cypherpunks

Idk it works for me.

I don't think there is any possible value for the sign variable which would make that if statement do anything other than raise a TypeError.

Also "8:00:00" > "10:00:00"

but "08:00:00" < "10:00:00". comparing timestamps as strings is weird but actually works, as long as the hour is zero-padded :)

the problem with this code is that & (bitwise AND) has higher operator precedence than > and == do, so it is first trying to bitwise AND "10:00:00" with sign (which i'm assuming would also be a string) and that will always raise a TypeError.

to do what the author appears to have intended to do, they would either need use parenthesis around both comparisons to actually bitwise AND their results, or (better) to use the boolean AND operator (and) instead of &.

The boolean and operator is the right tool for the job, and since it is lower precedence it also wouldn't require that any parenthesis be added here.

don't trust anyone over ~~30~~ 0x30

TypeError: unsupported operand type(s) for &: 'str' and 'str'

They may get off. But I highly doubt Kristy Noem and Stephen Miller will. Or even Greg Bovino. The people responsible for the policies that led to those murders will be held accountable.

Not sure if you're doing a bit, but i'll bite: Can you recall any historical examples of US public officials being held accountable for their obviously-criminal policy decisions? Eg, remind me who from the Bush administration went to prison due to the fact that they (as Obama put it) "tortured some folks"? And who from the Obama administration went to prison for any of their war crimes (eg)? What makes you think it will be different for people like Noem and Miller? 🤔

i think i get Candand (what some Barnes & Noble spam once rendered C++ as?) but, what is borsuk language?

💯

hopefully a FOSS organization will hire the person who made this

Reputable news source “GLOBAL FACTZ”

😂

Fwiw, before reposting this meme, I actually checked to make sure that the underlying "weird news" story here was not solely reported by random clickbait fake news sites but was also covered by an actual news organization.

So in summary. You’re right. Sealed sender is not a great solution. But

Thanks :)

But, I still maintain it is entirely useless - its only actual use is to give users the false impression that the server is unable to learn the social graph. It is 100% snake oil.

it is a mitigation for the period where those messages are being accepted.

It sounds like you're assuming that, prior to sealed sender, they were actually storing the server-visible sender information rather than immediately discarding it after using it to authenticate the sender? They've always said that they weren't doing that, but, if they were, they could have simply stopped storing that information rather than inventing their "sealed sender" cryptographic construction.

To recap: Sealed sender ostensibly exists specifically to allow the server to verify the sender's permission to send without needing to know the sender identity. It isn't about what is being stored (as they could simply not store the sender information), it is about what is being sent. As far as I can tell it only makes any sense if one imagines that a malicious server somehow would not simply infer the senders' identities from their (obviously already identified) receiver connections from the same IPs.

Sure. If a state serves a subpoena to gather logs for metadata analysis, sealed sender will prevent associating senders to receivers, making this task very difficult.

Pre sealed-sender they already claimed not to keep metadata logs, so, complying with such a subpoena^[it would more likely be an NSL or some other legal instrument rather than a subpoena] would already have required them to change the behavior of their server software.

If a state wanted to order them to add metadata logging in a non-sealed-sender world, wouldn't they also probably ask them to log IPs for all client-server interactions (which would enable breaking sealed-sender through a trivial correlation)?

Note that defeating sealed sender doesn't require any kind of high-resolution timing or costly analysis; with an adversary-controlled server (eg, one where a state adversary has compelled the operator to alter the server's behavior via a National Security Letter or something) it is easy to simply record the IP which sent each "sealed" message and also record which account(s) are checked from which IPs at all times.

sealed sender isn’t theater, in my view. It is a best effort attempt to mitigate one potential threat

But, what is the potential threat which is mitigated by sealed sender? Can you describe a specific attack scenario (eg, what are the attacker's goals, and what capabilities do you assume the attacker has) which would be possible if Signal didn't have sealed sender but which is no longer possible because sealed sender exists?

In case it wasn't clear, I'm certainly not advocating for using WhatsApp or any other proprietary, centralized, or Facebook-operated communication systems 😂

But I do think Facebook probably really actually isn't exploiting the content of the vast majority of whatsapp traffic (even if they do turn out to be able to exploit it for any specific users at any time, which i wouldn't be surprised by).

"Anonymity" is a vague term which you introduced to this discussion; I'm talking about metadata privacy which is a much clearer concept.

TLS cannot prevent an observer from seeing the source and destination IPs, but it does include some actually-useful metadata mitigations such as Encrypted Client Hello, which encrypts (among other things) the Server Name Indicator. ECH a very mild mitigation, since the source and destination IPs are intrinsically out of scope for protection by TLS, but unlike Sealed Sender it is not an entirely theatrical use of cryptography: it does actually prevent an on-path observer from learning the server hostname (at least, if used alongside some DNS privacy system).

The on path part is also an important detail here: the entire world's encrypted TLS traffic is not observable from a single choke point the way that the entire world's Signal traffic is.