Image depicts a destroyed Saudi pipeline pumping station.
My weekly preamble is in spoiler tags below.
preamble
If last week has had a geopolitical main character, it was Ansarallah in Yemen. In under 24 hours, they managed to seize a very large amount of territory to their west from Saudi-backed mercenary groups. Tens of thousands of enemy soldiers fled, thousands more were captured, and hundreds of combat vehicles and all sorts of military equipment and ammunition are now in Ansarallah's hands. The entire Red Sea coast of Yemen is now under their control, as well as some of the islands in and around the Bab el-Mandab, which is the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which then goes on to connect to the Arabian Sea.
While Ansarallah had a pretty good grip on the Red Sea beforehand and could blockade it to the extent that traffic through the Red Sea plummeted in 2024 and 2025 and remain subdued to this day, it is now capable of much more direct control. And the strait is considerably narrower than Hormuz, meaning there is little hope for any covert operations like those of which the US regularly tries and fails to do over there. The only alternatives for the enemies of Ansarallah both now and in the future are the route all the way around Africa, which becomes even less attractive than usual as fuel prices rise into daily record highs, or the newly inaugurated Northern Sea Route under the firm control of Russia.
While Ansarallah is likely to continue their territorial acquisitions to an extent - with Marib looking like an obvious target - how things will continue from this point seems likely to be increasingly diplomatic. Yemen was once divided between North Yemen (which is, really, western Yemen) and South Yemen (which is, really, eastern Yemen), and this division reflects several genuine historical differences between the populations. Ansarallah has repeatedly stated that they have no intention to militarily occupy the south, and indeed, they ended this most recent offensive at approximately the historical border. Nonetheless, the government in once-South Yemen's capital of Aden is considered the sole internationally recognized government of Yemen, which doesn't sound sustainable for the future, so we'll just have to see how the situation develops geopolitically from here, even if it's unlikely to be militarily in the case of the southern and eastern territories.
While all this has been going on, Ansarallah was additionally applying major pressure on Saudi Arabia itself, by bombing their military airfields and, even more critically, their oil transportation and production facilities. These strikes were mostly limited to the port facilities in e.g. Yanbu and Jazan, and the Western air interceptor famine has meant that these strikes were mostly unopposed and caused substantial losses. However, Ansarallah has now destroyed some pumping stations for the East-West pipeline that spans Saudi Arabia, bypassing Hormuz for some (but not all) of Saudi Arabia's oil production to the tune of around 4 million barrels per day, which is, in a happy numerical coincidence, about 4% of pre-2026 oil production. I've seen several wildly varying estimates for how long it might take to repair the stations, with some saying a few days and others stating at least a month; the damage does look pretty gnarly on the images. Of course, it might not really matter, because Ansarallah can easily just fire another missile at a station once it's repaired, unless and until the Saudis give in to Ansarallah's demands and end the war.
Last week's thread is here.
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The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine
Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:
UNRWA reports on the Zionists' destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.
English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.
Mirrors of Telegram channels that have been erased by Zionist censorship.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Sources:
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:
Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.
https://x.com/RoyalIntel_/status/2100051778158911608
Been following this osint for a while, usually almost always early with good reports
The Saudis are flying so low in videos it wouldn't be a suprise. Usually these days fighter jets want to fly at least 15 000ft AGL (above ground level) and drop PGMs to stay out of range of MANPADS, other IR SAM threats and AAA, even a golden BB from small arms fire can injure or kill crew at lower altitudes. Optics and targeting pods these days are more than good enough to see what's happening 15 000ft below, and the weather is clear, this isn't the Gulf War where A-10A pilots had to fly below 5000ft AGL to identify targets with binoculars and their eyeballs.
The general trends in aviation have been, towards the end of WW2, to fly higher to make interception very difficult (B-29), then fly even higher, above 50 000ft once the first SAMs and interceptors caught up (B-52), then to fly even higher (+60 000ft) and at twice the speed of sound (B-58) after the U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union, proving that even high altitude alone (+70 000ft) was not enough anymore, then to fly even higher (+80 000ft) and at three times the speed of sound (XB-70, SR-71). When three times the speed of sound and high altitude was no longer enough (XB-70 cancelled, SR-71 never overflew the USSR), the US reverted to very low altitude penetration with terrain following radar, 500ft AGL they would train at (F-111, modified B-52s). Then that low altitude penetration was combined with rudimentary low observability (B-1B, Tomahawk cruise missile). But with the invention of very low observability/stealth, improved ECM and SEAD/DEAD vs radar guided SAMs, and low altitude air defences becoming widely proliferated passive systems and very lethal, the current strategy is to stay at medium to high altitudes, out of range of the short range stuff, and rely on countermeasures vs radar guided longer range SAMs, with stealth aircraft at the beginning and even with non stealth aircraft once the longer range radar guided SAMs are suppressed. The Saudis should be staying at higher altitudes instead of providing a free air show for everyone, and have the capability to suppress the radar guided SAMs. Their current altitude, while low, is no where near low enough to be below the radar horizon anyways. If an air force lacks modern ECM, stealth and is up against high end air defence systems and an air force that can shoot them down, they revert to cold war era low penetration (Ukraine does this vs Russia, Ukraine does not constest the medium to high altitude regime, they stay very low, not crossing the line of contact, and fight from there).
One problem with the modern approach of staying high to avoid the kill zone of MANPADS and IR SAMs (passive systems that are very difficult to suppress) is that geography can help close the gap. Let's say you have a MANPAD with a 15 000ft flight ceiling, and live in a country with lots of mountain peaks above 10 000ft/3000m ASML. (Above Mean Sea Level). Now you have one guy climb to the top of the mountain with his FN-16 MANPAD or whatever other system, now he can hit anything up to 25 000ft AMSL that flies directly over his position. Now aircraft need to make sure that they clear every mountain top by over 15 000ft. In this case, pilots can be caught out if they don't, say over a mountainous area like Isfahan. Suddenly what was a safe altitude is no longer safe, and the aircraft is shot down by a guy with a MANPADS.
There is also those drones with MANPADs ducktaped to them.
huh, really? I was under the impression that it did
It didn't, because there was real risk it would be shot down by the S-200/SA-5 air defence system, which could hit targets at altitudes of over 130 000ft with upgraded missiles. it's why the XB-70, the Mach 3 nuclear bomber, was cancelled. The highest end SAMs at the time could fly higher and faster than these aircraft. The SR-71 mostly overflew Vietnam, which didn't have such systems, the SR-71 could outrun whatever SAMs Vietnam fired at it. Versus the USSR, the SR-71 was mostly used to get time sensitive reconnaissance of Soviet installations in the Barents Sea, especially their nuclear sub bases, and naval formations in the Baltics. The SR-71 also flew at such a high altitude and with advanced sensor packages for the time (SAR, oblique cameras), that it could see far into the USSR without overflight. To overly China's nuclear testing site, Lop Nur, during the cold war, the US used the Mach 3+ ramjet powered D-21 drone, which could fly a bit higher than the SR-71 and did not risk the capture of a pilot if shot down.
Modern stealth flying wing ISR remotely piloted aircraft such as the RQ-170 and RQ-180 are actually significantly better than the SR-71 and the D-21 in this regard, as they can actually enter the adversaries' airspace without being detected or shot down, and provide significantly more time on station with far greater endurance and the ability to circle over an area. The only advantage offered by the SR-71 is time to target because of it's speed. The US has made extensive use of these platforms in recent years, the RQ-170 spied on Maduro in Venezuela for weeks/months without the knowledge of the Venezuelans, it also overflew Pakistan to spy on Bin Laden, and apparently conducted reconnaissance on Crimea in 2022 according to leaked documents. It also overflew Iran for many years, with Iran capturing one. The RQ-180 was spotted operating out of Greece during airstrikes on Iran, and has been spotted over the Philippines on the way to China.
To be honest, in my opinion, the SR-71 is kind of like the Space Shuttle, overhyped because of nostalgia and "cool factor" when modern technology/alternatives perform the missions they were originally designed for significantly better. It's just that a stealth flying wing drone is not as cool to most people as a Mach 3+ aircraft, even if the flying wing does the job a whole lot better. And a SpaceX Falcon reusable rocket is not as cool as the Space Shuttle, even if the Falcon rocket actually fulfills the requirements a lot better.
Satellite and drone have replaced main use for spy plane. 1969 US can see Lop and Gansu mining area with satellite but not see enough to learn all information about test. First send D-21 after test 21-76 and 21-77, fail but succeed at overfly. Problem in 1969 failure to get it back. Control is not teleoperated, photo is on film. Problem do not exist any more.
Saudi has the means but as you said in another comment, their sortie rate is unthinkably low. They're clearly not the best trained airforce anyway - they've lost half a dozen or so 4th generation strike-interdiction aircraft to Houthi missiles at this point, but there's definitely an element of low availability of SEAD and/or PGMs to make the correct strategy less feasible.
It's hard to even fathom how any military with access to modern aircraft (and years of combat experience against this exact enemy!!!) could be performing so terribly out of incompetence alone.
The Saudis bought AGM-88 HARM and ALARM anti radiation missiles for their F-15SAs and Tornado IDS aircraft respectively, and bucket loads of PGMs since the original Obama administration arms deals, so I don't think availablity of munitions is the major issue. The Saudis just seem very bad at SEAD, and the Houthis have some advanced air defences with the Buk derivatives (I'm not sure what it's called in Yemen) for mobile radar guided systems and also lots of IR SAMs and FrankenSAM systems, and lots of combat experience against the US and Israeli air forces whom are much better than Saudi Arabia. Even if they didn't manage to shoot down an Israeli or American manned aircraft, they clearly learnt a lot from confronting them. No wonder Saudi Arabia wants stealth aircraft, though I highly doubt they'll get any. And even then, they'll probably be shot down anyways, stealth is not just about an aircraft, it's a whole set of tactics, techniques and procedures that are very complex.
Confirmed by the Yemeni Armed Forces.
and evidence https://t.me/MilitaryMediaY/46791
https://t.me/Middle_East_Spectator/36801
Same video, different telegram (yours appeared to be blocked on my vpn!)
You can see countermeasures being dropped from the aircraft before the hit. Fucking brutal btw, I doubt the pilot survived.
Also, I think he made some bizarre evasive maneuveres ??? If anything it would've only made interception easier by dumping speed at such low altitude - an average war thunder player could tell you AA missiles are at their slowest but most maneuverable in thicker air - playing Top Gun with your F-15 just kills your primary advantage.
I can never tell if the planes in these clips are being engaged with infrared or radar missiles. in most cases infrared is much more suited for passive, close range interception, however they are also easily deterred by counter measures. In the clip, these flares don't appear to be super bright against the jet's silhouette, which I would have expected given flares are supposed to mimic the heat signature of an aircraft. Although we're only seeing the result after the IR sensors have attempted to filtered out noise and countermeasures.
IMO it could have been an IR interception against an untrained pilot who dropped chaff instead of flares, or the IR systems are more advanced than the Saudis expected, or it was a radar intercept. Either way the footage will be displayed through IR for better visibility, it's just the tracking method I'm curious about.
Looking at the full video including the launch of the SAM, I'm guessing it's a Buk/SA-11/SA-17 derivative, Iran and the Houthis in Yemen have a lot of those, Raad, Tabas, and 3rd Khordad is what Iran calls them, I'm unaware of the Houthi designation. (Apparently it's the Barq-1 and Barq-2, depending on the variant ). The burn time of the rocket motor is around 15 seconds before it burns out in the night sky and disappears (to reappear on exploding in proximity with the F-15), which is the burn time of the missiles used in the SA-11 and SA-17. Most IR SAMs and MANPADS have a much shorter burn time on the rocket motor. Also, the hit is not rear aspect, a lot of IR systems will go for the heat signature of the engines (though more advanced IR seekers are all aspect these days). Also the explosion is quite large, looks like a large warhead, IR SAMs and MANPADS have much smaller warheads than radar guided missiles. The warhead on a Buk/SA-11 is 70kg/150lbs. The FN-16 MANPADS which shot down the F-15E over Iran has a 2.5kg/5.5lbs warhead. I'm guessing the pilots died on impact with the shrapnel from the warhead, there's a reason pilots hate these large radar guided SAMs, if it hits anywhere near the cockpit you're dead from all the fragmentation, and the missile will often "pull lead" with the guidance algorithm (it's also where the whole PATRIOT PAC-2 aims for the cockpit myth comes from) .
This is all just a guess based on the burn time mostly, and the size of the explosion on impact from the side.
V good points here. Surprised such older systems are so deadly ngl.
Buk is the deadliest air defence system in the Russia-Ukraine war according to pilots from both sides. It's a highly mobile radar guided SAM with electro optics as well, with an electronically scanned array radar, decent range, and with missiles that burn out at Mach 3-4 and can pull over 20G turns before hitting an aircraft with 150lbs of fragmentation, with semi active or active radar homing seekers. It can turn off it's radar and relocate very quickly and pop up almost anywhere to ambush aircraft. Just because the US has the SEAD/DEAD capabilities to eliminate these systems and make them a non factor (see the videos and photos of the Buk firing at US aircraft in Venezuela and the Buk getting hit by anti radiation missiles right afterwards) doesn't mean it's a bad system. It means that the US has invested a ton to defeat it (and every other double digit SA system and their derivatives) because it's dangerous to aircraft. These pop up, relocatable double digit SA systems are very deadly against anyone else. The Russians lost a Tu-22M3 bomber to a Buk ambush in Georgia on the first day of the war (in addition to 3 Su-25s), Ukraine and Russia have lost many aircraft to it. Most nation's air forces seem ill equipped to deal with such highly mobile systems with the range of the Buk.
This might work against Ansarallah given recent videos of the Saudis repeatedly airstriking their own mercenaries
Saudi F 15: Saudi mercenaries must go
AnsarAllah: who must go?
those "never been shot down" freaks are really quiet rn.