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Saudi and Emiratis are just treatlerites

Of course, UAE is just another country comprised exclusively of wealthy exploiters and has absolutely no major internal class contradictions.

Saudi Arabia another very regular normal country where everyone is bought off which is why they are executing 1 person a day on average by death penalty, many for political reasons.

I'm going to reference some passages from The History of Saudi Arabia now, specifically Chapter 12, which covers the Ikhwan Revolt (not 5-7), so I look forward to you sharing where Vassiliev describes Ibn Saud as "crying to the British". All passages are taken from the US version published by New York University Press in 2000 (ISBN 0-8147-8809-2)

I think a good place to start would be covering how the British bombing and assault by armored vehicles of the Ikhwan was in response to Ikhwan raids of the British protectorates of Iraq, Transjordan, and Kuwait, without the request of Ibn Saud:

Although Ibn Saud’s position in the kingdom was becoming precarious, the British still considered him the only real force in the peninsula and intended to cooperate with him. They abandoned the attempt to preserve or establish a protectorate over the kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its dependencies. The vast and sparsely populated Arabian kingdom was surrounded by British colonies, protectorates and dependencies. Even if it remained independent, Britain felt that the kingdom would be unable to hurt British interests.

In May 1927 Clayton entered into negotiations with Ibn Saud in Jidda. On 20 May a seven-year treaty of ‘friendship and good intentions’ was concluded. Known as the treaty of Jidda, it abrogated the treaty of 1915 and recognized the ‘complete and absolute independence’ of Ibn Saud’s possessions. No special privileges were formally granted to Britain, but Ibn Saud recognized Britain’s special relations with the Gulf states and the Aden protectorates. Without recognizing Transjordan’s annexation of Aqaba and Maan, the king nevertheless agreed to observe the status quo up to the final delimitation between Hijaz and Transjordan. The conclusion of the treaty was a substantial success for Saudi diplomacy and sealed the independence of the new state.

Soon afterwards Britain afforded the Ikhwan a pretext for action against Iraq. In September 1927 a small detachment of Iraqi police was sent to construct a fort near the wells at Busaya, a watering-place in Iraqi territory, fairly close to the border. Ibn Saud protested, on the basis of the Muhammara agreement and Protocol No. 1, signed in alUqair. The Iraqi government stated that the post in Busaya was 80 miles [130 km] from the border and that it was a police post, not a military one. To the Najdis, there was no difference between a policeman and a soldier. Britain did not react to the Saudi protest, but Ibn Saud, under pressure from the Ikhwan, demanded that the fort be demolished.

Faisal Al Dawish considered the Iraqi action a suitable opportunity to isolate Ibn Saud from the Ikhwan and deliver the ‘infidels’ a blow. During the night of 6 November 1927 the Mutair murdered all the Iraqi policemen but one. British aircraft intervened on the Iraqi side and bombed the bedouin.

In early December, 400 Mutair raided Kuwaiti territory to the north-east of al-Jahra. On 13 December Shaikh Ahmad Jabir Al Sabah asked British aircraft to intervene. Ibn Saud had already informed Iraq and Kuwait that the raids were contrary to his orders. On 16 December the fort in Busaya was rebuilt and occupied by an Iraqi army platoon. From 1927 British aircraft had been engaged in frequent attacks on the Ikhwan. It was difficult to distinguish between the Ikhwan and peaceful tribes in the ocean of desert, and many innocent people were killed during the bombing. The Ikhwan’s raids continued up to February. According to Glubb, who took part in the events:

The real change in the situation, however, was that in 1927 Ibn Saud was no longer in complete control. The Ikhwan, as a result of their victories in the Hejaz, were intoxicated with their own strength, and claimed that it was their fighting power which had made Ibn Saud great. They were perfectly aware that they were the backbone of his army and that he possessed no regular forces with which to discipline them . . . Wahhabi religious feeling was too strong in Nejed to permit the Ikhwan to revolt. By challenging the king on the question of war with Iraq, however, the Ikhwan were able to claim religious sentiments on their side. The Iraqis were not Wahhabis and were therefore renegade Muslims, against whom holy war was a duty. It was Ibn Saud who was guilty of religious laxity in being unwilling to engage in hostilities against the enemies of God. The Nejdis were not prepared to use force to prevent the Ikhwan raiding Iraq.

The King was aiso in a dilemma in his foreign relations. He was unwilling to confess to other governments that he was no longer in control of his own subjects. Yet to claim that he was still in perfect control would expose him to protests and reproaches, if the Ikhwan raided contrary to his wishes. Busaiya provided him with a useful pretext. He proclaimed loudly that all had been well until the Iraq Government had been guilty of the aggressive action of building a police post in the desert, contrary to the al-Uqair Protocol. In view of this outrageous breach of faith, he stated that he could not be responsible of any counter-action taken by his subjects.

The contest which followed was in reality a three-comer one. The Ikhwan were indirectly rebelling against Ibn Saud. Both claimed Iraq to be the villains of the plot, because both were anxious to win the support of public opinion in Nejed.

Under the circumstances, the king of Hijaz and Najd again preferred to bide his time. In March 1928 the Mutair returned to their hijras after successful raids.

In January 1928 the king’s adviser Hafiz Wahba met Henry Dobbs, the British high commissioner of Iraq, after Britain had warned Ibn Saud that it would bomb the Ikhwan mercilessly unless they ceased their raids. At the same time, supplies of British munitions to the king continued. A British government spokesman told the House of Commons in March 1928 that Britain had permitted the export of munitions to the Saudi state three times within recent months.

In April 1928 Ibn Saud wrote a long letter to the ruler of Kuwait, explaining that not all the Mutair were guilty of raids and that the Iraqis had also attacked Najdi territory. Ibn Saud was compelled to protect the Najdi tribes from the British, but he was reluctant to wage a war that he clearly could not win. The only solution was to start negotiations.

Pages 274-276.

Maybe you are referring to the regular arms shipments that the British has been sending to Ibn Saud since WWI as crying, I don't really know.

In late 1928, after tension has still not calmed down, Ibn Saud met with a new assembly comprised of various leaders of his kingdom, and offered to step down as ruler so long as another member of the House of Saud was chosen to rule. He was particularly popular with the nobility and populations of the towns and oases, who were not fond on the bedouin Ikhwan:

The nobility from the oases felt that it was high time to put an end to the Ikhwan: The nobility was keen to protect its interests against the rebel nomadic population and was aware of the settled people’s traditional hatred for the bedouin. The issue was complicated by the fact that the movement was conducted under a religious banner; the three Ikhwan leaders claimed to be genuine defenders of the faith and accused Ibn Saud of ignoring the true religion and collaborating with the infidel British for the sake of his vested interests.

When the grazing season began, it became clear that a civil war was unavoidable, though many tribes played for time. Instead of opposing Ibn Saud, however, the three Ikhwan leaders decided to attack Iraq, thus avoiding being accused of open revolt. Their intention was to win the support of other tribes by their successes in Iraq.

Ibn Bijad raided the village of al-Jumaima on the Iraqi border and massacred many merchants there, including several from Najd, and then attacked the Shammar. The rebels antagonized the Anaza, the largest tribe, and the Harb of Hijaz. Ibn Saud, who had felt uncertain of his strength just a month ago, was now supported by the bedouin and the settled people of Najd. Faisal Al Dawish was a more subtle politician than Ibn Bijad. He attacked only Iraqis, posing as the king’s loyal subject and not breaking off relations with him altogether. The differences grew between him and Ibn Bijad.

After the massacre in al-Jumaima, Ibn Saud arrived in Qasim and mobilized a double quota of Najdi fighters. They joined him readily because neither peasants nor traders felt safe from the Ikhwan bedouin’s murder and plunder. Ibn Saud was followed by a part of the Ataiba, led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Rubayin, Ibn Bijad’s rival; Mishari ibn Busayis of the Mutair; Dulaim ibn Barrak of the Hitaim; most of the Harb; almost all the Najdi Shammar; a sizeable part of the Zafir; a part of the Anaza from Hijaz; and the Wuld Sulaiman, Faqir and other tribes. The nucleus of the troops consisted of the settled people of Najd. In early March 1929 Ibn Saud opened the campaign. Faisal Al Dawish and Ibn Bijad gathered their troops at the wells in Sibila.55 A period of negotiations followed. Faisal Al Dawish even visited Ibn Saud’s camp and then returned to the Ikhwan.

The day after his visit, 31 March 1929, the battle of Sibila was waged. Putting the infantry of Najd in the centre and appointing his brothers and sons as column commanders, Ibn Saud began the offensive. The bedouin guard was on the flanks. The Ikhwan lost the battle and Faisal Al Dawish received a severe abdominal wound. The king’s son Saud, with the Riyadh citizens and the royal guard, moved ahead to complete the victory. It was the settled Najdis who bore the brunt of the battle.

Pages 277-278

By the time of the Battle of Sabilla, the Ikhwan has worn themselves down to the point where Ibn Saud had a 3:1 advantage in men, to say nothing of the machine guns.