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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49702854

Archived

Though highly publicized cases of police stations, such as those in the UK, have resulted in their closure after COVID-19, some Balkan states are trending in the opposite direction. By doing so, they reveal a permissive attitude that endorses China’s incursion into their domestic security policy, in exchange for receiving means to renew their legitimacy, including powerful technology, and infrastructure investments.

[...]

NGOs such as the Madrid-based Safeguard Defenders, which tracks human rights violations and crackdowns on activists by Chinese authorities, through several investigations unearthed the presence of “at least 54 overseas police service centers.” At these centers, including one located in the Serbian capital of Belgrade, 230,000 claimed “suspects of fraud” were “persuaded to return” to China.

[...]

An unnamed Chinese official backed up the reports on secretive police stations by citing difficulties with European nations extraditing people to China and thus circumventing bilateral cooperation agreements. Previous revelations found “persuasion” to consist of three approaches to securing suspects, each with varying degrees of severity:

• harassing or persecuting family members at home,
• face-to-face confrontation with the target, and
• kidnapping – both with and without the suspects’ cooperation.

Similarly, in October 2024, the World Uyghur Congress, held in Sarajevo, had to ramp up security after organizers and attendees reported receiving threats and intimidation from Chinese nationals who were seen monitoring the event. China has been “arbitrarily detaining” Uyghurs in the country’s Xinjiang region because of fears of destabilizing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control. Several countries, including the US have referred to the treatment as genocide.

[...]

Under Xi Jinping, China has worked to reinforce influence on foreign soil, and now operates under the “guide, buy, and coerce” model, which comprises strategies such as using diaspora communities as agents and encouraging those who are favorable to the government to become politically engaged. Campaigns of transnational repression are frequent, with dissidents, including students studying abroad, being targeted for their criticism of China’s government. During several of Xi’s foreign trips, protestors were arrested and detained with questionable legal justification for displaying signs supportive of Tibetan and Taiwanese independence. In the cases of France and Serbia, when activists probed officers over their detention, they were told that they were acting under orders from their superiors.

[...]

The adoption of surveillance technology has stretched the farthest in Bosnia and Serbia, where dozens of municipalities have implemented pedestrian and traffic monitoring systems in addition to video cameras [...] China has ignored the scrutiny that Aleksandar Vučić’s government has been under following the train station canopy collapse in Novi Sad – constructed as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – that took the lives of 16 people last year. As a response to massive protests following this tragedy, the government has implemented Chinese-made surveillance devices with at least 1000 known cameras in the capital, while intending to expand capacity by 3500 additional cameras, as suggested by a leaked purchase order with tech giant, Huawei. During Vučić’s tenure, Serbia has sought to extensively monitor protestors, including having plainclothes officers use high-tech cellphones to film individuals with the aim of cataloging “activists and other citizens who are critically aligned against the government.”

[...]

The EU might explore adjusting its accession strategy to include mitigative efforts regarding Chinese partnerships in the Western Balkans. However, limiting the role of Beijing is only one part of the task. The other consists of unearthing what enticements can be offered to prospective EU members to ensure their efforts are focused on long-term integration and not consolidating control within their own borders.

[Edit to insert archived link.]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49702544

China’s investigation into its top general is taking President Xi Jinping’s years-long corruption purge into his innermost circle, underlining that even close personal ties do not offer protection when it comes to loyalty to the party leadership.

China experts said Xi’s move against his long-term ally and Politburo member Gen. Zhang Youxia also concentrates even more power in the president's hands, makes the already secretive command of China’s military more opaque, and suggests that a near-term attack on Taiwan is less likely.

[...]

Both Xi and Zhang are princelings, children of former senior officers. The 75-year-old general was initially expected to retire in 2022, but Xi kept him on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Chinese military's top leadership body, for a third term, underscoring their closeness.

[...]

The military was one of the main targets of a broad corruption crackdown ordered by Xi after coming to power in 2012. The purges reached its elite Rocket Force, which oversees nuclear weapons as well as conventional missiles, in 2023. Two former defence ministers were also purged from the ruling Communist Party in recent years for corruption.

“I think corruption concerns are probably real, though those are typically more a pretext to remove someone in Chinese politics," said Jonathan Czin [of the Washington-based Brookings Institution], citing how deeply entrenched graft was before Xi's campaign.

Another senior member, Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC's Joint Staff Department, was also placed under investigation, effectively shrinking the seven-member body into two, with Xi at the top. "Xi has eviscerated the People's Liberation Army (PLA) top brass like no leader before him," said Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society.

[...]

ELIMINATING THREATS

In a front-page editorial on Sunday, the PLA Daily described the probe as a major achievement, adding that the two generals had "seriously undermined and violated" the Chairman Responsibility System.

Under the system, Xi, as the CMC chairman, is vested with the "supreme military decision-making." It also serves as the "institutional arrangement for practising the party's absolute leadership over the army," according to China's government.

“To invoke violating the Chairman Responsibility System suggests Zhang had too much power outside of Xi himself,” said Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

[...]

But leaving the army leadership depleted and without replacements raises questions about how the world's largest military is run.

“It is honestly not clear how the chain of command should be functioning - especially since so many of the officers who would otherwise be eligible to replace the disposed members of the CMC have themselves been ousted,” Brookings’ Czin said.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49702544

China’s investigation into its top general is taking President Xi Jinping’s years-long corruption purge into his innermost circle, underlining that even close personal ties do not offer protection when it comes to loyalty to the party leadership.

China experts said Xi’s move against his long-term ally and Politburo member Gen. Zhang Youxia also concentrates even more power in the president's hands, makes the already secretive command of China’s military more opaque, and suggests that a near-term attack on Taiwan is less likely.

[...]

Both Xi and Zhang are princelings, children of former senior officers. The 75-year-old general was initially expected to retire in 2022, but Xi kept him on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Chinese military's top leadership body, for a third term, underscoring their closeness.

[...]

The military was one of the main targets of a broad corruption crackdown ordered by Xi after coming to power in 2012. The purges reached its elite Rocket Force, which oversees nuclear weapons as well as conventional missiles, in 2023. Two former defence ministers were also purged from the ruling Communist Party in recent years for corruption.

“I think corruption concerns are probably real, though those are typically more a pretext to remove someone in Chinese politics," said Jonathan Czin [of the Washington-based Brookings Institution], citing how deeply entrenched graft was before Xi's campaign.

Another senior member, Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC's Joint Staff Department, was also placed under investigation, effectively shrinking the seven-member body into two, with Xi at the top. "Xi has eviscerated the People's Liberation Army (PLA) top brass like no leader before him," said Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society.

[...]

ELIMINATING THREATS

In a front-page editorial on Sunday, the PLA Daily described the probe as a major achievement, adding that the two generals had "seriously undermined and violated" the Chairman Responsibility System.

Under the system, Xi, as the CMC chairman, is vested with the "supreme military decision-making." It also serves as the "institutional arrangement for practising the party's absolute leadership over the army," according to China's government.

“To invoke violating the Chairman Responsibility System suggests Zhang had too much power outside of Xi himself,” said Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

[...]

But leaving the army leadership depleted and without replacements raises questions about how the world's largest military is run.

“It is honestly not clear how the chain of command should be functioning - especially since so many of the officers who would otherwise be eligible to replace the disposed members of the CMC have themselves been ousted,” Brookings’ Czin said.

[...]

Archived

Though highly publicized cases of police stations, such as those in the UK, have resulted in their closure after COVID-19, some Balkan states are trending in the opposite direction. By doing so, they reveal a permissive attitude that endorses China’s incursion into their domestic security policy, in exchange for receiving means to renew their legitimacy, including powerful technology, and infrastructure investments.

[...]

NGOs such as the Madrid-based Safeguard Defenders, which tracks human rights violations and crackdowns on activists by Chinese authorities, through several investigations unearthed the presence of “at least 54 overseas police service centers.” At these centers, including one located in the Serbian capital of Belgrade, 230,000 claimed “suspects of fraud” were “persuaded to return” to China.

[...]

An unnamed Chinese official backed up the reports on secretive police stations by citing difficulties with European nations extraditing people to China and thus circumventing bilateral cooperation agreements. Previous revelations found “persuasion” to consist of three approaches to securing suspects, each with varying degrees of severity:

• harassing or persecuting family members at home,
• face-to-face confrontation with the target, and
• kidnapping – both with and without the suspects’ cooperation.

Similarly, in October 2024, the World Uyghur Congress, held in Sarajevo, had to ramp up security after organizers and attendees reported receiving threats and intimidation from Chinese nationals who were seen monitoring the event. China has been “arbitrarily detaining” Uyghurs in the country’s Xinjiang region because of fears of destabilizing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control. Several countries, including the US have referred to the treatment as genocide.

[...]

Under Xi Jinping, China has worked to reinforce influence on foreign soil, and now operates under the “guide, buy, and coerce” model, which comprises strategies such as using diaspora communities as agents and encouraging those who are favorable to the government to become politically engaged. Campaigns of transnational repression are frequent, with dissidents, including students studying abroad, being targeted for their criticism of China’s government. During several of Xi’s foreign trips, protestors were arrested and detained with questionable legal justification for displaying signs supportive of Tibetan and Taiwanese independence. In the cases of France and Serbia, when activists probed officers over their detention, they were told that they were acting under orders from their superiors.

[...]

The adoption of surveillance technology has stretched the farthest in Bosnia and Serbia, where dozens of municipalities have implemented pedestrian and traffic monitoring systems in addition to video cameras [...] China has ignored the scrutiny that Aleksandar Vučić’s government has been under following the train station canopy collapse in Novi Sad – constructed as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – that took the lives of 16 people last year. As a response to massive protests following this tragedy, the government has implemented Chinese-made surveillance devices with at least 1000 known cameras in the capital, while intending to expand capacity by 3500 additional cameras, as suggested by a leaked purchase order with tech giant, Huawei. During Vučić’s tenure, Serbia has sought to extensively monitor protestors, including having plainclothes officers use high-tech cellphones to film individuals with the aim of cataloging “activists and other citizens who are critically aligned against the government.”

[...]

The EU might explore adjusting its accession strategy to include mitigative efforts regarding Chinese partnerships in the Western Balkans. However, limiting the role of Beijing is only one part of the task. The other consists of unearthing what enticements can be offered to prospective EU members to ensure their efforts are focused on long-term integration and not consolidating control within their own borders.

[Edit to insert archived link.]

China’s investigation into its top general is taking President Xi Jinping’s years-long corruption purge into his innermost circle, underlining that even close personal ties do not offer protection when it comes to loyalty to the party leadership.

China experts said Xi’s move against his long-term ally and Politburo member Gen. Zhang Youxia also concentrates even more power in the president's hands, makes the already secretive command of China’s military more opaque, and suggests that a near-term attack on Taiwan is less likely.

[...]

Both Xi and Zhang are princelings, children of former senior officers. The 75-year-old general was initially expected to retire in 2022, but Xi kept him on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Chinese military's top leadership body, for a third term, underscoring their closeness.

[...]

The military was one of the main targets of a broad corruption crackdown ordered by Xi after coming to power in 2012. The purges reached its elite Rocket Force, which oversees nuclear weapons as well as conventional missiles, in 2023. Two former defence ministers were also purged from the ruling Communist Party in recent years for corruption.

“I think corruption concerns are probably real, though those are typically more a pretext to remove someone in Chinese politics," said Jonathan Czin [of the Washington-based Brookings Institution], citing how deeply entrenched graft was before Xi's campaign.

Another senior member, Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC's Joint Staff Department, was also placed under investigation, effectively shrinking the seven-member body into two, with Xi at the top. "Xi has eviscerated the People's Liberation Army (PLA) top brass like no leader before him," said Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society.

[...]

ELIMINATING THREATS

In a front-page editorial on Sunday, the PLA Daily described the probe as a major achievement, adding that the two generals had "seriously undermined and violated" the Chairman Responsibility System.

Under the system, Xi, as the CMC chairman, is vested with the "supreme military decision-making." It also serves as the "institutional arrangement for practising the party's absolute leadership over the army," according to China's government.

“To invoke violating the Chairman Responsibility System suggests Zhang had too much power outside of Xi himself,” said Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

[...]

But leaving the army leadership depleted and without replacements raises questions about how the world's largest military is run.

“It is honestly not clear how the chain of command should be functioning - especially since so many of the officers who would otherwise be eligible to replace the disposed members of the CMC have themselves been ousted,” Brookings’ Czin said.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49701756

Archived

[...]

According to DataForce figures, which cover the EU, the UK and EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), Volkswagen’s electric sales jumped 56% year-on-year to 274,417 units. Tesla, meanwhile, saw a 27% drop, selling 238,765 vehicles across the region in 2025.

[...]

Volkswagen isn’t the only legacy brand accelerating its EV success. BMW boosted sales 15% last year to 193,186 electric units, while Skoda more than doubled deliveries to 172,000. Audi also gained momentum, climbing 51% to 153,848 vehicles sold.

[...]

VW’s broad range—led by the ID.3 hatchback, ID.4 crossover, and ID.7 sedan and wagon—failed to place any single model in the top three but collectively outsold Tesla’s Model Y and Model 3 combined.

[...]

Globally, Tesla’s near-decade reign ended in 2025 when BYD seized the top spot.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49702325

Archived

[...]

More than 90% of the materials currently used in lithium-ion batteries come from mining, a process with substantial environmental impact and concentrated geographic risk. When any dominant power imposes export controls — as China did recently with its sudden critical mineral export restrictions — or restricts processing, or experiences supply disruptions, the entire global economy is negatively impacted, and the West’s clean energy agenda is put at risk. Recent export controls on materials such as graphite anodes and refined lithium clearly demonstrated how shifting industrial policy in one region can ripple instantly through global energy systems.

The US and Europe cannot sustain, much less accelerate, technological innovation without a robust, renewable, domestically-controlled energy supply. The EV revolution cannot gain momentum if automakers face tariff shocks or supply uncertainty. Grid storage, increasingly critical to global AI advancement, cannot be scaled with confidence if critical materials are blocked or flow unpredictably. Data centers, transportation, and the industrial backbone of decarbonization all depend on battery supply chains that today rest on an increasingly shaky foundation of geopolitical convenience.

[...]

Archived

[...]

More than 90% of the materials currently used in lithium-ion batteries come from mining, a process with substantial environmental impact and concentrated geographic risk. When any dominant power imposes export controls — as China did recently with its sudden critical mineral export restrictions — or restricts processing, or experiences supply disruptions, the entire global economy is negatively impacted, and the West’s clean energy agenda is put at risk. Recent export controls on materials such as graphite anodes and refined lithium clearly demonstrated how shifting industrial policy in one region can ripple instantly through global energy systems.

The US and Europe cannot sustain, much less accelerate, technological innovation without a robust, renewable, domestically-controlled energy supply. The EV revolution cannot gain momentum if automakers face tariff shocks or supply uncertainty. Grid storage, increasingly critical to global AI advancement, cannot be scaled with confidence if critical materials are blocked or flow unpredictably. Data centers, transportation, and the industrial backbone of decarbonization all depend on battery supply chains that today rest on an increasingly shaky foundation of geopolitical convenience.

[...]

Archived

[...]

According to DataForce figures, which cover the EU, the UK and EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), Volkswagen’s electric sales jumped 56% year-on-year to 274,417 units. Tesla, meanwhile, saw a 27% drop, selling 238,765 vehicles across the region in 2025.

[...]

Volkswagen isn’t the only legacy brand accelerating its EV success. BMW boosted sales 15% last year to 193,186 electric units, while Skoda more than doubled deliveries to 172,000. Audi also gained momentum, climbing 51% to 153,848 vehicles sold.

[...]

VW’s broad range—led by the ID.3 hatchback, ID.4 crossover, and ID.7 sedan and wagon—failed to place any single model in the top three but collectively outsold Tesla’s Model Y and Model 3 combined.

[...]

Globally, Tesla’s near-decade reign ended in 2025 when BYD seized the top spot.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49591118

...

The younger generation [in China] now regards sex as a key part of a loving relationship. But there is still a lingering cultural emphasis on the value of female virginity, highlighting different social expectations for men and women.

Within this lies a contradiction. Young men expect their girlfriends to be willing to have sex as a demonstration of love and commitment. Yet many also expect their brides to be virgins. This is a considerable source of tension and anxiety for many young women.

This means women who openly embrace feminist principles to assert their sexual agency and pleasure remain in the minority. Most are still conservative in outlook and behaviour. Despite the increased incidence of premarital sex, the number of young women’s sexual partners before marriage (on average, one) is not noticeably different from women of older generations.

[...]

As well as these unequal social norms, the Chinese job market still rewards men more than women. This means in later life, men tend to have accumulated more wealth and status, and so are regarded as still desirable. In contrast, an older woman in a lower-paid job might be regarded as less attractive in the dating market.

As wives have children and grow older, they may need to find ways to prevent their husbands from abandoning their families – which is where the mistress dispeller comes in. Typically, only wealthier and young urban women without children feel able to initiate divorce.

[...]

Ressearch helps show that while sex outside marriage has become more normalised in China, sexual attitudes are held in check by deep-rooted traditional views. This has created an environment that disproportionately favours men and a privileged elite, leaving many wives no option but to find help from mistress dispellers when their husbands cheat. Anyone speaking of a sexual revolution in China needs to bear this in mind.

...

The younger generation [in China] now regards sex as a key part of a loving relationship. But there is still a lingering cultural emphasis on the value of female virginity, highlighting different social expectations for men and women.

Within this lies a contradiction. Young men expect their girlfriends to be willing to have sex as a demonstration of love and commitment. Yet many also expect their brides to be virgins. This is a considerable source of tension and anxiety for many young women.

This means women who openly embrace feminist principles to assert their sexual agency and pleasure remain in the minority. Most are still conservative in outlook and behaviour. Despite the increased incidence of premarital sex, the number of young women’s sexual partners before marriage (on average, one) is not noticeably different from women of older generations.

[...]

As well as these unequal social norms, the Chinese job market still rewards men more than women. This means in later life, men tend to have accumulated more wealth and status, and so are regarded as still desirable. In contrast, an older woman in a lower-paid job might be regarded as less attractive in the dating market.

As wives have children and grow older, they may need to find ways to prevent their husbands from abandoning their families – which is where the mistress dispeller comes in. Typically, only wealthier and young urban women without children feel able to initiate divorce.

[...]

Ressearch helps show that while sex outside marriage has become more normalised in China, sexual attitudes are held in check by deep-rooted traditional views. This has created an environment that disproportionately favours men and a privileged elite, leaving many wives no option but to find help from mistress dispellers when their husbands cheat. Anyone speaking of a sexual revolution in China needs to bear this in mind.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49588795

Guan Heng, who exposed human rights abuses in his native China, has been in U.S. custody since being swept up in an immigration enforcement operation in August. He says he dares not even think about what would happen to him if he were sent back.

“I would be prosecuted, I would be jailed, I would be tortured. All of that could happen,” Guan, 38, told The Associated Press in a recent call from the Broome County Correctional Facility in New York.

A judge on Monday is to consider his appeal to remain in the United States, where he sought asylum after fleeing his homeland more than four years ago to publish video footage of detention facilities in China’s Xinjiang region.

The Department of Homeland Security initially sought to deport him to Uganda, but dropped the plan in December after his plight raised public concerns and attracted attention on Capitol Hill. But his future remains unclear.

[...]

Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, a member of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, has urged Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to release Guan and approve his asylum request.

In a statement to the AP on Friday in reference to Guan's case, the Illinois Democrat called for “careful adherence to due process and America’s long-standing commitment to protecting human rights whistleblowers.”

Immigrants can apply for asylum when there’s a fear of harm back home because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

[...]