Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52240923

Here is the full report: Invisible Corners of the Factory Floor: Forced Labor in China’s Prisons (pdf)

A new report by China Labor Watch examines the issue of prison labor in China. Against the backdrop of increasing international attention, monitoring, and enforcement regarding systemic forced labor in China, the report aims to explore the institutional foundations of this practice within the Chinese prison system, analyze how prison-run enterprises embed products made by incarcerated laborers into global supply chains through multi-layer subcontracting, disguised registration, and local economic collaborations, and finally discuss the legal frictions and responsibility frameworks between Chinese prison labor practices and international human rights law and labor conventions.

[...]

- Institutionalized Logic of Coercion: Although labor is defined in legal texts as a means of “reform,” in practice it is directly tied to points-based evaluation systems and sentence reduction/parole decisions. This creates a structural incentive-and-sanction mechanism of “trading labor for freedom,” effectively undermining the voluntariness of labor.

- Dual Roles and Conflicts of Interest: Prison enterprises carry both judicial and economic functions. They are responsible for custody and rehabilitation while simultaneously acting as market actors accepting orders and generating revenue. These conflicting objectives often lead to weakened labor protections.

- Working Hour Limits are Systematically Relaxed: Although there are nominal limits such as “six days per week and eight hours per day,” exception clauses for “seasonal production” or “urgent tasks” are vaguely defined and lack external oversight, effectively creating a structural gateway for normalized overtime.

- Weak Labor Protection and Injury Compensation: Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) regulations are incomplete, and some cases show inadequate investment in protective equipment. Injury compensation is calculated based on prison labor stipends rather than social wage standards, resulting in significantly lower compensation. Channels for appeal and third-party medical assessment are extremely limited.

- Real Risks in Trade and Supply Chains: Despite formal export bans for prison-made products, such goods enter domestic and international markets through layered subcontracting and enterprise “rebranding.” Recent legislation, enforcement actions, and litigation within global business and human rights due diligence frameworks reveal that these risks are receiving increased recognition.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52240923

Here is the full report: Invisible Corners of the Factory Floor: Forced Labor in China’s Prisons (pdf)

A new report by China Labor Watch examines the issue of prison labor in China. Against the backdrop of increasing international attention, monitoring, and enforcement regarding systemic forced labor in China, the report aims to explore the institutional foundations of this practice within the Chinese prison system, analyze how prison-run enterprises embed products made by incarcerated laborers into global supply chains through multi-layer subcontracting, disguised registration, and local economic collaborations, and finally discuss the legal frictions and responsibility frameworks between Chinese prison labor practices and international human rights law and labor conventions.

[...]

- Institutionalized Logic of Coercion: Although labor is defined in legal texts as a means of “reform,” in practice it is directly tied to points-based evaluation systems and sentence reduction/parole decisions. This creates a structural incentive-and-sanction mechanism of “trading labor for freedom,” effectively undermining the voluntariness of labor.

- Dual Roles and Conflicts of Interest: Prison enterprises carry both judicial and economic functions. They are responsible for custody and rehabilitation while simultaneously acting as market actors accepting orders and generating revenue. These conflicting objectives often lead to weakened labor protections.

- Working Hour Limits are Systematically Relaxed: Although there are nominal limits such as “six days per week and eight hours per day,” exception clauses for “seasonal production” or “urgent tasks” are vaguely defined and lack external oversight, effectively creating a structural gateway for normalized overtime.

- Weak Labor Protection and Injury Compensation: Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) regulations are incomplete, and some cases show inadequate investment in protective equipment. Injury compensation is calculated based on prison labor stipends rather than social wage standards, resulting in significantly lower compensation. Channels for appeal and third-party medical assessment are extremely limited.

- Real Risks in Trade and Supply Chains: Despite formal export bans for prison-made products, such goods enter domestic and international markets through layered subcontracting and enterprise “rebranding.” Recent legislation, enforcement actions, and litigation within global business and human rights due diligence frameworks reveal that these risks are receiving increased recognition.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52240923

Here is the full report: Invisible Corners of the Factory Floor: Forced Labor in China’s Prisons (pdf)

A new report by China Labor Watch examines the issue of prison labor in China. Against the backdrop of increasing international attention, monitoring, and enforcement regarding systemic forced labor in China, the report aims to explore the institutional foundations of this practice within the Chinese prison system, analyze how prison-run enterprises embed products made by incarcerated laborers into global supply chains through multi-layer subcontracting, disguised registration, and local economic collaborations, and finally discuss the legal frictions and responsibility frameworks between Chinese prison labor practices and international human rights law and labor conventions.

[...]

- Institutionalized Logic of Coercion: Although labor is defined in legal texts as a means of “reform,” in practice it is directly tied to points-based evaluation systems and sentence reduction/parole decisions. This creates a structural incentive-and-sanction mechanism of “trading labor for freedom,” effectively undermining the voluntariness of labor.

- Dual Roles and Conflicts of Interest: Prison enterprises carry both judicial and economic functions. They are responsible for custody and rehabilitation while simultaneously acting as market actors accepting orders and generating revenue. These conflicting objectives often lead to weakened labor protections.

- Working Hour Limits are Systematically Relaxed: Although there are nominal limits such as “six days per week and eight hours per day,” exception clauses for “seasonal production” or “urgent tasks” are vaguely defined and lack external oversight, effectively creating a structural gateway for normalized overtime.

- Weak Labor Protection and Injury Compensation: Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) regulations are incomplete, and some cases show inadequate investment in protective equipment. Injury compensation is calculated based on prison labor stipends rather than social wage standards, resulting in significantly lower compensation. Channels for appeal and third-party medical assessment are extremely limited.

- Real Risks in Trade and Supply Chains: Despite formal export bans for prison-made products, such goods enter domestic and international markets through layered subcontracting and enterprise “rebranding.” Recent legislation, enforcement actions, and litigation within global business and human rights due diligence frameworks reveal that these risks are receiving increased recognition.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52240923

Here is the full report: Invisible Corners of the Factory Floor: Forced Labor in China’s Prisons (pdf)

A new report by China Labor Watch examines the issue of prison labor in China. Against the backdrop of increasing international attention, monitoring, and enforcement regarding systemic forced labor in China, the report aims to explore the institutional foundations of this practice within the Chinese prison system, analyze how prison-run enterprises embed products made by incarcerated laborers into global supply chains through multi-layer subcontracting, disguised registration, and local economic collaborations, and finally discuss the legal frictions and responsibility frameworks between Chinese prison labor practices and international human rights law and labor conventions.

[...]

- Institutionalized Logic of Coercion: Although labor is defined in legal texts as a means of “reform,” in practice it is directly tied to points-based evaluation systems and sentence reduction/parole decisions. This creates a structural incentive-and-sanction mechanism of “trading labor for freedom,” effectively undermining the voluntariness of labor.

- Dual Roles and Conflicts of Interest: Prison enterprises carry both judicial and economic functions. They are responsible for custody and rehabilitation while simultaneously acting as market actors accepting orders and generating revenue. These conflicting objectives often lead to weakened labor protections.

- Working Hour Limits are Systematically Relaxed: Although there are nominal limits such as “six days per week and eight hours per day,” exception clauses for “seasonal production” or “urgent tasks” are vaguely defined and lack external oversight, effectively creating a structural gateway for normalized overtime.

- Weak Labor Protection and Injury Compensation: Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) regulations are incomplete, and some cases show inadequate investment in protective equipment. Injury compensation is calculated based on prison labor stipends rather than social wage standards, resulting in significantly lower compensation. Channels for appeal and third-party medical assessment are extremely limited.

- Real Risks in Trade and Supply Chains: Despite formal export bans for prison-made products, such goods enter domestic and international markets through layered subcontracting and enterprise “rebranding.” Recent legislation, enforcement actions, and litigation within global business and human rights due diligence frameworks reveal that these risks are receiving increased recognition.

[...]