Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48645217

Archived

[...]

Trump’s Venezuela gamble threatens to upend years of painstaking work by Russia and China in a country that holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Both powers have invested heavily in Venezuelan crude, infrastructure, and political ties, filling the vacuum left by Western companies under sanctions. A potential U.S. return would not only challenge these positions but could also weaken China’s access to discounted oil and undercut Russia’s influence in Latin America.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48645217

Archived

[...]

Trump’s Venezuela gamble threatens to upend years of painstaking work by Russia and China in a country that holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Both powers have invested heavily in Venezuelan crude, infrastructure, and political ties, filling the vacuum left by Western companies under sanctions. A potential U.S. return would not only challenge these positions but could also weaken China’s access to discounted oil and undercut Russia’s influence in Latin America.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Trump’s Venezuela gamble threatens to upend years of painstaking work by Russia and China in a country that holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. Both powers have invested heavily in Venezuelan crude, infrastructure, and political ties, filling the vacuum left by Western companies under sanctions. A potential U.S. return would not only challenge these positions but could also weaken China’s access to discounted oil and undercut Russia’s influence in Latin America.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48642311

Archived

[...]

China’s information warfare is as much about shaping, disciplining, and pre-empting domestic opinion as it is about manipulating foreign audiences, blurring the boundary between internal social management and external strategic communication.

[...]

Information Warfare as State Doctrine

China’s leadership regards information not as a neutral public good but as a strategic resource. Both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) identify information dominance, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as core apparatuses of contemporary conflict. Managing information flow, its framing, and emotional impact has thus become essential to maintaining internal legitimacy and projecting external influence.

Domestically, this manifests as strict control over media, academia, and digital platforms. The aim is not only to suppress dissent but to proactively shape public perception and cultivate national cohesion around Party-defined ideals. Internationally, these same principles inform Beijing’s influence operations outside its territory, state media outreach, and strategic communication campaigns, demonstrating that control of information, both within and beyond China’s borders, is integral to its national strategy.

[...]

Surveillance as the Operational Arm of Information Warfare

In Chinese strategic thought, surveillance is the operational backbone of information warfare. Technologies such as real-time facial recognition, digital identity systems, and algorithmic content filtering provide the infrastructure through which information warfare principles are embedded into daily governance.

[...]

Introduced under the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP) after the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006), the SCS was originally presented as a framework to enhance commercial trust and civic responsibility. In practice, it integrates judicial, administrative, and commercial data to rank individuals, corporations, and organisations based on their “trustworthiness.”

The SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

Rather than relying on a single numerical score, the SCS functions through blacklists and redlists. Those who violate regulations or fail to comply with court judgments are blacklisted, facing restrictions on employment, mobility, credit, and government services. Conversely, those considered exemplary citizens are rewarded with privileges. By 2022, official data indicated that over 7.2 million individuals had been designated “untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement,” illustrating the expanding reach of the system.

Beyond its regulatory function, the SCS operates as a narrative enforcement tool. It rewards those who echo state-sanctioned narratives and penalises those who question them, effectively linking political conformity with social mobility through preferential access to school admissions, employment opportunities, and access to cash loans and consumer credit. In this sense, the SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

[...]

Information Control Beyond Borders

China’s information warfare strategy does not stop at its borders. The same tools of surveillance and narrative management that govern domestic society are increasingly applied to global audiences. Through state media expansion, technology exports, academic collaborations, and coordinated online campaigns, Beijing seeks to influence external perceptions of its governance model and strategic intentions.

[...]

Diaspora communities have become specific targets of this strategy. Reports suggest that Chinese citizens abroad face pressure through family connections, social networks, or economic motivations, indicating how domestic surveillance practices can exert mental influence beyond national boundaries. The logic of the SCS, which links loyalty with trustworthiness, thus extends internationally, functioning both as a domestic control mechanism and a model for global narrative influence.

[...]

The Social Credit System stands at the intersection of surveillance and information warfare. It extends the logic of battlefield information dominance into civilian governance, transforming citizens into participants in a perpetual system of ideological evaluation and control.

[...]

For policymakers and scholars worldwide, China’s governance model offers a cautionary lesson. As technology amplifies state capacity for observation and prediction, the central question is not whether surveillance can be achieved—but whether it can be restrained. The equilibrium between security and dignity, control and freedom, will shape not only China’s political future but the global norms of digital governance in the twenty-first century.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48642311

Archived

[...]

China’s information warfare is as much about shaping, disciplining, and pre-empting domestic opinion as it is about manipulating foreign audiences, blurring the boundary between internal social management and external strategic communication.

[...]

Information Warfare as State Doctrine

China’s leadership regards information not as a neutral public good but as a strategic resource. Both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) identify information dominance, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as core apparatuses of contemporary conflict. Managing information flow, its framing, and emotional impact has thus become essential to maintaining internal legitimacy and projecting external influence.

Domestically, this manifests as strict control over media, academia, and digital platforms. The aim is not only to suppress dissent but to proactively shape public perception and cultivate national cohesion around Party-defined ideals. Internationally, these same principles inform Beijing’s influence operations outside its territory, state media outreach, and strategic communication campaigns, demonstrating that control of information, both within and beyond China’s borders, is integral to its national strategy.

[...]

Surveillance as the Operational Arm of Information Warfare

In Chinese strategic thought, surveillance is the operational backbone of information warfare. Technologies such as real-time facial recognition, digital identity systems, and algorithmic content filtering provide the infrastructure through which information warfare principles are embedded into daily governance.

[...]

Introduced under the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP) after the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006), the SCS was originally presented as a framework to enhance commercial trust and civic responsibility. In practice, it integrates judicial, administrative, and commercial data to rank individuals, corporations, and organisations based on their “trustworthiness.”

The SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

Rather than relying on a single numerical score, the SCS functions through blacklists and redlists. Those who violate regulations or fail to comply with court judgments are blacklisted, facing restrictions on employment, mobility, credit, and government services. Conversely, those considered exemplary citizens are rewarded with privileges. By 2022, official data indicated that over 7.2 million individuals had been designated “untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement,” illustrating the expanding reach of the system.

Beyond its regulatory function, the SCS operates as a narrative enforcement tool. It rewards those who echo state-sanctioned narratives and penalises those who question them, effectively linking political conformity with social mobility through preferential access to school admissions, employment opportunities, and access to cash loans and consumer credit. In this sense, the SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

[...]

Information Control Beyond Borders

China’s information warfare strategy does not stop at its borders. The same tools of surveillance and narrative management that govern domestic society are increasingly applied to global audiences. Through state media expansion, technology exports, academic collaborations, and coordinated online campaigns, Beijing seeks to influence external perceptions of its governance model and strategic intentions.

[...]

Diaspora communities have become specific targets of this strategy. Reports suggest that Chinese citizens abroad face pressure through family connections, social networks, or economic motivations, indicating how domestic surveillance practices can exert mental influence beyond national boundaries. The logic of the SCS, which links loyalty with trustworthiness, thus extends internationally, functioning both as a domestic control mechanism and a model for global narrative influence.

[...]

The Social Credit System stands at the intersection of surveillance and information warfare. It extends the logic of battlefield information dominance into civilian governance, transforming citizens into participants in a perpetual system of ideological evaluation and control.

[...]

For policymakers and scholars worldwide, China’s governance model offers a cautionary lesson. As technology amplifies state capacity for observation and prediction, the central question is not whether surveillance can be achieved—but whether it can be restrained. The equilibrium between security and dignity, control and freedom, will shape not only China’s political future but the global norms of digital governance in the twenty-first century.

[...]

Archived

[...]

China’s information warfare is as much about shaping, disciplining, and pre-empting domestic opinion as it is about manipulating foreign audiences, blurring the boundary between internal social management and external strategic communication.

[...]

Information Warfare as State Doctrine

China’s leadership regards information not as a neutral public good but as a strategic resource. Both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) identify information dominance, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as core apparatuses of contemporary conflict. Managing information flow, its framing, and emotional impact has thus become essential to maintaining internal legitimacy and projecting external influence.

Domestically, this manifests as strict control over media, academia, and digital platforms. The aim is not only to suppress dissent but to proactively shape public perception and cultivate national cohesion around Party-defined ideals. Internationally, these same principles inform Beijing’s influence operations outside its territory, state media outreach, and strategic communication campaigns, demonstrating that control of information, both within and beyond China’s borders, is integral to its national strategy.

[...]

Surveillance as the Operational Arm of Information Warfare

In Chinese strategic thought, surveillance is the operational backbone of information warfare. Technologies such as real-time facial recognition, digital identity systems, and algorithmic content filtering provide the infrastructure through which information warfare principles are embedded into daily governance.

[...]

Introduced under the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP) after the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006), the SCS was originally presented as a framework to enhance commercial trust and civic responsibility. In practice, it integrates judicial, administrative, and commercial data to rank individuals, corporations, and organisations based on their “trustworthiness.”

The SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

Rather than relying on a single numerical score, the SCS functions through blacklists and redlists. Those who violate regulations or fail to comply with court judgments are blacklisted, facing restrictions on employment, mobility, credit, and government services. Conversely, those considered exemplary citizens are rewarded with privileges. By 2022, official data indicated that over 7.2 million individuals had been designated “untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement,” illustrating the expanding reach of the system.

Beyond its regulatory function, the SCS operates as a narrative enforcement tool. It rewards those who echo state-sanctioned narratives and penalises those who question them, effectively linking political conformity with social mobility through preferential access to school admissions, employment opportunities, and access to cash loans and consumer credit. In this sense, the SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

[...]

Information Control Beyond Borders

China’s information warfare strategy does not stop at its borders. The same tools of surveillance and narrative management that govern domestic society are increasingly applied to global audiences. Through state media expansion, technology exports, academic collaborations, and coordinated online campaigns, Beijing seeks to influence external perceptions of its governance model and strategic intentions.

[...]

Diaspora communities have become specific targets of this strategy. Reports suggest that Chinese citizens abroad face pressure through family connections, social networks, or economic motivations, indicating how domestic surveillance practices can exert mental influence beyond national boundaries. The logic of the SCS, which links loyalty with trustworthiness, thus extends internationally, functioning both as a domestic control mechanism and a model for global narrative influence.

[...]

The Social Credit System stands at the intersection of surveillance and information warfare. It extends the logic of battlefield information dominance into civilian governance, transforming citizens into participants in a perpetual system of ideological evaluation and control.

[...]

For policymakers and scholars worldwide, China’s governance model offers a cautionary lesson. As technology amplifies state capacity for observation and prediction, the central question is not whether surveillance can be achieved—but whether it can be restrained. The equilibrium between security and dignity, control and freedom, will shape not only China’s political future but the global norms of digital governance in the twenty-first century.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48601689

Archived

According to student statements at Beheshti (Melli) University, on the night of December 31st, security forces raided the female dormitory. In this attack, several female students were detained30. Reports indicate that plainclothes agents used pre-prepared lists to abduct students. The identities of some of these girls have not yet been officially released due to security threats against their families.

Similar reports of detained students emerge from across Iran, including form Yasuj University, Chamran University of Ahvaz, Bu-Ali Sina University of Hamadan, and other.

[...]

Archived

According to student statements at Beheshti (Melli) University, on the night of December 31st, security forces raided the female dormitory. In this attack, several female students were detained30. Reports indicate that plainclothes agents used pre-prepared lists to abduct students. The identities of some of these girls have not yet been officially released due to security threats against their families.

Similar reports of detained students emerge from across Iran, including form Yasuj University, Chamran University of Ahvaz, Bu-Ali Sina University of Hamadan, and other.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48583058

Archived

In a monitoring room in Buenos Aires, a dozen members of the Argentinian coast guard watch giant industrial-fishing ships moving in real time across a set of screens. “Every year, for five or six months, the foreign fleet comes from across the Indian Ocean, from Asian countries, and from the North Atlantic,” says Cdr Mauricio López, of the monitoring department. “It’s creating a serious environmental problem.”

Just beyond Argentina’s maritime frontier, hundreds of foreign vessels – known as the distant-water fishing fleet – are descending on Mile 201, a largely ungoverned strip of the high seas in the South Atlantic, to plunder its rich marine life. The fleet regularly becomes so big it can be seen from space, looking like a city floating on the sea.

[...]

The charity Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has described it as one of the largest unregulated squid fisheries in the world, warning that the scale of activities could destabilise an entire ecosystem.

[...]

Steve Trent, founder of the EJF, describes the fishery as a “free for all” and says squid could eventually disappear from the area as a result of “this mad fishing effort”.

The consequences extend far beyond squid. Whales, dolphins, seals, sea birds and commercially important fish species such as hake and tuna depend on the cephalopod. A collapse in the squid population could trigger a cascade of ecological disruption, with profound social and economic costs for coastal communities and key markets such as Spain, experts warn.

“If this species is affected, the whole ecosystem is affected,” Bobinac says. “It is the food for other species. It has a huge impact on the ecosystem and biodiversity.”

She says the “vulnerable marine ecosystems” beneath the fleet, such as deep-sea corals, are also at risk of physical damage and pollution.

[...]

Three-quarters of squid jigging vessels (which jerk barbless lures up and down to imitate prey) that are operating on the high seas are from China, according to the EJF, with fleets from Taiwan and South Korea also accounting for a significant share.

Activity on Mile 201 has surged over recent years, with total fishing hours increasing by 65% between 2019 and 2024 – a jump driven almost entirely by the Chinese fleet, which increased its activities by 85% in the same period, according to an investigation by the charity. The lack of oversight in Mile 201 has enabled something darker too.

Interviews conducted by the EJF suggest widespread cruelty towards marine wildlife in the area. Crew reported the deliberate capture and killing of seals – sometimes in their hundreds – on more than 40% of Chinese squid vessels and a fifth of Taiwanese vessels.

Edit for an addition:

There is a series on reports on illegal and destructive fishing practices by The Outlaw Ocean Project, ranging from reports to podcasts, documentaries, videos, and many other forms of media.

It reports on China: the Superpower of Seafood dominates at sea and on land high environmental and human cost.

You'll find also reports on other related topics on the site.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48583058

Archived

In a monitoring room in Buenos Aires, a dozen members of the Argentinian coast guard watch giant industrial-fishing ships moving in real time across a set of screens. “Every year, for five or six months, the foreign fleet comes from across the Indian Ocean, from Asian countries, and from the North Atlantic,” says Cdr Mauricio López, of the monitoring department. “It’s creating a serious environmental problem.”

Just beyond Argentina’s maritime frontier, hundreds of foreign vessels – known as the distant-water fishing fleet – are descending on Mile 201, a largely ungoverned strip of the high seas in the South Atlantic, to plunder its rich marine life. The fleet regularly becomes so big it can be seen from space, looking like a city floating on the sea.

[...]

The charity Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has described it as one of the largest unregulated squid fisheries in the world, warning that the scale of activities could destabilise an entire ecosystem.

[...]

Steve Trent, founder of the EJF, describes the fishery as a “free for all” and says squid could eventually disappear from the area as a result of “this mad fishing effort”.

The consequences extend far beyond squid. Whales, dolphins, seals, sea birds and commercially important fish species such as hake and tuna depend on the cephalopod. A collapse in the squid population could trigger a cascade of ecological disruption, with profound social and economic costs for coastal communities and key markets such as Spain, experts warn.

“If this species is affected, the whole ecosystem is affected,” Bobinac says. “It is the food for other species. It has a huge impact on the ecosystem and biodiversity.”

She says the “vulnerable marine ecosystems” beneath the fleet, such as deep-sea corals, are also at risk of physical damage and pollution.

[...]

Three-quarters of squid jigging vessels (which jerk barbless lures up and down to imitate prey) that are operating on the high seas are from China, according to the EJF, with fleets from Taiwan and South Korea also accounting for a significant share.

Activity on Mile 201 has surged over recent years, with total fishing hours increasing by 65% between 2019 and 2024 – a jump driven almost entirely by the Chinese fleet, which increased its activities by 85% in the same period, according to an investigation by the charity. The lack of oversight in Mile 201 has enabled something darker too.

Interviews conducted by the EJF suggest widespread cruelty towards marine wildlife in the area. Crew reported the deliberate capture and killing of seals – sometimes in their hundreds – on more than 40% of Chinese squid vessels and a fifth of Taiwanese vessels.

Edit for an addition:

There is a series on reports on illegal and destructive fishing practices by The Outlaw Ocean Project, ranging from reports to podcasts, documentaries, videos, and many other forms of media.

It reports on China: the Superpower of Seafood dominates at sea and on land high environmental and human cost.

You'll find also reports on other related topics on the site.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48583058

Archived

In a monitoring room in Buenos Aires, a dozen members of the Argentinian coast guard watch giant industrial-fishing ships moving in real time across a set of screens. “Every year, for five or six months, the foreign fleet comes from across the Indian Ocean, from Asian countries, and from the North Atlantic,” says Cdr Mauricio López, of the monitoring department. “It’s creating a serious environmental problem.”

Just beyond Argentina’s maritime frontier, hundreds of foreign vessels – known as the distant-water fishing fleet – are descending on Mile 201, a largely ungoverned strip of the high seas in the South Atlantic, to plunder its rich marine life. The fleet regularly becomes so big it can be seen from space, looking like a city floating on the sea.

[...]

The charity Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has described it as one of the largest unregulated squid fisheries in the world, warning that the scale of activities could destabilise an entire ecosystem.

[...]

Steve Trent, founder of the EJF, describes the fishery as a “free for all” and says squid could eventually disappear from the area as a result of “this mad fishing effort”.

The consequences extend far beyond squid. Whales, dolphins, seals, sea birds and commercially important fish species such as hake and tuna depend on the cephalopod. A collapse in the squid population could trigger a cascade of ecological disruption, with profound social and economic costs for coastal communities and key markets such as Spain, experts warn.

“If this species is affected, the whole ecosystem is affected,” Bobinac says. “It is the food for other species. It has a huge impact on the ecosystem and biodiversity.”

She says the “vulnerable marine ecosystems” beneath the fleet, such as deep-sea corals, are also at risk of physical damage and pollution.

[...]

Three-quarters of squid jigging vessels (which jerk barbless lures up and down to imitate prey) that are operating on the high seas are from China, according to the EJF, with fleets from Taiwan and South Korea also accounting for a significant share.

Activity on Mile 201 has surged over recent years, with total fishing hours increasing by 65% between 2019 and 2024 – a jump driven almost entirely by the Chinese fleet, which increased its activities by 85% in the same period, according to an investigation by the charity. The lack of oversight in Mile 201 has enabled something darker too.

Interviews conducted by the EJF suggest widespread cruelty towards marine wildlife in the area. Crew reported the deliberate capture and killing of seals – sometimes in their hundreds – on more than 40% of Chinese squid vessels and a fifth of Taiwanese vessels.

Edit for an addition:

There is a series on reports on illegal and destructive fishing practices by The Outlaw Ocean Project, ranging from reports to podcasts, documentaries, videos, and many other forms of media.

It reports on China: the Superpower of Seafood dominates at sea and on land high environmental and human cost.

You'll find also reports on other related topics on the site.

Archived

In a monitoring room in Buenos Aires, a dozen members of the Argentinian coast guard watch giant industrial-fishing ships moving in real time across a set of screens. “Every year, for five or six months, the foreign fleet comes from across the Indian Ocean, from Asian countries, and from the North Atlantic,” says Cdr Mauricio López, of the monitoring department. “It’s creating a serious environmental problem.”

Just beyond Argentina’s maritime frontier, hundreds of foreign vessels – known as the distant-water fishing fleet – are descending on Mile 201, a largely ungoverned strip of the high seas in the South Atlantic, to plunder its rich marine life. The fleet regularly becomes so big it can be seen from space, looking like a city floating on the sea.

[...]

The charity Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) has described it as one of the largest unregulated squid fisheries in the world, warning that the scale of activities could destabilise an entire ecosystem.

[...]

Steve Trent, founder of the EJF, describes the fishery as a “free for all” and says squid could eventually disappear from the area as a result of “this mad fishing effort”.

The consequences extend far beyond squid. Whales, dolphins, seals, sea birds and commercially important fish species such as hake and tuna depend on the cephalopod. A collapse in the squid population could trigger a cascade of ecological disruption, with profound social and economic costs for coastal communities and key markets such as Spain, experts warn.

“If this species is affected, the whole ecosystem is affected,” Bobinac says. “It is the food for other species. It has a huge impact on the ecosystem and biodiversity.”

She says the “vulnerable marine ecosystems” beneath the fleet, such as deep-sea corals, are also at risk of physical damage and pollution.

[...]

Three-quarters of squid jigging vessels (which jerk barbless lures up and down to imitate prey) that are operating on the high seas are from China, according to the EJF, with fleets from Taiwan and South Korea also accounting for a significant share.

Activity on Mile 201 has surged over recent years, with total fishing hours increasing by 65% between 2019 and 2024 – a jump driven almost entirely by the Chinese fleet, which increased its activities by 85% in the same period, according to an investigation by the charity. The lack of oversight in Mile 201 has enabled something darker too.

Interviews conducted by the EJF suggest widespread cruelty towards marine wildlife in the area. Crew reported the deliberate capture and killing of seals – sometimes in their hundreds – on more than 40% of Chinese squid vessels and a fifth of Taiwanese vessels.

Edit for an addition:

There is a series on reports on illegal and destructive fishing practices by The Outlaw Ocean Project, ranging from reports to podcasts, documentaries, videos, and many other forms of media.

It reports on China: the Superpower of Seafood dominates at sea and on land high environmental and human cost.

You'll find also reports on other related topics on the site.