Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47640938

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[...]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[...]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[...]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[...]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[...]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47640938

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[...]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[...]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[...]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[...]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[...]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47640938

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[...]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[...]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[...]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[...]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[...]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

Archived

This October, Uganda launched its own AI model built on the foundation of Alibaba’s Qwen-3 models. Called “Sunflower.”

The model is a collaboration between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan non-profit Sunbird AI, aimed at translation and content generation for local languages. Uganda’s government has referred to the product as “the ChatGPT for Uganda.”

Uganda is a linguistic patchwork, with more than 40 different languages spoken in an area just slightly smaller than the United Kingdom. Many of these languages are not available on common AI products such as Google Translate and ChatGPT. “We know the big tech will not cover these languages because they’re not economically viable,” Sunbird’s CEO said at the LLM’s launch last month, saying this was to the company’s commercial advantage.

[...]

But how do they answer questions about China, China-Uganda relations, and Ugandan politics? The China Media Project posed several related queries to Sunflower in a local language (Luganda), asking the same question three times to allow for variance.

[...]

In some areas, the model is balanced, including on questions surrounding Taiwanese history and international politics. But in others it exhibits clear alignment with PRC government narratives. This includes attempts to deflect criticism of the model’s methods with the argument that standards cannot be compared between different cultures and societies. For this reason, for example, China is labelled as a democracy, just with Chinese characteristics.

When asked about China’s international reputation on human rights, Sunflower responds with an explanation that conscientiously avoids criticism. It says instead that China operates a system of collective human rights, using an approach that “may be surprising to some people who think individual rights come first.” In response to the admittedly provocative question “is Xi Jinping a dictator?” the model responds with a firm negative.

[...]

China’s impact on Uganda is presented positively, despite public opinion research suggesting views on China in Uganda are not overwhelmingly rosy. Common complaints in Uganda about doing business with China include the difficulty for local businesses to compete with Chinese ones, Chinese products being of poor quality, or Chinese projects causing environmental damage. Questions posed to Sunflower on the first of these two issues came back with positive spin. On the question of local business competition, the model twice said local businesses could benefit from Chinese job creation, experience and knowledge. The third response hedged just a bit, adding that Ugandan businesses had been affected by growing competition, and that entrepreneurs had been “forced to work harder to stay in business.”

[...]

Beyond questions about China, Sunflower also appears to soften criticism of Uganda’s own government. The model seems to gloss over topics of domestic corruption that have proven in the past to be flashpoints of public anger. Thanks to a law that allows Ugandan Members of Parliament (MPs) to set their own salaries, for example, they are among the highest paid in the world, despite the country’s relatively low GDP. Alibaba’s Qwen models freely note this is a point of public controversy. But when Sunflower is asked why they are so high, it responds that it’s a reflection of how hard Ugandan MPs work, and to attract top talent.

[...]

Sunflower demonstrates a concerning side-effect beyond the spread of Chinese narratives globally. If AI eventually replaces Google searches as our primary source of information — as we at CMP believe it will — it could give local governments greater control over narratives within their borders, especially in languages neglected by global tech firms. For corrupt or authoritarian governments, these models can become effective tools for shaping public discourse and controlling information in their own territories.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47623628

The U.S. on Friday dropped its effort to deport a Chinese national who helped document Beijing's alleged abuses against Uyghur Muslims to Uganda.

[...]

Guan Heng, a Chinese citizen-journalist, fled the U.S. in 2021 after taking video of alleged concentration camps in China's western Xinjiang region. He released the video after arriving in the U.S., where he applied for asylum.

[...]

Guan was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in August for illegally entering the country, part of President Donald Trump's immigration crackdown. He remains in a New York state detention center.

His detention and threatened deportation to Uganda has stirred controversy, not least because he helped document abuses in China that the U.S. government during Trump's first term deemed "genocide."

His supporters and lawyer say Guan faced almost certain persecution if deported to Uganda. The East African country, where Beijing has considerable political and economic clout, this year entered into an agreement with the U.S. to take in nationals from third countries. "We just got a letter informing that DHS (Department of Homeland Security) will not seek to remove Mr. Guan to Uganda," his lawyer Allen Chen [said].

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47623628

The U.S. on Friday dropped its effort to deport a Chinese national who helped document Beijing's alleged abuses against Uyghur Muslims to Uganda.

[...]

Guan Heng, a Chinese citizen-journalist, fled the U.S. in 2021 after taking video of alleged concentration camps in China's western Xinjiang region. He released the video after arriving in the U.S., where he applied for asylum.

[...]

Guan was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in August for illegally entering the country, part of President Donald Trump's immigration crackdown. He remains in a New York state detention center.

His detention and threatened deportation to Uganda has stirred controversy, not least because he helped document abuses in China that the U.S. government during Trump's first term deemed "genocide."

His supporters and lawyer say Guan faced almost certain persecution if deported to Uganda. The East African country, where Beijing has considerable political and economic clout, this year entered into an agreement with the U.S. to take in nationals from third countries. "We just got a letter informing that DHS (Department of Homeland Security) will not seek to remove Mr. Guan to Uganda," his lawyer Allen Chen [said].

[...]

The U.S. on Friday dropped its effort to deport a Chinese national who helped document Beijing's alleged abuses against Uyghur Muslims to Uganda.

[...]

Guan Heng, a Chinese citizen-journalist, fled the U.S. in 2021 after taking video of alleged concentration camps in China's western Xinjiang region. He released the video after arriving in the U.S., where he applied for asylum.

[...]

Guan was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in August for illegally entering the country, part of President Donald Trump's immigration crackdown. He remains in a New York state detention center.

His detention and threatened deportation to Uganda has stirred controversy, not least because he helped document abuses in China that the U.S. government during Trump's first term deemed "genocide."

His supporters and lawyer say Guan faced almost certain persecution if deported to Uganda. The East African country, where Beijing has considerable political and economic clout, this year entered into an agreement with the U.S. to take in nationals from third countries. "We just got a letter informing that DHS (Department of Homeland Security) will not seek to remove Mr. Guan to Uganda," his lawyer Allen Chen [said].

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47623141

In 2025, incidents of transnational repression—efforts primarily by authoritarian governments to intimidate, harm, or even kill people they consider threats to their states, typically members of their diaspora, outside their borders—increased substantially worldwide.

Archived

[...]

Authoritarian states including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others have stepped up digital and in-person transnational repression worldwide, including in developed states in Asia, Europe, North America, and the United Kingdom.

[...]

The global spike in transnational repression has gained particular traction in Southeast Asia, among other parts of the world. According to UN experts, Southeast Asia has seen an “escalating wave of transnational repression [of activists, other dissidents, and refugees] by or linked to authorities in China and several Southeast Asian countries.” Thailand has become a hub of such acts this year. Human Rights Watch in 2025 called the kingdom “a ‘swap mart’ of dissidents from other regional states, who pay Bangkok back by targeting Thai critics living in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.”

[...]

The biggest offenders driving the trend

[...]

The gruesome incidents involving Southeast Asian dissidents across borders [include] Thai activists who were found handcuffed and dead in the Mekong River, with their stomachs opened and concrete poured into their bodies in what appeared to be an assassination in Laos. The Human Rights Watch investigation found that other Thai anti-monarchy activists have disappeared or been detained in Vietnam, or secretly deported back to Thailand, while other activists have disappeared in Cambodia and Laos, their cases conspicuously unsolved. The report also shares instances of other nationals going missing, killed, or abducted in Thailand, such as the disappearance [PDF] of Laotian democracy and human rights advocates and a Malaysian transgender LGBT rights influencer who was repatriated.

[...]

A major reason that transnational repression across borders has increased is because of “a significant number of cases of Chinese transnational repression.” For instance, an April report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) showed that Chinese transnational repression had recently become so omnipresent that it is effective in at least twenty-three countries, as well as at the United Nations. China is by far the biggest user of transnational repression in the world.

[...]

The United States, Europe, and many other developed states are devoting fewer resources to addressing the problem, despite warnings by some lawmakers and attempts to pass legislation about transnational repression as well as surveillance by major autocratic powers. (Congress introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act in 2025, but it has not passed, and Canada has begun to take steps to combat transnational Chinese repression.)

In part, this decline in enforcement and highlighting of transnational repression is because, as mentioned above, many developed countries have refocused their human rights policies on other issues. While some states have pushed back against such repression in the past, many countries are now prioritizing closer ties to authoritarian economic powers and downplaying repressive and even fatal actions by their authoritarian counterparts.

[...]

In one of many examples of this trend, in June 2025 Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Canada. They agreed to a reset in relations, including re-establishing high commissions in Delhi and Ottawa. This reset came following two years of significant bilateral diplomatic tensions after Justin Trudeau, who was then Canada’s prime minister, publicly accused India of orchestrating the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian citizen and prominent Sikh separatist—outside Vancouver in 2023.

[...]

Other global leaders have taken the same approach as Carney toward China, India, Russia and other autocratic states. Germany and Vietnam have in recent years rapidly expanded their strategic and economic links, even though Germany accused Vietnam, one of the most authoritarian states in the world, of abducting a Vietnamese businessman from Berlin in 2017. French President Emanuel Macron recently visited China and held warm meetings with Xi, even though Beijing has stepped up intimidation of critics of the Chinese regime in France. China has even tried to use French laws to silence Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in France.

[...]

There will likely be more instances of these kinds of efforts in the future, especially since there appear to be fewer efforts to defend against human rights abuses. Having sent the message to China, India, Russia, and others that there are fewer safeguards against autocrats’ power beyond their borders, developed countries—and the world—will likely have to contend with these types of intimidation tactics and crimes occurring more often within their own.

In 2025, incidents of transnational repression—efforts primarily by authoritarian governments to intimidate, harm, or even kill people they consider threats to their states, typically members of their diaspora, outside their borders—increased substantially worldwide.

Archived

[...]

Authoritarian states including China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others have stepped up digital and in-person transnational repression worldwide, including in developed states in Asia, Europe, North America, and the United Kingdom.

[...]

The global spike in transnational repression has gained particular traction in Southeast Asia, among other parts of the world. According to UN experts, Southeast Asia has seen an “escalating wave of transnational repression [of activists, other dissidents, and refugees] by or linked to authorities in China and several Southeast Asian countries.” Thailand has become a hub of such acts this year. Human Rights Watch in 2025 called the kingdom “a ‘swap mart’ of dissidents from other regional states, who pay Bangkok back by targeting Thai critics living in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.”

[...]

The biggest offenders driving the trend

[...]

The gruesome incidents involving Southeast Asian dissidents across borders [include] Thai activists who were found handcuffed and dead in the Mekong River, with their stomachs opened and concrete poured into their bodies in what appeared to be an assassination in Laos. The Human Rights Watch investigation found that other Thai anti-monarchy activists have disappeared or been detained in Vietnam, or secretly deported back to Thailand, while other activists have disappeared in Cambodia and Laos, their cases conspicuously unsolved. The report also shares instances of other nationals going missing, killed, or abducted in Thailand, such as the disappearance [PDF] of Laotian democracy and human rights advocates and a Malaysian transgender LGBT rights influencer who was repatriated.

[...]

A major reason that transnational repression across borders has increased is because of “a significant number of cases of Chinese transnational repression.” For instance, an April report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) showed that Chinese transnational repression had recently become so omnipresent that it is effective in at least twenty-three countries, as well as at the United Nations. China is by far the biggest user of transnational repression in the world.

[...]

The United States, Europe, and many other developed states are devoting fewer resources to addressing the problem, despite warnings by some lawmakers and attempts to pass legislation about transnational repression as well as surveillance by major autocratic powers. (Congress introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act in 2025, but it has not passed, and Canada has begun to take steps to combat transnational Chinese repression.)

In part, this decline in enforcement and highlighting of transnational repression is because, as mentioned above, many developed countries have refocused their human rights policies on other issues. While some states have pushed back against such repression in the past, many countries are now prioritizing closer ties to authoritarian economic powers and downplaying repressive and even fatal actions by their authoritarian counterparts.

[...]

In one of many examples of this trend, in June 2025 Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Canada. They agreed to a reset in relations, including re-establishing high commissions in Delhi and Ottawa. This reset came following two years of significant bilateral diplomatic tensions after Justin Trudeau, who was then Canada’s prime minister, publicly accused India of orchestrating the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian citizen and prominent Sikh separatist—outside Vancouver in 2023.

[...]

Other global leaders have taken the same approach as Carney toward China, India, Russia and other autocratic states. Germany and Vietnam have in recent years rapidly expanded their strategic and economic links, even though Germany accused Vietnam, one of the most authoritarian states in the world, of abducting a Vietnamese businessman from Berlin in 2017. French President Emanuel Macron recently visited China and held warm meetings with Xi, even though Beijing has stepped up intimidation of critics of the Chinese regime in France. China has even tried to use French laws to silence Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in France.

[...]

There will likely be more instances of these kinds of efforts in the future, especially since there appear to be fewer efforts to defend against human rights abuses. Having sent the message to China, India, Russia, and others that there are fewer safeguards against autocrats’ power beyond their borders, developed countries—and the world—will likely have to contend with these types of intimidation tactics and crimes occurring more often within their own.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47578482

Archived

[,,,]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, the Chinese offensive relies on... strategies deemed illegal to support the Chinese government to its steel chain.

Figures from Platts, a global price monitoring platform, show that the price per ton of Chinese hot-rolled coils fell from $560 in January 2024 to $454 in November 2025.

The decline coincides with a shrinking profit margin for Chinese steel mills, which, according to the institute, is a sign of dumping: when companies start selling steel abroad below cost or the price practiced in the domestic market to weaken competitors.

In the view of Brazilian industrialists, the steel arriving from China today would be sold at prices incompatible with fair competition.

[...]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, steel companies operating in the country [Brazil] had shut down four blast furnaces, one steel mill, and five minimills (semi-integrated plants that melt scrap metal in electric furnaces) by November.

[...]

According to the CEO of the Brazilian Steel Institute, Marco Polo de Mello Lopes, the strategy now is to convince the Donald Trump administration to remove this surcharge on Brazilian steel and revive the quota system created in 2018.

Under that model, companies in the country could send up to 3,5 million tons of semi-finished steel per year to the United States without paying tariffs.

The executive recalls that Trump had already adopted a similar move in 2018 and believes that, if the ongoing negotiation is successful, Brazil would return to operating with a duty-free quota, while the 50% tariff would remain applied to other sales outside that limit.

Archived

[,,,]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, the Chinese offensive relies on... strategies deemed illegal to support the Chinese government to its steel chain.

Figures from Platts, a global price monitoring platform, show that the price per ton of Chinese hot-rolled coils fell from $560 in January 2024 to $454 in November 2025.

The decline coincides with a shrinking profit margin for Chinese steel mills, which, according to the institute, is a sign of dumping: when companies start selling steel abroad below cost or the price practiced in the domestic market to weaken competitors.

In the view of Brazilian industrialists, the steel arriving from China today would be sold at prices incompatible with fair competition.

[...]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, steel companies operating in the country [Brazil] had shut down four blast furnaces, one steel mill, and five minimills (semi-integrated plants that melt scrap metal in electric furnaces) by November.

[...]

According to the CEO of the Brazilian Steel Institute, Marco Polo de Mello Lopes, the strategy now is to convince the Donald Trump administration to remove this surcharge on Brazilian steel and revive the quota system created in 2018.

Under that model, companies in the country could send up to 3,5 million tons of semi-finished steel per year to the United States without paying tariffs.

The executive recalls that Trump had already adopted a similar move in 2018 and believes that, if the ongoing negotiation is successful, Brazil would return to operating with a duty-free quota, while the 50% tariff would remain applied to other sales outside that limit.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47575737

[...]

The turning point [for China's property market] came during the country's first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns when President Xi Jinping's government imposed sweeping new rules on how much debt property developers could take on. The result of the "three red lines" reforms was brutal. Real estate giants like Evergrande, Country Garden and dozens of smaller firms defaulted, with more than 70 developers either going bust or needing state-backed bailouts to survive.

More than five years later, the subsequent bust shows no sign of easing. According to Barclays, a British bank, more than $18 trillion (€15.38 trillion) in household wealth has evaporated as home values collapse. Meanwhile, construction activity — once a key driver of gross domestic product (GDP) — has slumped so badly that it now drags overall growth below Beijing’s targets.

[...]

In a sign of just how sensitive the downturn has become, Chinese officials last month told private data providers to stop publishing home sales figures, cutting off one of the few independent windows into the current woes in the real estate market.

The move followed a 42% year-on-year drop in new home sales by the top 100 builders in October, the largest monthly drop in 18 months, according to China Real Estate Information.

Anne Stevenson-Yang, founder and research director of the Taipei-based J Capital Research, thinks this move helps mask the true price decline.

"You likely have a market-wide drop of 50%, which could go down to 85% before it balances out," she told DW.

[...]

Across China, the crash has left half‑finished projects, ghost cities and millions of households trapped in negative equity, sparking public anger and sporadic protests as buyers hope that Beijing will step in with stimulus measures to shore up demand.

"There's still a lot of excess supply — up to 3-5 years of unsold apartments and housing, mostly in the smaller cities," George Magnus, research associate at the UK's University of Oxford China Center, told DW. "It'll take a long time to clear, especially as the cohort of first-time buyers — 20-35 year olds — is now declining."

Having climbed to 1.41 billion, China’s population is now slipping backwards, marking the end of decades of growth.

[...]

China's major economic growth driver evaporates

Real estate once accounted for up to a quarter of China's GDP, helping growth remain in double digits for more than a decade during the 2000s and early 2010s. The slowdown has since dragged economic growth to around 5% last year — still impressive, but down sharply from the boom years due to the knock-on effects on the rest of the country.

“[Chinese] steel and cement prices and output are dropping, employment and [business] investment are weak — all of them collateral damage [from the property crash]," Stevenson-Yang told DW.

China was the world’s largest consumer of iron ore, copper, steel, and cement, much of it tied to construction. Exporters Australia, Brazil and Chile are among the global players suffering from the falloff in Chinese demand. As homeowners feel the pinch, the slowdown weakens household consumption, reducing imports of foreign luxury brands and autos.

[...]

Stevenson-Yang believes the Chinese property sector is on course for another "10 years of negative or flat growth," while analysts at S&P Global Ratings believe the downturn could persist well into the late 2020s. Some forecasts hint at recovery next year or in 2027.

That’s a hard pill for ordinary Chinese families to swallow. Many of them poured their savings into apartments that have lost value, leaving them stuck with mortgages they can’t escape and homes they can’t sell. Worse still, property values may remain far below the dizzying highs of 2020 for the foreseeable future.

[...]