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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47336592

China’s fixed-asset investment fell by 2.6% year-on-year in January-November 2025 period, more than market expectations of a 2.3% decrease and following a 1.7% drop in the first ten months.

This was the third straight month of decline and the sharpest since June 2020, due to continued decreases in property investment (-15.9% vs -14.7% in January-October) and infrastructure (-1.1% vs -0.1%), alongside softer growth in manufacturing (1.9% vs 2.7%).

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47336592

China’s fixed-asset investment fell by 2.6% year-on-year in January-November 2025 period, more than market expectations of a 2.3% decrease and following a 1.7% drop in the first ten months.

This was the third straight month of decline and the sharpest since June 2020, due to continued decreases in property investment (-15.9% vs -14.7% in January-October) and infrastructure (-1.1% vs -0.1%), alongside softer growth in manufacturing (1.9% vs 2.7%).

[...]

China’s fixed-asset investment fell by 2.6% year-on-year in January-November 2025 period, more than market expectations of a 2.3% decrease and following a 1.7% drop in the first ten months.

This was the third straight month of decline and the sharpest since June 2020, due to continued decreases in property investment (-15.9% vs -14.7% in January-October) and infrastructure (-1.1% vs -0.1%), alongside softer growth in manufacturing (1.9% vs 2.7%).

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47329586

Archived

[...]

Despite legal prohibitions, the employment of minors persists, especially in less-developed regions like the Western and rural provinces. Children from these areas are often recruited into small workshops, informal sectors, and manufacturing supply chains, including electronics and toy production. A specific form of exploitation involves the student-worker system, where vocational schools place students, sometimes as young as 16, into factories for long hours of repetitive labor irrelevant to their studies. Refusal to participate in these mandatory “internships” often results in the student being threatened with the loss of funding or graduation status, creating a coercive labor condition.

A distinct and systemic issue is the state-sponsored coercive labor programs operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This system compels Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations, including minors, into forced labor through mass internment and “labor transfer programs.” This exploitation is embedded in state policy, targeting industries like cotton and solar polysilicon for the goal of forced assimilation and social control. The coercive nature of this state-enforced labor represents a severe human rights abuse in the supply chain.

[...]

Effective enforcement is hampered by systemic challenges and a lack of resources. The number of labor inspectors is insufficient to monitor the vast number of workplaces, especially in the informal sector where violations are common. Enforcement relies on periodic, campaign-like factory investigations rather than routine supervision. A lack of transparency and accountability, coupled with local officials prioritizing economic interests, prevents the rigorous application of the law. Inadequate penalties and sporadic enforcement are often insufficient to deter employers from violating child labor prohibitions.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47329586

Archived

[...]

Despite legal prohibitions, the employment of minors persists, especially in less-developed regions like the Western and rural provinces. Children from these areas are often recruited into small workshops, informal sectors, and manufacturing supply chains, including electronics and toy production. A specific form of exploitation involves the student-worker system, where vocational schools place students, sometimes as young as 16, into factories for long hours of repetitive labor irrelevant to their studies. Refusal to participate in these mandatory “internships” often results in the student being threatened with the loss of funding or graduation status, creating a coercive labor condition.

A distinct and systemic issue is the state-sponsored coercive labor programs operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This system compels Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations, including minors, into forced labor through mass internment and “labor transfer programs.” This exploitation is embedded in state policy, targeting industries like cotton and solar polysilicon for the goal of forced assimilation and social control. The coercive nature of this state-enforced labor represents a severe human rights abuse in the supply chain.

[...]

Effective enforcement is hampered by systemic challenges and a lack of resources. The number of labor inspectors is insufficient to monitor the vast number of workplaces, especially in the informal sector where violations are common. Enforcement relies on periodic, campaign-like factory investigations rather than routine supervision. A lack of transparency and accountability, coupled with local officials prioritizing economic interests, prevents the rigorous application of the law. Inadequate penalties and sporadic enforcement are often insufficient to deter employers from violating child labor prohibitions.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Despite legal prohibitions, the employment of minors persists, especially in less-developed regions like the Western and rural provinces. Children from these areas are often recruited into small workshops, informal sectors, and manufacturing supply chains, including electronics and toy production. A specific form of exploitation involves the student-worker system, where vocational schools place students, sometimes as young as 16, into factories for long hours of repetitive labor irrelevant to their studies. Refusal to participate in these mandatory “internships” often results in the student being threatened with the loss of funding or graduation status, creating a coercive labor condition.

A distinct and systemic issue is the state-sponsored coercive labor programs operating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). This system compels Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations, including minors, into forced labor through mass internment and “labor transfer programs.” This exploitation is embedded in state policy, targeting industries like cotton and solar polysilicon for the goal of forced assimilation and social control. The coercive nature of this state-enforced labor represents a severe human rights abuse in the supply chain.

[...]

Effective enforcement is hampered by systemic challenges and a lack of resources. The number of labor inspectors is insufficient to monitor the vast number of workplaces, especially in the informal sector where violations are common. Enforcement relies on periodic, campaign-like factory investigations rather than routine supervision. A lack of transparency and accountability, coupled with local officials prioritizing economic interests, prevents the rigorous application of the law. Inadequate penalties and sporadic enforcement are often insufficient to deter employers from violating child labor prohibitions.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47179958

The Hong Kong authorities’ reaction to a deadly fire that raged through a high-rise apartment complex killing at least 159 people last month did not only include rescuing survivors and addressing the disaster but also a sweeping crackdown on those who dared to raise questions.

This chilling move is yet another sign of the increasing mainlandization of Hong Kong, where disasters, man-made and natural, are most often met with arbitrary detentions, censorship and harassment of anyone who strays from the Chinese Communist Party’s chosen narrative.

In the days after the tragedy, the Hong Kong authorities:

• kicked out volunteers who were distributing aid at the disaster site;
• arrested a 71-year-old man for posting a critical comment online;
• detained a student on "sedition" charges who had launched a petition callling for accountability; and,
• directly copying from China’s playbook, accused foreign anti-China forces of spreading rumours.

[...]

Questions that need answers

• Before the fire broke out on 26 November 2025 in Wong Fuk Court, some residents had opposed a planned renovation project over soaring repair costs and an opaque tendering system. Despite this, the renovation went ahead anyway in July 2024.

• For more than a year, residents warned the authorities that the netting and polystyrene materials used on building exteriors as part of the renovation work, were flammable. The government first said there were “no strict rules” on such materials, then later concluded the fire risk was “relatively low.”

• Labour and fire departments issued multiple notices demanding safety improvements but these warnings were not enforced.

• In the wake of the fire, investigators found that the netting failed fire-safety standards. To date, 13 people have been arrested on manslaughter charges in connection with the blaze— including contractors and a consultant.

[...]

The Hong Kong authorities’ reaction to a deadly fire that raged through a high-rise apartment complex killing at least 159 people last month did not only include rescuing survivors and addressing the disaster but also a sweeping crackdown on those who dared to raise questions.

This chilling move is yet another sign of the increasing mainlandization of Hong Kong, where disasters, man-made and natural, are most often met with arbitrary detentions, censorship and harassment of anyone who strays from the Chinese Communist Party’s chosen narrative.

In the days after the tragedy, the Hong Kong authorities:

• kicked out volunteers who were distributing aid at the disaster site;
• arrested a 71-year-old man for posting a critical comment online;
• detained a student on "sedition" charges who had launched a petition callling for accountability; and,
• directly copying from China’s playbook, accused foreign anti-China forces of spreading rumours.

[...]

Questions that need answers

• Before the fire broke out on 26 November 2025 in Wong Fuk Court, some residents had opposed a planned renovation project over soaring repair costs and an opaque tendering system. Despite this, the renovation went ahead anyway in July 2024.

• For more than a year, residents warned the authorities that the netting and polystyrene materials used on building exteriors as part of the renovation work, were flammable. The government first said there were “no strict rules” on such materials, then later concluded the fire risk was “relatively low.”

• Labour and fire departments issued multiple notices demanding safety improvements but these warnings were not enforced.

• In the wake of the fire, investigators found that the netting failed fire-safety standards. To date, 13 people have been arrested on manslaughter charges in connection with the blaze— including contractors and a consultant.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47178832

Archived

[...]

Bankers and fund managers are now rushing to weigh the damage of what could become one of the biggest corporate restructurings in China’s history, involving over $50 billion of outstanding debt — including more than $7 billion held by lenders and bond investors overseas. They warn that Vanke’s worsening problems will send ripples throughout China’s economy and its financial system, threatening losses for banks and ramping up pressure on the long-struggling property sector.

[...]

The chaos at Vanke has an unmistakable sense of deja vu for investors who endured around $130 billion of defaults over the past four years, as the property crunch toppled almost all of China’s once high-flying developers. But while giants like China Evergrande Group had binged on debt and spent wildly, Vanke was considered safer — and better connected. Some investors even considered it too big to fail.

[...]

The warning signs had been building for years. In late 2024, a mid-level executive at a Chinese regional bank started to worry about his firm’s exposure to Vanke.

He noticed a simple problem: The property company had an asset-liability ratio of around 70%, meaning it had $100 to cover every $70 of debt. But real estate prices had been falling for years, with a gauge of second-hand home prices in Shenzhen down more than a third from its peak. How could banks be sure that Vanke’s assets would continue to be worth enough to cover its debts?

The banker, suspecting Vanke’s debt would soon run into trouble, submitted a proposal to his bosses to reclassify the company’s loans as non-performing. His plan was rejected. His bosses pointed out that other big banks weren’t calling the loans non-performing, and so there was no need to go against the grain.

State banks are sometimes group-thinking animals, he said. There was a logic behind his managers’ reluctance to act. At the time, it still seemed likely that Shenzhen Metro — and perhaps even the Shenzhen government — would be there to help.

[...]

Vanke’s roughly $160 billion of assets and more than 125,000 employees gave it a huge importance to Shenzhen, a bustling trade hub. The city’s busy skyline is dotted with Vanke developments, including packed residential blocks, towering office buildings and high-end shopping malls. The Vanke Centre, its sprawling headquarters, flanks the city’s beach getaway of Dameisha.

[...]

Around 45% of Vanke’s roughly $50 billion debt load is unsecured, according to Barclays research based on data to the end of June, making it particularly vulnerable if the company is forced to restructure. Some of Vanke’s loans are protected by a so-called letter of comfort — a vague attempt at reassurance that has questionable legal value.

[...]

The yearslong crisis is also fueling a rising sense of anxiety among Chinese officials, who are considering measures to turn around the property market including mortgage subsidies and tax rebates. On Thursday, policymakers said they would encourage more purchases of unsold homes.

Officials recently ordered two private data agencies to freeze the publication of home sales data. Shanghai authorities have censored posts that express a pessimistic outlook about the real estate sector. There is also a growing self-censorship: At a credit ratings conference in early December, speakers didn’t refer to Vanke by name — referring only to a debt extension by “a major developer.”

“The core issue with the property market is the glut of housing inventory and the severely dented confidence of homebuyers,” said Kelvin Lam, senior China economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics. “But the ongoing debt problems aren’t helping the situation, and suggest that the property sector is still very far away from being out of the woods.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47178832

Archived

[...]

Bankers and fund managers are now rushing to weigh the damage of what could become one of the biggest corporate restructurings in China’s history, involving over $50 billion of outstanding debt — including more than $7 billion held by lenders and bond investors overseas. They warn that Vanke’s worsening problems will send ripples throughout China’s economy and its financial system, threatening losses for banks and ramping up pressure on the long-struggling property sector.

[...]

The chaos at Vanke has an unmistakable sense of deja vu for investors who endured around $130 billion of defaults over the past four years, as the property crunch toppled almost all of China’s once high-flying developers. But while giants like China Evergrande Group had binged on debt and spent wildly, Vanke was considered safer — and better connected. Some investors even considered it too big to fail.

[...]

The warning signs had been building for years. In late 2024, a mid-level executive at a Chinese regional bank started to worry about his firm’s exposure to Vanke.

He noticed a simple problem: The property company had an asset-liability ratio of around 70%, meaning it had $100 to cover every $70 of debt. But real estate prices had been falling for years, with a gauge of second-hand home prices in Shenzhen down more than a third from its peak. How could banks be sure that Vanke’s assets would continue to be worth enough to cover its debts?

The banker, suspecting Vanke’s debt would soon run into trouble, submitted a proposal to his bosses to reclassify the company’s loans as non-performing. His plan was rejected. His bosses pointed out that other big banks weren’t calling the loans non-performing, and so there was no need to go against the grain.

State banks are sometimes group-thinking animals, he said. There was a logic behind his managers’ reluctance to act. At the time, it still seemed likely that Shenzhen Metro — and perhaps even the Shenzhen government — would be there to help.

[...]

Vanke’s roughly $160 billion of assets and more than 125,000 employees gave it a huge importance to Shenzhen, a bustling trade hub. The city’s busy skyline is dotted with Vanke developments, including packed residential blocks, towering office buildings and high-end shopping malls. The Vanke Centre, its sprawling headquarters, flanks the city’s beach getaway of Dameisha.

[...]

Around 45% of Vanke’s roughly $50 billion debt load is unsecured, according to Barclays research based on data to the end of June, making it particularly vulnerable if the company is forced to restructure. Some of Vanke’s loans are protected by a so-called letter of comfort — a vague attempt at reassurance that has questionable legal value.

[...]

The yearslong crisis is also fueling a rising sense of anxiety among Chinese officials, who are considering measures to turn around the property market including mortgage subsidies and tax rebates. On Thursday, policymakers said they would encourage more purchases of unsold homes.

Officials recently ordered two private data agencies to freeze the publication of home sales data. Shanghai authorities have censored posts that express a pessimistic outlook about the real estate sector. There is also a growing self-censorship: At a credit ratings conference in early December, speakers didn’t refer to Vanke by name — referring only to a debt extension by “a major developer.”

“The core issue with the property market is the glut of housing inventory and the severely dented confidence of homebuyers,” said Kelvin Lam, senior China economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics. “But the ongoing debt problems aren’t helping the situation, and suggest that the property sector is still very far away from being out of the woods.”

Archived

[...]

Bankers and fund managers are now rushing to weigh the damage of what could become one of the biggest corporate restructurings in China’s history, involving over $50 billion of outstanding debt — including more than $7 billion held by lenders and bond investors overseas. They warn that Vanke’s worsening problems will send ripples throughout China’s economy and its financial system, threatening losses for banks and ramping up pressure on the long-struggling property sector.

[...]

The chaos at Vanke has an unmistakable sense of deja vu for investors who endured around $130 billion of defaults over the past four years, as the property crunch toppled almost all of China’s once high-flying developers. But while giants like China Evergrande Group had binged on debt and spent wildly, Vanke was considered safer — and better connected. Some investors even considered it too big to fail.

[...]

The warning signs had been building for years. In late 2024, a mid-level executive at a Chinese regional bank started to worry about his firm’s exposure to Vanke.

He noticed a simple problem: The property company had an asset-liability ratio of around 70%, meaning it had $100 to cover every $70 of debt. But real estate prices had been falling for years, with a gauge of second-hand home prices in Shenzhen down more than a third from its peak. How could banks be sure that Vanke’s assets would continue to be worth enough to cover its debts?

The banker, suspecting Vanke’s debt would soon run into trouble, submitted a proposal to his bosses to reclassify the company’s loans as non-performing. His plan was rejected. His bosses pointed out that other big banks weren’t calling the loans non-performing, and so there was no need to go against the grain.

State banks are sometimes group-thinking animals, he said. There was a logic behind his managers’ reluctance to act. At the time, it still seemed likely that Shenzhen Metro — and perhaps even the Shenzhen government — would be there to help.

[...]

Vanke’s roughly $160 billion of assets and more than 125,000 employees gave it a huge importance to Shenzhen, a bustling trade hub. The city’s busy skyline is dotted with Vanke developments, including packed residential blocks, towering office buildings and high-end shopping malls. The Vanke Centre, its sprawling headquarters, flanks the city’s beach getaway of Dameisha.

[...]

Around 45% of Vanke’s roughly $50 billion debt load is unsecured, according to Barclays research based on data to the end of June, making it particularly vulnerable if the company is forced to restructure. Some of Vanke’s loans are protected by a so-called letter of comfort — a vague attempt at reassurance that has questionable legal value.

[...]

The yearslong crisis is also fueling a rising sense of anxiety among Chinese officials, who are considering measures to turn around the property market including mortgage subsidies and tax rebates. On Thursday, policymakers said they would encourage more purchases of unsold homes.

Officials recently ordered two private data agencies to freeze the publication of home sales data. Shanghai authorities have censored posts that express a pessimistic outlook about the real estate sector. There is also a growing self-censorship: At a credit ratings conference in early December, speakers didn’t refer to Vanke by name — referring only to a debt extension by “a major developer.”

“The core issue with the property market is the glut of housing inventory and the severely dented confidence of homebuyers,” said Kelvin Lam, senior China economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics. “But the ongoing debt problems aren’t helping the situation, and suggest that the property sector is still very far away from being out of the woods.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47167958

Archived

At least two fistfights broke out last week between [Temu parent company] PDD Holdings Inc. employees and Chinese regulators who were performing checks at the e-commerce company’s Shanghai premises, according to people familiar with the matter.

The altercations involved PDD staff and officials from the State Administration for Market Regulation, the people said, asking not to be identified discussing a sensitive issue. The SAMR [stands for State Administration for Market Regulation in China] officials were investigating reports of fraudulent deliveries on PDD’s platform, the people said, adding that police made several arrests in the aftermath.

While details of how the fights began weren’t immediately clear, the episode may trigger investor concern about increased regulatory scrutiny of PDD. It’s unheard of for interactions between large Chinese companies and regulators to descend into physical confrontations, even as tensions often run high between the two sides.

The SAMR, an agency with sweeping powers to investigate industries from technology to energy, led a high-profile antitrust probe against Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. in 2020 that culminated in a sector-wide clampdown. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government has since made a concerted push to show its support for the private sector, including in a meeting between Xi and entrepreneurs such as Alibaba’s Jack Ma in February.

...

PDD, better-known as the creator of Temu and the Pinduoduo Chinese e-commerce platform, competes directly with Alibaba and JD.com domestically. Abroad, it’s known as an aggressive online retailer that, along with Shein, has ambitions to become a major player in the US and Europe.

PDD’s rapid growth has drawn regulatory attention not just at home.

Temu’s European headquarters in Dublin were raided by European Union competition watchdogs, amid suspicions the Chinese e-commerce giant may have received unfair subsidies from Beijing. Those unannounced inspections took place last week, according to people familiar with the matter who spoke under condition of anonymity.

PDD just last month warned of a slowdown in an intensively competitive Chinese consumption environment, reflecting an escalating battle in online commerce.