Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48461821

Archived

In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”

Zhao vowed that his group would:

… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.

The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.

[...]

Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials.

[...]

“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.

[...]

While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.

Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”

[...]

This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.

Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high."

[...]

The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48461821

Archived

In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”

Zhao vowed that his group would:

… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.

The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.

[...]

Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials.

[...]

“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.

[...]

While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.

Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”

[...]

This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.

Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high."

[...]

The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48461821

Archived

In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”

Zhao vowed that his group would:

… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.

The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.

[...]

Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials.

[...]

“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.

[...]

While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.

Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”

[...]

This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.

Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high."

[...]

The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population.

[...]

Archived

In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”

Zhao vowed that his group would:

… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.

The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.

[...]

Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials.

[...]

“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.

[...]

While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.

Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”

[...]

This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.

Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high."

[...]

The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48459223

Archived

[...]

Australian companies and investors who focused on China, the US and Europe risked missing out on the opportunity presented by south-east Asia’s booming middle class and projected GDP growth of between 5 and 6 per cent. “There’s a much bigger opportunity to embrace in the region,” he said, forecasting trade to double over the next 10 years.

Trade had increased by A$5.7bn (US$3.8bn) in 2024, a 3 per cent rise on the previous year, according to government data. Exports of Australian goods and services to south-east Asia reached A$85bn the same year, with Laos seeing the biggest growth at 32 per cent and Singapore, Canberra’s largest trading partner in the region, registering 6 per cent. The Australian government invested A$75mn into Singapore’s clean energy transition fund last December.

[...]

Much of the growth has been driven by agriculture. But other sectors, such as mining, finance and manufacturing, are also expanding.

Breville, the kitchen goods maker, shifted its manufacturing base for espresso machines from China to Indonesia’s Batam island, spurred by US President Donald Trump’s volatile trade policy. Meanwhile Lynas, the mining company and the largest non-Chinese rare earths company, refines its metals in Malaysia.

Canberra was keen to encourage more, said Moore, adding that 500 Australian business leaders would have participated in trade missions and delegations to south-east Asia by the end of this year.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48459223

Archived

[...]

Australian companies and investors who focused on China, the US and Europe risked missing out on the opportunity presented by south-east Asia’s booming middle class and projected GDP growth of between 5 and 6 per cent. “There’s a much bigger opportunity to embrace in the region,” he said, forecasting trade to double over the next 10 years.

Trade had increased by A$5.7bn (US$3.8bn) in 2024, a 3 per cent rise on the previous year, according to government data. Exports of Australian goods and services to south-east Asia reached A$85bn the same year, with Laos seeing the biggest growth at 32 per cent and Singapore, Canberra’s largest trading partner in the region, registering 6 per cent. The Australian government invested A$75mn into Singapore’s clean energy transition fund last December.

[...]

Much of the growth has been driven by agriculture. But other sectors, such as mining, finance and manufacturing, are also expanding.

Breville, the kitchen goods maker, shifted its manufacturing base for espresso machines from China to Indonesia’s Batam island, spurred by US President Donald Trump’s volatile trade policy. Meanwhile Lynas, the mining company and the largest non-Chinese rare earths company, refines its metals in Malaysia.

Canberra was keen to encourage more, said Moore, adding that 500 Australian business leaders would have participated in trade missions and delegations to south-east Asia by the end of this year.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Australian companies and investors who focused on China, the US and Europe risked missing out on the opportunity presented by south-east Asia’s booming middle class and projected GDP growth of between 5 and 6 per cent. “There’s a much bigger opportunity to embrace in the region,” he said, forecasting trade to double over the next 10 years.

Trade had increased by A$5.7bn (US$3.8bn) in 2024, a 3 per cent rise on the previous year, according to government data. Exports of Australian goods and services to south-east Asia reached A$85bn the same year, with Laos seeing the biggest growth at 32 per cent and Singapore, Canberra’s largest trading partner in the region, registering 6 per cent. The Australian government invested A$75mn into Singapore’s clean energy transition fund last December.

[...]

Much of the growth has been driven by agriculture. But other sectors, such as mining, finance and manufacturing, are also expanding.

Breville, the kitchen goods maker, shifted its manufacturing base for espresso machines from China to Indonesia’s Batam island, spurred by US President Donald Trump’s volatile trade policy. Meanwhile Lynas, the mining company and the largest non-Chinese rare earths company, refines its metals in Malaysia.

Canberra was keen to encourage more, said Moore, adding that 500 Australian business leaders would have participated in trade missions and delegations to south-east Asia by the end of this year.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48458463

Archived

A top cybersecurity figure says China’s Salt Typhoon hacking campaign has almost certainly burrowed into Australia’s critical infrastructure in one of the most effective long-term espionage campaigns ever seen.

Alastair MacGibbon, chief strategy officer at CyberCX and a former cybersecurity adviser to then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, said Salt Typhoon’s operation has probably compromised multiple sectors across Australia and New Zealand and remains undetected.

[...]

Salt Typhoon – named by Microsoft using its convention for Chinese state-linked threat groups - is a hacking operation that has been active since at least 2019. Rather than deploying ransomware or seeking quick financial pay-offs like criminal hackers, Salt Typhoon is focused on long-term espionage: quietly infiltrating telecommunications networks, stealing data, and maintaining persistent access that could be weaponised during future conflicts.

[...]

What makes Salt Typhoon particularly alarming is its exploitation of “lawful intercept” capabilities – surveillance systems that telecommunications companies are legally required to maintain for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“By targeting US telco networks, Salt Typhoon has enabled China’s Ministry of State Security to take over the lawful intercept capabilities that governments compel telcos to have,” MacGibbon said. “This means that the MSS can see and listen to highly sensitive interception and surveillance data meant for law enforcement and security agencies.”

MacGibbon said one of the most concerning aspects for security professionals was how difficult such state-backed campaigns were to identify.

[...]

Unlike ransomware gangs, nation-state actors employ so-called “living off the land” techniques that exploit legitimate, built-in tools within a victim’s own systems rather than deploying malware that might trigger security alerts.

“These stealthy techniques can bypass traditional security tripwires and are much harder to detect,” MacGibbon said. CyberCX’s most recent threat report found that espionage incidents take on average about 400 days to detect, compared to just over three weeks for financially motivated attacks perpetrated by cybercriminals.

For businesses, the stakes extend beyond espionage. Jake Hense, a research analyst at American Century, noted that cybersecurity had become fundamental to assessing whether a business can survive long-term, a factor the US Securities and Exchange Commission now requires companies to address in their disclosures.

“A sustainable business must be able to address risks, including cyberthreats that could significantly impact its ability to conduct day-to-day business,” Hense said.

[...]

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, who leads Defence’s cyber and space operations, told the same summit that Australia was effectively already fighting in cyberspace.

“I would be naive to get up here and tell you that we’re not in conflict in the cyber domain now,” Coyle said. “Our ships will not sail, our planes will not fly, and our missiles will miss targets if we don’t get the cyber domain right.”

MacGibbon said Five Eyes agencies were “very alive to the risk” and regularly publishing joint advisories with practical guidance for critical infrastructure organisations, including reviewing network device logs for unexpected activity and employing robust change management processes.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48458463

Archived

A top cybersecurity figure says China’s Salt Typhoon hacking campaign has almost certainly burrowed into Australia’s critical infrastructure in one of the most effective long-term espionage campaigns ever seen.

Alastair MacGibbon, chief strategy officer at CyberCX and a former cybersecurity adviser to then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, said Salt Typhoon’s operation has probably compromised multiple sectors across Australia and New Zealand and remains undetected.

[...]

Salt Typhoon – named by Microsoft using its convention for Chinese state-linked threat groups - is a hacking operation that has been active since at least 2019. Rather than deploying ransomware or seeking quick financial pay-offs like criminal hackers, Salt Typhoon is focused on long-term espionage: quietly infiltrating telecommunications networks, stealing data, and maintaining persistent access that could be weaponised during future conflicts.

[...]

What makes Salt Typhoon particularly alarming is its exploitation of “lawful intercept” capabilities – surveillance systems that telecommunications companies are legally required to maintain for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“By targeting US telco networks, Salt Typhoon has enabled China’s Ministry of State Security to take over the lawful intercept capabilities that governments compel telcos to have,” MacGibbon said. “This means that the MSS can see and listen to highly sensitive interception and surveillance data meant for law enforcement and security agencies.”

MacGibbon said one of the most concerning aspects for security professionals was how difficult such state-backed campaigns were to identify.

[...]

Unlike ransomware gangs, nation-state actors employ so-called “living off the land” techniques that exploit legitimate, built-in tools within a victim’s own systems rather than deploying malware that might trigger security alerts.

“These stealthy techniques can bypass traditional security tripwires and are much harder to detect,” MacGibbon said. CyberCX’s most recent threat report found that espionage incidents take on average about 400 days to detect, compared to just over three weeks for financially motivated attacks perpetrated by cybercriminals.

For businesses, the stakes extend beyond espionage. Jake Hense, a research analyst at American Century, noted that cybersecurity had become fundamental to assessing whether a business can survive long-term, a factor the US Securities and Exchange Commission now requires companies to address in their disclosures.

“A sustainable business must be able to address risks, including cyberthreats that could significantly impact its ability to conduct day-to-day business,” Hense said.

[...]

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, who leads Defence’s cyber and space operations, told the same summit that Australia was effectively already fighting in cyberspace.

“I would be naive to get up here and tell you that we’re not in conflict in the cyber domain now,” Coyle said. “Our ships will not sail, our planes will not fly, and our missiles will miss targets if we don’t get the cyber domain right.”

MacGibbon said Five Eyes agencies were “very alive to the risk” and regularly publishing joint advisories with practical guidance for critical infrastructure organisations, including reviewing network device logs for unexpected activity and employing robust change management processes.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48458463

Archived

A top cybersecurity figure says China’s Salt Typhoon hacking campaign has almost certainly burrowed into Australia’s critical infrastructure in one of the most effective long-term espionage campaigns ever seen.

Alastair MacGibbon, chief strategy officer at CyberCX and a former cybersecurity adviser to then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, said Salt Typhoon’s operation has probably compromised multiple sectors across Australia and New Zealand and remains undetected.

[...]

Salt Typhoon – named by Microsoft using its convention for Chinese state-linked threat groups - is a hacking operation that has been active since at least 2019. Rather than deploying ransomware or seeking quick financial pay-offs like criminal hackers, Salt Typhoon is focused on long-term espionage: quietly infiltrating telecommunications networks, stealing data, and maintaining persistent access that could be weaponised during future conflicts.

[...]

What makes Salt Typhoon particularly alarming is its exploitation of “lawful intercept” capabilities – surveillance systems that telecommunications companies are legally required to maintain for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“By targeting US telco networks, Salt Typhoon has enabled China’s Ministry of State Security to take over the lawful intercept capabilities that governments compel telcos to have,” MacGibbon said. “This means that the MSS can see and listen to highly sensitive interception and surveillance data meant for law enforcement and security agencies.”

MacGibbon said one of the most concerning aspects for security professionals was how difficult such state-backed campaigns were to identify.

[...]

Unlike ransomware gangs, nation-state actors employ so-called “living off the land” techniques that exploit legitimate, built-in tools within a victim’s own systems rather than deploying malware that might trigger security alerts.

“These stealthy techniques can bypass traditional security tripwires and are much harder to detect,” MacGibbon said. CyberCX’s most recent threat report found that espionage incidents take on average about 400 days to detect, compared to just over three weeks for financially motivated attacks perpetrated by cybercriminals.

For businesses, the stakes extend beyond espionage. Jake Hense, a research analyst at American Century, noted that cybersecurity had become fundamental to assessing whether a business can survive long-term, a factor the US Securities and Exchange Commission now requires companies to address in their disclosures.

“A sustainable business must be able to address risks, including cyberthreats that could significantly impact its ability to conduct day-to-day business,” Hense said.

[...]

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, who leads Defence’s cyber and space operations, told the same summit that Australia was effectively already fighting in cyberspace.

“I would be naive to get up here and tell you that we’re not in conflict in the cyber domain now,” Coyle said. “Our ships will not sail, our planes will not fly, and our missiles will miss targets if we don’t get the cyber domain right.”

MacGibbon said Five Eyes agencies were “very alive to the risk” and regularly publishing joint advisories with practical guidance for critical infrastructure organisations, including reviewing network device logs for unexpected activity and employing robust change management processes.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48458463

Archived

A top cybersecurity figure says China’s Salt Typhoon hacking campaign has almost certainly burrowed into Australia’s critical infrastructure in one of the most effective long-term espionage campaigns ever seen.

Alastair MacGibbon, chief strategy officer at CyberCX and a former cybersecurity adviser to then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, said Salt Typhoon’s operation has probably compromised multiple sectors across Australia and New Zealand and remains undetected.

[...]

Salt Typhoon – named by Microsoft using its convention for Chinese state-linked threat groups - is a hacking operation that has been active since at least 2019. Rather than deploying ransomware or seeking quick financial pay-offs like criminal hackers, Salt Typhoon is focused on long-term espionage: quietly infiltrating telecommunications networks, stealing data, and maintaining persistent access that could be weaponised during future conflicts.

[...]

What makes Salt Typhoon particularly alarming is its exploitation of “lawful intercept” capabilities – surveillance systems that telecommunications companies are legally required to maintain for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“By targeting US telco networks, Salt Typhoon has enabled China’s Ministry of State Security to take over the lawful intercept capabilities that governments compel telcos to have,” MacGibbon said. “This means that the MSS can see and listen to highly sensitive interception and surveillance data meant for law enforcement and security agencies.”

MacGibbon said one of the most concerning aspects for security professionals was how difficult such state-backed campaigns were to identify.

[...]

Unlike ransomware gangs, nation-state actors employ so-called “living off the land” techniques that exploit legitimate, built-in tools within a victim’s own systems rather than deploying malware that might trigger security alerts.

“These stealthy techniques can bypass traditional security tripwires and are much harder to detect,” MacGibbon said. CyberCX’s most recent threat report found that espionage incidents take on average about 400 days to detect, compared to just over three weeks for financially motivated attacks perpetrated by cybercriminals.

For businesses, the stakes extend beyond espionage. Jake Hense, a research analyst at American Century, noted that cybersecurity had become fundamental to assessing whether a business can survive long-term, a factor the US Securities and Exchange Commission now requires companies to address in their disclosures.

“A sustainable business must be able to address risks, including cyberthreats that could significantly impact its ability to conduct day-to-day business,” Hense said.

[...]

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, who leads Defence’s cyber and space operations, told the same summit that Australia was effectively already fighting in cyberspace.

“I would be naive to get up here and tell you that we’re not in conflict in the cyber domain now,” Coyle said. “Our ships will not sail, our planes will not fly, and our missiles will miss targets if we don’t get the cyber domain right.”

MacGibbon said Five Eyes agencies were “very alive to the risk” and regularly publishing joint advisories with practical guidance for critical infrastructure organisations, including reviewing network device logs for unexpected activity and employing robust change management processes.

[...]

Archived

A top cybersecurity figure says China’s Salt Typhoon hacking campaign has almost certainly burrowed into Australia’s critical infrastructure in one of the most effective long-term espionage campaigns ever seen.

Alastair MacGibbon, chief strategy officer at CyberCX and a former cybersecurity adviser to then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, said Salt Typhoon’s operation has probably compromised multiple sectors across Australia and New Zealand and remains undetected.

[...]

Salt Typhoon – named by Microsoft using its convention for Chinese state-linked threat groups - is a hacking operation that has been active since at least 2019. Rather than deploying ransomware or seeking quick financial pay-offs like criminal hackers, Salt Typhoon is focused on long-term espionage: quietly infiltrating telecommunications networks, stealing data, and maintaining persistent access that could be weaponised during future conflicts.

[...]

What makes Salt Typhoon particularly alarming is its exploitation of “lawful intercept” capabilities – surveillance systems that telecommunications companies are legally required to maintain for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

“By targeting US telco networks, Salt Typhoon has enabled China’s Ministry of State Security to take over the lawful intercept capabilities that governments compel telcos to have,” MacGibbon said. “This means that the MSS can see and listen to highly sensitive interception and surveillance data meant for law enforcement and security agencies.”

MacGibbon said one of the most concerning aspects for security professionals was how difficult such state-backed campaigns were to identify.

[...]

Unlike ransomware gangs, nation-state actors employ so-called “living off the land” techniques that exploit legitimate, built-in tools within a victim’s own systems rather than deploying malware that might trigger security alerts.

“These stealthy techniques can bypass traditional security tripwires and are much harder to detect,” MacGibbon said. CyberCX’s most recent threat report found that espionage incidents take on average about 400 days to detect, compared to just over three weeks for financially motivated attacks perpetrated by cybercriminals.

For businesses, the stakes extend beyond espionage. Jake Hense, a research analyst at American Century, noted that cybersecurity had become fundamental to assessing whether a business can survive long-term, a factor the US Securities and Exchange Commission now requires companies to address in their disclosures.

“A sustainable business must be able to address risks, including cyberthreats that could significantly impact its ability to conduct day-to-day business,” Hense said.

[...]

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, who leads Defence’s cyber and space operations, told the same summit that Australia was effectively already fighting in cyberspace.

“I would be naive to get up here and tell you that we’re not in conflict in the cyber domain now,” Coyle said. “Our ships will not sail, our planes will not fly, and our missiles will miss targets if we don’t get the cyber domain right.”

MacGibbon said Five Eyes agencies were “very alive to the risk” and regularly publishing joint advisories with practical guidance for critical infrastructure organisations, including reviewing network device logs for unexpected activity and employing robust change management processes.

[...]