Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51341402

A series of patents filed the past two years indicates that institutions across China are working out how to use AI to improve grassroots surveillance.

Archived

Reading between the lines, a dry little document released by the Fujian Police Academy in December last year is a small window onto the future of authoritarianism.

The academy, which is directly under the Fujian provincial government and conducts research to improve public security mechanisms, proposes a new method for detecting an abnormal build-up of people into “potential mass incidents” (潜在群体性事件) — referring to an oft-used official bureaucratic euphemism for collective protests, riots, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of organized public unrest. The academy’s new method uses AI that is fed data from sound sensors, cameras and official reports. The AI system flags an incident as soon as it starts to develop, giving the police advance warning. If the system overlooks an incident, it reviews the video footage and recordings to improve detection in future. This is machine learning in the service of AI-based surveillance.

[...]

Throughout the past year, institutions across China, both private and state-owned, have proposed variations of the same system: taking big data from China’s extensive surveillance system — including input from street cameras and satellites, noise sensors, social media posts, as well as reports from social services — and feeding it into AI models to aid predictive policing. This is part of the government’s vision of a fusion of human and machine response, making for a more robust domestic security system.

The trend does not bode well for the most vulnerable sections of Chinese society.

[...]

While some institutions are making use of Chinese AI models for these projects, Western ones are also being considered. In August 2025 Guizhou Normal University suggested using OpenAI’s GPT models as a “core reasoning tool” in a system to predict “social governance incidents” based on reports of an individual’s “personality traits,” “long-term emotional states” or “degree of exposure to negative cultural influences.” The patent does not specify how data on “negative cultural influences” would be collected, though any such system would depend on extensive pre-existing surveillance infrastructure. While OpenAI has banned individual Chinese users from accessing its products since 2024, businesses in China can still access OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure.

[...]

How would these inventions impact society? The systems described in these patents would likely fall hardest on the most vulnerable members of Chinese society. The algorithms are programmed around catch-all risk categories commonly associated with violent or disorderly behavior, with little apparent regard for individual circumstances. Guizhou’s risk monitoring system for assessing the danger levels of an individual include a “criminal record, drug abuse record, serious mental illness” as well as tense relationships with family members. It is not clear how the algorithm would make allowances for those, say, who have a criminal record through minor offences as opposed to a major one, or whose family relationships are tense due to living with abusive parents or spouses.

[...]

It is also a chance to exert greater control over a system that has persistently caused trouble for local authorities. The Southwestern University of Political Science and Law in Chongqing has created a risk monitoring system specifically targeted at petitioners, individuals who are seeking redress for a wrong done to them either by a local cadre or peer. Petitioners are frequently driven to increasingly desperate acts after years spent navigating a grievance system that rarely produces results — a dynamic that authorities have long treated as a public order problem rather than a governance failure.

The invention would see sensors and cameras placed in spaces where citizens meet officials, flagging a warning to police based on detecting heightened emotion through noise sensors and facial recognition software. But the algorithm is also programmed to take “Life Observations” into account. Subjects are considered high risk if they have spread inflammatory comments on social media over three times in one month, not had steady employment for over a year or do not have any social security, are homeless or reported as “not going out [of the house] for a long time (≥ 7 days).”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51341510

Archived

The Philippines is facing a “coordinated and sustained” cyber offensive from China, signaling a shift in geopolitical tensions from the West Philippine Sea into the digital domain through influence operations aimed at shaping public perception, manipulating discourse, and weakening institutional trust, a think tank said over the weekend.

Speaking during the two-day “Navigating Digital Crossroads” cybersecurity forum held in partnership with the Embassy of Canada to the Philippines, Stratbase ADR Institute president Victor Andres Manhit said the country was engaged in what he described as an “unseen war” waged through information dominance, psychological operations, and digital manipulation rather than conventional military force.

Manhit said modern conflict was no longer determined solely by weapons systems or troop deployments but by the ability to control narratives, influence decision-making environments, and shape public perception — developments he said were increasingly evident as regional tensions spilled over into cyberspace across the broader Indo-Pacific.

[...]

“What reverberates within our domestic context affects the broader region. And developments in the region inevitably shape outcomes in the Philippines,” he said, describing the phenomenon as coordinated political warfare in which physical operations and informational campaigns move in lockstep to secure strategic narrative superiority.

He cited Beijing’s so-called “three warfares” doctrine — composed of psychological, legal, and public opinion warfare — as a framework already reflected in operations that seek to undermine Philippine sovereignty by embedding strategic messaging into public discourse and amplifying pro-China narratives across online platforms.

[...]

He pointed to what he described as China’s use of coordinated networks linked to its United Front Work to embed strategic narratives into Philippine public discourse through associations spanning business and chamber groups, academic exchanges, think tanks, study centers, and even sister-city partnerships.

“We have observed a network of associations functioning as amplifiers of pro-Beijing narratives and actions,” he said, noting that influence campaigns may operate through both formal partnerships and informal online communities.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51341402

A series of patents filed the past two years indicates that institutions across China are working out how to use AI to improve grassroots surveillance.

Archived

Reading between the lines, a dry little document released by the Fujian Police Academy in December last year is a small window onto the future of authoritarianism.

The academy, which is directly under the Fujian provincial government and conducts research to improve public security mechanisms, proposes a new method for detecting an abnormal build-up of people into “potential mass incidents” (潜在群体性事件) — referring to an oft-used official bureaucratic euphemism for collective protests, riots, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of organized public unrest. The academy’s new method uses AI that is fed data from sound sensors, cameras and official reports. The AI system flags an incident as soon as it starts to develop, giving the police advance warning. If the system overlooks an incident, it reviews the video footage and recordings to improve detection in future. This is machine learning in the service of AI-based surveillance.

[...]

Throughout the past year, institutions across China, both private and state-owned, have proposed variations of the same system: taking big data from China’s extensive surveillance system — including input from street cameras and satellites, noise sensors, social media posts, as well as reports from social services — and feeding it into AI models to aid predictive policing. This is part of the government’s vision of a fusion of human and machine response, making for a more robust domestic security system.

The trend does not bode well for the most vulnerable sections of Chinese society.

[...]

While some institutions are making use of Chinese AI models for these projects, Western ones are also being considered. In August 2025 Guizhou Normal University suggested using OpenAI’s GPT models as a “core reasoning tool” in a system to predict “social governance incidents” based on reports of an individual’s “personality traits,” “long-term emotional states” or “degree of exposure to negative cultural influences.” The patent does not specify how data on “negative cultural influences” would be collected, though any such system would depend on extensive pre-existing surveillance infrastructure. While OpenAI has banned individual Chinese users from accessing its products since 2024, businesses in China can still access OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure.

[...]

How would these inventions impact society? The systems described in these patents would likely fall hardest on the most vulnerable members of Chinese society. The algorithms are programmed around catch-all risk categories commonly associated with violent or disorderly behavior, with little apparent regard for individual circumstances. Guizhou’s risk monitoring system for assessing the danger levels of an individual include a “criminal record, drug abuse record, serious mental illness” as well as tense relationships with family members. It is not clear how the algorithm would make allowances for those, say, who have a criminal record through minor offences as opposed to a major one, or whose family relationships are tense due to living with abusive parents or spouses.

[...]

It is also a chance to exert greater control over a system that has persistently caused trouble for local authorities. The Southwestern University of Political Science and Law in Chongqing has created a risk monitoring system specifically targeted at petitioners, individuals who are seeking redress for a wrong done to them either by a local cadre or peer. Petitioners are frequently driven to increasingly desperate acts after years spent navigating a grievance system that rarely produces results — a dynamic that authorities have long treated as a public order problem rather than a governance failure.

The invention would see sensors and cameras placed in spaces where citizens meet officials, flagging a warning to police based on detecting heightened emotion through noise sensors and facial recognition software. But the algorithm is also programmed to take “Life Observations” into account. Subjects are considered high risk if they have spread inflammatory comments on social media over three times in one month, not had steady employment for over a year or do not have any social security, are homeless or reported as “not going out [of the house] for a long time (≥ 7 days).”

[...]

Archived

The Philippines is facing a “coordinated and sustained” cyber offensive from China, signaling a shift in geopolitical tensions from the West Philippine Sea into the digital domain through influence operations aimed at shaping public perception, manipulating discourse, and weakening institutional trust, a think tank said over the weekend.

Speaking during the two-day “Navigating Digital Crossroads” cybersecurity forum held in partnership with the Embassy of Canada to the Philippines, Stratbase ADR Institute president Victor Andres Manhit said the country was engaged in what he described as an “unseen war” waged through information dominance, psychological operations, and digital manipulation rather than conventional military force.

Manhit said modern conflict was no longer determined solely by weapons systems or troop deployments but by the ability to control narratives, influence decision-making environments, and shape public perception — developments he said were increasingly evident as regional tensions spilled over into cyberspace across the broader Indo-Pacific.

[...]

“What reverberates within our domestic context affects the broader region. And developments in the region inevitably shape outcomes in the Philippines,” he said, describing the phenomenon as coordinated political warfare in which physical operations and informational campaigns move in lockstep to secure strategic narrative superiority.

He cited Beijing’s so-called “three warfares” doctrine — composed of psychological, legal, and public opinion warfare — as a framework already reflected in operations that seek to undermine Philippine sovereignty by embedding strategic messaging into public discourse and amplifying pro-China narratives across online platforms.

[...]

He pointed to what he described as China’s use of coordinated networks linked to its United Front Work to embed strategic narratives into Philippine public discourse through associations spanning business and chamber groups, academic exchanges, think tanks, study centers, and even sister-city partnerships.

“We have observed a network of associations functioning as amplifiers of pro-Beijing narratives and actions,” he said, noting that influence campaigns may operate through both formal partnerships and informal online communities.

A series of patents filed the past two years indicates that institutions across China are working out how to use AI to improve grassroots surveillance.

Archived

Reading between the lines, a dry little document released by the Fujian Police Academy in December last year is a small window onto the future of authoritarianism.

The academy, which is directly under the Fujian provincial government and conducts research to improve public security mechanisms, proposes a new method for detecting an abnormal build-up of people into “potential mass incidents” (潜在群体性事件) — referring to an oft-used official bureaucratic euphemism for collective protests, riots, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of organized public unrest. The academy’s new method uses AI that is fed data from sound sensors, cameras and official reports. The AI system flags an incident as soon as it starts to develop, giving the police advance warning. If the system overlooks an incident, it reviews the video footage and recordings to improve detection in future. This is machine learning in the service of AI-based surveillance.

[...]

Throughout the past year, institutions across China, both private and state-owned, have proposed variations of the same system: taking big data from China’s extensive surveillance system — including input from street cameras and satellites, noise sensors, social media posts, as well as reports from social services — and feeding it into AI models to aid predictive policing. This is part of the government’s vision of a fusion of human and machine response, making for a more robust domestic security system.

The trend does not bode well for the most vulnerable sections of Chinese society.

[...]

While some institutions are making use of Chinese AI models for these projects, Western ones are also being considered. In August 2025 Guizhou Normal University suggested using OpenAI’s GPT models as a “core reasoning tool” in a system to predict “social governance incidents” based on reports of an individual’s “personality traits,” “long-term emotional states” or “degree of exposure to negative cultural influences.” The patent does not specify how data on “negative cultural influences” would be collected, though any such system would depend on extensive pre-existing surveillance infrastructure. While OpenAI has banned individual Chinese users from accessing its products since 2024, businesses in China can still access OpenAI models through Microsoft Azure.

[...]

How would these inventions impact society? The systems described in these patents would likely fall hardest on the most vulnerable members of Chinese society. The algorithms are programmed around catch-all risk categories commonly associated with violent or disorderly behavior, with little apparent regard for individual circumstances. Guizhou’s risk monitoring system for assessing the danger levels of an individual include a “criminal record, drug abuse record, serious mental illness” as well as tense relationships with family members. It is not clear how the algorithm would make allowances for those, say, who have a criminal record through minor offences as opposed to a major one, or whose family relationships are tense due to living with abusive parents or spouses.

[...]

It is also a chance to exert greater control over a system that has persistently caused trouble for local authorities. The Southwestern University of Political Science and Law in Chongqing has created a risk monitoring system specifically targeted at petitioners, individuals who are seeking redress for a wrong done to them either by a local cadre or peer. Petitioners are frequently driven to increasingly desperate acts after years spent navigating a grievance system that rarely produces results — a dynamic that authorities have long treated as a public order problem rather than a governance failure.

The invention would see sensors and cameras placed in spaces where citizens meet officials, flagging a warning to police based on detecting heightened emotion through noise sensors and facial recognition software. But the algorithm is also programmed to take “Life Observations” into account. Subjects are considered high risk if they have spread inflammatory comments on social media over three times in one month, not had steady employment for over a year or do not have any social security, are homeless or reported as “not going out [of the house] for a long time (≥ 7 days).”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51296230

Archived

Child soldiers linked to Sudan’s warring factions have gained viral fame on TikTok, with their videos attracting millions of views.

A Bellingcat investigation has found that the young boys – widely referred to as “lion cubs” – have become celebrated figures of the rival groups that have been fighting for control of the country since 2023.

Many of the videos we reviewed show the children in military uniforms posing with fighters and senior officials from both sides of the conflict – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). They are seen celebrating battlefield victories, delivering motivational speeches, and making violent threats. In some footage the children are armed.

Child soldier experts told Bellingcat that the visibility and popularity of this content, which portrays fighting as normal, celebrated and aspirational, could lead to the recruitment of more young people in the conflict.

[...]

Bellingcat flagged 12 TikTok accounts that had each posted viral content of child soldiers through the platform’s internal reporting mechanism. After more than 48 hours without action, we emailed TikTok to request comment, providing links to the reported content. This was done to give TikTok a further opportunity to review and remove the accounts, in order to minimise the risk of amplification by reporting on it.

Following our inquiry, TikTok removed seven of the reported accounts. The remaining active accounts continue to host more than a dozen videos featuring child soldier content, which, according to TikTok’s own guidelines, breaches its content policies.

[...]

Bellingcat geolocated multiple TikTok videos showing an RSF “lion cub” – who appears to be a young teenager – celebrating the capture of the 22nd infantry division SAF base in Babanusa, a city in West Kordofan, in early December 2025.

The videos, posted by pro-RSF TikTok accounts and viewed millions of times, show the child’s movements on the ground in the aftermath of the takeover. In the weeks that followed, the child’s TikTok account gained tens of thousands of followers and recent posts amassed hundreds of thousands of views.

In a TikTok video posted to the child’s account on Jan. 1, 2026, in response to social media comments, the child says: “I see people on the [social] media saying that I will die. The person who dies is as if he has paid his debt” This video received more than 1,6 million views.

[...]

Archived

Child soldiers linked to Sudan’s warring factions have gained viral fame on TikTok, with their videos attracting millions of views.

A Bellingcat investigation has found that the young boys – widely referred to as “lion cubs” – have become celebrated figures of the rival groups that have been fighting for control of the country since 2023.

Many of the videos we reviewed show the children in military uniforms posing with fighters and senior officials from both sides of the conflict – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). They are seen celebrating battlefield victories, delivering motivational speeches, and making violent threats. In some footage the children are armed.

Child soldier experts told Bellingcat that the visibility and popularity of this content, which portrays fighting as normal, celebrated and aspirational, could lead to the recruitment of more young people in the conflict.

[...]

Bellingcat flagged 12 TikTok accounts that had each posted viral content of child soldiers through the platform’s internal reporting mechanism. After more than 48 hours without action, we emailed TikTok to request comment, providing links to the reported content. This was done to give TikTok a further opportunity to review and remove the accounts, in order to minimise the risk of amplification by reporting on it.

Following our inquiry, TikTok removed seven of the reported accounts. The remaining active accounts continue to host more than a dozen videos featuring child soldier content, which, according to TikTok’s own guidelines, breaches its content policies.

[...]

Bellingcat geolocated multiple TikTok videos showing an RSF “lion cub” – who appears to be a young teenager – celebrating the capture of the 22nd infantry division SAF base in Babanusa, a city in West Kordofan, in early December 2025.

The videos, posted by pro-RSF TikTok accounts and viewed millions of times, show the child’s movements on the ground in the aftermath of the takeover. In the weeks that followed, the child’s TikTok account gained tens of thousands of followers and recent posts amassed hundreds of thousands of views.

In a TikTok video posted to the child’s account on Jan. 1, 2026, in response to social media comments, the child says: “I see people on the [social] media saying that I will die. The person who dies is as if he has paid his debt” This video received more than 1,6 million views.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51295702

Archived

The alleged plot has echoes of a Cold War-era spy novel. A hesitant young woman is directed by her security agency handler to “infiltrate the enemy’s inner circle”, using a false identity to burrow deep for secrets she can dispatch back to senior officers.

But the scene is not set in the atmospheric mists of Prague’s Charles Bridge or the hectic bustle of Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar. Instead, it takes place in the sleepy suburbs of Australia’s Bush Capital, where a 37-year-old Chinese woman and her two co-defendants have been charged with “reckless foreign interference” for allegedly spying on an unassuming Buddhist association.

Documents released this week by Canberra’s Magistrates Court reveal how the unusual alleged surveillance mission unfolded over three years before it was abruptly interrupted by the Australian Federal Police, but may also offer an alluring insight into the techniques of suspected Chinese state influence and interference operations now expanding not only in Australia but globally.

The AFP statement of facts from Operation Autumn Shield, led by the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, details alleged WeChat messages between “Foreign Official 1” – a member of China’s Public Security Bureau – a woman operating under the pseudonym Thomas Tyler and her co-accused Zheng Siru, 31, and Joseph Vance, 25, also using a pseudonym.

[...]

The court materials show police alleged the defendants gathered information on the Buddhist group and its associated media company from many open sources, including SBS Chinese programs and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

In the messages released by the court, Foreign Official 1 allegedly urges Tyler to “slip in, climb as high as you can” within the ranks of Guan Yin Citta’s Canberra branch, despite her protestation that this “seems to be developing rather quickly … Then you’ll have me arrested.”

The task has a “bit of spy thriller feel to it”, responds the official, encouraging his charge that, “if you climb high enough, you’ll be commended directly to the leaders in Beijing”.

The three accused have been bailed and are expected to plead not guilty when the court resumes the case later this year.

While the targeting of a fringe Buddhist organisation – whose founder once claimed that former prime minister Kevin Rudd was a Chinese man in a past life – may seem strange, close observers of the ruling Chinese Communist Party point to the regime’s deep-seated paranoia about overseas religious and political groups it fears could internally destabilise China.

[...]

A joint February 11 media release from the AFP and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, announcing the charging of the two younger Chinese nationals in the Canberra case, referred to past statements by ASIO chief Mike Burgess, that foreign interference remains one of Australia’s principal security concerns.

“A complex, challenging and changing security environment is becoming more dynamic, diverse and degraded,” Burgess said in his annual threat assessment in 2025.

“Multiple foreign regimes are monitoring, harassing and intimidating members of our diaspora communities. This sort of behaviour is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” he said.

[...]

China’s United Front

Under President Xi Jinping, the expansion of Chinese state influence and interference operations globally, and the increased surveillance of diaspora groups and individuals, has been well documented.

It has been carried out in part by the loosely defined and secretive Communist Party agency known as the United Front Work Department.

The UFWD – described by Xi as a “magic weapon” – and the Chinese security agencies operating within its strategy, conducts an opaque mix of intelligence gathering, surveillance of the Chinese diaspora and a campaign to shape the global political environment and narratives in Beijing’s favour.

The agency focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China but is also used by the Communist regime to engage in transnational repression and the silencing of critics living abroad.

While declining to comment on the Canberra case, Chris Taylor, the head of the statecraft and intelligence policy centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the overseas actions of authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and Cambodia were driven by a sense of vulnerability about their political structures and social systems.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51295702

Archived

The alleged plot has echoes of a Cold War-era spy novel. A hesitant young woman is directed by her security agency handler to “infiltrate the enemy’s inner circle”, using a false identity to burrow deep for secrets she can dispatch back to senior officers.

But the scene is not set in the atmospheric mists of Prague’s Charles Bridge or the hectic bustle of Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar. Instead, it takes place in the sleepy suburbs of Australia’s Bush Capital, where a 37-year-old Chinese woman and her two co-defendants have been charged with “reckless foreign interference” for allegedly spying on an unassuming Buddhist association.

Documents released this week by Canberra’s Magistrates Court reveal how the unusual alleged surveillance mission unfolded over three years before it was abruptly interrupted by the Australian Federal Police, but may also offer an alluring insight into the techniques of suspected Chinese state influence and interference operations now expanding not only in Australia but globally.

The AFP statement of facts from Operation Autumn Shield, led by the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, details alleged WeChat messages between “Foreign Official 1” – a member of China’s Public Security Bureau – a woman operating under the pseudonym Thomas Tyler and her co-accused Zheng Siru, 31, and Joseph Vance, 25, also using a pseudonym.

[...]

The court materials show police alleged the defendants gathered information on the Buddhist group and its associated media company from many open sources, including SBS Chinese programs and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

In the messages released by the court, Foreign Official 1 allegedly urges Tyler to “slip in, climb as high as you can” within the ranks of Guan Yin Citta’s Canberra branch, despite her protestation that this “seems to be developing rather quickly … Then you’ll have me arrested.”

The task has a “bit of spy thriller feel to it”, responds the official, encouraging his charge that, “if you climb high enough, you’ll be commended directly to the leaders in Beijing”.

The three accused have been bailed and are expected to plead not guilty when the court resumes the case later this year.

While the targeting of a fringe Buddhist organisation – whose founder once claimed that former prime minister Kevin Rudd was a Chinese man in a past life – may seem strange, close observers of the ruling Chinese Communist Party point to the regime’s deep-seated paranoia about overseas religious and political groups it fears could internally destabilise China.

[...]

A joint February 11 media release from the AFP and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, announcing the charging of the two younger Chinese nationals in the Canberra case, referred to past statements by ASIO chief Mike Burgess, that foreign interference remains one of Australia’s principal security concerns.

“A complex, challenging and changing security environment is becoming more dynamic, diverse and degraded,” Burgess said in his annual threat assessment in 2025.

“Multiple foreign regimes are monitoring, harassing and intimidating members of our diaspora communities. This sort of behaviour is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” he said.

[...]

China’s United Front

Under President Xi Jinping, the expansion of Chinese state influence and interference operations globally, and the increased surveillance of diaspora groups and individuals, has been well documented.

It has been carried out in part by the loosely defined and secretive Communist Party agency known as the United Front Work Department.

The UFWD – described by Xi as a “magic weapon” – and the Chinese security agencies operating within its strategy, conducts an opaque mix of intelligence gathering, surveillance of the Chinese diaspora and a campaign to shape the global political environment and narratives in Beijing’s favour.

The agency focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China but is also used by the Communist regime to engage in transnational repression and the silencing of critics living abroad.

While declining to comment on the Canberra case, Chris Taylor, the head of the statecraft and intelligence policy centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the overseas actions of authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and Cambodia were driven by a sense of vulnerability about their political structures and social systems.

[...]

Archived

The alleged plot has echoes of a Cold War-era spy novel. A hesitant young woman is directed by her security agency handler to “infiltrate the enemy’s inner circle”, using a false identity to burrow deep for secrets she can dispatch back to senior officers.

But the scene is not set in the atmospheric mists of Prague’s Charles Bridge or the hectic bustle of Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar. Instead, it takes place in the sleepy suburbs of Australia’s Bush Capital, where a 37-year-old Chinese woman and her two co-defendants have been charged with “reckless foreign interference” for allegedly spying on an unassuming Buddhist association.

Documents released this week by Canberra’s Magistrates Court reveal how the unusual alleged surveillance mission unfolded over three years before it was abruptly interrupted by the Australian Federal Police, but may also offer an alluring insight into the techniques of suspected Chinese state influence and interference operations now expanding not only in Australia but globally.

The AFP statement of facts from Operation Autumn Shield, led by the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, details alleged WeChat messages between “Foreign Official 1” – a member of China’s Public Security Bureau – a woman operating under the pseudonym Thomas Tyler and her co-accused Zheng Siru, 31, and Joseph Vance, 25, also using a pseudonym.

[...]

The court materials show police alleged the defendants gathered information on the Buddhist group and its associated media company from many open sources, including SBS Chinese programs and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

In the messages released by the court, Foreign Official 1 allegedly urges Tyler to “slip in, climb as high as you can” within the ranks of Guan Yin Citta’s Canberra branch, despite her protestation that this “seems to be developing rather quickly … Then you’ll have me arrested.”

The task has a “bit of spy thriller feel to it”, responds the official, encouraging his charge that, “if you climb high enough, you’ll be commended directly to the leaders in Beijing”.

The three accused have been bailed and are expected to plead not guilty when the court resumes the case later this year.

While the targeting of a fringe Buddhist organisation – whose founder once claimed that former prime minister Kevin Rudd was a Chinese man in a past life – may seem strange, close observers of the ruling Chinese Communist Party point to the regime’s deep-seated paranoia about overseas religious and political groups it fears could internally destabilise China.

[...]

A joint February 11 media release from the AFP and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, announcing the charging of the two younger Chinese nationals in the Canberra case, referred to past statements by ASIO chief Mike Burgess, that foreign interference remains one of Australia’s principal security concerns.

“A complex, challenging and changing security environment is becoming more dynamic, diverse and degraded,” Burgess said in his annual threat assessment in 2025.

“Multiple foreign regimes are monitoring, harassing and intimidating members of our diaspora communities. This sort of behaviour is utterly unacceptable and cannot be tolerated,” he said.

[...]

China’s United Front

Under President Xi Jinping, the expansion of Chinese state influence and interference operations globally, and the increased surveillance of diaspora groups and individuals, has been well documented.

It has been carried out in part by the loosely defined and secretive Communist Party agency known as the United Front Work Department.

The UFWD – described by Xi as a “magic weapon” – and the Chinese security agencies operating within its strategy, conducts an opaque mix of intelligence gathering, surveillance of the Chinese diaspora and a campaign to shape the global political environment and narratives in Beijing’s favour.

The agency focuses on the management of potential opposition groups inside China but is also used by the Communist regime to engage in transnational repression and the silencing of critics living abroad.

While declining to comment on the Canberra case, Chris Taylor, the head of the statecraft and intelligence policy centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said the overseas actions of authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and Cambodia were driven by a sense of vulnerability about their political structures and social systems.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51252387

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51251702

Archived

Australia, the United States, Japan and the Philippines should establish a formal NATO-style defence alliance to counter China’s growing military power in Asia, according to a former top adviser to Joe Biden.

Ely Ratner, who served as Biden’s assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific security affairs, also urged the Albanese government to significantly increase military spending to ensure that AUKUS does not cannibalise the defence budget and drain resources for other important investments.

[...]

He said he was concerned by Donald Trump’s lack of focus on competition with China and that he feared the US president could make damaging concessions to Beijing when he meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping this year.

“The threat is mounting from China. China’s ambitions have not moderated. It is building a military to be able to dominate the Indo-Pacific, and it has ambitions for which only combat-credible deterrence will prevent conflict in the Indo-Pacific,” Ratner said in an interview.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51252490

Public broadcaster ABC said some Chinese riders with food delivery service HungryPanda in Australia were in a dispute over their pay and conditions.

They discussed protest plans in a group chat on Chinese messaging app WeChat, the ABC said.

Some riders reportedly said police in China then called them directly or warned them through their families not to get involved in protests.

HungryPanda, an Asian food delivery firm founded by a Chinese international student in Britain in 2017, did not immediately reply to a request for comment.

"The Australian Government does not tolerate surveillance, harassment, or threats towards any Australian citizens or individuals lawfully in Australia," said a spokesperson for the Department of Home Affairs.

Australia's counter foreign interference taskforce was "aware" of the ABC report on HungryPanda riders, the spokesperson said, declining, however, to comment on individual cases.

[...]

In its annual threat assessment last year, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation said "multiple foreign regimes" attempt to monitor, harass and intimidate Australians and Australian residents.

This month, Australia's federal police charged two Chinese nationals with foreign interference, accusing them of spying on a Buddhist group at the behest of police in China.

[...]