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In '91, the US specifically did not try to take over all of Iraq, but mainly focused on liberating Kuwait and pushing partially into Iraq for a short period. This was still the more Kissinger-esque generation of competent ghouls, who retained an inkling of how to fight a war with actually clearly defined and appropriately limited goals. They nevertheless inflicted heavy damage on the Iraqis, because the situation was just pretty lopsided:

• Firstly, the US was simply technologically far ahead. The Iraqi military was large, yes, but they simply did not have effective counters to the scale of US bombardment. Russia and China would both take lessons from this, and work on countermeasures (and the Soviets were to some extent already working on that), but the US, at this specific moment in time, was just on top.
• Secondly, the US was able to build up assets over the course of half a year pretty much uncontested. This is key to the success of the bombardment in the first point - without being able to move all these assets and munitions into place beforehand, the US wouldn't have been able to actually sustain the bombardment campaign for as long, and inflict as much damage on the Iraqis. Contrast that with the current situation, where as part of the US's buildup, they retreated from their closest bases in the region, rather than moving assets to them! This is the big change here - in the '80s and '90s, extensive deep strikes were mainly the prerogative of NATO, and more specifically the US. The advances in missile and drone technology have "democratized" deep strike capability - you no longer need to be the most well-funded military in the world with all your highly sophisticated planes and precision-guided munitions to manage this, a small-time insurgent outfit can buy a bunch of drones and execute strikes (admittedly, small ones) deep into enemy territory. This is what's making the current rumblings about boots on the ground ridiculous - what ground? Where are they going to stage the troops where they won't be hit before they even get to move out? This is the exact problem Russia and Ukraine are facing in their own war, they just can't build up a mass of troops for a big offensive since such concentrations are immediately seen by modern ISR, and are then rendered vulnerable to long-range strikes - so you need to disperse your troops, but then when they're dispersed they just don't have the mass to break through enemy lines and sustain a push.
• Thirdly, with the Soviets on their way out, and China still having a long way to go, the US was feeling like the king of the world and willing to expend a ludicrous amount of munitions on just this one war. A US that was facing a more hostile and not-Gorbacheved USSR may have been hesitant to actually dedicate all these assets to Iraq specifically, out of concern that this will leave their forces in Europe too sparsely-supplied - just as the modern US has to consider that each munition they expend here is one they won't have for China (although, in practice it seems like the people actually considering that aren't really being listened to, so they're draining their future capacity to fight China anyway).

For '03, Iraq had been under sanctions for over a decade by that point - and thanks to the economic devastation that wrought, the Iraqi political class and military leadership weren't particularly motivated, and were very vulnerable to bribery. Plus, Iraq as a country, was additionally vulnerable to sectarian tensions, so there were plenty of people rooting for the government to fall and ready to start jockeying for positions in the new post-war order. Remember how Assad's Syria kind of just dissolved, to all our collective shock? This wasn't quite as bad, but still, in reality, Coalition forces simply didn't do that much fighting

There was again a substantial build-up (I think around 4 months this time), lots of bombardment, and then they did a lighting-fast blitz on the capital, still managed to run into logistics issues, and were so lighting fast that they didn't actually really substantially damage the Iraqi army's manpower - they didn't exactly overrun them (unlike in '91, when there was actually a broad-front offensive, with Coalition forces inflicting heavy casualties all across it) - they mainly just punched a hole through to the capital. Not that that isn't impressive, but it has different strategic implications - Iraqi forces simply aren't actually being destroyed in such large numbers in this scenario. Coalition forces were so lighting fast that they kind of neglected to actually secure basically anything in the country outside of the immediate vicinity of the capital and a couple major cities, allowing tons upon tons of weaponry, and particularly explosives, to just fall into the hands of civilians. The IED crisis that Coalition forces later faced was pretty much of their own making - the insurgents didn't just conjure up all the ordnance they made their bombs out of from thin air, Coalition forces practically handed it to them.

Overall, the idea of '03 as a victory is heavily based on just arbitrarily drawing a line in the sand when Saddam's government falls, and pretending that the subsequent insurgency was just this independent Act of God that happened for completely unrelated reasons. Except, when you look into the composition of the insurgent forces, and find out that their core was literally just a whole bunch of former Iraqi Army soldiers, it kind of starts seeming like Coalition forces are essentially fighting the same entity they were fighting at the start, just having undergone a transformation. So, when you start viewing the whole thing as a single continuous conflict with several phases, it starts looking rather different - an initial victory, followed up by a grinding attritional quagmire that doesn't really end the best for the occupiers (although of course, they do manage to slaughter or otherwise ruin the lives of a substantial amount of civilians in the process, in typical imperial fashion)

10 years of sanctions, then the generals were bribed.

I guess you could listen to season 1 of blowback (the podcast and not the Mehdi Hasan show)

If you want a breakdown of all of the events of Iraq 2003 this video is nearly completely comprehensive: www.youtube.com/watch?v=pNYnhk_6YRY

My take: Iraq were easily defeated in conventional warfare due to technological superiority. They then won the following insurgency through asymmetrical tactics long after the opponent declared a victory that was never really completed.

By '03 the regular army was in complete disarray, thrown into a hopeless battle and they understood the only way out was to simply give up. On paper it was a big army with some, again on paper, decent formations, but in reality it was a hollow army that simply didn't have the will to fight an army they had fought about 10 years prior and completely massacred them with sheer airpower. The bulk of the fighting for the Iraqi side was carried out by the remnants of the Republican Guard (better equiped and more motivated, but nothing compared to what it used to be in the early 90s) and the Feyadeen Saddam, a militia loyal to Saddam and led by Qusay (his son). In fact the Feyadeen had some early successes against the US Coalition and can be seen as the proto-insurgency that would later appear.

Also defending in Iraq while being attacked from the southern deserts is not an easy task, Iran is different to the chain of mountains that offer a natural line of defense... in Iraq you kinda had to dig in and wait for your aviation + air defense network to do the heavy lifting (they tried, but it was almost hopeless). Another factor to keep in mind was the utter ridiculous massacre that was the Iran-Iraq War, both sides ended with heavy losses and attrition.

First time round was air superiority, second time the army was hollowed out from the first rounds of fighting.