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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46055439

Archived

As he prepared to speak at a panel in Washington last December, Chinese economist Gao Shanwen tapped the microphone not once but twice, as though to make sure he would be heard. “We do not know the true number of China’s real growth figure,” he began.

After the Covid-19 pandemic, many people had doubts about the official GDP figures, which Gao thought were overstated. “My own speculation is that in the past two to three years the real number, on average, might be around 2 per cent, even though the official number is close to 5 per cent.”

By January, Gao was no longer chief economist at SDIC Securities, his former employer in Hong Kong. In a WeChat group of Chinese economists, he went quiet. For almost a year, there was no sign of any public appearance.

It is only in recent weeks that Gao has re-emerged, participating in a panel about savings and investment at a conference in Shanghai. His almost year-long silence underlines the intense political sensitivity surrounding China’s economic data.

Over the decades that its growth rates were the envy of the rest of the world, the reliability of its statistics drew scrutiny. But the questions have become even more urgent as the economy has lost momentum amid a property slowdown and trade tensions with the US.

[...]

Rather than addressing past concerns about its data, China has instead increased opacity by discontinuing a number of data series and further restricting access for researchers. At a time when governments, international businesses and financial markets are watching China’s economy more closely than ever, their understanding is deeply constrained.

Eswar Prasad, a professor at Cornell University and former IMF official, points to “opacity in data collection”, “lack of clarity on definitional issues” and “the absence of transparency on sampling methodology” across China’s macroeconomic data.

[...]

On an A-to-D scale for national accounts, the IMF’s 2024 grade for China is C. The measure puts it on a par with India and below Vietnam, which also transitioned from a Soviet-style measurement system in the early 1990s.

Vast quantities of official data are still produced in China and are widely used to compile alternative estimates of economic growth. In some cases, they indicate weaknesses, including recent signs of deflation and falling home prices. The country’s most widely used gauge of investment is negative this year for the second time in decades.

[...]

Following its entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China made efforts to upgrade its statistical methods and engage in dialogue, shedding light on the extent of the practical measurement challenges it faced across such a vast and fast-changing economy.

But as the political system has become more closed under President Xi Jinping, especially during his unprecedented third term, which was confirmed in 2022, efforts at outreach have dwindled. Sensitivity over data of all kinds soared during the pandemic and has remained elevated.

[...]

A decade ago, the NBS was relatively engaged with outside researchers. [Now] transparency has in some ways gone backwards. One of the best examples is fixed asset investment, a statistic that dates back to China’s planned economy era.

[...]

China does not publish [quarterly breakdowns of the expenditure approach to GDP, including investment, consumption and net exports, and do not publish subcomponents of those broad categories, which can provide useful insights into what is driving the headline figures].

Emerging Advisors, a consultancy, says that across 40 emerging economies it tracks, only four others do not publish such quarterly data, and they are countries with economies based on hydrocarbons. “We can’t stress enough how abnormal this is for an economy of any significant size,” noted economist Jonathan Anderson in a report this year.

[...]

At a separate speech in Shenzhen last December, which is still censored online, Gao, the Chinese economist, described a breakdown in the relationship between GDP and retail sales, as well as lagging fixed asset investment. He calculated the economic impact of real estate bubbles bursting in other countries and contrasted them to the absence of any impact on China’s GDP figures.

This time, speaking his own language, his tone at times shifted towards deadpan irony.

“Perhaps this phenomenon exceeds our ability to understand,” Gao said, of the various contradictions in the data. “This is possible,” he went on, with a slight raise of the eyebrows. “But . . . we tend to think that we need to consider the growth data more carefully.”

Archived

As he prepared to speak at a panel in Washington last December, Chinese economist Gao Shanwen tapped the microphone not once but twice, as though to make sure he would be heard. “We do not know the true number of China’s real growth figure,” he began.

After the Covid-19 pandemic, many people had doubts about the official GDP figures, which Gao thought were overstated. “My own speculation is that in the past two to three years the real number, on average, might be around 2 per cent, even though the official number is close to 5 per cent.”

By January, Gao was no longer chief economist at SDIC Securities, his former employer in Hong Kong. In a WeChat group of Chinese economists, he went quiet. For almost a year, there was no sign of any public appearance.

It is only in recent weeks that Gao has re-emerged, participating in a panel about savings and investment at a conference in Shanghai. His almost year-long silence underlines the intense political sensitivity surrounding China’s economic data.

Over the decades that its growth rates were the envy of the rest of the world, the reliability of its statistics drew scrutiny. But the questions have become even more urgent as the economy has lost momentum amid a property slowdown and trade tensions with the US.

[...]

Rather than addressing past concerns about its data, China has instead increased opacity by discontinuing a number of data series and further restricting access for researchers. At a time when governments, international businesses and financial markets are watching China’s economy more closely than ever, their understanding is deeply constrained.

Eswar Prasad, a professor at Cornell University and former IMF official, points to “opacity in data collection”, “lack of clarity on definitional issues” and “the absence of transparency on sampling methodology” across China’s macroeconomic data.

[...]

On an A-to-D scale for national accounts, the IMF’s 2024 grade for China is C. The measure puts it on a par with India and below Vietnam, which also transitioned from a Soviet-style measurement system in the early 1990s.

Vast quantities of official data are still produced in China and are widely used to compile alternative estimates of economic growth. In some cases, they indicate weaknesses, including recent signs of deflation and falling home prices. The country’s most widely used gauge of investment is negative this year for the second time in decades.

[...]

Following its entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China made efforts to upgrade its statistical methods and engage in dialogue, shedding light on the extent of the practical measurement challenges it faced across such a vast and fast-changing economy.

But as the political system has become more closed under President Xi Jinping, especially during his unprecedented third term, which was confirmed in 2022, efforts at outreach have dwindled. Sensitivity over data of all kinds soared during the pandemic and has remained elevated.

[...]

A decade ago, the NBS was relatively engaged with outside researchers. [Now] transparency has in some ways gone backwards. One of the best examples is fixed asset investment, a statistic that dates back to China’s planned economy era.

[...]

China does not publish [quarterly breakdowns of the expenditure approach to GDP, including investment, consumption and net exports, and do not publish subcomponents of those broad categories, which can provide useful insights into what is driving the headline figures].

Emerging Advisors, a consultancy, says that across 40 emerging economies it tracks, only four others do not publish such quarterly data, and they are countries with economies based on hydrocarbons. “We can’t stress enough how abnormal this is for an economy of any significant size,” noted economist Jonathan Anderson in a report this year.

[...]

At a separate speech in Shenzhen last December, which is still censored online, Gao, the Chinese economist, described a breakdown in the relationship between GDP and retail sales, as well as lagging fixed asset investment. He calculated the economic impact of real estate bubbles bursting in other countries and contrasted them to the absence of any impact on China’s GDP figures.

This time, speaking his own language, his tone at times shifted towards deadpan irony.

“Perhaps this phenomenon exceeds our ability to understand,” Gao said, of the various contradictions in the data. “This is possible,” he went on, with a slight raise of the eyebrows. “But . . . we tend to think that we need to consider the growth data more carefully.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46047488

Archived

• Since 1978, China has transformed from a poor, relatively equal society to a leading global economy with levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe and resembling the U.S.
• The state-owned (vs. privately-owned) share of China’s wealth fell from 70% to about 30%, compared to 0% in the U.S. (adjusted for debt).
• The share of China’s national income earned by the top 10% of the population has increased from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, nearing the U.S.’s 45% and surpassing France's 32%.
• Similarly, the wealth share of the top 10% of the population reached 67%, close to the U.S.’s 72% and higher than France’s 50%.

[...]

Income and wealth inequality in China approaching or exceeding levels in the U.S. and Europe. China’s inequality levels used to be lower than Europe’s in the late 1970s, close to the most egalitarian Nordic countries. Now, however, it is approaching U.S. levels. The bottom 50% earns about 15% of total income in China versus 12% in the U.S. and 22% in France. However, China’s top 10% wealth share (67% in 2015) is getting close to that of the U.S. (72%) and is much higher than in a country like France (50%).

[...]

While comparisons are difficult, the available evidence indicates that income growth trends in China during this period [between 1978 and 2015] may have been more egalitarian than those of the U.S., but less so than Europe’s. However, the current lack of transparency about income and wealth data in China, especially regarding offshore assets, puts serious limits on researchers’ collective ability to monitor inequality dynamics and design adequate policy responses.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46047488

Archived

• Since 1978, China has transformed from a poor, relatively equal society to a leading global economy with levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe and resembling the U.S.
• The state-owned (vs. privately-owned) share of China’s wealth fell from 70% to about 30%, compared to 0% in the U.S. (adjusted for debt).
• The share of China’s national income earned by the top 10% of the population has increased from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, nearing the U.S.’s 45% and surpassing France's 32%.
• Similarly, the wealth share of the top 10% of the population reached 67%, close to the U.S.’s 72% and higher than France’s 50%.

[...]

Income and wealth inequality in China approaching or exceeding levels in the U.S. and Europe. China’s inequality levels used to be lower than Europe’s in the late 1970s, close to the most egalitarian Nordic countries. Now, however, it is approaching U.S. levels. The bottom 50% earns about 15% of total income in China versus 12% in the U.S. and 22% in France. However, China’s top 10% wealth share (67% in 2015) is getting close to that of the U.S. (72%) and is much higher than in a country like France (50%).

[...]

While comparisons are difficult, the available evidence indicates that income growth trends in China during this period [between 1978 and 2015] may have been more egalitarian than those of the U.S., but less so than Europe’s. However, the current lack of transparency about income and wealth data in China, especially regarding offshore assets, puts serious limits on researchers’ collective ability to monitor inequality dynamics and design adequate policy responses.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46047488

Archived

• Since 1978, China has transformed from a poor, relatively equal society to a leading global economy with levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe and resembling the U.S.
• The state-owned (vs. privately-owned) share of China’s wealth fell from 70% to about 30%, compared to 0% in the U.S. (adjusted for debt).
• The share of China’s national income earned by the top 10% of the population has increased from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, nearing the U.S.’s 45% and surpassing France's 32%.
• Similarly, the wealth share of the top 10% of the population reached 67%, close to the U.S.’s 72% and higher than France’s 50%.

[...]

Income and wealth inequality in China approaching or exceeding levels in the U.S. and Europe. China’s inequality levels used to be lower than Europe’s in the late 1970s, close to the most egalitarian Nordic countries. Now, however, it is approaching U.S. levels. The bottom 50% earns about 15% of total income in China versus 12% in the U.S. and 22% in France. However, China’s top 10% wealth share (67% in 2015) is getting close to that of the U.S. (72%) and is much higher than in a country like France (50%).

[...]

While comparisons are difficult, the available evidence indicates that income growth trends in China during this period [between 1978 and 2015] may have been more egalitarian than those of the U.S., but less so than Europe’s. However, the current lack of transparency about income and wealth data in China, especially regarding offshore assets, puts serious limits on researchers’ collective ability to monitor inequality dynamics and design adequate policy responses.

[...]

Archived

• Since 1978, China has transformed from a poor, relatively equal society to a leading global economy with levels of inequality surpassing much of Europe and resembling the U.S.
• The state-owned (vs. privately-owned) share of China’s wealth fell from 70% to about 30%, compared to 0% in the U.S. (adjusted for debt).
• The share of China’s national income earned by the top 10% of the population has increased from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, nearing the U.S.’s 45% and surpassing France's 32%.
• Similarly, the wealth share of the top 10% of the population reached 67%, close to the U.S.’s 72% and higher than France’s 50%.

[...]

Income and wealth inequality in China approaching or exceeding levels in the U.S. and Europe. China’s inequality levels used to be lower than Europe’s in the late 1970s, close to the most egalitarian Nordic countries. Now, however, it is approaching U.S. levels. The bottom 50% earns about 15% of total income in China versus 12% in the U.S. and 22% in France. However, China’s top 10% wealth share (67% in 2015) is getting close to that of the U.S. (72%) and is much higher than in a country like France (50%).

[...]

While comparisons are difficult, the available evidence indicates that income growth trends in China during this period [between 1978 and 2015] may have been more egalitarian than those of the U.S., but less so than Europe’s. However, the current lack of transparency about income and wealth data in China, especially regarding offshore assets, puts serious limits on researchers’ collective ability to monitor inequality dynamics and design adequate policy responses.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46040700

Archived

Media professionals are increasingly targeted by transnational repression (TNR), which is when authoritarian states carry out attacks beyond their national borders. These attacks can be physical, digital and psychological, as demonstrated by the credible threats to Iran International journalists across seven countries including G7 members Germany, UK, USA and Canada. The ongoing threats against Egyptian investigative journalist Basma Mostafa, who lives in Germany, have been described as ‘extremely worrying’. Authoritarian states also resort to legal means: Russian authorities impose prison sentences in absentia or issue arrest warrants for media professionals in exile, which severely restricts their mobility. Such measures are intended to suppress critical voices, intimidate exiled journalists and silence opposition figures.

RSF has been documenting these attacks for many years. In addition to Russia and Egypt, journalists from China, Belarus, Iran, Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Vietnam, and many other countries are affected. However, there are many unreported cases and insufficient data, which makes an effective response difficult.

[...]

Archived

Media professionals are increasingly targeted by transnational repression (TNR), which is when authoritarian states carry out attacks beyond their national borders. These attacks can be physical, digital and psychological, as demonstrated by the credible threats to Iran International journalists across seven countries including G7 members Germany, UK, USA and Canada. The ongoing threats against Egyptian investigative journalist Basma Mostafa, who lives in Germany, have been described as ‘extremely worrying’. Authoritarian states also resort to legal means: Russian authorities impose prison sentences in absentia or issue arrest warrants for media professionals in exile, which severely restricts their mobility. Such measures are intended to suppress critical voices, intimidate exiled journalists and silence opposition figures.

RSF has been documenting these attacks for many years. In addition to Russia and Egypt, journalists from China, Belarus, Iran, Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Vietnam, and many other countries are affected. However, there are many unreported cases and insufficient data, which makes an effective response difficult.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45996928

Archived

[...]

“The overcapacity problem is continuing to grow and it has a devastating effect on global steel markets,” Cobden, who was present at the meeting, told the Financial Times.

Global steel capacity is forecast to exceed demand by 38 per cent, or 721mn metric tonnes (mmt), by 2027, according to the OECD. A significant portion of the excess comes from China, which is responsible for more than 50 per cent of steel supply globally, after a slowdown in its property market sapped domestic demand. According to the body’s calculations, China subsidises its production at 10 times the average level of OECD countries.

In a statement issued after the meeting, the 25-member steel committee warned that excess capacity was increasing this year at the fastest pace since the 2009 global financial crisis, risking “severe trade disruptions, and leading to national and economic security risks”.

[...]

Canada in June announced tight quotas and 50 per cent tariffs on excess steel products from countries that are not part of free trade agreements. It has previously raised concerns about subsidised steel from other Asian countries, including Vietnam and South Korea.

“It is clear that free trade in the steel industry is dead. Governments are being forced to protect their industries by China’s market distorting subsidies and colossal overproduction,” said Peter Brennan, policy director of the British lobby group UK Steel, who was also present at the OECD meeting.

Eurometal, which represents downstream steel users in Europe’s manufacturing supply chains, has claimed that three million EU industrial jobs are at risk from a “silent surge” of unfairly subsidised steel embedded in imported goods.

[...]

Trade policy experts said the prospect of joined-up action to counter the strategic threat posed by Chinese steel overproduction could be the first move towards a “League of Democracies” defending common interests.

“If democracies team up in response to security threats — as they did to deny Russia access to their markets after the invasion of Ukraine — there’s nothing to stop them doing the same for economic threats,” said Simon Evenett, professor of geopolitics and strategy at IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45996928

Archived

[...]

“The overcapacity problem is continuing to grow and it has a devastating effect on global steel markets,” Cobden, who was present at the meeting, told the Financial Times.

Global steel capacity is forecast to exceed demand by 38 per cent, or 721mn metric tonnes (mmt), by 2027, according to the OECD. A significant portion of the excess comes from China, which is responsible for more than 50 per cent of steel supply globally, after a slowdown in its property market sapped domestic demand. According to the body’s calculations, China subsidises its production at 10 times the average level of OECD countries.

In a statement issued after the meeting, the 25-member steel committee warned that excess capacity was increasing this year at the fastest pace since the 2009 global financial crisis, risking “severe trade disruptions, and leading to national and economic security risks”.

[...]

Canada in June announced tight quotas and 50 per cent tariffs on excess steel products from countries that are not part of free trade agreements. It has previously raised concerns about subsidised steel from other Asian countries, including Vietnam and South Korea.

“It is clear that free trade in the steel industry is dead. Governments are being forced to protect their industries by China’s market distorting subsidies and colossal overproduction,” said Peter Brennan, policy director of the British lobby group UK Steel, who was also present at the OECD meeting.

Eurometal, which represents downstream steel users in Europe’s manufacturing supply chains, has claimed that three million EU industrial jobs are at risk from a “silent surge” of unfairly subsidised steel embedded in imported goods.

[...]

Trade policy experts said the prospect of joined-up action to counter the strategic threat posed by Chinese steel overproduction could be the first move towards a “League of Democracies” defending common interests.

“If democracies team up in response to security threats — as they did to deny Russia access to their markets after the invasion of Ukraine — there’s nothing to stop them doing the same for economic threats,” said Simon Evenett, professor of geopolitics and strategy at IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland.

[...]

Archived

[...]

“The overcapacity problem is continuing to grow and it has a devastating effect on global steel markets,” Cobden, who was present at the meeting, told the Financial Times.

Global steel capacity is forecast to exceed demand by 38 per cent, or 721mn metric tonnes (mmt), by 2027, according to the OECD. A significant portion of the excess comes from China, which is responsible for more than 50 per cent of steel supply globally, after a slowdown in its property market sapped domestic demand. According to the body’s calculations, China subsidises its production at 10 times the average level of OECD countries.

In a statement issued after the meeting, the 25-member steel committee warned that excess capacity was increasing this year at the fastest pace since the 2009 global financial crisis, risking “severe trade disruptions, and leading to national and economic security risks”.

[...]

Canada in June announced tight quotas and 50 per cent tariffs on excess steel products from countries that are not part of free trade agreements. It has previously raised concerns about subsidised steel from other Asian countries, including Vietnam and South Korea.

“It is clear that free trade in the steel industry is dead. Governments are being forced to protect their industries by China’s market distorting subsidies and colossal overproduction,” said Peter Brennan, policy director of the British lobby group UK Steel, who was also present at the OECD meeting.

Eurometal, which represents downstream steel users in Europe’s manufacturing supply chains, has claimed that three million EU industrial jobs are at risk from a “silent surge” of unfairly subsidised steel embedded in imported goods.

[...]

Trade policy experts said the prospect of joined-up action to counter the strategic threat posed by Chinese steel overproduction could be the first move towards a “League of Democracies” defending common interests.

“If democracies team up in response to security threats — as they did to deny Russia access to their markets after the invasion of Ukraine — there’s nothing to stop them doing the same for economic threats,” said Simon Evenett, professor of geopolitics and strategy at IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45994892

• Taiwan starts handing out copies of new civil defence handbook
• Taiwan faces growing military pressure from China
• Japan PM assures support of Taiwan in case of Chinese military aggression

China is the real regional "troublemaker", a senior Taiwanese security official said on Friday, personally giving out copies of a new civil defence handbook the government is sending to every household on the island as China tensions rise.

The handbook, unveiled in September, includes for the first time instructions on what to do if citizens encounter enemy soldiers and stresses that any claims of Taiwan's surrender should be considered false.

[...]

It marks Taiwan's latest effort to prepare its population for crises ranging from natural disasters to a Chinese invasion, as Beijing steps up military and political pressure to assert its sovereignty claims over the democratically-governed island.

China has this month also been locked in an increasingly bitter dispute with Japan after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told parliament a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo.

Lin Fei-fan, Deputy Secretary-General of Taiwan's National Security Council who has overseen the handbook initiative, told reporters in a Taipei residential area as he handed out copies to residents that Japan had Taiwan's highest-level support.

"The Chinese communists are the real troublemaker in geopolitics of the entire region," he said.

"What we are doing now is to ensure that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait can be continued by all means necessary and that the status quo will not be unilaterally destroyed."

[...]