cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43381608

EU warns of 'cultural erasure' in China as human rights situation in the country shows 'no substantive sign of improvement'

The EU criticizes China's "systemic and severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms and on the right of minorities" to enjoy their own culture, and to use their own language, in private and public, including in the field of education, a statement by the EU Delegation in China reads.

"These restrictions risk leading to cultural erasure."

In spite of many engagements, "unfortunately, the overall human rights situation in China showed no substantive sign of improvement," the EU statement reads.

The situation in Xinjiang remains serious. Numerous credible reports, including the assessment issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), indicate serious human rights violations that “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”. The EU remains deeply troubled by continuing reports of forced labour and state‑imposed labour transfer schemes involving Uyghurs both within Xinjiang and to other provinces.

The human rights situation in Tibet remains equally alarming. This applies both to the Tibet Autonomous Region and to Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu provinces, where similar patterns of restrictions have been reported. Reports continue to document far-reaching state control over religious life, intensified surveillance of monasteries, and the imposition of mandatory boarding schools, where Tibetan children are separated from their families and educated primarily in Mandarin. The closure of Tibetan-language schools, and the marginalisation of Tibetan-language instruction are deeply troubling.

...

The EU continues to criticize the enforced disappearance since 1995 of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama. No credible information is provided on his whereabouts or well-being. We continue to call on China to respect and protect the rights of persons belonging to religious groups to exercise their religious freedoms without interference. The selection of religious leaders should happen without government interference and in accordance with religious norms, including for the succession of the Dalai Lama.

...

The EU also remains concerned about the situation in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where policy shifts have resulted in a marked reduction in the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction and a narrowing of space for cultural and linguistic expression. The move from Mongolian as a vehicle of instruction to its relegation as a stand‑alone subject stands in contrast with official commitments to ethnic harmony and cultural diversity, and risks accelerating the erosion of the Mongolian community’s cultural and linguistic identity.

...

The EU ... calls for the immediate and unconditional release of, among others, Gulshan Abbas, Anya Sengdra, Ekpar Asat, Chadrel Rinpoche, Rahile Dawut, Ding Jiaxi, Ding Yuande, Dong Yuyu, Pastor Mingri (Ezra) Jin, Gao Zhen, Gao Zhisheng, Go Sherab Gyatso, Golog Palden, He Fangmei, Huang Qi, Huang Xueqin, Hushtar Isa, Yalkun Isa, Ji Xiaolong, Li Yanhe, Peng Lifa, Qin Yongming, Ruan Xiaohuan, Tashi Dorje, Tashpolat Tiyip, Sakharov Prize winner Ilham Tohti, Wang Bingzhang, Pastor Wang Yi, Kamile Wayit, Xie Yang, Xu Na, Xu Zhiyong, Yang Hengjung, Yang Maodong, Yu Wensheng, Pastor Zhang Chunlei, Tara Zhang Yadi and Zhang Zhan, as well as EU citizen Gui Minhai whose right to consular access must be respected.

...

The EU underscores the essential role of freedom of expression, media independence and access to information in ensuring accountable and effective governance. In China, these freedoms remain severely constrained ... The EU strongly promotes global gender equality and women and girls full enjoyment of human rights [and] reaffirms its commitment to LGBTI persons’ full enjoyment of human rights.

"We are concerned about the rising challenges faced by China's LGBTI community, including the restriction on the freedom of association, online censorship, and intimidation of activists," the EU says.

...

In Hong Kong, fundamental rights and freedoms have further eroded.

...

China must also respect the principle of non-refoulement, and refrain from any extraterritorial activity, including transnational repression, that is not in line with international law.

...

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43319573

Web archive link

Over 1,000 documented TNR [Transnational Repression] cases have occurred since 2014, affecting individuals across 100 countries and involving at least 44 perpetrator states. Europe has emerged as a critical venue for TNR, with a growing number of targeted journalists, human rights defenders, political opponents, and whistleblowers seeking safety and protection on European soil.

Despite the scope of the problem, there is currently no binding European or international legal instrument specifically addressing TNR. Existing human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), while applicable in principle, do not offer comprehensive safeguards tailored to the realities of TNR.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43231602

Web archive link

The regime of North Korea has continued to exploit the war in Ukraine to spread its propaganda. This week we learnt that Ukrainian children, abducted by Russia, are being sent to an infamous North Korean summer camp. The children have reportedly been taught to ‘destroy Japanese imperialists’ and heard from North Korean soldiers who destroyed the USS Pueblo, a spy ship captured and sank by North Korea in 1968.

This Ukrainian children have been at the Songdowon International Children’s Camp, located near the port city of Wonsan on the country’s east coast. Well known as a popular tourist hotspot for North Korean elites, Wonsan has recently gained infamy for the newly-opened Wonsan-Kalma tourist resort, which has been not-so-affectionately nicknamed ‘North Korea’s Benidorm’. Wonsan, too, has a significant place in North Korean history. It was where Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un spent much of his childhood.

The children’s camp is hardly a new creation. Established in 1960 amid the backdrop of the Cold War, the camp became one additional facet of North Korean cultural diplomacy, as Pyongyang sought to develop ties with communist and communist-friendly countries. Whether from North Korea’s Cold War patrons of Russia and China or communist-sympathising states further afield, such as Laos, Tanzania and even Syria, children would be sent to the camp to engage in a range of activities, including cooking, swimming, rock climbing, or marathon running. For the North Korean regime, the goal was simple: spread the virtues of socialism, North Korea-style, and become friends with like-minded states.

...

Although little is known about the Ukrainian abductees sent to North Korea, cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in areas beyond security looks to continue to grow, especially as peace in Ukraine looks evermore elusive. North Korea and Russia signed a mutual defence pact in June 2024, but these renewed ties were not limited to the domain of security. It was no coincidence that only a week after the ink was dry, Grigory Gurov, Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, announced that around 250 Russian children, mainly from the Russian Far East, would visit Songdowon, making them one of the first groups to visit the camp following North Korea’s draconian three-year border closure, owing to coronavirus, in January 2021.

...

Russia and North Korea are yet to respond to the reports that Ukrainian abductees are being sent to Songdowon. Pyongyang will probably just say the children were participating in a cultural exchange – helping out an ally. We need only go back to February this year when Russia’s ambassador to North Korea, Alexander Matsegora, announced that how ‘hundreds of wounded [Russian] soldiers’ fighting against Ukraine were being treated in North Korean hospitals, epitomising the ‘brotherly attitude’ between the two Cold War allies.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46747896

Archived

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has just received confirmation from local sources that Chinese journalist and photojournalist Du Bin has been held by the authorities at the Shunyi Detention Centre in Beijing since 15 October 2025. The former New York Times photographer is accused of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, an offence punishable by five years in prison and routinely used by the Chinese regime to suppress journalists and press freedom defenders.

The photojournalist’s family has repeatedly requested to see the written detention order, but the authorities have refused to provide one. The officer in charge of the case has also declined to give further information, citing confidentiality. Through his photos, books and documentary films, Du Bin has extensively documented human rights abuses committed by the Chinese regime. His work has been published in major international media outlets, including The New York Times, Time magazine and The Guardian.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46639484

Archived

Here is the report The party’s AI: How China’s new AI systems are reshaping human rights - (pdf)

The Chinese Communist Party's AI: A new report shows how Beijing is using LLMs as ‘precision tools’ of censorship and repression at home and abroad

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming China’s state control system into a precision instrument for managing its population and targeting groups at home and abroad, a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) finds.

China’s extensive AI‑powered visual surveillance systems are already well documented. This report reveals new ways that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using large language models (LLMs) and other AI systems to automate censorship, enhance surveillance and pre‑emptively suppress dissent.

Key summary:

Chinese LLMs censor politically sensitive images, not just text.

• While prior research has extensively mapped textual censorship, this report identifies a critical gap: the censorship of politically sensitive images by Chinese LLMs remains largely unexamined.
• To address this, ASPI developed a testing methodology, using a dataset of 200 images likely to trigger censorship, to interrogate how LLMs censor sensitive imagery. The results revealed that visual censorship mechanisms are embedded across multiple layers within the LLM ecosystem.

The Chinese Government is deploying AI throughout the criminal‑justice pipeline—from AI‑enabled policing and mass surveillance, to smart courts, to smart prisons.

• This emerging AI pipeline reduces transparency and accountability, enhances the efficiency of police, prosecutors and prisons, and further enables state repression.
• Beijing is pushing courts to adopt AI not just in drafting basic paperwork, but even in recommending judgements and sentences, which could deepen structural discrimination and weaken defence counsels’ ability to appeal.
• The Chinese surveillance technology company iFlyTek stands out as a major provider of LLM‑based systems used in this pipeline.

China is using minority‑language LLMs to deepen surveillance and control of ethnic minorities, both in China and abroad.

• The Chinese Government is developing, and in some cases already testing, AI‑enabled public‑sentiment analysis in ethnic minority languages—especially Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian and Korean—for the explicitly stated purpose of enhancing the state’s capacity to monitor and control communications in those languages across text, video and audio.
• DeepSeek and most other commercial LLM models have insufficient capacity to do this effectively, as there’s little market incentive to create sophisticated, expensive models for such small language groups. The Chinese state is stepping in to provide resources and backing for the development of minority‑language models for that explicit purpose.
• China is also seeking to deploy this technology to target those groups in foreign countries along the Belt and Road.

AI now performs much of the work of online censorship in China.

• AI‑powered censorship systems scan vast volumes of digital content, flag potential violations, and delete banned material within seconds.
• Yet the system still depends on human content reviewers to supply the cultural and political judgement that algorithms lack, according to ASPI’s review of more than 100 job postings for online‑content censors in China. Future technological advances are likely to minimise that remaining dependence on human reviewers.

China’s censorship regulations have created a robust domestic market for AI‑enabled censorship tools.

• China’s biggest tech companies, including Tencent, Baidu and ByteDance, have developed advanced AI censorship platforms that they’re selling to smaller companies and organisations around China.
• In this way, China’s laws mandating internal censorship have created market incentives for China’s top tech companies to make censorship cheaper, faster, easier and more efficient—and embedding compliance into China’s digital economy.

The use of AI amplifies China’s state‑supported erosion of the economic rights of some vulnerable groups abroad, to the financial benefit of Chinese private and state‑owned companies.

• ASPI research shows that Chinese fishing fleets have begun adopting AI‑powered intelligent fishing platforms, developed by Chinese companies and research institutes, that further tip the technological scales towards Chinese vessels and away from local fishers and artisanal fishing communities.
• ASPI has identified several individual Chinese fishing vessels using those platforms that operate in exclusive economic zones where Chinese fishing is widely implicated in illegal incidents, including Mauritania and Vanuatu, and ASPI found one vessel that has itself been specifically implicated in an incident.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46377338

Opinion piece by Li Qiang, founder and executive director of China Labor Watch, and a human rights advocate with over 30 years of experience investigating global supply chains.

Archived

[...]

China’s low rights model is no longer a domestic labor issue but a systemic challenge to global labor standards, supply chain governance, and fair market competition. Without a coordinated civil society response, the global baseline for worker rights will continue to fall.

I call China’s economic model a “low rights” one because it has long relied on suppressing labor costs to maintain industrial competitiveness. As a result, trade imbalances between China, the United States, and Europe are strategically linked to China’s ability to attract multinational companies through low-cost labor and policy incentives. At the same time, Chinese companies internalized the technology and management know-how of these foreign companies into their domestic systems, gradually transforming what were originally Western competitive advantages into China’s own strengths.

[...]

In recent years, China’s “low-standard, low-cost” development model has expanded beyond its borders. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has spread globally, exporting labor, environmental, and governance risks to host countries. Nowhere is this more evident than in Indonesia’s nickel sector, where mining and smelting contracts are so short that they function like countdown clocks, pressuring companies to recoup capital as fast as possible.

[...]

This “low-cost” model has been permitted to exist due to an increasingly shrinking civic space. Independent labor monitoring inside China has become dramatically harder in the past decade. Today, only a few independent organizations remain capable of conducting investigations, such as China Labor Watch. Yet, political risks deter most international funders from supporting work inside China, leaving independent oversight critically under-resourced in an area where it is needed most.

[...]

To counter this dynamic, civil society organizations must be central to any strategy for raising global labor standards. We can advance change in three key ways.

First, increase public awareness. We can collectively highlight that consumers must recognize the real costs behind low-priced products: long working hours, low pay, job displacement, low labor standards. The public must understand that declining labor standards ultimately harm every society. In reality, with wages stagnating in many Western countries, more consumers rely on cheaper products that are produced by workers who are, in fact, competing with them for similar types of jobs in the global labor market.

Second, advocate and partner with authorities for the rigorous enforcement of forced-labor laws. Import bans, labor regulations, and due diligence laws already exist. But enforcement depends on independent organizations holding authorities accountable, and providing evidence if there are enforcement gaps. It also requires sufficient and sustained funding to ensure that these laws can be implemented in practice, rather than remaining symbolic commitments.

[...]

The EU Forced Labor Regulation and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) had their scope narrowed during the legislative process, while U.S. forced labor import enforcement remains inconsistent and lacks clear direction, making the global regulatory landscape by significant uncertainty. If global civil society does not intervene now, global labor standards will not simply stagnate; they will be redefined downward by a model built on speed, opacity, and the suppression of rights.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/46147523

Archived

UN Special Procedures experts warn of an escalating wave of transnational repression by or linked to authorities in China and several Southeast Asian countries.

In joint communications to China, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they detail at least 150 cases in which human rights defenders, dissidents, members of marginalised groups, and their family members were subjected to violence, refoulement, harassment, and intimidation by States or their proxies outside their territories.

[...]

Patterns of repression include:

Physical attacks, assassinations, and enforced disappearances: At least nine political exiles from Thailand, Cambodia and Laos have been assassinated or forcibly disappeared in neighbouring countries. Cases cited include the killing of Cambodian opposition figure Lim Kim Ya in Thailand, and the enforced disappearances of Thai dissidents Wanchalearm Satsaksit in Cambodia and Surachai Darnwattananusorn in Laos.

Refugees and dissents refouled: In violation of the principle of non-refoulement, authorities have forcibly returned refugees and asylum seekers to places where they face persecution. Thailand returned 40 Uyghur men to China after nearly 11 years in detention, and seven United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)‑recognised Cambodian opposition activists and family members to Cambodia. Laos returned Chinese human rights lawyer Lu Siwei to China, and Malaysia returned Thai dissident and asylum seeker Praphan Pipithnamporn to Thailand; both were subsequently imprisoned.

Legal harassment: Hong Kong authorities issued National Security Law arrest warrants and HKD 1 million (approximately USD 128,000) bounties for at least eight overseas activists in exile, including Anna Kwok, Carmen Lau, Ted Hui, Frances Hui, and Chloe Cheung. Vietnam further criminalised civil society by designating Montagnards Stand for Justice and Boat People SOS as terrorist entities.

Surveillance and intimidation: In the United Kingdom, associates of Hong Kong activist Carmen Lau received flyers urging them to report her to Hong Kong authorities or bring her to the Chinese Embassy, citing the bounty on her head. In Thailand, a Vietnamese security delegation, accompanied by Thai police, reportedly entered refugee communities near Bangkok to pressure Montagnard refugees to return to Vietnam.

Retaliation against families: As Hong Kong activists such as Anna Kwok, Carmen Lau, and Ted Hui continued their advocacy overseas, their relatives in Hong Kong were interrogated, arrested, or publicly shamed in state media. In Cambodia, the father of France‑based activist Sorn Dara was imprisoned on fabricated charges.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45707079

Archived

In late November 2022, for a brief moment, Shanghai appeared to loosen the grip that had defined its pandemic years. On Wulumuqi Road normally an unremarkable thoroughfare residents gathered with candles to mourn ten people who died in a fire in far-off Urumqi. Local accounts later described how the victims, trapped behind locked exits during a COVID lockdown, became symbols of a policy that had exhausted the country long before the flames claimed their lives.

What began as a quiet vigil on 26 November evolved into the most overt public challenge to the Chinese leadership since the Tiananmen demonstrations more than three decades earlier. The crowds swelled, some chanting slogans that would have been unthinkable only weeks before. Yet the opening proved fleeting. By the morning of 28 November, the street was deserted. The sudden silence was not organic it was engineered.

The speed with which authorities restored control demonstrated not only the strength of China’s policing apparatus but the degree to which three years of pandemic management had equipped the state with an unusually detailed map of its citizens’ movements, networks, and vulnerabilities. The crackdown that followed was not a spontaneous reaction to dissent. It was the culmination of a system refined through data, surveillance, and the routinisation of extraordinary powers.

The turning point came in the early hours of 27 November. As more demonstrators assembled some holding blank A4 sheets as understated rebuttals to censorship plainclothes officers blended into the crowd. Witnesses later described people being pulled into police vans at around 4:30am. Among those seized was Ed Lawrence, a BBC journalist detained and beaten while covering the protest. Beijing later insisted he had “failed to identify himself”, a claim rejected by the broadcaster.

[...]

The censorship campaign that followed was comprehensive and efficient. Searches for “Shanghai,” “Wulumuqi Road,” and “Urumqi fire,” which normally generated millions of posts, began returning only a handful. References to “white paper,” “A4,” and related hashtags vanished across Weibo and WeChat.

[...]

By Monday morning, the authorities had all but erased digital traces of the protest. The memorials had been cleared, and the street resumed its familiar subdued rhythm.

[...]

Where previous generations of Chinese protest movements relied on anonymity faces in a crowd the demonstrators of 2022 faced an entirely different environment. China’s security apparatus had spent years constructing one of the world’s most extensive networks of facial recognition cameras, combined with compulsory health-code apps, QR-based movement tracking, and real-time linkage of mobile phone data to personal identity.

This infrastructure, designed and justified through the zero-COVID period, played a decisive role in identifying attendees. Multiple participants later reported receiving calls or home visits from police within 24 hours of the vigil. One, a protester identified only as Zhang, took elaborate steps to avoid detection: wearing a balaclava, switching jackets, and navigating backstreets. Yet his phone had connected to towers near the demonstration. The next day, police rang to ask about his whereabouts: minutes later, they arrived at his door.

[...]

Those detained included university graduates, publishing editors, and a state media journalist, Yang Liu. Among the most well-known was Cao Zhixin, an editor at a publishing house, who was taken into custody alongside several friends. Videos recorded before their arrests pleaded that if they disappeared, it was because they had attended the vigil.

[...]

Comparisons with 1989 are inevitable, but they also illustrate how China’s methods have evolved. Where Tiananmen relied on overwhelming military force, Shanghai’s protest was extinguished with algorithms, phone data, and targeted detentions. The absence of visible violence made the repression less conspicuous but no less effective.

This model carries implications far outside China’s borders. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has supplied surveillance infrastructure including camera networks, cloud-based monitoring systems, and facial recognition software to dozens of countries. Several African states have adopted variants of these tools to monitor domestic unrest. Human rights groups warn that the technology exported is often calibrated using data gathered from China’s own population, sometimes optimised for use on minority ethnic groups abroad.

The Shanghai crackdown demonstrated how these systems can function when deployed at scale: quick identification, quiet detentions, minimal public spectacle.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45599434

Archived

[...]

A new investigation by People of Baikal reveals another tactic the Russian military has employed to stem personnel losses: torturing the friends and family of deserters. Journalists reporting from the Transbaikal region spoke to Olga Vtorushina, the mother of a 24-year-old man named Pavel.

On November 2, 2025, masked men kidnapped her son, drove him outside of town, and tortured him with a stun gun, demanding that he help them locate his cousin Pyotr, who’d recently failed to return to his unit. The men who abducted and tortured Pavel wore camouflage uniforms and masks, but Olga said she’d seen them around town and had recognized one as a member of the local military police. She told journalists that the men beat her son and shocked him repeatedly with a stun gun until he passed out several times. Pavel wasn’t released until he telephoned Pyotr and lured him to a meeting where he was later apprehended.

[...]

A 25-year-old contract soldier who deserted his unit when the military ordered him back to duty after he sustained a head injury [...] escaped to his hometown and spent several months in hiding. To find the missing soldier, masked men tracked down his father and tortured him with a stun gun. They also beat his friend. The soldier’s mother told journalists that the assailants were not military police but a search group from her son’s military base. Her son is now in the army’s custody.

[...]

Military police officers tracked down 36-year-old Viktor at his friend’s home. They tased him, broke his nose, stuffed him in the trunk of a car, and drove him 300 miles away. Viktor had failed to return to his unit on time, staying at home to assist his wife, who was expecting their third child any day. She gave birth a week later. Viktor’s mother told People of Baikal that the men who took her son are the same ones who tortured Pavel on November 2.

Similar raids have been reported in towns throughout the Transbaikal region. In Ushmun, for example, masked men were spotted patrolling the streets. According to a local newspaper, these were military police officers. Authorities in Trubachevo and Novoshirokinsky confirmed to People of Baikal by phone that locals had been subjected to “measures of force.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/41779805

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

...

Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

...

There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

...

Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

...

Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

...

A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

...

Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

Op-ed by Laura Murphy, professor of Human Rights at Sheffield Hallam University in the UK. Her work focuses on Modern slavery. Murphy became prominent recntly when Sheffield Hallam apologised to her for removing their support for her work on forced labour in China.

Archived

In august last year a senior colleague informed me that the university where I work, Sheffield Hallam University (shu), would not publish my team’s research exposing Uyghur forced labour in the critical-minerals sector in China. I was also told that, if necessary, shu was prepared to take the highly unusual step of voluntarily returning hundreds of thousands of pounds in grant funding rather than have future projects bear the imprimatur of the Helena Kennedy Centre (hkc), the university’s human-rights research institute for which I had been working since 2019.

What could possibly induce a university to make such a surprising decision, especially one that had spent years standing up to harassment from Chinese authorities for its research on Uyghur forced labour, and whose own chancellor had been hit with sanctions by the Chinese government for her criticism of rights abuses in China?

[...]

The research in question was a series of reports my team had published documenting the systematic use of forced labour in the Uyghur region of China (known in China as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region). Government-imposed forced labour affects at least a fifth of the Uyghur and Kazakh population in the region, making it probably the largest system of state-imposed forced labour the world has seen since the Holocaust. The Chinese government and Chinese companies had for years tried to stop my team from publicising the resulting risk to the integrity of international supply chains—including for solar modules, clothing, cars, electronics, chemicals and, not inconsequentially, critical minerals.

[...]

Academic freedom is the cornerstone of knowledge production in democratic societies. Preserving it requires that universities shelter researchers from the retaliation of authoritarian governments by refusing to surrender to threats or put harnesses on their faculty’s research agenda. Universities protect that freedom in part by securing the necessary insurance to cover their researchers. And they provide financial and administrative support to faculty to pursue the questions that animate them, regardless of whether they are considered “sensitive”.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44906377

Archived

Russia arrests the [Ukrainian] children’s parents, separates them from their families, and takes the children to Russia, preparing them for forced adoption. During this time, the children remain under the control of the Russian state, often in conditions of confinement. This propaganda might work on the Russian population — it may even be primarily targeted at them. Russia wants to present itself as morally upright, showing that it’s “rescuing” Ukrainian children through these evacuations. But I don’t really see this narrative gaining traction internationally. The real problem is different: on the international level, there is still very little awareness about this practice —especially in certain regions of the world, such as Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. For many, this is entirely new information.

[...]

Authoritarian leaders tend to support one another situationally because they share a common worldview. They see people as objects to be governed. They deny rights and freedoms not only to others but also to their own citizens.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/5321915

The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights has called for urgent action to prevent goods produced with forced labour from entering the country, warning that existing laws fail to protect workers or hold companies accountable.

In its new report, the Committee found that the UK’s current approach based largely on voluntary corporate reporting under the Modern Slavery Act is fails to prevent exploitation.

The report follows a long inquiry into how the UK addresses forced labour in global supply chain. The Committee received extensive evidence, including submissions from Walk Free.

The lack of meaningful enforcement and the absence of mandatory due diligence requirements mean that goods made with forced or child labour are likely being imported and sold in the UK.

...

Walk Free’s Global Slavery Index estimates the UK imports around US$26 billion in goods at risk of forced labour each year, including US$14.8 billion worth of solar panels.

The Committee highlighted the need to address forced labour risks in the green energy transition. Especially sourcing key materials used in solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries.

Cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements are essential components of renewable energy technologies. But these are frequently mined or processed in regions with high rates of labour exploitation.

More than 70% of the world’s cobalt supply comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where forced and child labour in artisanal mining is well documented.

China produces around 90% of the world’s polysilicon, most originating in Xinjiang. Investigations have revealed the use of state-imposed forced labour involving Uyghur and Turkic Muslim minorities.

...

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44529566

• Report alleges China and Russia tried to block funding
• China and Russia may gain influence as US retreats, report says
• Chinese mission to UN says resources of human rights have grown
• UN human rights budgets under strain amid funding crisis

A small group of countries led by China and Russia has repeatedly tried to block funding for human rights-related work at the United Nations over a five-year period, according to a report by the non-profit International Service for Human Rights.

The report cited proposals for major cuts to the U.N. Human Rights Office and for the elimination of funding for some U.N. investigations, in what it called a weaponisation of the budget process.

While those attempts, made in closed-door U.N. meetings, did not succeed, the authors voiced concern about them at a time when the United Nations is suffering from a financial crisis and as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump steps back from multilateralism.

"The proposals that China and Russia have put forth are clearly about crippling OHCHR (the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)," said Angeli Datt, one of the authors of the 97-page report titled "Budget Battles at the U.N.".

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44324540

The targeted repression of human rights activists across borders is becoming more frequent and sophisticated, according to the latest annual U.N. report detailing acts of intimidation and reprisals inside the international organization.

The report lists new allegations of reprisals from two dozen countries including China, echoing the findings of ICIJ’s China Targets investigation, which revealed how suspected proxies for the Chinese government surveilled or harassed activists at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva, the center of the human rights system.

Two Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and a Uyghur linguist are among the cases compiled by the secretary-general between May 2024 and 2025, alongside updates on reprisals included in previous reports.

“Allegations of transnational repression across borders have increased, with examples from around the world,” the report said. “Targeted repression across borders appears to be growing in scale and sophistication, and the impact on the protection of human rights defenders and affected individuals in exile, as well as the chilling effect on those who continue to defend human rights in challenging contexts, is of increasing concern.”

[...]

Raphäel Viana David, the China and Latin America program manager at the International Service for Human Rights, a nonprofit that trains activists in U.N. advocacy, said the report reflected a shift within the U.N. in recognizing transnational repression as a tool states use to carry out reprisals.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44096052

Archived

[...]

For China, the U.N. summit on October 13-14 is the final, triumphant act of a yearlong show of force from its diplomatic and media mouthpieces seeking to center its “historic achievements in women’s development” and position China as a global model for women’s rights protection.

Yet as officials trumpet their “30 years of progress” to assembled dignitaries, the voices of the country’s own feminists will be conspicuously absent.

That’s because many are in prison, while others face threats and harassment intended to keep them silent – whether they still live in China, or have had to flee abroad.

China’s self-congratulatory narrative on women’s rights has been pushed not just at home, but also abroad: from the halls of the United Nations to the pages of local embassies and media markets in, for example, South Africa, Tanzania, Liberia, Ghana and Grenada. Last month, state-run press even published two compilations of Xi Jinping’s speeches in English for the explicit purpose of “help[ing] international readers gain a deeper understanding of Xi’s views” on women’s rights and much more ahead of the U.N. meeting in Beijing.

[...]

Xi’s views are clear on one point: that shutting down space for critical voices and public discussion on human rights, including topics of women and gender, are essential matters of national security.

Over the last decade, the Chinese state has continued to implement laws and policies that suppress feminist activism – and in doing so has convicted women human rights defenders one by one.

[...]

The five women made famous by their 2015 criminal detentions for advocacy on International Women’s Day continue to work in civil society and to push for policy change – but they are careful to do so in ways that keep them and their families safe. Following their detentions, the costs of speaking out publicly have only risen. For four years, #MeToo activist and journalist Huang Xueqin has been locked up for “inciting subversion of state power” for her social media posts and her efforts to learn about and discuss non-violent movements.

Many other women activists – such as Li Qiaochu, Chen Jianfang, Xu Yan and Zhang Zhan – have languished in prison based on similarly spurious convictions. Vaccine safety advocate He Fangmei was convicted of “picking quarrels” and (absurdly) bigamy in 2024; when she’s released in 2027 she will have spent seven of the last eight years in detention. Her family doesn’t know where her daughters – the youngest one born while she was in detention – are located.

[...]

When Chinese officials wax poetic about the country’s progress on women’s rights, it is essential to remember that this is not the whole story. The government postures on anti-discrimination, locks up women defenders, and criminalizes feminist activism – all out of fear that the system the CCP has built might come crashing down on their heads.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44066965

Archived

Ireland: University professor turns down invitation to meet with representatives of "deeply hypocritical" Chinese human rights organisation

An academic with Trinity College Dublin (TCD), has expressed surprise that officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and staff from the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) are separately meeting with representatives of what she says is a “deeply hypocritical” Chinese human rights organisation.

Dr Isabella Jackson, assistant professor of Chinese history, turned down an invitation from the IIEA to attend a meeting with visiting representatives of the China Foundation for Human Rights Development in the institute’s Dublin offices on Tuesday.

Dr Jackson told the institute she could not “in good conscience” attend a meeting with what she said was a white-washing state body “that exists to pretend China cares about human rights despite the severe abuses of human rights throughout the country but especially in Tibet and Xinjiang”.

“I am happy to engage with Chinese diplomats conducting diplomacy, but not a body as deeply hypocritical as this,” she told the institute. Dr Jackson told The Irish Times that, globally, the Beijing government is “trying to change the narrative so we can’t talk about Chinese abuses of human rights” and the foundation was part of this effort.

She was “quite surprised” that officials from the Department were meeting with the foundation which, she said, sought to highlight “hypocrisy” in the West over human rights abuses while seeking to deflect attention from even worse human rights abuses in China. “The foundation is trying to present China as a positive international actor for human rights whereas the opposite is the case,” she said.

“It’s just propaganda.”

[...]

She declined an invitation to attend a meeting in Berlin a number of years ago with the Chinese foundation “for the very same reasons.”

According to its website, the Chinese Foundation for the Development of Human Rights is registered with Beijing’s ministry for foreign affairs and its “business advisor” is the publicity department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

[...]

Senator Malcolm Byrne, co-chair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, said it “strikes me as odd” that IIEA was facilitating a meeting with the Chinese delegation.

It was very important to have good relations with China and to trade with China, he said, but “the CPC has a particular mission and that mission does not have respect for human rights, and they need to be called out on it”.

[...]

Considered Ireland’s premier think tank on international affairs, the IIEA is funded mainly by member subscriptions and state grants.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43833960

Archived

The exiled Chinese civil society organization “Chinese Human Rights Defenders Families Network” has released a nearly 30,000-word specialized research report titled: “Collateral Childhoods: The Psychological Impact of State Violence on the Children of Human Rights Defenders.”

It marks the first systematic study [...] to unveil the situation and profound psychological trauma suffered by the children of human rights defenders in an environment of state violence.

Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director of Human Rights in China (HRIC), who has long provided humanitarian aid to the families of human rights defenders (HRDs), stated that under the reality of authoritarian rule and high-pressure politics, the children of Chinese HRDs are often forced to endure the associative harm resulting from the persecution of their parents: their education is interrupted, their daily lives lose stability, and their psychological sense of security is repeatedly shattered.

The associated repression by state violence that these children suffer is akin to the barbaric ancient system of ‘guilt by association'. Because they lack adequate cognitive and defense mechanisms, the scars left by these traumas are often deeper and more difficult for society and the system to recognize.

Key findings:

1. Severe Deprivation of the Right to Education: Used as a Tool of Repression. The report found that children in nearly all cases experienced educational interruption or denial. Some were outright rejected by schools due to their parents’ identity, others faced forced displacement and multiple transfers, and some were publicly shamed as “children of political prisoners” by teachers and peers in the classroom. The education system, meant to ensure equal development, has been weaponized for political persecution.

2. Widespread Mental Health Crisis: Self-Harm and Suicidal Ideation. Multiple children and adolescents exhibited severe symptoms like depression, anxiety, insomnia, and hypervigilance. Furthermore, some reached a point where “they sought ‘liberation’ by abandoning life,” resulting in documented cases of self-harm and attempted suicide. Prolonged exposure to high-pressure, fear-inducing environments prevents them from achieving normal identity formation and socialization during adolescence, posing severe risks for their adulthood.

3. Frequent Fragmentation of Family Structure. In the majority of cases, one or both parents were subjected to long-term imprisonment, restriction of freedom, or forced exile. Children lost their primary attachment figures during critical developmental stages, relying on single parents or fragmented kinship care. This chronic separation led to severe attachment disorders and a pervasive sense of insecurity.

4. Continuation and Silencing of Intergenerational Trauma. The parents’ fear, shame, and powerlessness are often transmitted to their children through emotional atmosphere and behavioral patterns, forming a “silent legacy.” Some children even normalize torture and humiliation, prematurely adopting the role of “protecting their parents,” thereby losing the safety and freedom of childhood through premature adultification.

5. Exile Abroad: Not an End, But a New Predicament. While some children were fortunate enough to leave China, they faced new difficulties abroad: language barriers, cultural isolation, identity anxiety, economic hardship, and the persistence of trauma responses. Exile marks a relative start to safety but simultaneously represents a continuation of isolation and compounded adversity.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43815611

Archived

“Marriage and childbirth are not only a family affair related to personal happiness, but also a major event for the survival and development of the country and the nation.” -- China Family Planning Association

“First forced abortions, now pressured into pregnancy.” -- Chinese netizen online, What’s On Weibo

Key findings:

• The Chinese leadership faces unique challenges to sustainable population growth. The legacy of the One-Child Policy is proving difficult to reverse, and stubborn systemic factors are equally hard to address, including the rising costs of raising children and workplace discrimination against women of childbearing age.
• Beijing has shifted its goal from containing population growth to boosting it. China’s shrinking population poses a threat to economic growth and its ambitions to be a global superpower, so the authorities are trying to raise the birth rate. The repercussions of Beijing’s demographic successes and failures will reverberate across the world.
• Central and local governments have rolled out a patchwork of incentives, with uneven outcomes. The most recent is China’s first nationwide child subsidy of CNY 3,600 (EUR 430) per child per year, until age three. Substantial investment is still lacking.
• Many citizens remain skeptical of government efforts. The mismatch between people’s desires (often to remain single, or to have small families) and government interventions is likely to deepen social discontent.
• Population pressures have been elevated to a national security issue, trumping women’s freedom of choice and bodily autonomy. Online discussions show signs of resistance from women and other parts of the population who have been openly critical of the shift.
• Some regions have introduced coercive policies. New pro-natalist policies and campaigns frame women primarily as mothers and caregivers, eroding gender equality gains. These steps raise concerns about women’s rights.

[...]

Large and persistent propaganda campaigns have been aimed at the public, both online and offline. To get free promotional content, for instance, the CFPA [China Family Planning Association] launched a competition for slogans praising the three-child policy. This quickly backfired, as people mostly criticized the initiative and highlighted the CFPA’s role in previous coercive campaigns under the One-Child Policy.35 Other much criticized initiatives included local authorities cold-calling married women to ask about their plans for children.

[...]

Local Women’s Federations have organized mass weddings to give young people an affordable wedding, complete with a certificate praising their patriotic gesture.

[...]

Educational courses on ”healthy families” and ”marriage and love.” For example, in December 2024, a state-run publication from the National Health Commission called on universities to set up “marriage and love education courses” to encourage students to think positively about marriage.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43652412

[...]

"Chinese people still feel in their hearts the need for democracy," said Zhou [Junyi, founder of the China Democracy Party, an exile group, organised a commemoration on June 4 in Kanchanaburi, west of Bangkok, for the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown in Beijing] . "Even if they cannot express it or say it openly, it is there."

Thai police arrested the 53-year-old at his home in the capital eight days after the ceremony, ostensibly for visa offences.

He now faces deportation -- for which he blames Beijing.

"I'm anxious, I've lost hope," he [said].

Zhou fears immediate arrest, torture and a long prison sentence if he is sent back to China, which he fled 10 years ago after attending a pro-democracy conference in the United States.

UN figures show that around 200 Chinese exiles have sought refuge in Thailand in recent years, but activists say pressure from Beijing is raising the risk of forced deportation.

[...]

Alongside Zhou at the detention centre, Tan Yixiang shouted across a metre-wide space between two wire mesh fences.

A vocal advocate for Tibetan and Uyghur rights, Tan is a UN-recognised refugee but has been held by Thai immigration for more than a year.

"I will never sing the praises of dictatorship, I speak up for human rights," the 48-year-old said.

Both men are seeking asylum from third countries.

[...]

Zhou's arrest is consistent with what analysts describe as an increasingly stark pattern of Chinese transnational repression, with NGO Freedom House in February calling its government the world's "most prolific perpetrator".

Thailand's ties with China have strengthened in recent years, with then-premier Paetongtarn Shinawatra pledging to deepen economic cooperation on a trip to Beijing in February.

Thailand also forcibly deported some 40 Uyghurs -- a Muslim minority that rights groups say faces persecution in western China -- who had been held for more than a decade.

Western governments condemned the move, which human rights groups deemed "completely outrageous". The Uyghur group's whereabouts remain unknown.

[...]

In 2015, Chinese-born political publisher and naturalised Swedish citizen Gui Minhai was abducted while on vacation in Thailand and was later convicted in China of espionage.

[...]

Thailand is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, so does not distinguish between refugees and other migrants.

Statistics from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees show the number of Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand rose more than fivefold between 2019 and 2023, but its Thailand office said it could not comment on individual cases.

[...]

The China Democracy Party emerged out of calls for political reform in the late 1990s. Its website notes there are "dangers" to joining but it says it has thousands of members, who largely engage in activism abroad.

Party members held a small protest in Los Angeles days after Zhou's arrest, calling on the Thai government not to deport him.

Zhou claims Chinese authorities have harassed his parents, who live in the eastern province of Zhejiang, to get him to return.

He said he even divorced his wife, who remains in the United States, to protect her from persecution.

Chinese embassy staff have visited him several times to try to make him sign a voluntary return form, he said. "But every time I refuse."

[...]

cross-posted from: https://masto.ai/users/Miro_Collas/statuses/115306680251083999

"A Call to the Free People of the World

We are dying in Gaza…
The bodies of women and children lie in the streets.
Israel has destroyed the hospitals, and there is no food or medicine."

https://xcancel.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1973511718656450596

#Palestine #Gaza #Israel
@palestine@lemmy.ml @palestine@fedibird.com

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43336645

Archived

Chinese courts are systematically weaponizing vague national security and public order laws to silence human rights defenders, Amnesty International said today in a new report exposing the judiciary’s central role in sustaining the Beijing authorities’ crackdown on fundamental freedoms.

The research briefing, How could this verdict be ‘legal’?, published on China’s National Day, analyses more than 100 official judicial documents from 68 cases involving 64 human rights defenders over the past decade. It details how Chinese courts are rubber-stamping convictions against peaceful activists, journalists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, often on the basis of their words, associations or international contacts.

“China’s leaders like to play up a message of international cooperation and commitment to the rule of law. The reality is, this masks a system in which Chinese courts operate as instruments of repression rather than justice when handling politically sensitive cases,” said Sarah Brooks, Amnesty International’s China Director.

“Human rights defenders in China are being treated as enemies of the state for no more than speaking out, organizing peacefully, or engaging with the outside world. Their bravery is met with prison, torture and sham trials.”

In over 90% of cases analysed in Amnesty’s research, courts relied on national security or public order provisions that are vague, overly broad and inconsistent with international standards. Charges such as “subversion of state power,” “inciting subversion,” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” were most frequently applied, enabling authorities to criminalize peaceful speech and association.

Courts frequently treated online expression – including blog posts, social media comments, or sharing human rights articles – as evidence of “subversion.”

International engagement was routinely cited as criminal activity. Giving interviews to foreign media, publishing articles on overseas websites, or attending NGO trainings abroad were presented as proof of “collusion with foreign forces”.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43302230

Archived

UN experts* today expressed serious concern over the increasing criminalisation of Uyghur and other minority cultural expression in China, citing the case of artist Yaxia’er Xiaohelaiti and the enforced disappearance of scholar Rahile Dawut.

“These cases reflect deeply troubling patterns where cultural identity, artistic creativity, and academic work are treated as threats to national security,” the experts said. “The right to freely express and participate in cultural life, without discrimination or fear, is a cornerstone of human rights.”

Yaxia'er Xiaohelaiti, a 26-year-old Uyghur songwriter performing under the name Uigga, was sentenced to three years in prison in 2024 after being convicted of “promoting extremism” and “possessing extremist materials.” The charges reportedly stemmed from his artistic work in the Uyghur language and from owning books regarded as central to the community’s cultural history. Prosecutors alleged that his lyrics undermined the State, while civil society actors maintain that his music simply gave voice to his cultural roots.

[...]

The case of Rahile Dawut, a renowned woman ethnographer and cultural scholar, exemplifies the risks faced by those engaged in cultural and academic work. She was forcibly disappeared in 2017 while traveling to Beijing and has not been seen since. Reports suggest that she was secretly tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for alleged separatism, yet her fate and whereabouts remain unacknowledged by authorities.

“Enforced disappearance is an extremely serious violation of several human rights, and a continuing offence until authorities provide verifiable information on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared person,” the experts said. They warned that when committed systematically within a specific context, they amount to crimes against humanity.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/43176835

A newly proposed law in China would provide a broad legal framework to justify existing repression and force assimilation of minority populations throughout the country and abroad, Human Rights Watch said today. Once passed, the law could be used to facilitate intensifying ideological controls, target ethnic and religious minorities including by erasing minority language rights, and foster control beyond China’s borders.

The 62-article draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress was submitted to the National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, on September 8, 2025. An official explanatory document states that the law “implements General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important thinking” on ethnic affairs and promotes “the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups … along the path of rule of law.”

[...]

The draft law prescribes a rigid and uniform ideological framework for China. In its preamble, it asserts an unbroken historical continuity of the modern People’s Republic of China, established in 1949, as “a civilization with a history of over 5,000 years” that has forged “a unified multi-ethnic nation” under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Xi Jinping has increasingly emphasized this narrative and these specific phrases while adopting ethnic policies characterized by forced assimilation.

[...]

Under article 20(2), parents and guardians would be required to “educate and guide minors to love the Chinese Communist Party,” and “establish the concept that all ethnic groups of the Chinese nation are one family and shall not teach minors concepts detrimental to ethnic unity and progress.”

[...]

In Tibet, criticism of the government or party, such as championing language rights or raising concerns about mass relocations, is often construed as damaging “ethnic unity” and punished by imprisonment under existing laws.

In Xinjiang, the Chinese government has justified its cultural persecution and other crimes against humanity toward Uyghurs in terms similar to those contained in the draft law. Its abusive Strike-Hard Campaign targets anyone who “challenges … ethnic unity,” categorizing some peaceful expressions and behavior by Uyghurs, such as studying the Quran without state permission, as “ideological viruses.”

[...]

The draft law seeks to erase previously guaranteed rights of minorities to “use and develop their own language” as stipulated in the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy, emphasizing instead the dominance of Mandarin Chinese.

For example, the 1984 law states that government agencies in minority areas “shall … use one or several languages commonly used in the locality.” But article 15(3) of the draft law states that “if it is necessary to issue documents in minority languages and scripts,” agencies should accompany it with a version in Mandarin Chinese and that it should be clear that “the national common language” is “given prominence.” Such practices have already been required, at least in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

[...]

In Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, the authorities have already significantly reduced students’ access to education in their mother tongue, despite strong opposition and protests by students, teachers, and parents.

[...]