becoming leader in 2012, Mr Xi has reordered the Chinese security and intelligence services and strengthened the party's grip on the Chinese population overseas.

"Now they're heavily engaged in the world, they need resources from all sorts of places," Mr Triplett said.

"So anyone within the Chinese population internally, or in the diaspora … that could threaten the party's control … that's what they would be investigating, opposing and disrupting if necessary."

MPS works with other elements of China's national state security including the country's foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security, and the CCP's main foreign influence arm, the United Front Work Department (UFWD).

The UFWD is tasked with increasing China's influence abroad and UFWD-associated community groups exist in virtually all countries where there is a significant Chinese population – including Australia.

"United Front work creates tall grass to hide the snakes," said former CIA analyst Peter Mattis.

"The MPS are some of those snakes." Citizens returned

Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaigns Fox Hunt and Sky Net to return more than 12,000 so-called fugitives to China since 2014. Many were returned in covert operations without the knowledge or permission of local authorities.

As part of Fox Hunt, in 2014 two Chinese police officers covertly entered Australia to pursue and return a Melbourne bus driver. When it was made public the following year, it caused a major diplomatic incident and the Chinese government promised it would never happen again.

In 2019, Chinese officers came to Australia again and returned with a 59-year-old Australian resident.

"The MPS sent officials … to Australia to have a so-called heart-to-heart with a female who was then persuaded to come back," said Laura Harth, campaigns director at human rights NGO, Safeguard Defenders.

"They used the [Australian] Chinese consulate-general and embassy to help them."

Four Corners has established that the AFP did approve the 2019 visit, but the Chinese officers didn't follow the agreed protocol and the woman was escorted back to China by them without the AFP's approval.

Do you know more about this story? Contact Four Corners here.

Last month, Safeguard Defenders released a report documenting more than 280 cases of foreign citizens and residents being repatriated to China. The individuals are accused of committing economic crimes.

There were at least 16 successful individual extrajudicial returns from Australia between 2014 and 2023, according to the report, which relied on Chinese state media. Four of those returns took place last year.

"These successful operations — or even the attempts at operations that turn out not to be successful — are a clear violation of Australia's sovereignty," Ms Harth said.

A spokeswoman for the AFP said it "will never endorse or facilitate a foreign agency to come to Australia to intimidate or force foreign nationals to return home".

"Under Australian law, that is a crime," she said.

"It is an offence for foreign governments, or those acting on their behalf, to threaten culturally and linguistically diverse communities, or anyone else in Australia. This includes harassment, surveillance, intimidation and other coercive measures."

An Australian Government spokesperson said defending against malicious foreign interference was "a top priority".

"Australia's law enforcement and intelligence agencies assess, investigate, disrupt and where possible, prosecute acts of foreign interference."

"The ASIO and AFP-led Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce is actively investigating a range of foreign interference cases."

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to a request for comment.

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As Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Europe this week to discuss Ukraine and trade, China remains Russia's leading source of sanctioned dual-use goods, fueling the ongoing war.

"Around 90% of the goods deemed high priority products by the Western countries... (was) supplied by China" as Chinese-made products or re-exported goods in 2023, a sharp rise from 30% in 2021, Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told the Kyiv Independent.

China-based companies pour a range of items – from drones to microchips and machine parts – into Russia, including products made in China and those that bypass Western export controls via Chinese entities.

Beijing has thus far refused to commit direct lethal weapons to Russia's war, and both Kyiv and the EU sought to engage it in peace efforts, hoping to leverage its influence over Moscow.

Bringing China to the Ukraine-led Peace Summit planned in Switzerland for mid-June is among Kyiv's top priorities, a source in the president's office told the Kyiv Independent.

The flow of dual-use goods indicates that China is not as neutral in the war as it wishes to appear.

"More effort is needed to curtail the delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 6 after meeting Xi in Paris.

Washington warned its partners in April that the level of this support is only increasing, extending also to geospatial intelligence and missile propellants.

While the West's options are limited regarding China selling its own products, there are avenues of action when it comes to re-selling Western goods and bypassing sanctions.

A coordinated action by Western partners could help drive up the costs for Russia and China, curtailing this critical lifeline, experts say.

What is Russia buying from China?

In 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90% of Russia's imports of approximately 50 items included in the G7 "high-priority" sanctioned goods list, such as microelectronics, navigation and communication equipment, optics, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools.

China serves both as a producer of these items and as an intermediary for their re-export from other countries, helping to bypass sanctions.

The country's role as Moscow's lifeline for economic output and military production has risen sharply since the West imposed extensive trade restrictions on Russia.

While Chinese overall exports to the rest of the world have grown by 29% since 2021, exports to Russia have spiked by a whopping 121%, underscoring the role of their partnership.

When it comes to individual dual-use items, the sales of semi-conductors – vital for the manufacturing of communication systems, radars, missile guidance, or electronic warfare equipment – jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to the Free Russia Foundation.

Several sectors of Russia's defense industry and military capabilities are boosted by Chinese trade.

"(Russia's) logistics machine is really important. So trucks, spare parts, forklift trucks, all those sorts of things that keep the war machine going," China can provide, said Edward Lucas, a senior advisor at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in a comment for the Kyiv Independent.

Other key components include drone parts and complete off-the-shelf drones, microchips, and other electronics, the expert added.

"When you look at what China is providing to Russia, it is less about (whole) systems, it is more about parts, specifically microelectronics, that China has been increasingly providing to Russia for the past few years… (which are then) integrated into weapon systems," Mathieu Boulègue, a senior fellow at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.

"The core of what China is providing Russia with right now are mostly spare parts, detached parts, microelectronics, components that are cannibalized by the Russian military industry."

Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute focused on the sanctions regime against Russia, told the Kyiv Independent that we can see China playing three different roles when it comes to the dual-goods flow.

"So there are Chinese companies producing goods that Russia imports and needs for its military. The second role… is that there are foreign companies, including Western ones, that have production facilities in China," Hilgenstock said, adding: "These are not goods from Chinese producers, but they're made in China."

"And then the third role is Chinese entities as final sellers of these goods to Russia from Western companies."

Between January and October 2023, 41% of "battlefield goods" (the aforementioned ≈50 goods defined as "high priority" by the U.S., the EU, and other allies) supplied to Russia were produced by China-based firms, a report by the KSE Institute and the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group shows.

The percentage is almost the same for "critical components" (KSE's term for other dual-use goods that go beyond the definition set by the U.S. and other partners), making companies headquartered in China the leading source in both cases, followed by the U.S., Taiwan, and the EU.

Chinese tech giant Huawei was Russia's top provider of critical components for the first 10 months of 2023 ($530 million) and the second most significant source of battlefield goods ($286 million) after the American Intel. China's Lenovo and Hikvision also rank high in both indicators.

China's role as the global manufacturing leader comes into play as well. The KSE's research shows that 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components sent to Russia during much of the last year were produced in China-based plants (including factories owned by foreign companies).

Similarly notable is the role of Chinese companies as final sellers. In terms of battlefield goods, 38% were sold to Russia from China and 30.9% from Hong Kong between January and October 2023. As for critical components, the percentages are 38.9% for China and 18.1% for Hong Kong.

The Chinese share in Russia's dual-use goods supply is not as high in the KSE Institute's report as the 90% figure presented by Carnegie Endowment, but the former examines the individual roles that China plays in this process, which do not always overlap. In the end, both organizations agree that China is Moscow's one source of these products.

Lucas stresses, however, that "it would be a mistake to say that China is the only lifeline of Russia's war machine."

Moscow showed dexterity in circumventing Western sanctions through other intermediaries, like the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. It has obtained wholesale battlefield goods from Iran and North Korea, and its own economy is in war mode, producing more artillery shells than the U.S. or the EU can currently provide to Ukraine.

"If you remove China's help completely, tomorrow, it would indeed impact certain segments of the (Russian) military industry… (but) unfortunately, Russia is fully able to continue waging war by itself without China's support," Boulègue said.

One curious aspect is that even though customs data show extensive Chinese supplies flowing to Russia, they represent a disproportionately small portion of foreign-made components found in Russian weapon systems on Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese products amounted to a mere 4% of the 2,800 foreign parts found in Russian missiles, drones, and armored vehicles and documented by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. This pales in comparison to nearly three-quarters of the sum being U.S.-made parts.

Hilgenstock offers two possible explanations for this discrepancy.

"One hypothesis is that (Russia) hasn't been able to substitute the Western goods" with Chinese products, he said. This would give the West powerful leverage to curb the supplies by its own efforts, but it also indicates that the current export controls are not as effective as hoped.

"The second hypothesis is that Russia does not have to substitute the (Western) parts because it still has access to them," the expert suggested.

What are China's goals?

Unlike other Moscow's partners like Iran or North Korea, Beijing has staved off from supplying direct lethal assistance. This has allowed China to continue supporting Russia under the veil of plausible deniability.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has dismissed criticism against China by the West, saying its exports to Russia fall within the confines of "normal cooperation."

Despite its apparent affinity toward the Kremlin and hostility toward Washington, China's rhetoric has been constrained regarding Ukraine, calling instead for a mutually satisfactory peaceful resolution.

Looking beneath the veneer of pacifist proclamations, Beijing's role in assisting Russia's war machine is hard to deny.

Given the Chinese government's sway over the domestic business sector, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-use goods supplies are happening without its tacit approval.

According to Sher, "Given the size and scope of these transactions, it does seem like it's more than just Chinese companies looking to turn a profit... the Chinese government is likely aware of these transactions."

"If you change the optics a little bit, I would argue that China is providing lethal aid to Russia. It's not direct lethal aid, but military components and parts that are used to kill Ukrainians," Boulègue said.

"Of course, there is a big difference between providing a missile system and electronics that go into a radar used inside that missile. But still… I think we could argue that China is indeed providing a form of indirect lethal aid to Russia," he added.

Chinese companies can capitalize on Russia's growing demand, while Beijing is also likely interested in curtailing Western influence, and its partnership with Moscow is a key piece in this puzzle.

Yet, there are clear limits that Beijing has to respect as a global geopolitical player. While it wishes to support Russia against the West, it does not want to get its hands too dirty, tarnish its international reputation, and attract further costly sanctions from the EU or the U.S., experts say.

"(China) needs to put a critical distance between what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what it hopes to accomplish in the international arena because it brings too much attention, too much heat," Boulègue commented.

"In that sort of… geopolitical battle between the United States and China, they definitely do not want to overreach."

During Xi's visit, EU officials acknowledged Beijing's past efforts to moderate Russia's nuclear saber-rattling or its refusal to provide lethal aid.

Many observers noted that China is playing a careful balancing game, seeking to woo the EU and drive a wedge between it and the U.S. Given Europe's support for Ukraine, this naturally means treading carefully on war-related issues.

"The Americans would love everyone close ranks against Russia and China. China doesn't want that," Lucas noted.

What can the West do?

Shortly after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Western countries imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, aimed at cutting off its crucial supply lanes.

While experiencing a sudden drop in microelectronics imports in 2022, Russia has rebounded to prewar levels since then, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.

As China has played an increasingly important role in Russia's sanctions circumvention, Western efforts have recently zeroed in on Chinese companies.

Following repeated warnings issued toward Beijing, the U.S. announced on May 1 a package of sanctions against almost 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia's war effort.

The EU's 13th sanctions package also included China-based entities helping Moscow dodge restrictive measures.

In a separate effort to pressure Beijing, the U.S. added 37 Chinese entities to the trade blacklist due to security reasons, including 11 of them accused of being connected to last year's espionage incident, the U.S. Commerce Department said on May 9.

Nevertheless, while China's monthly transactions with Russia dropped in early 2024 compared to their peak of $600 million last December, the country remains the leading supplier of high-priority goods, Carnegie Endowment said.

According to Lucas, sanctions can function as a deterrent and make it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade with Russia, but their "record of changing decisions is quite limited."

"The U.S. and Europe are not making China's life easier, but they still find many ways to bypass sanctions. So, honestly, we are several steps behind being efficient in the full sanctions regime," Boulègue said.

While there is little that Kyiv's allies can do regarding trade with Chinese-made products, there is certainly room for improvement in curtailing the re-exports of Western goods.

Under the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule, the U.S. authorities can regulate re-exports not only of American-made products but also of foreign-produced items whose production involves U.S. software or technology.

"And then it becomes a question of enforcement," Hilgenstock noted.

While the EU does not have such a rule, its past sanctions included additional restrictions on further re-exports to Russia from third-party companies.

Sanctioning such entities also has its limits, however. A common practice in Russia's evasion schemes is foreign-based shell companies that can be dissolved and re-registered as formally new entities after being targeted by sanctions.

For this method to be effective, "you have to do it comprehensively. So not just one or two of these intermediaries, but rather all of them, you would have to do it consistently across all of the coalition's jurisdictions," Hilgenstock commented.

One positive impact that may not be apparent at first sight is the change in value of the products rather than their volumes.

Hilgenstock said that there is some evidence that "Russia is paying significantly more money simply because the Chinese know that Russia desperately needs" these supplies.

This mirrors the situation in Russia's oil exports. Sanctions forced Moscow to pivot from European markets to India and China while selling their product at a significant discount.

"We're not going to stop every single battlefield item from reaching Russia, but if we can make them significantly more expensive, that would be a very promising avenue," Hilgenstock concluded.

Archived link.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Europe this week to discuss Ukraine and trade, China remains Russia's leading source of sanctioned dual-use goods, fueling the ongoing war.

"Around 90% of the goods deemed high priority products by the Western countries... (was) supplied by China" as Chinese-made products or re-exported goods in 2023, a sharp rise from 30% in 2021, Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told the Kyiv Independent.

China-based companies pour a range of items – from drones to microchips and machine parts – into Russia, including products made in China and those that bypass Western export controls via Chinese entities.

Beijing has thus far refused to commit direct lethal weapons to Russia's war, and both Kyiv and the EU sought to engage it in peace efforts, hoping to leverage its influence over Moscow.

Bringing China to the Ukraine-led Peace Summit planned in Switzerland for mid-June is among Kyiv's top priorities, a source in the president's office told the Kyiv Independent.

The flow of dual-use goods indicates that China is not as neutral in the war as it wishes to appear.

"More effort is needed to curtail the delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 6 after meeting Xi in Paris.

Washington warned its partners in April that the level of this support is only increasing, extending also to geospatial intelligence and missile propellants.

While the West's options are limited regarding China selling its own products, there are avenues of action when it comes to re-selling Western goods and bypassing sanctions.

A coordinated action by Western partners could help drive up the costs for Russia and China, curtailing this critical lifeline, experts say.

What is Russia buying from China?

In 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90% of Russia's imports of approximately 50 items included in the G7 "high-priority" sanctioned goods list, such as microelectronics, navigation and communication equipment, optics, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools.

China serves both as a producer of these items and as an intermediary for their re-export from other countries, helping to bypass sanctions.

The country's role as Moscow's lifeline for economic output and military production has risen sharply since the West imposed extensive trade restrictions on Russia.

While Chinese overall exports to the rest of the world have grown by 29% since 2021, exports to Russia have spiked by a whopping 121%, underscoring the role of their partnership.

When it comes to individual dual-use items, the sales of semi-conductors – vital for the manufacturing of communication systems, radars, missile guidance, or electronic warfare equipment – jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to the Free Russia Foundation.

Several sectors of Russia's defense industry and military capabilities are boosted by Chinese trade.

"(Russia's) logistics machine is really important. So trucks, spare parts, forklift trucks, all those sorts of things that keep the war machine going," China can provide, said Edward Lucas, a senior advisor at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in a comment for the Kyiv Independent.

Other key components include drone parts and complete off-the-shelf drones, microchips, and other electronics, the expert added.

"When you look at what China is providing to Russia, it is less about (whole) systems, it is more about parts, specifically microelectronics, that China has been increasingly providing to Russia for the past few years… (which are then) integrated into weapon systems," Mathieu Boulègue, a senior fellow at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.

"The core of what China is providing Russia with right now are mostly spare parts, detached parts, microelectronics, components that are cannibalized by the Russian military industry."

Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute focused on the sanctions regime against Russia, told the Kyiv Independent that we can see China playing three different roles when it comes to the dual-goods flow.

"So there are Chinese companies producing goods that Russia imports and needs for its military. The second role… is that there are foreign companies, including Western ones, that have production facilities in China," Hilgenstock said, adding: "These are not goods from Chinese producers, but they're made in China."

"And then the third role is Chinese entities as final sellers of these goods to Russia from Western companies."

Between January and October 2023, 41% of "battlefield goods" (the aforementioned ≈50 goods defined as "high priority" by the U.S., the EU, and other allies) supplied to Russia were produced by China-based firms, a report by the KSE Institute and the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group shows.

The percentage is almost the same for "critical components" (KSE's term for other dual-use goods that go beyond the definition set by the U.S. and other partners), making companies headquartered in China the leading source in both cases, followed by the U.S., Taiwan, and the EU.

Chinese tech giant Huawei was Russia's top provider of critical components for the first 10 months of 2023 ($530 million) and the second most significant source of battlefield goods ($286 million) after the American Intel. China's Lenovo and Hikvision also rank high in both indicators.

China's role as the global manufacturing leader comes into play as well. The KSE's research shows that 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components sent to Russia during much of the last year were produced in China-based plants (including factories owned by foreign companies).

Similarly notable is the role of Chinese companies as final sellers. In terms of battlefield goods, 38% were sold to Russia from China and 30.9% from Hong Kong between January and October 2023. As for critical components, the percentages are 38.9% for China and 18.1% for Hong Kong.

The Chinese share in Russia's dual-use goods supply is not as high in the KSE Institute's report as the 90% figure presented by Carnegie Endowment, but the former examines the individual roles that China plays in this process, which do not always overlap. In the end, both organizations agree that China is Moscow's one source of these products.

Lucas stresses, however, that "it would be a mistake to say that China is the only lifeline of Russia's war machine."

Moscow showed dexterity in circumventing Western sanctions through other intermediaries, like the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. It has obtained wholesale battlefield goods from Iran and North Korea, and its own economy is in war mode, producing more artillery shells than the U.S. or the EU can currently provide to Ukraine.

"If you remove China's help completely, tomorrow, it would indeed impact certain segments of the (Russian) military industry… (but) unfortunately, Russia is fully able to continue waging war by itself without China's support," Boulègue said.

One curious aspect is that even though customs data show extensive Chinese supplies flowing to Russia, they represent a disproportionately small portion of foreign-made components found in Russian weapon systems on Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese products amounted to a mere 4% of the 2,800 foreign parts found in Russian missiles, drones, and armored vehicles and documented by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. This pales in comparison to nearly three-quarters of the sum being U.S.-made parts.

Hilgenstock offers two possible explanations for this discrepancy.

"One hypothesis is that (Russia) hasn't been able to substitute the Western goods" with Chinese products, he said. This would give the West powerful leverage to curb the supplies by its own efforts, but it also indicates that the current export controls are not as effective as hoped.

"The second hypothesis is that Russia does not have to substitute the (Western) parts because it still has access to them," the expert suggested.

What are China's goals?

Unlike other Moscow's partners like Iran or North Korea, Beijing has staved off from supplying direct lethal assistance. This has allowed China to continue supporting Russia under the veil of plausible deniability.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has dismissed criticism against China by the West, saying its exports to Russia fall within the confines of "normal cooperation."

Despite its apparent affinity toward the Kremlin and hostility toward Washington, China's rhetoric has been constrained regarding Ukraine, calling instead for a mutually satisfactory peaceful resolution.

Looking beneath the veneer of pacifist proclamations, Beijing's role in assisting Russia's war machine is hard to deny.

Given the Chinese government's sway over the domestic business sector, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-use goods supplies are happening without its tacit approval.

According to Sher, "Given the size and scope of these transactions, it does seem like it's more than just Chinese companies looking to turn a profit... the Chinese government is likely aware of these transactions."

"If you change the optics a little bit, I would argue that China is providing lethal aid to Russia. It's not direct lethal aid, but military components and parts that are used to kill Ukrainians," Boulègue said.

"Of course, there is a big difference between providing a missile system and electronics that go into a radar used inside that missile. But still… I think we could argue that China is indeed providing a form of indirect lethal aid to Russia," he added.

Chinese companies can capitalize on Russia's growing demand, while Beijing is also likely interested in curtailing Western influence, and its partnership with Moscow is a key piece in this puzzle.

Yet, there are clear limits that Beijing has to respect as a global geopolitical player. While it wishes to support Russia against the West, it does not want to get its hands too dirty, tarnish its international reputation, and attract further costly sanctions from the EU or the U.S., experts say.

"(China) needs to put a critical distance between what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what it hopes to accomplish in the international arena because it brings too much attention, too much heat," Boulègue commented.

"In that sort of… geopolitical battle between the United States and China, they definitely do not want to overreach."

During Xi's visit, EU officials acknowledged Beijing's past efforts to moderate Russia's nuclear saber-rattling or its refusal to provide lethal aid.

Many observers noted that China is playing a careful balancing game, seeking to woo the EU and drive a wedge between it and the U.S. Given Europe's support for Ukraine, this naturally means treading carefully on war-related issues.

"The Americans would love everyone close ranks against Russia and China. China doesn't want that," Lucas noted.

What can the West do?

Shortly after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Western countries imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, aimed at cutting off its crucial supply lanes.

While experiencing a sudden drop in microelectronics imports in 2022, Russia has rebounded to prewar levels since then, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.

As China has played an increasingly important role in Russia's sanctions circumvention, Western efforts have recently zeroed in on Chinese companies.

Following repeated warnings issued toward Beijing, the U.S. announced on May 1 a package of sanctions against almost 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia's war effort.

The EU's 13th sanctions package also included China-based entities helping Moscow dodge restrictive measures.

In a separate effort to pressure Beijing, the U.S. added 37 Chinese entities to the trade blacklist due to security reasons, including 11 of them accused of being connected to last year's espionage incident, the U.S. Commerce Department said on May 9.

Nevertheless, while China's monthly transactions with Russia dropped in early 2024 compared to their peak of $600 million last December, the country remains the leading supplier of high-priority goods, Carnegie Endowment said.

According to Lucas, sanctions can function as a deterrent and make it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade with Russia, but their "record of changing decisions is quite limited."

"The U.S. and Europe are not making China's life easier, but they still find many ways to bypass sanctions. So, honestly, we are several steps behind being efficient in the full sanctions regime," Boulègue said.

While there is little that Kyiv's allies can do regarding trade with Chinese-made products, there is certainly room for improvement in curtailing the re-exports of Western goods.

Under the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule, the U.S. authorities can regulate re-exports not only of American-made products but also of foreign-produced items whose production involves U.S. software or technology.

"And then it becomes a question of enforcement," Hilgenstock noted.

While the EU does not have such a rule, its past sanctions included additional restrictions on further re-exports to Russia from third-party companies.

Sanctioning such entities also has its limits, however. A common practice in Russia's evasion schemes is foreign-based shell companies that can be dissolved and re-registered as formally new entities after being targeted by sanctions.

For this method to be effective, "you have to do it comprehensively. So not just one or two of these intermediaries, but rather all of them, you would have to do it consistently across all of the coalition's jurisdictions," Hilgenstock commented.

One positive impact that may not be apparent at first sight is the change in value of the products rather than their volumes.

Hilgenstock said that there is some evidence that "Russia is paying significantly more money simply because the Chinese know that Russia desperately needs" these supplies.

This mirrors the situation in Russia's oil exports. Sanctions forced Moscow to pivot from European markets to India and China while selling their product at a significant discount.

"We're not going to stop every single battlefield item from reaching Russia, but if we can make them significantly more expensive, that would be a very promising avenue," Hilgenstock concluded.

Archived link.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Europe this week to discuss Ukraine and trade, China remains Russia's leading source of sanctioned dual-use goods, fueling the ongoing war.

"Around 90% of the goods deemed high priority products by the Western countries... (was) supplied by China" as Chinese-made products or re-exported goods in 2023, a sharp rise from 30% in 2021, Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told the Kyiv Independent.

China-based companies pour a range of items – from drones to microchips and machine parts – into Russia, including products made in China and those that bypass Western export controls via Chinese entities.

Beijing has thus far refused to commit direct lethal weapons to Russia's war, and both Kyiv and the EU sought to engage it in peace efforts, hoping to leverage its influence over Moscow.

Bringing China to the Ukraine-led Peace Summit planned in Switzerland for mid-June is among Kyiv's top priorities, a source in the president's office told the Kyiv Independent.

The flow of dual-use goods indicates that China is not as neutral in the war as it wishes to appear.

"More effort is needed to curtail the delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 6 after meeting Xi in Paris.

Washington warned its partners in April that the level of this support is only increasing, extending also to geospatial intelligence and missile propellants.

While the West's options are limited regarding China selling its own products, there are avenues of action when it comes to re-selling Western goods and bypassing sanctions.

A coordinated action by Western partners could help drive up the costs for Russia and China, curtailing this critical lifeline, experts say.

What is Russia buying from China?

In 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90% of Russia's imports of approximately 50 items included in the G7 "high-priority" sanctioned goods list, such as microelectronics, navigation and communication equipment, optics, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools.

China serves both as a producer of these items and as an intermediary for their re-export from other countries, helping to bypass sanctions.

The country's role as Moscow's lifeline for economic output and military production has risen sharply since the West imposed extensive trade restrictions on Russia.

While Chinese overall exports to the rest of the world have grown by 29% since 2021, exports to Russia have spiked by a whopping 121%, underscoring the role of their partnership.

When it comes to individual dual-use items, the sales of semi-conductors – vital for the manufacturing of communication systems, radars, missile guidance, or electronic warfare equipment – jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to the Free Russia Foundation.

Several sectors of Russia's defense industry and military capabilities are boosted by Chinese trade.

"(Russia's) logistics machine is really important. So trucks, spare parts, forklift trucks, all those sorts of things that keep the war machine going," China can provide, said Edward Lucas, a senior advisor at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in a comment for the Kyiv Independent.

Other key components include drone parts and complete off-the-shelf drones, microchips, and other electronics, the expert added.

"When you look at what China is providing to Russia, it is less about (whole) systems, it is more about parts, specifically microelectronics, that China has been increasingly providing to Russia for the past few years… (which are then) integrated into weapon systems," Mathieu Boulègue, a senior fellow at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.

"The core of what China is providing Russia with right now are mostly spare parts, detached parts, microelectronics, components that are cannibalized by the Russian military industry."

Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute focused on the sanctions regime against Russia, told the Kyiv Independent that we can see China playing three different roles when it comes to the dual-goods flow.

"So there are Chinese companies producing goods that Russia imports and needs for its military. The second role… is that there are foreign companies, including Western ones, that have production facilities in China," Hilgenstock said, adding: "These are not goods from Chinese producers, but they're made in China."

"And then the third role is Chinese entities as final sellers of these goods to Russia from Western companies."

Between January and October 2023, 41% of "battlefield goods" (the aforementioned ≈50 goods defined as "high priority" by the U.S., the EU, and other allies) supplied to Russia were produced by China-based firms, a report by the KSE Institute and the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group shows.

The percentage is almost the same for "critical components" (KSE's term for other dual-use goods that go beyond the definition set by the U.S. and other partners), making companies headquartered in China the leading source in both cases, followed by the U.S., Taiwan, and the EU.

Chinese tech giant Huawei was Russia's top provider of critical components for the first 10 months of 2023 ($530 million) and the second most significant source of battlefield goods ($286 million) after the American Intel. China's Lenovo and Hikvision also rank high in both indicators.

China's role as the global manufacturing leader comes into play as well. The KSE's research shows that 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components sent to Russia during much of the last year were produced in China-based plants (including factories owned by foreign companies).

Similarly notable is the role of Chinese companies as final sellers. In terms of battlefield goods, 38% were sold to Russia from China and 30.9% from Hong Kong between January and October 2023. As for critical components, the percentages are 38.9% for China and 18.1% for Hong Kong.

The Chinese share in Russia's dual-use goods supply is not as high in the KSE Institute's report as the 90% figure presented by Carnegie Endowment, but the former examines the individual roles that China plays in this process, which do not always overlap. In the end, both organizations agree that China is Moscow's one source of these products.

Lucas stresses, however, that "it would be a mistake to say that China is the only lifeline of Russia's war machine."

Moscow showed dexterity in circumventing Western sanctions through other intermediaries, like the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. It has obtained wholesale battlefield goods from Iran and North Korea, and its own economy is in war mode, producing more artillery shells than the U.S. or the EU can currently provide to Ukraine.

"If you remove China's help completely, tomorrow, it would indeed impact certain segments of the (Russian) military industry… (but) unfortunately, Russia is fully able to continue waging war by itself without China's support," Boulègue said.

One curious aspect is that even though customs data show extensive Chinese supplies flowing to Russia, they represent a disproportionately small portion of foreign-made components found in Russian weapon systems on Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese products amounted to a mere 4% of the 2,800 foreign parts found in Russian missiles, drones, and armored vehicles and documented by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. This pales in comparison to nearly three-quarters of the sum being U.S.-made parts.

Hilgenstock offers two possible explanations for this discrepancy.

"One hypothesis is that (Russia) hasn't been able to substitute the Western goods" with Chinese products, he said. This would give the West powerful leverage to curb the supplies by its own efforts, but it also indicates that the current export controls are not as effective as hoped.

"The second hypothesis is that Russia does not have to substitute the (Western) parts because it still has access to them," the expert suggested.

What are China's goals?

Unlike other Moscow's partners like Iran or North Korea, Beijing has staved off from supplying direct lethal assistance. This has allowed China to continue supporting Russia under the veil of plausible deniability.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has dismissed criticism against China by the West, saying its exports to Russia fall within the confines of "normal cooperation."

Despite its apparent affinity toward the Kremlin and hostility toward Washington, China's rhetoric has been constrained regarding Ukraine, calling instead for a mutually satisfactory peaceful resolution.

Looking beneath the veneer of pacifist proclamations, Beijing's role in assisting Russia's war machine is hard to deny.

Given the Chinese government's sway over the domestic business sector, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-use goods supplies are happening without its tacit approval.

According to Sher, "Given the size and scope of these transactions, it does seem like it's more than just Chinese companies looking to turn a profit... the Chinese government is likely aware of these transactions."

"If you change the optics a little bit, I would argue that China is providing lethal aid to Russia. It's not direct lethal aid, but military components and parts that are used to kill Ukrainians," Boulègue said.

"Of course, there is a big difference between providing a missile system and electronics that go into a radar used inside that missile. But still… I think we could argue that China is indeed providing a form of indirect lethal aid to Russia," he added.

Chinese companies can capitalize on Russia's growing demand, while Beijing is also likely interested in curtailing Western influence, and its partnership with Moscow is a key piece in this puzzle.

Yet, there are clear limits that Beijing has to respect as a global geopolitical player. While it wishes to support Russia against the West, it does not want to get its hands too dirty, tarnish its international reputation, and attract further costly sanctions from the EU or the U.S., experts say.

"(China) needs to put a critical distance between what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what it hopes to accomplish in the international arena because it brings too much attention, too much heat," Boulègue commented.

"In that sort of… geopolitical battle between the United States and China, they definitely do not want to overreach."

During Xi's visit, EU officials acknowledged Beijing's past efforts to moderate Russia's nuclear saber-rattling or its refusal to provide lethal aid.

Many observers noted that China is playing a careful balancing game, seeking to woo the EU and drive a wedge between it and the U.S. Given Europe's support for Ukraine, this naturally means treading carefully on war-related issues.

"The Americans would love everyone close ranks against Russia and China. China doesn't want that," Lucas noted.

What can the West do?

Shortly after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Western countries imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, aimed at cutting off its crucial supply lanes.

While experiencing a sudden drop in microelectronics imports in 2022, Russia has rebounded to prewar levels since then, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.

As China has played an increasingly important role in Russia's sanctions circumvention, Western efforts have recently zeroed in on Chinese companies.

Following repeated warnings issued toward Beijing, the U.S. announced on May 1 a package of sanctions against almost 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia's war effort.

The EU's 13th sanctions package also included China-based entities helping Moscow dodge restrictive measures.

In a separate effort to pressure Beijing, the U.S. added 37 Chinese entities to the trade blacklist due to security reasons, including 11 of them accused of being connected to last year's espionage incident, the U.S. Commerce Department said on May 9.

Nevertheless, while China's monthly transactions with Russia dropped in early 2024 compared to their peak of $600 million last December, the country remains the leading supplier of high-priority goods, Carnegie Endowment said.

According to Lucas, sanctions can function as a deterrent and make it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade with Russia, but their "record of changing decisions is quite limited."

"The U.S. and Europe are not making China's life easier, but they still find many ways to bypass sanctions. So, honestly, we are several steps behind being efficient in the full sanctions regime," Boulègue said.

While there is little that Kyiv's allies can do regarding trade with Chinese-made products, there is certainly room for improvement in curtailing the re-exports of Western goods.

Under the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule, the U.S. authorities can regulate re-exports not only of American-made products but also of foreign-produced items whose production involves U.S. software or technology.

"And then it becomes a question of enforcement," Hilgenstock noted.

While the EU does not have such a rule, its past sanctions included additional restrictions on further re-exports to Russia from third-party companies.

Sanctioning such entities also has its limits, however. A common practice in Russia's evasion schemes is foreign-based shell companies that can be dissolved and re-registered as formally new entities after being targeted by sanctions.

For this method to be effective, "you have to do it comprehensively. So not just one or two of these intermediaries, but rather all of them, you would have to do it consistently across all of the coalition's jurisdictions," Hilgenstock commented.

One positive impact that may not be apparent at first sight is the change in value of the products rather than their volumes.

Hilgenstock said that there is some evidence that "Russia is paying significantly more money simply because the Chinese know that Russia desperately needs" these supplies.

This mirrors the situation in Russia's oil exports. Sanctions forced Moscow to pivot from European markets to India and China while selling their product at a significant discount.

"We're not going to stop every single battlefield item from reaching Russia, but if we can make them significantly more expensive, that would be a very promising avenue," Hilgenstock concluded.

Archived link.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping toured Europe this week to discuss Ukraine and trade, China remains Russia's leading source of sanctioned dual-use goods, fueling the ongoing war.

"Around 90% of the goods deemed high priority products by the Western countries... (was) supplied by China" as Chinese-made products or re-exported goods in 2023, a sharp rise from 30% in 2021, Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told the Kyiv Independent.

China-based companies pour a range of items – from drones to microchips and machine parts – into Russia, including products made in China and those that bypass Western export controls via Chinese entities.

Beijing has thus far refused to commit direct lethal weapons to Russia's war, and both Kyiv and the EU sought to engage it in peace efforts, hoping to leverage its influence over Moscow.

Bringing China to the Ukraine-led Peace Summit planned in Switzerland for mid-June is among Kyiv's top priorities, a source in the president's office told the Kyiv Independent.

The flow of dual-use goods indicates that China is not as neutral in the war as it wishes to appear.

"More effort is needed to curtail the delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on May 6 after meeting Xi in Paris.

Washington warned its partners in April that the level of this support is only increasing, extending also to geospatial intelligence and missile propellants.

While the West's options are limited regarding China selling its own products, there are avenues of action when it comes to re-selling Western goods and bypassing sanctions.

A coordinated action by Western partners could help drive up the costs for Russia and China, curtailing this critical lifeline, experts say.

What is Russia buying from China?

In 2023, China was responsible for roughly 90% of Russia's imports of approximately 50 items included in the G7 "high-priority" sanctioned goods list, such as microelectronics, navigation and communication equipment, optics, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools.

China serves both as a producer of these items and as an intermediary for their re-export from other countries, helping to bypass sanctions.

The country's role as Moscow's lifeline for economic output and military production has risen sharply since the West imposed extensive trade restrictions on Russia.

While Chinese overall exports to the rest of the world have grown by 29% since 2021, exports to Russia have spiked by a whopping 121%, underscoring the role of their partnership.

When it comes to individual dual-use items, the sales of semi-conductors – vital for the manufacturing of communication systems, radars, missile guidance, or electronic warfare equipment – jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to the Free Russia Foundation.

Several sectors of Russia's defense industry and military capabilities are boosted by Chinese trade.

"(Russia's) logistics machine is really important. So trucks, spare parts, forklift trucks, all those sorts of things that keep the war machine going," China can provide, said Edward Lucas, a senior advisor at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA), in a comment for the Kyiv Independent.

Other key components include drone parts and complete off-the-shelf drones, microchips, and other electronics, the expert added.

"When you look at what China is providing to Russia, it is less about (whole) systems, it is more about parts, specifically microelectronics, that China has been increasingly providing to Russia for the past few years… (which are then) integrated into weapon systems," Mathieu Boulègue, a senior fellow at CEPA, told the Kyiv Independent.

"The core of what China is providing Russia with right now are mostly spare parts, detached parts, microelectronics, components that are cannibalized by the Russian military industry."

Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute focused on the sanctions regime against Russia, told the Kyiv Independent that we can see China playing three different roles when it comes to the dual-goods flow.

"So there are Chinese companies producing goods that Russia imports and needs for its military. The second role… is that there are foreign companies, including Western ones, that have production facilities in China," Hilgenstock said, adding: "These are not goods from Chinese producers, but they're made in China."

"And then the third role is Chinese entities as final sellers of these goods to Russia from Western companies."

Between January and October 2023, 41% of "battlefield goods" (the aforementioned ≈50 goods defined as "high priority" by the U.S., the EU, and other allies) supplied to Russia were produced by China-based firms, a report by the KSE Institute and the Yermak-McFaul International Working Group shows.

The percentage is almost the same for "critical components" (KSE's term for other dual-use goods that go beyond the definition set by the U.S. and other partners), making companies headquartered in China the leading source in both cases, followed by the U.S., Taiwan, and the EU.

Chinese tech giant Huawei was Russia's top provider of critical components for the first 10 months of 2023 ($530 million) and the second most significant source of battlefield goods ($286 million) after the American Intel. China's Lenovo and Hikvision also rank high in both indicators.

China's role as the global manufacturing leader comes into play as well. The KSE's research shows that 63.1% of battlefield goods and 58.7% of critical components sent to Russia during much of the last year were produced in China-based plants (including factories owned by foreign companies).

Similarly notable is the role of Chinese companies as final sellers. In terms of battlefield goods, 38% were sold to Russia from China and 30.9% from Hong Kong between January and October 2023. As for critical components, the percentages are 38.9% for China and 18.1% for Hong Kong.

The Chinese share in Russia's dual-use goods supply is not as high in the KSE Institute's report as the 90% figure presented by Carnegie Endowment, but the former examines the individual roles that China plays in this process, which do not always overlap. In the end, both organizations agree that China is Moscow's one source of these products.

Lucas stresses, however, that "it would be a mistake to say that China is the only lifeline of Russia's war machine."

Moscow showed dexterity in circumventing Western sanctions through other intermediaries, like the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. It has obtained wholesale battlefield goods from Iran and North Korea, and its own economy is in war mode, producing more artillery shells than the U.S. or the EU can currently provide to Ukraine.

"If you remove China's help completely, tomorrow, it would indeed impact certain segments of the (Russian) military industry… (but) unfortunately, Russia is fully able to continue waging war by itself without China's support," Boulègue said.

One curious aspect is that even though customs data show extensive Chinese supplies flowing to Russia, they represent a disproportionately small portion of foreign-made components found in Russian weapon systems on Ukrainian battlefields.

Chinese products amounted to a mere 4% of the 2,800 foreign parts found in Russian missiles, drones, and armored vehicles and documented by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention. This pales in comparison to nearly three-quarters of the sum being U.S.-made parts.

Hilgenstock offers two possible explanations for this discrepancy.

"One hypothesis is that (Russia) hasn't been able to substitute the Western goods" with Chinese products, he said. This would give the West powerful leverage to curb the supplies by its own efforts, but it also indicates that the current export controls are not as effective as hoped.

"The second hypothesis is that Russia does not have to substitute the (Western) parts because it still has access to them," the expert suggested.

What are China's goals?

Unlike other Moscow's partners like Iran or North Korea, Beijing has staved off from supplying direct lethal assistance. This has allowed China to continue supporting Russia under the veil of plausible deniability.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has dismissed criticism against China by the West, saying its exports to Russia fall within the confines of "normal cooperation."

Despite its apparent affinity toward the Kremlin and hostility toward Washington, China's rhetoric has been constrained regarding Ukraine, calling instead for a mutually satisfactory peaceful resolution.

Looking beneath the veneer of pacifist proclamations, Beijing's role in assisting Russia's war machine is hard to deny.

Given the Chinese government's sway over the domestic business sector, it is difficult to imagine that the dual-use goods supplies are happening without its tacit approval.

According to Sher, "Given the size and scope of these transactions, it does seem like it's more than just Chinese companies looking to turn a profit... the Chinese government is likely aware of these transactions."

"If you change the optics a little bit, I would argue that China is providing lethal aid to Russia. It's not direct lethal aid, but military components and parts that are used to kill Ukrainians," Boulègue said.

"Of course, there is a big difference between providing a missile system and electronics that go into a radar used inside that missile. But still… I think we could argue that China is indeed providing a form of indirect lethal aid to Russia," he added.

Chinese companies can capitalize on Russia's growing demand, while Beijing is also likely interested in curtailing Western influence, and its partnership with Moscow is a key piece in this puzzle.

Yet, there are clear limits that Beijing has to respect as a global geopolitical player. While it wishes to support Russia against the West, it does not want to get its hands too dirty, tarnish its international reputation, and attract further costly sanctions from the EU or the U.S., experts say.

"(China) needs to put a critical distance between what Russia is doing in Ukraine and what it hopes to accomplish in the international arena because it brings too much attention, too much heat," Boulègue commented.

"In that sort of… geopolitical battle between the United States and China, they definitely do not want to overreach."

During Xi's visit, EU officials acknowledged Beijing's past efforts to moderate Russia's nuclear saber-rattling or its refusal to provide lethal aid.

Many observers noted that China is playing a careful balancing game, seeking to woo the EU and drive a wedge between it and the U.S. Given Europe's support for Ukraine, this naturally means treading carefully on war-related issues.

"The Americans would love everyone close ranks against Russia and China. China doesn't want that," Lucas noted.

What can the West do?

Shortly after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Western countries imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, aimed at cutting off its crucial supply lanes.

While experiencing a sudden drop in microelectronics imports in 2022, Russia has rebounded to prewar levels since then, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said.

As China has played an increasingly important role in Russia's sanctions circumvention, Western efforts have recently zeroed in on Chinese companies.

Following repeated warnings issued toward Beijing, the U.S. announced on May 1 a package of sanctions against almost 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies accused of aiding Russia's war effort.

The EU's 13th sanctions package also included China-based entities helping Moscow dodge restrictive measures.

In a separate effort to pressure Beijing, the U.S. added 37 Chinese entities to the trade blacklist due to security reasons, including 11 of them accused of being connected to last year's espionage incident, the U.S. Commerce Department said on May 9.

Nevertheless, while China's monthly transactions with Russia dropped in early 2024 compared to their peak of $600 million last December, the country remains the leading supplier of high-priority goods, Carnegie Endowment said.

According to Lucas, sanctions can function as a deterrent and make it more difficult for Chinese companies to trade with Russia, but their "record of changing decisions is quite limited."

"The U.S. and Europe are not making China's life easier, but they still find many ways to bypass sanctions. So, honestly, we are several steps behind being efficient in the full sanctions regime," Boulègue said.

While there is little that Kyiv's allies can do regarding trade with Chinese-made products, there is certainly room for improvement in curtailing the re-exports of Western goods.

Under the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule, the U.S. authorities can regulate re-exports not only of American-made products but also of foreign-produced items whose production involves U.S. software or technology.

"And then it becomes a question of enforcement," Hilgenstock noted.

While the EU does not have such a rule, its past sanctions included additional restrictions on further re-exports to Russia from third-party companies.

Sanctioning such entities also has its limits, however. A common practice in Russia's evasion schemes is foreign-based shell companies that can be dissolved and re-registered as formally new entities after being targeted by sanctions.

For this method to be effective, "you have to do it comprehensively. So not just one or two of these intermediaries, but rather all of them, you would have to do it consistently across all of the coalition's jurisdictions," Hilgenstock commented.

One positive impact that may not be apparent at first sight is the change in value of the products rather than their volumes.

Hilgenstock said that there is some evidence that "Russia is paying significantly more money simply because the Chinese know that Russia desperately needs" these supplies.

This mirrors the situation in Russia's oil exports. Sanctions forced Moscow to pivot from European markets to India and China while selling their product at a significant discount.

"We're not going to stop every single battlefield item from reaching Russia, but if we can make them significantly more expensive, that would be a very promising avenue," Hilgenstock concluded.

Tens of thousands of Georgians have taken to the streets of the capital Tbilisi on Saturday evening to protest a controversial "foreign influence" bill backed by the government.

Protesters marched to the capital's Europe Square holding Georgian and EU flags, chanting “no to the Russian law”.

The law would target civil society organisations and independent media that receive foreign funding.

Massive rallies have gripped the Black Sea Caucasus country for nearly a month after the ruling Georgian Dream party reintroduced the bill.

Despite a campaign of intimidation ahead of Saturday's rally - in which dozens of NGO workers, activists and opposition politicians received threats or were physically assaulted - protesters turned up in their thousands undeterred by the pouring rain.

Opposition parties say the bill - coined "Russian law" after Russia's passing of similar legislation in 2012 - will be used by the government to clamp down on dissent.

The US has said the bill threatens free speech.

In neighbouring Russia, the law has since been used to marginalise voices challenging the Kremlin - including prominent cultural figures, media organisations and civil society groups.

Many Georgians in the rally do not want Russia's authoritarian-style leadership crossing into their country.

"We don't need to return to the Soviet Union," 38-year-old Georgian-language teacher Lela Tsiklauri, said.

"We are protecting our European future and our freedom," said another protester, Mariam Meunrgia, 39, who works for a German company.

The law, if passed, could harm Georgia's attempt to join the EU, which has given it candidate status.

On Friday, foreign ministers of Nordic and Baltic states issued a joint statement urging the government in Tbilisi to reconsider the bill

Last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Georgian people want a "European future".

"Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe," she posted on X.

But the Georgian Dream government has defended the bill, saying it will "boost transparency" over NGOs' foreign funding. It aims to sign the measure into law by mid-May.

If adopted, the law would require that any independent NGO and media organisation receiving more than 20% of its funding from abroad to register as an "organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power".

But the protesters fear it could be used to crush critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections later this year.

The bill cleared its second parliamentary stage by a margin of 83 votes to 23. After a third reading, it has to be signed by President Salome Zurabishvili, who has vowed to veto it - although Georgian Dream has sufficient numbers in parliament to overrule her.

In 2023, mass street protests forced Georgian Dream to drop plans for similar measures.

Tens of thousands of Georgians have taken to the streets of the capital Tbilisi on Saturday evening to protest a controversial "foreign influence" bill backed by the government.

Protesters marched to the capital's Europe Square holding Georgian and EU flags, chanting “no to the Russian law”.

The law would target civil society organisations and independent media that receive foreign funding.

Massive rallies have gripped the Black Sea Caucasus country for nearly a month after the ruling Georgian Dream party reintroduced the bill.

Despite a campaign of intimidation ahead of Saturday's rally - in which dozens of NGO workers, activists and opposition politicians received threats or were physically assaulted - protesters turned up in their thousands undeterred by the pouring rain.

Opposition parties say the bill - coined "Russian law" after Russia's passing of similar legislation in 2012 - will be used by the government to clamp down on dissent.

The US has said the bill threatens free speech.

In neighbouring Russia, the law has since been used to marginalise voices challenging the Kremlin - including prominent cultural figures, media organisations and civil society groups.

Many Georgians in the rally do not want Russia's authoritarian-style leadership crossing into their country.

"We don't need to return to the Soviet Union," 38-year-old Georgian-language teacher Lela Tsiklauri, said.

"We are protecting our European future and our freedom," said another protester, Mariam Meunrgia, 39, who works for a German company.

The law, if passed, could harm Georgia's attempt to join the EU, which has given it candidate status.

On Friday, foreign ministers of Nordic and Baltic states issued a joint statement urging the government in Tbilisi to reconsider the bill

Last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Georgian people want a "European future".

"Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe," she posted on X.

But the Georgian Dream government has defended the bill, saying it will "boost transparency" over NGOs' foreign funding. It aims to sign the measure into law by mid-May.

If adopted, the law would require that any independent NGO and media organisation receiving more than 20% of its funding from abroad to register as an "organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power".

But the protesters fear it could be used to crush critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections later this year.

The bill cleared its second parliamentary stage by a margin of 83 votes to 23. After a third reading, it has to be signed by President Salome Zurabishvili, who has vowed to veto it - although Georgian Dream has sufficient numbers in parliament to overrule her.

In 2023, mass street protests forced Georgian Dream to drop plans for similar measures.

Tens of thousands of Georgians have taken to the streets of the capital Tbilisi on Saturday evening to protest a controversial "foreign influence" bill backed by the government.

Protesters marched to the capital's Europe Square holding Georgian and EU flags, chanting “no to the Russian law”.

The law would target civil society organisations and independent media that receive foreign funding.

Massive rallies have gripped the Black Sea Caucasus country for nearly a month after the ruling Georgian Dream party reintroduced the bill.

Despite a campaign of intimidation ahead of Saturday's rally - in which dozens of NGO workers, activists and opposition politicians received threats or were physically assaulted - protesters turned up in their thousands undeterred by the pouring rain.

Opposition parties say the bill - coined "Russian law" after Russia's passing of similar legislation in 2012 - will be used by the government to clamp down on dissent.

The US has said the bill threatens free speech.

In neighbouring Russia, the law has since been used to marginalise voices challenging the Kremlin - including prominent cultural figures, media organisations and civil society groups.

Many Georgians in the rally do not want Russia's authoritarian-style leadership crossing into their country.

"We don't need to return to the Soviet Union," 38-year-old Georgian-language teacher Lela Tsiklauri, said.

"We are protecting our European future and our freedom," said another protester, Mariam Meunrgia, 39, who works for a German company.

The law, if passed, could harm Georgia's attempt to join the EU, which has given it candidate status.

On Friday, foreign ministers of Nordic and Baltic states issued a joint statement urging the government in Tbilisi to reconsider the bill

Last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the Georgian people want a "European future".

"Georgia is at a crossroads. It should stay the course on the road to Europe," she posted on X.

But the Georgian Dream government has defended the bill, saying it will "boost transparency" over NGOs' foreign funding. It aims to sign the measure into law by mid-May.

If adopted, the law would require that any independent NGO and media organisation receiving more than 20% of its funding from abroad to register as an "organisation pursuing the interests of a foreign power".

But the protesters fear it could be used to crush critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections later this year.

The bill cleared its second parliamentary stage by a margin of 83 votes to 23. After a third reading, it has to be signed by President Salome Zurabishvili, who has vowed to veto it - although Georgian Dream has sufficient numbers in parliament to overrule her.

In 2023, mass street protests forced Georgian Dream to drop plans for similar measures.

Three decades ago, Chinese dissidents were being smuggled out of the country in a secret operation called Yellow Bird - but as one of them tells the BBC, Beijing is still pursuing them.

June 1992: It was the middle of the night on the South China Sea, and a Chinese patrol vessel was approaching a boat en route from the Communist mainland to the then-British colony of Hong Kong.

As border troops came on board to talk to the crew, their voices could be heard by a group of people packed into a secret compartment below deck.

A few minutes earlier, when the patrol boat was spotted, these secret passengers had been given an urgent order.

“I was told to hide,” one of them, Yan Xiong, recalls. “Don’t make any noise!”

Most of those hiding were economic migrants, hoping to find work in Hong Kong – but not Yan.

He was a political dissident, and if he was discovered, he would be in serious trouble.

Yan was being smuggled out of China as part of a secret operation code-named Yellow Bird.

The patrol eventually sailed away, and in the early hours Yan - who had never travelled in a boat before that night - arrived in Hong Kong.

After a hearty breakfast, he was taken to a detention centre. This was, he was told, for his own safety. Walking the streets could be dangerous.

Being in detention was not new to Yan. He had already spent 19 months in a Chinese prison for his part in 1989’s Tiananmen Square protests. Students had called for greater democracy and freedom, but the Communist Party sent in tanks to crush them.

At the end of June 1989, the Chinese government said that 200 civilians and several dozen security personnel had died. Other estimates have ranged from hundreds to many thousands.

On his release, Yan had made his way to southern China where, in scenes that could have been taken from a spy film, he was sent from one public phone booth to another, to be put in touch with the people who could get him out.

He was not the only dissident to undertake this risky journey.

Speaking to the BBC for a new series, Shadow War: China and the West, Chaohua Wang recalls her escape.

Despite being number 14 on a list of the 21 most wanted people after the Tiananmen Square protests, she managed to evade capture, hiding in tiny rooms for months before heading south and becoming part of the Yellow Bird escape line.

“I was like a parcel moved from one [person] to another,” she says.

“I didn't even know the name Yellow Bird for quite some years.”

Yellow Bird may sound like a classic spy operation, and many believed that an intelligence service - MI6 or the CIA - had come up with the idea. But they had not.

In fact, it was a private enterprise undertaken by concerned groups of citizens in Hong Kong, motivated by a desire to help out those who were among the run. Among them were the local film and entertainment industry and (more usefully) organised crime, in the form of the triads.

"They [the triads] had a lot of Chinese police in their pockets,” says Nigel Inkster, who at that time was an intelligence officer based in Hong Kong. This was what enabled them to move people out of hiding in Beijing and smuggle them across the border.

The UK and US only became involved when those people who arrived in Hong Kong needed to work out where to go next.

Yan remembers being visited by what he described as an “English gentleman” who never gave his name but helped him with the paperwork.

“It is better for you to go to America, not England,” the man told him. Within days Yan was in Los Angeles.  Chaohua Wang also ended up in the US.

Why not England?

Former officials have told the BBC the UK was reluctant to take in Tiananmen protesters because it was desperate to avoid upsetting China in the run-up to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.

An agreement had been signed by the UK in 1984, but the events of Tiananmen Square five years later raised difficult questions about Hong Kong’s future.

In 1992, a few weeks after Yan’s arrival in the colony, the former Conservative cabinet minister Chris Patten became the last governor of Hong Kong.

He says he was determined to embed greater democracy, in the hope it would endure after the handover, and he announced proposals for the democratic reform of Hong Kong's institutions, aimed at broadening the voting base in elections.

There was opposition to the reforms not just from China’s leadership but also from those in London who did not want to antagonise Beijing.

“My main responsibility was to try to give people in Hong Kong the best chance of continuing to live in freedom and prosperity, and to do so after 1997,” the former governor, now Lord Patten, tells me. He says he also was aware of - but not involved in - Yellow Bird.

The reluctance to allow dissidents to come to the UK - and the anger in some quarters about Patten’s reforms - speaks to a central question from the 1990s which still matters today: How far should the West go to avoid angering China and accommodate its rise, especially when it comes to values like human rights and democracy?

Yellow Bird ended on the rainy night in July 1997 when Hong Kong became sovereign Chinese territory. For a few years, the liberties that Patten had been trying to secure, held. But in the past decade, China - under Xi Jinping - has taken a more authoritarian turn and has tried to bring Hong Kong into line.

Yan took US citizenship and lived a model American life. He joined the US army and served in Iraq as a military chaplain.

He might have thought the hand of China’s Communist Party could not reach him in his new home, but he was wrong.

In 2021, he decided to run for public office. He stood as a candidate in the Democratic primary for New York's 1st Congressional District.

Yan started noticing some odd occurrences during his campaign. Strange cars followed him and lurked outside where he was staying at three in the morning. At campaign events, people would try to block him from speaking.

He learned why when the FBI came to talk to him. A US private investigator had told them he had been approached by an individual in China, who had asked him to carry out surveillance on Yan. It seems the idea of a former Tiananmen protester entering US Congress was unacceptable.

“He had specifically told our private investigator that they needed to undermine the victim’s candidacy,” says FBI agent Jason Moritz.

The FBI were able to monitor events as the Chinese-based individual proposed the investigator dig up dirt on Yan. If he could not find any, he was instructed to make some up. If that did not work, beating him up or even staging a car accident was suggested.

“They want to smother and kill my campaign,” Yan explains.

The person instructing the private investigator, the FBI assessed, was working on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. They were indicted but could not be arrested because they were outside the US.

China has consistently denied claims of political interference. But this is not the only case where it is alleged to have become more assertive in tracking down those it considers dissidents in other countries. There have been claims of “overseas police stations” in the UK and US and of individuals being pressured to return to China or be silent.

Yan’s story reveals that as China has become more confident and controlling at home, it has also sought to extend its reach abroad. And that is increasingly causing friction over issues of espionage, surveillance and human rights.

Meanwhile, Yan’s message to Western governments when dealing with China is simple: “They've got to be careful.”

Three decades ago, Chinese dissidents were being smuggled out of the country in a secret operation called Yellow Bird - but as one of them tells the BBC, Beijing is still pursuing them.

June 1992: It was the middle of the night on the South China Sea, and a Chinese patrol vessel was approaching a boat en route from the Communist mainland to the then-British colony of Hong Kong.

As border troops came on board to talk to the crew, their voices could be heard by a group of people packed into a secret compartment below deck.

A few minutes earlier, when the patrol boat was spotted, these secret passengers had been given an urgent order.

“I was told to hide,” one of them, Yan Xiong, recalls. “Don’t make any noise!”

Most of those hiding were economic migrants, hoping to find work in Hong Kong – but not Yan.

He was a political dissident, and if he was discovered, he would be in serious trouble.

Yan was being smuggled out of China as part of a secret operation code-named Yellow Bird.

The patrol eventually sailed away, and in the early hours Yan - who had never travelled in a boat before that night - arrived in Hong Kong.

After a hearty breakfast, he was taken to a detention centre. This was, he was told, for his own safety. Walking the streets could be dangerous.

Being in detention was not new to Yan. He had already spent 19 months in a Chinese prison for his part in 1989’s Tiananmen Square protests. Students had called for greater democracy and freedom, but the Communist Party sent in tanks to crush them.

At the end of June 1989, the Chinese government said that 200 civilians and several dozen security personnel had died. Other estimates have ranged from hundreds to many thousands.

On his release, Yan had made his way to southern China where, in scenes that could have been taken from a spy film, he was sent from one public phone booth to another, to be put in touch with the people who could get him out.

He was not the only dissident to undertake this risky journey.

Speaking to the BBC for a new series, Shadow War: China and the West, Chaohua Wang recalls her escape.

Despite being number 14 on a list of the 21 most wanted people after the Tiananmen Square protests, she managed to evade capture, hiding in tiny rooms for months before heading south and becoming part of the Yellow Bird escape line.

“I was like a parcel moved from one [person] to another,” she says.

“I didn't even know the name Yellow Bird for quite some years.”

Yellow Bird may sound like a classic spy operation, and many believed that an intelligence service - MI6 or the CIA - had come up with the idea. But they had not.

In fact, it was a private enterprise undertaken by concerned groups of citizens in Hong Kong, motivated by a desire to help out those who were among the run. Among them were the local film and entertainment industry and (more usefully) organised crime, in the form of the triads.

"They [the triads] had a lot of Chinese police in their pockets,” says Nigel Inkster, who at that time was an intelligence officer based in Hong Kong. This was what enabled them to move people out of hiding in Beijing and smuggle them across the border.

The UK and US only became involved when those people who arrived in Hong Kong needed to work out where to go next.

Yan remembers being visited by what he described as an “English gentleman” who never gave his name but helped him with the paperwork.

“It is better for you to go to America, not England,” the man told him. Within days Yan was in Los Angeles.  Chaohua Wang also ended up in the US.

Why not England?

Former officials have told the BBC the UK was reluctant to take in Tiananmen protesters because it was desperate to avoid upsetting China in the run-up to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.

An agreement had been signed by the UK in 1984, but the events of Tiananmen Square five years later raised difficult questions about Hong Kong’s future.

In 1992, a few weeks after Yan’s arrival in the colony, the former Conservative cabinet minister Chris Patten became the last governor of Hong Kong.

He says he was determined to embed greater democracy, in the hope it would endure after the handover, and he announced proposals for the democratic reform of Hong Kong's institutions, aimed at broadening the voting base in elections.

There was opposition to the reforms not just from China’s leadership but also from those in London who did not want to antagonise Beijing.

“My main responsibility was to try to give people in Hong Kong the best chance of continuing to live in freedom and prosperity, and to do so after 1997,” the former governor, now Lord Patten, tells me. He says he also was aware of - but not involved in - Yellow Bird.

The reluctance to allow dissidents to come to the UK - and the anger in some quarters about Patten’s reforms - speaks to a central question from the 1990s which still matters today: How far should the West go to avoid angering China and accommodate its rise, especially when it comes to values like human rights and democracy?

Yellow Bird ended on the rainy night in July 1997 when Hong Kong became sovereign Chinese territory. For a few years, the liberties that Patten had been trying to secure, held. But in the past decade, China - under Xi Jinping - has taken a more authoritarian turn and has tried to bring Hong Kong into line.

Yan took US citizenship and lived a model American life. He joined the US army and served in Iraq as a military chaplain.

He might have thought the hand of China’s Communist Party could not reach him in his new home, but he was wrong.

In 2021, he decided to run for public office. He stood as a candidate in the Democratic primary for New York's 1st Congressional District.

Yan started noticing some odd occurrences during his campaign. Strange cars followed him and lurked outside where he was staying at three in the morning. At campaign events, people would try to block him from speaking.

He learned why when the FBI came to talk to him. A US private investigator had told them he had been approached by an individual in China, who had asked him to carry out surveillance on Yan. It seems the idea of a former Tiananmen protester entering US Congress was unacceptable.

“He had specifically told our private investigator that they needed to undermine the victim’s candidacy,” says FBI agent Jason Moritz.

The FBI were able to monitor events as the Chinese-based individual proposed the investigator dig up dirt on Yan. If he could not find any, he was instructed to make some up. If that did not work, beating him up or even staging a car accident was suggested.

“They want to smother and kill my campaign,” Yan explains.

The person instructing the private investigator, the FBI assessed, was working on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. They were indicted but could not be arrested because they were outside the US.

China has consistently denied claims of political interference. But this is not the only case where it is alleged to have become more assertive in tracking down those it considers dissidents in other countries. There have been claims of “overseas police stations” in the UK and US and of individuals being pressured to return to China or be silent.

Yan’s story reveals that as China has become more confident and controlling at home, it has also sought to extend its reach abroad. And that is increasingly causing friction over issues of espionage, surveillance and human rights.

Meanwhile, Yan’s message to Western governments when dealing with China is simple: “They've got to be careful.”