Hotznplotzn

joined 10 months ago
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 2 points 9 hours ago (1 children)

It's not only about Taiwan itself and their tech business there as others already have said, but about the entire South China Sea - and the sea’s estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. China competes with other claimants in the region such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

China has been steadily increasing its assertiveness in the South China Sea since the 1970s, resulting in heightened tensions with Southeast Asian states, particularly the Philippines, at the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, which possesses rich natural resources and fishing areas.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled against China regarding the Spratly Islands after a claim brought to the court by the Philippines on the basis of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although China is a signatory to the treaty establishing the The Hague tribunal, Beijing refuses to accept the court’s authority to this day.

Over the years, China has even increased its efforts to claim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the islands’ size and even creating new ones altogether, e.g., by piling sand onto existing reefs. In addition, China constructed ports, military posts, in Spratly Islands and the surrounding area. China has also been deploying military jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system.

This is about money and colonial power at a much larger scale than "only" Taiwan and semiconductors.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 25 points 10 hours ago (4 children)

The world socialist website parrots Chinese Communist Party propaganda only, they even support China's aggression against Taiwan and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, among other things. This is not a reliable media source.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 10 hours ago

From you comment one can easily infer that you didn't even click the link.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47578482

Archived

[,,,]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, the Chinese offensive relies on... strategies deemed illegal to support the Chinese government to its steel chain.

Figures from Platts, a global price monitoring platform, show that the price per ton of Chinese hot-rolled coils fell from $560 in January 2024 to $454 in November 2025.

The decline coincides with a shrinking profit margin for Chinese steel mills, which, according to the institute, is a sign of dumping: when companies start selling steel abroad below cost or the price practiced in the domestic market to weaken competitors.

In the view of Brazilian industrialists, the steel arriving from China today would be sold at prices incompatible with fair competition.

[...]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, steel companies operating in the country [Brazil] had shut down four blast furnaces, one steel mill, and five minimills (semi-integrated plants that melt scrap metal in electric furnaces) by November.

[...]

According to the CEO of the Brazilian Steel Institute, Marco Polo de Mello Lopes, the strategy now is to convince the Donald Trump administration to remove this surcharge on Brazilian steel and revive the quota system created in 2018.

Under that model, companies in the country could send up to 3,5 million tons of semi-finished steel per year to the United States without paying tariffs.

The executive recalls that Trump had already adopted a similar move in 2018 and believes that, if the ongoing negotiation is successful, Brazil would return to operating with a duty-free quota, while the 50% tariff would remain applied to other sales outside that limit.

 

Archived

[,,,]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, the Chinese offensive relies on... strategies deemed illegal to support the Chinese government to its steel chain.

Figures from Platts, a global price monitoring platform, show that the price per ton of Chinese hot-rolled coils fell from $560 in January 2024 to $454 in November 2025.

The decline coincides with a shrinking profit margin for Chinese steel mills, which, according to the institute, is a sign of dumping: when companies start selling steel abroad below cost or the price practiced in the domestic market to weaken competitors.

In the view of Brazilian industrialists, the steel arriving from China today would be sold at prices incompatible with fair competition.

[...]

According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, steel companies operating in the country [Brazil] had shut down four blast furnaces, one steel mill, and five minimills (semi-integrated plants that melt scrap metal in electric furnaces) by November.

[...]

According to the CEO of the Brazilian Steel Institute, Marco Polo de Mello Lopes, the strategy now is to convince the Donald Trump administration to remove this surcharge on Brazilian steel and revive the quota system created in 2018.

Under that model, companies in the country could send up to 3,5 million tons of semi-finished steel per year to the United States without paying tariffs.

The executive recalls that Trump had already adopted a similar move in 2018 and believes that, if the ongoing negotiation is successful, Brazil would return to operating with a duty-free quota, while the 50% tariff would remain applied to other sales outside that limit.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47575737

[...]

The turning point [for China's property market] came during the country's first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns when President Xi Jinping's government imposed sweeping new rules on how much debt property developers could take on. The result of the "three red lines" reforms was brutal. Real estate giants like Evergrande, Country Garden and dozens of smaller firms defaulted, with more than 70 developers either going bust or needing state-backed bailouts to survive.

More than five years later, the subsequent bust shows no sign of easing. According to Barclays, a British bank, more than $18 trillion (€15.38 trillion) in household wealth has evaporated as home values collapse. Meanwhile, construction activity — once a key driver of gross domestic product (GDP) — has slumped so badly that it now drags overall growth below Beijing’s targets.

[...]

In a sign of just how sensitive the downturn has become, Chinese officials last month told private data providers to stop publishing home sales figures, cutting off one of the few independent windows into the current woes in the real estate market.

The move followed a 42% year-on-year drop in new home sales by the top 100 builders in October, the largest monthly drop in 18 months, according to China Real Estate Information.

Anne Stevenson-Yang, founder and research director of the Taipei-based J Capital Research, thinks this move helps mask the true price decline.

"You likely have a market-wide drop of 50%, which could go down to 85% before it balances out," she told DW.

[...]

Across China, the crash has left half‑finished projects, ghost cities and millions of households trapped in negative equity, sparking public anger and sporadic protests as buyers hope that Beijing will step in with stimulus measures to shore up demand.

"There's still a lot of excess supply — up to 3-5 years of unsold apartments and housing, mostly in the smaller cities," George Magnus, research associate at the UK's University of Oxford China Center, told DW. "It'll take a long time to clear, especially as the cohort of first-time buyers — 20-35 year olds — is now declining."

Having climbed to 1.41 billion, China’s population is now slipping backwards, marking the end of decades of growth.

[...]

China's major economic growth driver evaporates

Real estate once accounted for up to a quarter of China's GDP, helping growth remain in double digits for more than a decade during the 2000s and early 2010s. The slowdown has since dragged economic growth to around 5% last year — still impressive, but down sharply from the boom years due to the knock-on effects on the rest of the country.

“[Chinese] steel and cement prices and output are dropping, employment and [business] investment are weak — all of them collateral damage [from the property crash]," Stevenson-Yang told DW.

China was the world’s largest consumer of iron ore, copper, steel, and cement, much of it tied to construction. Exporters Australia, Brazil and Chile are among the global players suffering from the falloff in Chinese demand. As homeowners feel the pinch, the slowdown weakens household consumption, reducing imports of foreign luxury brands and autos.

[...]

Stevenson-Yang believes the Chinese property sector is on course for another "10 years of negative or flat growth," while analysts at S&P Global Ratings believe the downturn could persist well into the late 2020s. Some forecasts hint at recovery next year or in 2027.

That’s a hard pill for ordinary Chinese families to swallow. Many of them poured their savings into apartments that have lost value, leaving them stuck with mortgages they can’t escape and homes they can’t sell. Worse still, property values may remain far below the dizzying highs of 2020 for the foreseeable future.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47575737

[...]

The turning point [for China's property market] came during the country's first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns when President Xi Jinping's government imposed sweeping new rules on how much debt property developers could take on. The result of the "three red lines" reforms was brutal. Real estate giants like Evergrande, Country Garden and dozens of smaller firms defaulted, with more than 70 developers either going bust or needing state-backed bailouts to survive.

More than five years later, the subsequent bust shows no sign of easing. According to Barclays, a British bank, more than $18 trillion (€15.38 trillion) in household wealth has evaporated as home values collapse. Meanwhile, construction activity — once a key driver of gross domestic product (GDP) — has slumped so badly that it now drags overall growth below Beijing’s targets.

[...]

In a sign of just how sensitive the downturn has become, Chinese officials last month told private data providers to stop publishing home sales figures, cutting off one of the few independent windows into the current woes in the real estate market.

The move followed a 42% year-on-year drop in new home sales by the top 100 builders in October, the largest monthly drop in 18 months, according to China Real Estate Information.

Anne Stevenson-Yang, founder and research director of the Taipei-based J Capital Research, thinks this move helps mask the true price decline.

"You likely have a market-wide drop of 50%, which could go down to 85% before it balances out," she told DW.

[...]

Across China, the crash has left half‑finished projects, ghost cities and millions of households trapped in negative equity, sparking public anger and sporadic protests as buyers hope that Beijing will step in with stimulus measures to shore up demand.

"There's still a lot of excess supply — up to 3-5 years of unsold apartments and housing, mostly in the smaller cities," George Magnus, research associate at the UK's University of Oxford China Center, told DW. "It'll take a long time to clear, especially as the cohort of first-time buyers — 20-35 year olds — is now declining."

Having climbed to 1.41 billion, China’s population is now slipping backwards, marking the end of decades of growth.

[...]

China's major economic growth driver evaporates

Real estate once accounted for up to a quarter of China's GDP, helping growth remain in double digits for more than a decade during the 2000s and early 2010s. The slowdown has since dragged economic growth to around 5% last year — still impressive, but down sharply from the boom years due to the knock-on effects on the rest of the country.

“[Chinese] steel and cement prices and output are dropping, employment and [business] investment are weak — all of them collateral damage [from the property crash]," Stevenson-Yang told DW.

China was the world’s largest consumer of iron ore, copper, steel, and cement, much of it tied to construction. Exporters Australia, Brazil and Chile are among the global players suffering from the falloff in Chinese demand. As homeowners feel the pinch, the slowdown weakens household consumption, reducing imports of foreign luxury brands and autos.

[...]

Stevenson-Yang believes the Chinese property sector is on course for another "10 years of negative or flat growth," while analysts at S&P Global Ratings believe the downturn could persist well into the late 2020s. Some forecasts hint at recovery next year or in 2027.

That’s a hard pill for ordinary Chinese families to swallow. Many of them poured their savings into apartments that have lost value, leaving them stuck with mortgages they can’t escape and homes they can’t sell. Worse still, property values may remain far below the dizzying highs of 2020 for the foreseeable future.

[...]

 

[...]

The turning point [for China's property market] came during the country's first wave of COVID-19 lockdowns when President Xi Jinping's government imposed sweeping new rules on how much debt property developers could take on. The result of the "three red lines" reforms was brutal. Real estate giants like Evergrande, Country Garden and dozens of smaller firms defaulted, with more than 70 developers either going bust or needing state-backed bailouts to survive.

More than five years later, the subsequent bust shows no sign of easing. According to Barclays, a British bank, more than $18 trillion (€15.38 trillion) in household wealth has evaporated as home values collapse. Meanwhile, construction activity — once a key driver of gross domestic product (GDP) — has slumped so badly that it now drags overall growth below Beijing’s targets.

[...]

In a sign of just how sensitive the downturn has become, Chinese officials last month told private data providers to stop publishing home sales figures, cutting off one of the few independent windows into the current woes in the real estate market.

The move followed a 42% year-on-year drop in new home sales by the top 100 builders in October, the largest monthly drop in 18 months, according to China Real Estate Information.

Anne Stevenson-Yang, founder and research director of the Taipei-based J Capital Research, thinks this move helps mask the true price decline.

"You likely have a market-wide drop of 50%, which could go down to 85% before it balances out," she told DW.

[...]

Across China, the crash has left half‑finished projects, ghost cities and millions of households trapped in negative equity, sparking public anger and sporadic protests as buyers hope that Beijing will step in with stimulus measures to shore up demand.

"There's still a lot of excess supply — up to 3-5 years of unsold apartments and housing, mostly in the smaller cities," George Magnus, research associate at the UK's University of Oxford China Center, told DW. "It'll take a long time to clear, especially as the cohort of first-time buyers — 20-35 year olds — is now declining."

Having climbed to 1.41 billion, China’s population is now slipping backwards, marking the end of decades of growth.

[...]

China's major economic growth driver evaporates

Real estate once accounted for up to a quarter of China's GDP, helping growth remain in double digits for more than a decade during the 2000s and early 2010s. The slowdown has since dragged economic growth to around 5% last year — still impressive, but down sharply from the boom years due to the knock-on effects on the rest of the country.

“[Chinese] steel and cement prices and output are dropping, employment and [business] investment are weak — all of them collateral damage [from the property crash]," Stevenson-Yang told DW.

China was the world’s largest consumer of iron ore, copper, steel, and cement, much of it tied to construction. Exporters Australia, Brazil and Chile are among the global players suffering from the falloff in Chinese demand. As homeowners feel the pinch, the slowdown weakens household consumption, reducing imports of foreign luxury brands and autos.

[...]

Stevenson-Yang believes the Chinese property sector is on course for another "10 years of negative or flat growth," while analysts at S&P Global Ratings believe the downturn could persist well into the late 2020s. Some forecasts hint at recovery next year or in 2027.

That’s a hard pill for ordinary Chinese families to swallow. Many of them poured their savings into apartments that have lost value, leaving them stuck with mortgages they can’t escape and homes they can’t sell. Worse still, property values may remain far below the dizzying highs of 2020 for the foreseeable future.

[...]

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47572383

Archived

When Angola’s Laúca hydropower dam began operating on the Kwanza River, it was widely presented as a milestone moment in Angola’s green energy grid development. Built by Chinese contractors and financed largely through Chinese loans, the project added more than 2,000 megawatts of capacity to the national grid and was framed as a key step toward cleaner energy.

In official state-sponsored Chinese narratives, projects like Laúca are frequently cited as examples of “green cooperation” in China–Africa relations. Government portals linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s international development and infrastructure connectivity project, describe overseas hydropower as a low-carbon solution that supports both foreign development and international climate goals.

Yet in Angola, journalists and civil society groups are telling a more complicated story — one shaped not only by megawatts and emissions, but by debt, transparency, and questions around who ultimately benefits from large-scale infrastructure projects.

[...]

In [Chinese] framing, large hydropower projects are positioned not only as development infrastructure but also as climate-aligned investments supporting global energy transition goals.

[...]

Angola is today one of China’s largest borrowers in Africa. The Chinese government and its state media have proudly touted this fact for years. Data compiled by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University show that the country has received more than USD 40 billion in Chinese loans, much of it tied to oil-backed repayment arrangements.

While Chinese policy researchers have framed resource-backed lending as a stabilizing tool during Angola’s post-war reconstruction, many subsequent reports by international media and independent researchers have highlighted how heavy reliance on oil-backed debt has left the country exposed during downturns.

[...]

[One report] noted that Angola is “saddled with high external debt to various creditors, including oil-backed loans from China,” and has increasingly turned to complicated financing arrangements as access to conventional borrowing narrows. The same report also warned that Angola currently has no financing program with the International Monetary Fund, underscoring the limited policy space available when oil revenues fall.

[...]

When prices [for oil] fell after 2014, debt servicing absorbed a growing share of public revenue, narrowing fiscal space for health, education, and climate adaptation.

Debt sustainability assessments by the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank continue to flag Angola’s vulnerability, noting that high repayment obligations constrain public investment.

[...]

Sustainability is not measured only in megawatts or emissions avoided. It also depends on transparency, debt sustainability, and whether projects expand — or constrain — a country’s development goals.

Angola’s experience suggests that clean energy can still come with high political and economic costs, even when framed as green cooperation. At the same time, China’s growing footprint in overseas finance has sparked alarm among analysts who warn that countries such as Angola risk sliding deeper into debt dependency. Under the banner of green finance, Chinese lending is increasingly presented as a superior alternative to Western aid — a message that features prominently in Chinese state media and has found a receptive audience in parts of Africa, both at the governmental level and among the public.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47572383

Archived

When Angola’s Laúca hydropower dam began operating on the Kwanza River, it was widely presented as a milestone moment in Angola’s green energy grid development. Built by Chinese contractors and financed largely through Chinese loans, the project added more than 2,000 megawatts of capacity to the national grid and was framed as a key step toward cleaner energy.

In official state-sponsored Chinese narratives, projects like Laúca are frequently cited as examples of “green cooperation” in China–Africa relations. Government portals linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s international development and infrastructure connectivity project, describe overseas hydropower as a low-carbon solution that supports both foreign development and international climate goals.

Yet in Angola, journalists and civil society groups are telling a more complicated story — one shaped not only by megawatts and emissions, but by debt, transparency, and questions around who ultimately benefits from large-scale infrastructure projects.

[...]

In [Chinese] framing, large hydropower projects are positioned not only as development infrastructure but also as climate-aligned investments supporting global energy transition goals.

[...]

Angola is today one of China’s largest borrowers in Africa. The Chinese government and its state media have proudly touted this fact for years. Data compiled by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University show that the country has received more than USD 40 billion in Chinese loans, much of it tied to oil-backed repayment arrangements.

While Chinese policy researchers have framed resource-backed lending as a stabilizing tool during Angola’s post-war reconstruction, many subsequent reports by international media and independent researchers have highlighted how heavy reliance on oil-backed debt has left the country exposed during downturns.

[...]

[One report] noted that Angola is “saddled with high external debt to various creditors, including oil-backed loans from China,” and has increasingly turned to complicated financing arrangements as access to conventional borrowing narrows. The same report also warned that Angola currently has no financing program with the International Monetary Fund, underscoring the limited policy space available when oil revenues fall.

[...]

When prices [for oil] fell after 2014, debt servicing absorbed a growing share of public revenue, narrowing fiscal space for health, education, and climate adaptation.

Debt sustainability assessments by the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank continue to flag Angola’s vulnerability, noting that high repayment obligations constrain public investment.

[...]

Sustainability is not measured only in megawatts or emissions avoided. It also depends on transparency, debt sustainability, and whether projects expand — or constrain — a country’s development goals.

Angola’s experience suggests that clean energy can still come with high political and economic costs, even when framed as green cooperation. At the same time, China’s growing footprint in overseas finance has sparked alarm among analysts who warn that countries such as Angola risk sliding deeper into debt dependency. Under the banner of green finance, Chinese lending is increasingly presented as a superior alternative to Western aid — a message that features prominently in Chinese state media and has found a receptive audience in parts of Africa, both at the governmental level and among the public.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47572383

Archived

When Angola’s Laúca hydropower dam began operating on the Kwanza River, it was widely presented as a milestone moment in Angola’s green energy grid development. Built by Chinese contractors and financed largely through Chinese loans, the project added more than 2,000 megawatts of capacity to the national grid and was framed as a key step toward cleaner energy.

In official state-sponsored Chinese narratives, projects like Laúca are frequently cited as examples of “green cooperation” in China–Africa relations. Government portals linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s international development and infrastructure connectivity project, describe overseas hydropower as a low-carbon solution that supports both foreign development and international climate goals.

Yet in Angola, journalists and civil society groups are telling a more complicated story — one shaped not only by megawatts and emissions, but by debt, transparency, and questions around who ultimately benefits from large-scale infrastructure projects.

[...]

In [Chinese] framing, large hydropower projects are positioned not only as development infrastructure but also as climate-aligned investments supporting global energy transition goals.

[...]

Angola is today one of China’s largest borrowers in Africa. The Chinese government and its state media have proudly touted this fact for years. Data compiled by the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University show that the country has received more than USD 40 billion in Chinese loans, much of it tied to oil-backed repayment arrangements.

While Chinese policy researchers have framed resource-backed lending as a stabilizing tool during Angola’s post-war reconstruction, many subsequent reports by international media and independent researchers have highlighted how heavy reliance on oil-backed debt has left the country exposed during downturns.

[...]

[One report] noted that Angola is “saddled with high external debt to various creditors, including oil-backed loans from China,” and has increasingly turned to complicated financing arrangements as access to conventional borrowing narrows. The same report also warned that Angola currently has no financing program with the International Monetary Fund, underscoring the limited policy space available when oil revenues fall.

[...]

When prices [for oil] fell after 2014, debt servicing absorbed a growing share of public revenue, narrowing fiscal space for health, education, and climate adaptation.

Debt sustainability assessments by the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank continue to flag Angola’s vulnerability, noting that high repayment obligations constrain public investment.

[...]

Sustainability is not measured only in megawatts or emissions avoided. It also depends on transparency, debt sustainability, and whether projects expand — or constrain — a country’s development goals.

Angola’s experience suggests that clean energy can still come with high political and economic costs, even when framed as green cooperation. At the same time, China’s growing footprint in overseas finance has sparked alarm among analysts who warn that countries such as Angola risk sliding deeper into debt dependency. Under the banner of green finance, Chinese lending is increasingly presented as a superior alternative to Western aid — a message that features prominently in Chinese state media and has found a receptive audience in parts of Africa, both at the governmental level and among the public.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47560941

Archived

[...]

The Lai verdict represents not merely a continuation of this judicial function [of courts serving an autocratic regime] but a new low. The Court of First Instance departed from political impartiality by adopting politicized language against Lai – and by extension, Hong Kong’s entire pro-democracy movement.

The verdict claims Lai’s trial is not a “trial for his political views and he is free to hold whatever views he likes on politics.” Yet its substance overwhelmingly associates his guilt with political speeches and actions. The opening paragraphs stigmatize Lai’s character with loaded language: his “rabid hatred of the CCP” (Chinese Communist Party), his “deep resentment,” his “obsession to change CCP’s values to those of the Western worlds and counterbalance China’s influence.”

The court describes him as “poisoning the minds of his readers” through “venomous assertions” in the Apple Daily. The verdict traces Lai’s origins in Hong Kong – a story of displacement from mainland China shared by many Hong Kongers – to paint a picture of a man motivated by hatred rather than principle.

[...]

Jimmy Lai’s conviction is not merely a personal tragedy for a man who may die in prison. It declares that in today’s Hong Kong, voices of political dissent will be criminalized, international engagement seeking accountability for the domestic government will be punished, and courts will be deployed to endorse manipulated information and legitimize repression.

Beijing and its proxies have long portrayed Lai as a criminal; now they have a judicial stamp to cite. The global community must recognize this verdict for what it is: not a milestone of justice or common law jurisprudence, but cognitive warfare by judicial means.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47560941

Archived

[...]

The Lai verdict represents not merely a continuation of this judicial function [of courts serving an autocratic regime] but a new low. The Court of First Instance departed from political impartiality by adopting politicized language against Lai – and by extension, Hong Kong’s entire pro-democracy movement.

The verdict claims Lai’s trial is not a “trial for his political views and he is free to hold whatever views he likes on politics.” Yet its substance overwhelmingly associates his guilt with political speeches and actions. The opening paragraphs stigmatize Lai’s character with loaded language: his “rabid hatred of the CCP” (Chinese Communist Party), his “deep resentment,” his “obsession to change CCP’s values to those of the Western worlds and counterbalance China’s influence.”

The court describes him as “poisoning the minds of his readers” through “venomous assertions” in the Apple Daily. The verdict traces Lai’s origins in Hong Kong – a story of displacement from mainland China shared by many Hong Kongers – to paint a picture of a man motivated by hatred rather than principle.

[...]

Jimmy Lai’s conviction is not merely a personal tragedy for a man who may die in prison. It declares that in today’s Hong Kong, voices of political dissent will be criminalized, international engagement seeking accountability for the domestic government will be punished, and courts will be deployed to endorse manipulated information and legitimize repression.

Beijing and its proxies have long portrayed Lai as a criminal; now they have a judicial stamp to cite. The global community must recognize this verdict for what it is: not a milestone of justice or common law jurisprudence, but cognitive warfare by judicial means.

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47560941

Archived

[...]

The Lai verdict represents not merely a continuation of this judicial function [of courts serving an autocratic regime] but a new low. The Court of First Instance departed from political impartiality by adopting politicized language against Lai – and by extension, Hong Kong’s entire pro-democracy movement.

The verdict claims Lai’s trial is not a “trial for his political views and he is free to hold whatever views he likes on politics.” Yet its substance overwhelmingly associates his guilt with political speeches and actions. The opening paragraphs stigmatize Lai’s character with loaded language: his “rabid hatred of the CCP” (Chinese Communist Party), his “deep resentment,” his “obsession to change CCP’s values to those of the Western worlds and counterbalance China’s influence.”

The court describes him as “poisoning the minds of his readers” through “venomous assertions” in the Apple Daily. The verdict traces Lai’s origins in Hong Kong – a story of displacement from mainland China shared by many Hong Kongers – to paint a picture of a man motivated by hatred rather than principle.

[...]

Jimmy Lai’s conviction is not merely a personal tragedy for a man who may die in prison. It declares that in today’s Hong Kong, voices of political dissent will be criminalized, international engagement seeking accountability for the domestic government will be punished, and courts will be deployed to endorse manipulated information and legitimize repression.

Beijing and its proxies have long portrayed Lai as a criminal; now they have a judicial stamp to cite. The global community must recognize this verdict for what it is: not a milestone of justice or common law jurisprudence, but cognitive warfare by judicial means.

 

Archived

[...]

The Lai verdict represents not merely a continuation of this judicial function [of courts serving an autocratic regime] but a new low. The Court of First Instance departed from political impartiality by adopting politicized language against Lai – and by extension, Hong Kong’s entire pro-democracy movement.

The verdict claims Lai’s trial is not a “trial for his political views and he is free to hold whatever views he likes on politics.” Yet its substance overwhelmingly associates his guilt with political speeches and actions. The opening paragraphs stigmatize Lai’s character with loaded language: his “rabid hatred of the CCP” (Chinese Communist Party), his “deep resentment,” his “obsession to change CCP’s values to those of the Western worlds and counterbalance China’s influence.”

The court describes him as “poisoning the minds of his readers” through “venomous assertions” in the Apple Daily. The verdict traces Lai’s origins in Hong Kong – a story of displacement from mainland China shared by many Hong Kongers – to paint a picture of a man motivated by hatred rather than principle.

[...]

Jimmy Lai’s conviction is not merely a personal tragedy for a man who may die in prison. It declares that in today’s Hong Kong, voices of political dissent will be criminalized, international engagement seeking accountability for the domestic government will be punished, and courts will be deployed to endorse manipulated information and legitimize repression.

Beijing and its proxies have long portrayed Lai as a criminal; now they have a judicial stamp to cite. The global community must recognize this verdict for what it is: not a milestone of justice or common law jurisprudence, but cognitive warfare by judicial means.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (1 children)

Enormously. Of course, “pro-democracy” tends to ignore that elections happen every five years, with the last round being in March of 2023.

It is up to you, of course, as it is your life. But I suggest you do yourself a favor and stay away from wherever you receive this stuff.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) (3 children)

I don't 'google the keywords,' and there is no AfD government in Germany.

Do you think it is safe to be a pro-democracy activist living under a CCP government?

As an addition: As you may know, there is not much difference between the AfD in Germany and the CCP as Beijing is a huge supporter of its far-right partner organizations abroad. Some even claim the AfD is just a CCP branch in Germany.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 3 days ago (5 children)

Here is another journalistic article covering migrant in Germany:

The Chinese migrants hoping for a new life in Germany - (Feb 2025) -- [Archived]

A small but growing number of Chinese people are fleeing home, with their sights set on Germany thanks to its reputation as a safe haven for refugees.

Read about the people featured in the article.

A migration expert in August 2025 also covered the topic:

Beyond America: The New Routes of Chinese Migration

As the Chinese government becomes increasingly unable to uphold its part of the social contract, migration out of China is likely to remain an attractive option. Indeed, the domestic economic situation is bleak for many Chinese families: youth unemployment is soaring, and the value of real estate properties has been hit hard by the sector’s overcapacity.

There's much more, it's easy to find.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 1 week ago

I guess this is just saying that China is occupying parts of Russia.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 3 points 1 week ago

This is very bad. Also, a quick reminder that China's wealth and income levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe, resembling the U.S., according to a recent study finds:

  • Since 1978, China has transformed from a poor, relatively equal society to a leading global economy with levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe and resembling the U.S.
  • The state-owned (vs. privately-owned) share of China’s wealth fell from 70% to about 30%, compared to 0% in the U.S. (adjusted for debt).
  • The share of China’s national income earned by the top 10% of the population has increased from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, nearing the U.S.’s 45% and surpassing France's 32%.
  • Similarly, the wealth share of the top 10% of the population reached 67%, close to the U.S.’s 72% and higher than France’s 50%.

[...]

Income and wealth inequality in China approaching or exceeding levels in the U.S. and Europe. China’s inequality levels used to be lower than Europe’s in the late 1970s, close to the most egalitarian Nordic countries. Now, however, it is approaching U.S. levels. The bottom 50% earns about 15% of total income in China versus 12% in the U.S. and 22% in France. However, China’s top 10% wealth share (67% in 2015) is getting close to that of the U.S. (72%) and is much higher than in a country like France (50%).

[...]

While comparisons are difficult, the available evidence indicates that income growth trends in China during this period [between 1978 and 2015] may have been more egalitarian than those of the U.S., but less so than Europe’s. However, the current lack of transparency about income and wealth data in China, especially regarding offshore assets, puts serious limits on researchers’ collective ability to monitor inequality dynamics and design adequate policy responses.

[...]

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 24 points 1 week ago (29 children)

The Word Socialist website is supporting Chinese propaganda, including Beijing's aggression against Taiwan, and they support Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 1 week ago

As far as I know, there was some tendency within China's political elite back in the 1980s toward a different system - I wouldn't say democratic, but a bit more liberalized. Even at the beginning of the Tiananmen Square protests, there reportedly were some politicians who advised to allow some protests; but eventually the hardliners won this internal battle as we know, cracking down on protesters. But I can't elaborate on that unfortunately as my knowledge on this subject is too limited.

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 8 points 1 week ago (2 children)

@doben@lemmy.wtf

Xinhua News Agency January 19, 2016

And you consider that a credible source?

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