Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49123787

Archived

[...]

Japan's PM Takaichi Sanae and her Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni at the Prime Minister's Office agreed to elevate bilateral ties. They decided to strengthen collaboration to build resilient supply chains and set up a body to discuss cooperation in space.

[...]

At the meeting, the leaders agreed to elevate the two countries' relations to a "special strategic partnership" and promote cooperation in a broad range of fields.

That includes security, in which they confirmed that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Italian military will conduct joint training. Japan and Italy are also working with Britain on the joint development of a next-generation fighter jet. Takaichi and Meloni agreed to accelerate cooperation on the project.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Japan's PM Takaichi Sanae and her Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni at the Prime Minister's Office agreed to elevate bilateral ties. They decided to strengthen collaboration to build resilient supply chains and set up a body to discuss cooperation in space.

[...]

At the meeting, the leaders agreed to elevate the two countries' relations to a "special strategic partnership" and promote cooperation in a broad range of fields.

That includes security, in which they confirmed that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Italian military will conduct joint training. Japan and Italy are also working with Britain on the joint development of a next-generation fighter jet. Takaichi and Meloni agreed to accelerate cooperation on the project.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49121271

Archived

Chinese regulators have threatened “severe penalties” for automakers that launched a new wave of price cuts, defying government efforts to limit excessive competition.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, along with the market regulator and the country’s top economic planner, convened a meeting with the heads of 17 carmakers earlier this week, during which the authorities said they would step up investigations into production costs and price monitoring.

They warned of “severe penalties” against companies for violations, according to a statement by MIIT on Thursday.

By mid-January, nearly all of China’s top 10 carmakers by 2025 sales had rolled out early-year promotions, intensifying discounts to shore up market share.

[...]

Archived

Chinese regulators have threatened “severe penalties” for automakers that launched a new wave of price cuts, defying government efforts to limit excessive competition.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, along with the market regulator and the country’s top economic planner, convened a meeting with the heads of 17 carmakers earlier this week, during which the authorities said they would step up investigations into production costs and price monitoring.

They warned of “severe penalties” against companies for violations, according to a statement by MIIT on Thursday.

By mid-January, nearly all of China’s top 10 carmakers by 2025 sales had rolled out early-year promotions, intensifying discounts to shore up market share.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49099528

Archived

• 2025 was the bloodiest year for Russia’s armed forces since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The pace of recruitment in Russia last year remained at about 30,000 to 35,000 people a month — but up to 90% of those recruits were put towards replacing ongoing losses in frontline units. As a result, forming new units and building strategic reserves proved impossible.
• The Kremlin still fully controls only one of the four Ukrainian “new regions “ it illegally annexed in October 2022. Control in the Kherson Region remains unchanged at about 72%, as the sides are firmly separated by the Dnipro River. No major river-crossing operations are expected in the foreseeable future.
• During a briefing by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov at a meeting on Dec. 17, 2025, officials for the first time presented an estimate of expenditures “directly related to the special military operation”: 11.1 trillion rubles, or 5.1% of GDP. With total budget spending under the “national defense” line item set at 13.5 trillion rubles for 2025, this means more than 80% of defense outlays are going toward the war.
• Russia's territorial gains achieved in 2025 — about 4,800 square kilometers — came at the cost of more than 20 fatalities per square kilometer. Despite these gains (and these losses), in the Donetsk Region alone, roughly 6,000 square kilometers remain under Ukrainian control. A linear extrapolation suggests it would take about 1.5 years and 120,000 military lives to capture that territory, though numerous factors could significantly slow or accelerate the pace of any hypothetical Russian advance in 2026.

Archived

• 2025 was the bloodiest year for Russia’s armed forces since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The pace of recruitment in Russia last year remained at about 30,000 to 35,000 people a month — but up to 90% of those recruits were put towards replacing ongoing losses in frontline units. As a result, forming new units and building strategic reserves proved impossible.
• The Kremlin still fully controls only one of the four Ukrainian “new regions “ it illegally annexed in October 2022. Control in the Kherson Region remains unchanged at about 72%, as the sides are firmly separated by the Dnipro River. No major river-crossing operations are expected in the foreseeable future.
• During a briefing by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov at a meeting on Dec. 17, 2025, officials for the first time presented an estimate of expenditures “directly related to the special military operation”: 11.1 trillion rubles, or 5.1% of GDP. With total budget spending under the “national defense” line item set at 13.5 trillion rubles for 2025, this means more than 80% of defense outlays are going toward the war.
• Russia's territorial gains achieved in 2025 — about 4,800 square kilometers — came at the cost of more than 20 fatalities per square kilometer. Despite these gains (and these losses), in the Donetsk Region alone, roughly 6,000 square kilometers remain under Ukrainian control. A linear extrapolation suggests it would take about 1.5 years and 120,000 military lives to capture that territory, though numerous factors could significantly slow or accelerate the pace of any hypothetical Russian advance in 2026.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49098561

Archived

[...]

Many observers of Britain’s technology scene rue losing DeepMind to Google in 2014. Its capable founders had ambitious plans and could not find anyone in Britain who had the vision and cash to help them make them happen. They sold for £400 million when a cheque from the government or a smart domestic investor could have seen DeepMind become Britain’s OpenAI — the latter, set up in 2015, was valued at $500 billion last year.

[...]

“If you’re lucky enough to be a country that starts to see something emerge that could be [trillion dollar in] scale, it feels fairly obvious to me that you need to do something about it,” [AI expert and venture capitalist Ian] Hogarth says. “It still to me feels tragic that nobody in the UK really realised how important DeepMind was.”

[...]

While DeepMind’s cofounders Sir Demis Hassabis and Shane Legg are exceptional, others are following in their path, inspired by what the pair have achieved. In response the government should get behind them, Hogarth says. It can do that in a number of powerful ways, just as the Americans and Chinese already do.

[...]

“The primary driver of economic growth in the UK was the City and finance. That has been superseded by technology, globally,” he says.

“Fundamentally what the UK needs is a government that has an understanding of technology embedded in every aspect of what it does. It’s not a bolt-on advisory council but actually a mindset that this is something we have to win.

“You want the prime minister to be waking up thinking about who are the five companies that could really, really matter. This is actually the meat and potatoes of the next 20 years of the UK’s success or failure.”

Where possible, government spending should be directed at this small group of “winners” to help create $100 billion-plus national tech champions, he argues. Giving lucrative computer contracts to Microsoft, Google, Nvidia and the like, or drone contracts to US defence companies, actively hinders the development of their UK-based rivals.

[...]

Archived

[...]

Many observers of Britain’s technology scene rue losing DeepMind to Google in 2014. Its capable founders had ambitious plans and could not find anyone in Britain who had the vision and cash to help them make them happen. They sold for £400 million when a cheque from the government or a smart domestic investor could have seen DeepMind become Britain’s OpenAI — the latter, set up in 2015, was valued at $500 billion last year.

[...]

“If you’re lucky enough to be a country that starts to see something emerge that could be [trillion dollar in] scale, it feels fairly obvious to me that you need to do something about it,” [AI expert and venture capitalist Ian] Hogarth says. “It still to me feels tragic that nobody in the UK really realised how important DeepMind was.”

[...]

While DeepMind’s cofounders Sir Demis Hassabis and Shane Legg are exceptional, others are following in their path, inspired by what the pair have achieved. In response the government should get behind them, Hogarth says. It can do that in a number of powerful ways, just as the Americans and Chinese already do.

[...]

“The primary driver of economic growth in the UK was the City and finance. That has been superseded by technology, globally,” he says.

“Fundamentally what the UK needs is a government that has an understanding of technology embedded in every aspect of what it does. It’s not a bolt-on advisory council but actually a mindset that this is something we have to win.

“You want the prime minister to be waking up thinking about who are the five companies that could really, really matter. This is actually the meat and potatoes of the next 20 years of the UK’s success or failure.”

Where possible, government spending should be directed at this small group of “winners” to help create $100 billion-plus national tech champions, he argues. Giving lucrative computer contracts to Microsoft, Google, Nvidia and the like, or drone contracts to US defence companies, actively hinders the development of their UK-based rivals.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49097519

Archived

• China is systematically embedding itself in global renewable energy supply chains, connected devices and European energy system operators. In an unstable geo-political environment characterised by weaponised dependencies, this risk has become unacceptable.
• The EU must reconcile its renewable energy ambitions with the risks of over-dependence on China. This requires targeted public procurement for defence-related needs, notably in solar PV, alongside selective trade restrictions in wind power and safeguards for emerging green hydrogen and synthetic fuel industries.
• There is a growing cyber threat linked to Chinese-made solar inverters, underscoring the need for a ‘Made in Europe’ requirement for critical infrastructure. The EU should phase out and exclude Chinese components from Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funded cross-border projects.

[...]

[China] controlls a large part of the global renewable energy supply chain [while] Chinese state companies have also been investing in European utilities and grid operators, which carries similar risks – especially for transmission system operators (TSOs).

Chinese state-linked companies now own significant stakes in the system operators REN (Portugal), Terna through CDP Reti (Italy), Creos (Luxembourg), Enermalta (Malta) and IPTO/ADMIE (Greece). Broader efforts to acquire stakes in system operators in Spain, Germany and the UK have been blocked by national governments, often on national security grounds.

While there has been a considerable drop-off in investments by Chinese energy companies since the late 2010s, as well as greater scrutiny of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, the legacy of Chinese involvement in the energy system persists.

[...]

Controlling the on-off switch

The risks posed by Chinese inverters to Europe’s energy system echo earlier concerns about Huawei’s role in 5G telecoms networks. There do appear to be legitimate grounds for concern about Chinese components this time in the energy system. Solar Power Europe has noted that cybersecurity protocols within the EU, notably the NIS 2 directive, are sufficient for utilities, but do not apply to smaller generators such as rooftop solar panels. In effect, this means a cybersecurity risk in an increasingly relevant but vulnerable sector. For example, in the Netherlands, rooftop solar accounts for 15-16% of total electricity generation capacity.

Considering that the EU also has its own substantial inverter industry, and that some services such as ‘scrubbing’ of inverters are available (and are already utilised by several European utilities), there appears little reason to maintain this risk. This is especially problematic for solar installations with military relevance, where Chinese technology is commonly used.

[...]

Equally, some of the risks associated with Chinese inverters, such as internet connectivity and their reliance on cloud servers, also apply to European-made inverters, underscoring that cybersecurity, rather than country of origin alone, is the central issue. Such concerns are also relevant to other connected devices that increasingly underpin the energy system, from smart meters to smart heating. Nevertheless, additional risks persist, as Chinese producers are legally obliged, under article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, to share product information with the state.

[...]

Recommendations for Europe

Public procurement tools should be employed to ensure a minimum level of production within the EU to service high-risk sectors. Public procurement tools would also be most effective if paired with targeted investment in R&D, such as in perovskite solar cells, focusing on specialised production and future technologies rather than directly competing with Chinese industrial dominance [...] The EU has considerable strengths at its disposal in the size of its market, which it should be much more active in employing against China. In areas where Europe remains competitive and where its market weight is vital to Chinese exporters, restrictive trade measures should be enforced at both national and EU level.

[...]

A consistent security premium should be applied to wind turbines, as is already the case in some Member States. With China already built into the supply chain through its dominance of permanent magnets, efforts to ensure the competitiveness of the European wind industry will have to move in parallel with measures to ensure supply of critical minerals in Europe. This dependency can be managed, especially by building on Europe’s strong recycling capacity for magnets and batteries.

[...]

For hydrogen and SAF, the EU is already a major market and will become a more important one in the future. Given their significant military relevance, supply chains in these sectors must not become dependent on China. In these areas, the Commission should deploy robust protective trade measures to shield Europe’s nascent industries.

[...]

Regarding inverters [...] there are clear risks both for the supply chain and also from potential cybersecurity infiltration. However, both risks are manageable. There is a strong argument for a ‘made in Europe’ strategy for inverters, an area where the EU already has a strong market share spread over several Member States. For high-risk sectors, including grid-scale projects and military applications, such inverters should be employed as a matter of policy, even at higher cost. By contrast, some parts of the solar sector present lower levels of risk, allowing greater discretion over whether to use Chinese-made – and potentially vulnerable – inverters. For example, where generation is kept separate from the grid and risk is borne entirely by the user, who can make a choice between short-term cost and long-term disruption. For installations connected to the grid, such as rooftop solar, grid operators should be responsible for assessing the potential risk to the system and for setting clear eligibility criteria for solar installations linked to the grid via inverters.

[...]

The EU should adopt a coordinated approach to define a single EU-wide strategy for future Chinese investment in TSOs. Individual Member States should also outline clear procurement guidelines for Chinese energy technologies, particularly in military-relevant energy infrastructure. Given the scale of current grid expansion, the risks of infiltration and influence over decisions on future planning are simply too high. The Commission should therefore incorporate security criteria into future Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funding to limit the involvement of Chinese actors.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49097519

Archived

• China is systematically embedding itself in global renewable energy supply chains, connected devices and European energy system operators. In an unstable geo-political environment characterised by weaponised dependencies, this risk has become unacceptable.
• The EU must reconcile its renewable energy ambitions with the risks of over-dependence on China. This requires targeted public procurement for defence-related needs, notably in solar PV, alongside selective trade restrictions in wind power and safeguards for emerging green hydrogen and synthetic fuel industries.
• There is a growing cyber threat linked to Chinese-made solar inverters, underscoring the need for a ‘Made in Europe’ requirement for critical infrastructure. The EU should phase out and exclude Chinese components from Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funded cross-border projects.

[...]

[China] controlls a large part of the global renewable energy supply chain [while] Chinese state companies have also been investing in European utilities and grid operators, which carries similar risks – especially for transmission system operators (TSOs).

Chinese state-linked companies now own significant stakes in the system operators REN (Portugal), Terna through CDP Reti (Italy), Creos (Luxembourg), Enermalta (Malta) and IPTO/ADMIE (Greece). Broader efforts to acquire stakes in system operators in Spain, Germany and the UK have been blocked by national governments, often on national security grounds.

While there has been a considerable drop-off in investments by Chinese energy companies since the late 2010s, as well as greater scrutiny of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, the legacy of Chinese involvement in the energy system persists.

[...]

Controlling the on-off switch

The risks posed by Chinese inverters to Europe’s energy system echo earlier concerns about Huawei’s role in 5G telecoms networks. There do appear to be legitimate grounds for concern about Chinese components this time in the energy system. Solar Power Europe has noted that cybersecurity protocols within the EU, notably the NIS 2 directive, are sufficient for utilities, but do not apply to smaller generators such as rooftop solar panels. In effect, this means a cybersecurity risk in an increasingly relevant but vulnerable sector. For example, in the Netherlands, rooftop solar accounts for 15-16% of total electricity generation capacity.

Considering that the EU also has its own substantial inverter industry, and that some services such as ‘scrubbing’ of inverters are available (and are already utilised by several European utilities), there appears little reason to maintain this risk. This is especially problematic for solar installations with military relevance, where Chinese technology is commonly used.

[...]

Equally, some of the risks associated with Chinese inverters, such as internet connectivity and their reliance on cloud servers, also apply to European-made inverters, underscoring that cybersecurity, rather than country of origin alone, is the central issue. Such concerns are also relevant to other connected devices that increasingly underpin the energy system, from smart meters to smart heating. Nevertheless, additional risks persist, as Chinese producers are legally obliged, under article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, to share product information with the state.

[...]

Recommendations for Europe

Public procurement tools should be employed to ensure a minimum level of production within the EU to service high-risk sectors. Public procurement tools would also be most effective if paired with targeted investment in R&D, such as in perovskite solar cells, focusing on specialised production and future technologies rather than directly competing with Chinese industrial dominance [...] The EU has considerable strengths at its disposal in the size of its market, which it should be much more active in employing against China. In areas where Europe remains competitive and where its market weight is vital to Chinese exporters, restrictive trade measures should be enforced at both national and EU level.

[...]

A consistent security premium should be applied to wind turbines, as is already the case in some Member States. With China already built into the supply chain through its dominance of permanent magnets, efforts to ensure the competitiveness of the European wind industry will have to move in parallel with measures to ensure supply of critical minerals in Europe. This dependency can be managed, especially by building on Europe’s strong recycling capacity for magnets and batteries.

[...]

For hydrogen and SAF, the EU is already a major market and will become a more important one in the future. Given their significant military relevance, supply chains in these sectors must not become dependent on China. In these areas, the Commission should deploy robust protective trade measures to shield Europe’s nascent industries.

[...]

Regarding inverters [...] there are clear risks both for the supply chain and also from potential cybersecurity infiltration. However, both risks are manageable. There is a strong argument for a ‘made in Europe’ strategy for inverters, an area where the EU already has a strong market share spread over several Member States. For high-risk sectors, including grid-scale projects and military applications, such inverters should be employed as a matter of policy, even at higher cost. By contrast, some parts of the solar sector present lower levels of risk, allowing greater discretion over whether to use Chinese-made – and potentially vulnerable – inverters. For example, where generation is kept separate from the grid and risk is borne entirely by the user, who can make a choice between short-term cost and long-term disruption. For installations connected to the grid, such as rooftop solar, grid operators should be responsible for assessing the potential risk to the system and for setting clear eligibility criteria for solar installations linked to the grid via inverters.

[...]

The EU should adopt a coordinated approach to define a single EU-wide strategy for future Chinese investment in TSOs. Individual Member States should also outline clear procurement guidelines for Chinese energy technologies, particularly in military-relevant energy infrastructure. Given the scale of current grid expansion, the risks of infiltration and influence over decisions on future planning are simply too high. The Commission should therefore incorporate security criteria into future Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funding to limit the involvement of Chinese actors.

Archived

• China is systematically embedding itself in global renewable energy supply chains, connected devices and European energy system operators. In an unstable geo-political environment characterised by weaponised dependencies, this risk has become unacceptable.
• The EU must reconcile its renewable energy ambitions with the risks of over-dependence on China. This requires targeted public procurement for defence-related needs, notably in solar PV, alongside selective trade restrictions in wind power and safeguards for emerging green hydrogen and synthetic fuel industries.
• There is a growing cyber threat linked to Chinese-made solar inverters, underscoring the need for a ‘Made in Europe’ requirement for critical infrastructure. The EU should phase out and exclude Chinese components from Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funded cross-border projects.

[...]

[China] controlls a large part of the global renewable energy supply chain [while] Chinese state companies have also been investing in European utilities and grid operators, which carries similar risks – especially for transmission system operators (TSOs).

Chinese state-linked companies now own significant stakes in the system operators REN (Portugal), Terna through CDP Reti (Italy), Creos (Luxembourg), Enermalta (Malta) and IPTO/ADMIE (Greece). Broader efforts to acquire stakes in system operators in Spain, Germany and the UK have been blocked by national governments, often on national security grounds.

While there has been a considerable drop-off in investments by Chinese energy companies since the late 2010s, as well as greater scrutiny of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in general, the legacy of Chinese involvement in the energy system persists.

[...]

Controlling the on-off switch

The risks posed by Chinese inverters to Europe’s energy system echo earlier concerns about Huawei’s role in 5G telecoms networks. There do appear to be legitimate grounds for concern about Chinese components this time in the energy system. Solar Power Europe has noted that cybersecurity protocols within the EU, notably the NIS 2 directive, are sufficient for utilities, but do not apply to smaller generators such as rooftop solar panels. In effect, this means a cybersecurity risk in an increasingly relevant but vulnerable sector. For example, in the Netherlands, rooftop solar accounts for 15-16% of total electricity generation capacity.

Considering that the EU also has its own substantial inverter industry, and that some services such as ‘scrubbing’ of inverters are available (and are already utilised by several European utilities), there appears little reason to maintain this risk. This is especially problematic for solar installations with military relevance, where Chinese technology is commonly used.

[...]

Equally, some of the risks associated with Chinese inverters, such as internet connectivity and their reliance on cloud servers, also apply to European-made inverters, underscoring that cybersecurity, rather than country of origin alone, is the central issue. Such concerns are also relevant to other connected devices that increasingly underpin the energy system, from smart meters to smart heating. Nevertheless, additional risks persist, as Chinese producers are legally obliged, under article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, to share product information with the state.

[...]

Recommendations for Europe

Public procurement tools should be employed to ensure a minimum level of production within the EU to service high-risk sectors. Public procurement tools would also be most effective if paired with targeted investment in R&D, such as in perovskite solar cells, focusing on specialised production and future technologies rather than directly competing with Chinese industrial dominance [...] The EU has considerable strengths at its disposal in the size of its market, which it should be much more active in employing against China. In areas where Europe remains competitive and where its market weight is vital to Chinese exporters, restrictive trade measures should be enforced at both national and EU level.

[...]

A consistent security premium should be applied to wind turbines, as is already the case in some Member States. With China already built into the supply chain through its dominance of permanent magnets, efforts to ensure the competitiveness of the European wind industry will have to move in parallel with measures to ensure supply of critical minerals in Europe. This dependency can be managed, especially by building on Europe’s strong recycling capacity for magnets and batteries.

[...]

For hydrogen and SAF, the EU is already a major market and will become a more important one in the future. Given their significant military relevance, supply chains in these sectors must not become dependent on China. In these areas, the Commission should deploy robust protective trade measures to shield Europe’s nascent industries.

[...]

Regarding inverters [...] there are clear risks both for the supply chain and also from potential cybersecurity infiltration. However, both risks are manageable. There is a strong argument for a ‘made in Europe’ strategy for inverters, an area where the EU already has a strong market share spread over several Member States. For high-risk sectors, including grid-scale projects and military applications, such inverters should be employed as a matter of policy, even at higher cost. By contrast, some parts of the solar sector present lower levels of risk, allowing greater discretion over whether to use Chinese-made – and potentially vulnerable – inverters. For example, where generation is kept separate from the grid and risk is borne entirely by the user, who can make a choice between short-term cost and long-term disruption. For installations connected to the grid, such as rooftop solar, grid operators should be responsible for assessing the potential risk to the system and for setting clear eligibility criteria for solar installations linked to the grid via inverters.

[...]

The EU should adopt a coordinated approach to define a single EU-wide strategy for future Chinese investment in TSOs. Individual Member States should also outline clear procurement guidelines for Chinese energy technologies, particularly in military-relevant energy infrastructure. Given the scale of current grid expansion, the risks of infiltration and influence over decisions on future planning are simply too high. The Commission should therefore incorporate security criteria into future Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) funding to limit the involvement of Chinese actors.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49097095

Archived

Kevin Slaten, research lead for the China Dissent Monitor (CDM), explains how the CDM team uncovers dissent activity in China, what this information tells us about economic, social, and political trends there, and why understanding dissent and protest in China is important for people living outside.

[...]

Slaten: CDM is currently the only public database of protest events in China. We have collected and analyzed nearly 14,000 such events since June 2022.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has for many years systematically censored information about protests in China’s media and internet, and it has arrested citizens who attempted to centralize this information into a database [...] Understanding patterns related to the frequency, topics, and locations of dissent provides insight into how China’s economic slowdown affects ordinary people, the efficacy of government policies, and public dissatisfaction with the conduct of government and other officials—as well as systemic injustices and potentially even regime stability.

[...]

The CDM team races every day to document protest activity on China’s social media sites before it is deleted. Depending on the topic and size of the event—and whether it goes viral—some posts may disappear in minutes. Online censorship makes this sort of documentation difficult. Searches for dissent-related terms don’t turn up many results, and protest posts are often restricted, for example.

[...]

Additionally, dissent by some social groups, such as ethnic and religious minorities or activists, is not well represented on Chinese social media because these groups face especially stringent restrictions like closer surveillance by state security.

[...]

Chinese citizens often have some understanding that protests happen, having seen them in internet posts or heard anecdotes through their social networks. But, they may not know the real prevalence or distribution of protests, including in their own cities, much less other regions. This can contribute to the perception that protest is an abnormal or illegitimate way to seek justice, a narrative that the CCP promotes and benefits from.

[...]

More generally, protest events across China have been increasing in the last year, according to CDM’s database. This upward trend is primarily associated with economic grievances, particularly protests by workers, home buyers, and other consumers or investors.

[...]

A lot of the things that prompt dissent in China—from widespread labor rights violations to repression of ethnic minority groups—reflect consequences of the CCP systematically restricting rights like free expression and free association. We can already see the influence of this system expanding beyond China’s borders. For example, the CCP manipulates media in other countries and is the world’s worst perpetrator of transnational repression, when governments reach across borders to intimidate or attack exiles they perceive as a threat. Chinese companies import poor labor practices into the foreign countries where they work. This puts pressure on American companies to compete by lowering their labor standards. Thus CCP abuses can undermine people’s rights everywhere, including in the United States.

[...]

Accurate information about developments in China is increasingly difficult to find as the CCP has restricted access to economic and social data, in addition to suppressing public criticism through its sprawling censorship apparatus. CDM is an alternative source of information which, by documenting protest actions, sheds light on the state of China’s economic, social, and political developments at the grassroots level.

[...]

The CDM is now back online thanks to a tranche of short-term funding. However, without further support, policymakers, businesses, investors, researchers, and others could once again lose access to this uniquely valuable public resource that exposes the social and political developments the CCP tries to hide. To help CDM continue its groundbreaking research, please donate to Freedom House today.