Hotznplotzn

joined 1 year ago
sorted by: new top controversial old
Built to peak: Coal power expansion runs out of room in China – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 2 hours ago (1 children)

You’re implying it was the government’s intent rather than incompetence?

I wouldn't say incompetence in that there are many excellent experts in China who perfectly know -and always knew- a better way forward. The problem imo is that they have nothing to say, and everyone who dares to express an even slightly different opinion than the central government risks to get in big trouble.

As an example: Because China wants to achieve its planned GDP growth, political leaders in the provinces are given 'targets' by the central government for their regional output. To reach this target (and secure their political careers?), they build coal plants and other infrastructure, although they are often not needed. As regional leaders want to achieve their local GDP goals, there is also little incentive to collaborate with each other - such as in joint grid investments that would enable them to share resources. (The central government has announced it will invest in its countrywide grid some time ago, but so far nothing tangible has happened.)

One result is excessive overcapacity in a large number (all?) sectors.

Built to peak: Coal power expansion runs out of room in China – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 3 points 2 hours ago (3 children)

No. Just read the article. Most solar panels China produces sit and do nothing. Instead of investing into the domestic grid, China pursued a policy to subsidies production even as the output is not needed, neither in China nor in the world. The only thing Western countries are to blame is that they didn't ban cheap Chinese tech already back in the 2000s (industry experts have warned about this even then).

This problem has intentionally been "Made in China." Something like this happens if a centralized government wants to gain control over entire supply chains while ignoring economic realities.

China's government has been getting a lot wrong here for a long time, and by now there seems to be no intention to correct course. There are many excellent analyses that proof this, for example, one is here:

The explanation for China’s recent coal boom lies in a combination of policy priorities, institutional incentives and system-level mismatches, with origins in the widespread power shortages China experienced in the early 2020s.

In 2021, a “mismatch” between the price of coal and the government-set price of coal-fired power incentivised coal-fired power plants to cut generation ... China had – and still has – more than enough “dispatchable” resources to meet even the highest demand peaks. (Dispatchable sources include coal, gas, nuclear and hydropower.) It also has more than enough underutilised coal-power capacity to meet potential demand growth.

A bigger factor behind the shortages was grid inflexibility. During both the 2020 power crisis in north-east China and the 2022 shortage in Sichuan, affected provinces continued to export electricity while experiencing local shortages.

A lack of coordination between provinces and inflexible market mechanisms governing the “dispatch” of power plants – the instructions to adjust generation up or down – meant that existing resources could not be fully utilised ... Nevertheless, with coal power plants cheap to build and quick to gain approval, many provinces saw them as a reliable way to reassure policymakers, balance local grids and support industry interests, regardless of whether the plants would end up being economically viable or frequently used ...

4
As food prices surge, Russians stop buying fruit, ignore expiration dates, and brace for more hikes (meduza.io)
 

One of the biggest concerns for Russians at the start of this year is the rapid rise in the cost of basic necessities. Across the country, prices for vegetables, fruit, meat, dairy products, pet food, and other everyday goods have climbed sharply.

Archived

5
Built to peak: Coal power expansion runs out of room in China – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (energyandcleanair.org)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50183000

In 2025, China’s new and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high, while capacity additions that came online reached the highest annual level in a decade, even as clean energy put China’s CO2 emissions into reverse for the first time and drove down coal power generation.

Archived

TL;DR:

  • 2025 saw China’s current coal power build-out cycle reach a new high. Coal power capacity additions reached their highest level in a decade, even as coal power generation declined, and clean energy met all net growth in power demand.
  • New and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high. If built, the projects proposed in just this one year would commit China to years of coal expansion beyond power demand growth and climate requirements, reflecting a rush by the coal industry stakeholders to advance projects ahead of tighter policy constraints.
  • With a large pipeline of projects still under construction and permitted, rapid growth of coal power capacity risks extending into the early years of the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) period, while coal power retirements remain low.
  • Meeting China’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target implies a shift away from baseload coal power and a decline in operating hours. Yet coal capacity commissioned in 2025, and much of the remaining pipeline, remains dominated by large units designed for high-utilisation, reflecting incentives that favour energy and capacity over flexibility.
18
Built to peak: Coal power expansion runs out of room in China – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (energyandcleanair.org)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50183000

In 2025, China’s new and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high, while capacity additions that came online reached the highest annual level in a decade, even as clean energy put China’s CO2 emissions into reverse for the first time and drove down coal power generation.

Archived

TL;DR:

  • 2025 saw China’s current coal power build-out cycle reach a new high. Coal power capacity additions reached their highest level in a decade, even as coal power generation declined, and clean energy met all net growth in power demand.
  • New and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high. If built, the projects proposed in just this one year would commit China to years of coal expansion beyond power demand growth and climate requirements, reflecting a rush by the coal industry stakeholders to advance projects ahead of tighter policy constraints.
  • With a large pipeline of projects still under construction and permitted, rapid growth of coal power capacity risks extending into the early years of the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) period, while coal power retirements remain low.
  • Meeting China’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target implies a shift away from baseload coal power and a decline in operating hours. Yet coal capacity commissioned in 2025, and much of the remaining pipeline, remains dominated by large units designed for high-utilisation, reflecting incentives that favour energy and capacity over flexibility.
1
Built to peak: Coal power expansion runs out of room in China – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (energyandcleanair.org)
 

In 2025, China’s new and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high, while capacity additions that came online reached the highest annual level in a decade, even as clean energy put China’s CO2 emissions into reverse for the first time and drove down coal power generation.

Archived

TL;DR:

  • 2025 saw China’s current coal power build-out cycle reach a new high. Coal power capacity additions reached their highest level in a decade, even as coal power generation declined, and clean energy met all net growth in power demand.
  • New and reactivated coal power project proposals surged to a record high. If built, the projects proposed in just this one year would commit China to years of coal expansion beyond power demand growth and climate requirements, reflecting a rush by the coal industry stakeholders to advance projects ahead of tighter policy constraints.
  • With a large pipeline of projects still under construction and permitted, rapid growth of coal power capacity risks extending into the early years of the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) period, while coal power retirements remain low.
  • Meeting China’s 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target implies a shift away from baseload coal power and a decline in operating hours. Yet coal capacity commissioned in 2025, and much of the remaining pipeline, remains dominated by large units designed for high-utilisation, reflecting incentives that favour energy and capacity over flexibility.
4
Involution and Overcapacity in China: Why Policy Fixes Fall Short | Research (www.mjemcgill.com)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50181960

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50181764

Archived

A new term has entered the lexicon of Chinese economic analysis: involution. In Chinese, this term translates to “nei-juan”, a concept that refers to a state of “excessive and self-defeating competition among Chinese companies for limited resources and opportunities”. In this situation, intensifying effort yields diminishing returns for all participants [...] This phenomenon is best captured with a theatre metaphor: in a crowded theatre, one person stands to get a better view, forcing everyone else to stand as well. Ultimately, no one’s view improves, but all are exhausted from the extra effort.

[...]

China’s involution issue is ... a structural outcome [China's] supply-side, investment-driven model [that] systematically suppresses household income to subsidize production and leads to chronic overcapacity and destructive competition.

[...]

The trigger was the collapse of China’s real estate sector in 2021–2022. As property developers cut investment sharply, Beijing faced a serious threat to GDP growth. Because the growth model could not tolerate a decline in investment, the state redirected capital away from real estate and toward manufacturing. This shift was politically necessary to stabilize headline growth, but it was not driven by market demand.

[...]

[Chinese] provincial and municipal governments, under pressure to meet [Beijing's] growth targets, offered subsidies, cheap land, tax exemptions, and financing to attract investment. This led to duplicated projects and rapid oversupply.

[...]

The surge in supply collided with structurally weak [domesstic] demand. Consumer confidence deteriorated after 2020 due to job insecurity, falling property values, and rising precautionary savings. The same growth model that fuels overcapacity also depresses consumption by transferring income from households to producers. A limited social safety net further encourages precautionary saving, reducing the effectiveness of short-term consumption subsidies.

[...]

The polysilicon industry, a key upstream input for solar panel manufacturing, illustrates the scale of the problem. After the property collapse, in less than four years, the top four Chinese producers managed to add the capacity equal to two-thirds of the total global capacity ... It puts China as world-leading in the industry, supplying about 95% of the world’s polysilicon supply. The problem is that this is roughly double the global demand. This overload of supply drove capacity utilization below 40% in 2025, forcing producers to sell panels at prices below their variable costs.

[...]

Beijing’s “anti-involution” campaign represents a serious attempt to curb the most damaging effects of excessive competition. Measures include revisions to the Pricing Law, coordinated production cuts, and sector-specific interventions such as plans to retire excess polysilicon capacity ... However, these policies treat the symptoms rather than the cause. They reduce capacity in one sector without changing growth incentives, simply shifting overinvestment elsewhere. Indeed, while investment slows in EVs and solar, capacity expansion is accelerating in petrochemicals, another sector already facing involution.

[...]

Two reforms are essential [in China]: strengthening domestic demand and accepting lower investment-led growth ... The supply-side reforms must be paired with strong fiscal support for households. In a liquidity-trap environment, fiscal policy, not monetary easing, must play the central role in restoring confidence and consumption.

[...]

In parallel, China must reduce its reliance on manufacturing and infrastructure as primary growth engines. This would require Xi Jinping to confront an uncomfortable political trade-off: accepting lower GDP growth targets in order to pivot the economy toward services, consumption, and household income growth.

[...]

13
Involution and Overcapacity in China: Why Policy Fixes Fall Short | Research (www.mjemcgill.com)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50181764

Archived

A new term has entered the lexicon of Chinese economic analysis: involution. In Chinese, this term translates to “nei-juan”, a concept that refers to a state of “excessive and self-defeating competition among Chinese companies for limited resources and opportunities”. In this situation, intensifying effort yields diminishing returns for all participants [...] This phenomenon is best captured with a theatre metaphor: in a crowded theatre, one person stands to get a better view, forcing everyone else to stand as well. Ultimately, no one’s view improves, but all are exhausted from the extra effort.

[...]

China’s involution issue is ... a structural outcome [China's] supply-side, investment-driven model [that] systematically suppresses household income to subsidize production and leads to chronic overcapacity and destructive competition.

[...]

The trigger was the collapse of China’s real estate sector in 2021–2022. As property developers cut investment sharply, Beijing faced a serious threat to GDP growth. Because the growth model could not tolerate a decline in investment, the state redirected capital away from real estate and toward manufacturing. This shift was politically necessary to stabilize headline growth, but it was not driven by market demand.

[...]

[Chinese] provincial and municipal governments, under pressure to meet [Beijing's] growth targets, offered subsidies, cheap land, tax exemptions, and financing to attract investment. This led to duplicated projects and rapid oversupply.

[...]

The surge in supply collided with structurally weak [domesstic] demand. Consumer confidence deteriorated after 2020 due to job insecurity, falling property values, and rising precautionary savings. The same growth model that fuels overcapacity also depresses consumption by transferring income from households to producers. A limited social safety net further encourages precautionary saving, reducing the effectiveness of short-term consumption subsidies.

[...]

The polysilicon industry, a key upstream input for solar panel manufacturing, illustrates the scale of the problem. After the property collapse, in less than four years, the top four Chinese producers managed to add the capacity equal to two-thirds of the total global capacity ... It puts China as world-leading in the industry, supplying about 95% of the world’s polysilicon supply. The problem is that this is roughly double the global demand. This overload of supply drove capacity utilization below 40% in 2025, forcing producers to sell panels at prices below their variable costs.

[...]

Beijing’s “anti-involution” campaign represents a serious attempt to curb the most damaging effects of excessive competition. Measures include revisions to the Pricing Law, coordinated production cuts, and sector-specific interventions such as plans to retire excess polysilicon capacity ... However, these policies treat the symptoms rather than the cause. They reduce capacity in one sector without changing growth incentives, simply shifting overinvestment elsewhere. Indeed, while investment slows in EVs and solar, capacity expansion is accelerating in petrochemicals, another sector already facing involution.

[...]

Two reforms are essential [in China]: strengthening domestic demand and accepting lower investment-led growth ... The supply-side reforms must be paired with strong fiscal support for households. In a liquidity-trap environment, fiscal policy, not monetary easing, must play the central role in restoring confidence and consumption.

[...]

In parallel, China must reduce its reliance on manufacturing and infrastructure as primary growth engines. This would require Xi Jinping to confront an uncomfortable political trade-off: accepting lower GDP growth targets in order to pivot the economy toward services, consumption, and household income growth.

[...]

0
Involution and Overcapacity in China: Why Policy Fixes Fall Short | Research (www.mjemcgill.com)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50181764

Archived

A new term has entered the lexicon of Chinese economic analysis: involution. In Chinese, this term translates to “nei-juan”, a concept that refers to a state of “excessive and self-defeating competition among Chinese companies for limited resources and opportunities”. In this situation, intensifying effort yields diminishing returns for all participants [...] This phenomenon is best captured with a theatre metaphor: in a crowded theatre, one person stands to get a better view, forcing everyone else to stand as well. Ultimately, no one’s view improves, but all are exhausted from the extra effort.

[...]

China’s involution issue is ... a structural outcome [China's] supply-side, investment-driven model [that] systematically suppresses household income to subsidize production and leads to chronic overcapacity and destructive competition.

[...]

The trigger was the collapse of China’s real estate sector in 2021–2022. As property developers cut investment sharply, Beijing faced a serious threat to GDP growth. Because the growth model could not tolerate a decline in investment, the state redirected capital away from real estate and toward manufacturing. This shift was politically necessary to stabilize headline growth, but it was not driven by market demand.

[...]

[Chinese] provincial and municipal governments, under pressure to meet [Beijing's] growth targets, offered subsidies, cheap land, tax exemptions, and financing to attract investment. This led to duplicated projects and rapid oversupply.

[...]

The surge in supply collided with structurally weak [domesstic] demand. Consumer confidence deteriorated after 2020 due to job insecurity, falling property values, and rising precautionary savings. The same growth model that fuels overcapacity also depresses consumption by transferring income from households to producers. A limited social safety net further encourages precautionary saving, reducing the effectiveness of short-term consumption subsidies.

[...]

The polysilicon industry, a key upstream input for solar panel manufacturing, illustrates the scale of the problem. After the property collapse, in less than four years, the top four Chinese producers managed to add the capacity equal to two-thirds of the total global capacity ... It puts China as world-leading in the industry, supplying about 95% of the world’s polysilicon supply. The problem is that this is roughly double the global demand. This overload of supply drove capacity utilization below 40% in 2025, forcing producers to sell panels at prices below their variable costs.

[...]

Beijing’s “anti-involution” campaign represents a serious attempt to curb the most damaging effects of excessive competition. Measures include revisions to the Pricing Law, coordinated production cuts, and sector-specific interventions such as plans to retire excess polysilicon capacity ... However, these policies treat the symptoms rather than the cause. They reduce capacity in one sector without changing growth incentives, simply shifting overinvestment elsewhere. Indeed, while investment slows in EVs and solar, capacity expansion is accelerating in petrochemicals, another sector already facing involution.

[...]

Two reforms are essential [in China]: strengthening domestic demand and accepting lower investment-led growth ... The supply-side reforms must be paired with strong fiscal support for households. In a liquidity-trap environment, fiscal policy, not monetary easing, must play the central role in restoring confidence and consumption.

[...]

In parallel, China must reduce its reliance on manufacturing and infrastructure as primary growth engines. This would require Xi Jinping to confront an uncomfortable political trade-off: accepting lower GDP growth targets in order to pivot the economy toward services, consumption, and household income growth.

[...]

6
Involution and Overcapacity in China: Why Policy Fixes Fall Short | Research (www.mjemcgill.com)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50181764

Archived

A new term has entered the lexicon of Chinese economic analysis: involution. In Chinese, this term translates to “nei-juan”, a concept that refers to a state of “excessive and self-defeating competition among Chinese companies for limited resources and opportunities”. In this situation, intensifying effort yields diminishing returns for all participants [...] This phenomenon is best captured with a theatre metaphor: in a crowded theatre, one person stands to get a better view, forcing everyone else to stand as well. Ultimately, no one’s view improves, but all are exhausted from the extra effort.

[...]

China’s involution issue is ... a structural outcome [China's] supply-side, investment-driven model [that] systematically suppresses household income to subsidize production and leads to chronic overcapacity and destructive competition.

[...]

The trigger was the collapse of China’s real estate sector in 2021–2022. As property developers cut investment sharply, Beijing faced a serious threat to GDP growth. Because the growth model could not tolerate a decline in investment, the state redirected capital away from real estate and toward manufacturing. This shift was politically necessary to stabilize headline growth, but it was not driven by market demand.

[...]

[Chinese] provincial and municipal governments, under pressure to meet [Beijing's] growth targets, offered subsidies, cheap land, tax exemptions, and financing to attract investment. This led to duplicated projects and rapid oversupply.

[...]

The surge in supply collided with structurally weak [domesstic] demand. Consumer confidence deteriorated after 2020 due to job insecurity, falling property values, and rising precautionary savings. The same growth model that fuels overcapacity also depresses consumption by transferring income from households to producers. A limited social safety net further encourages precautionary saving, reducing the effectiveness of short-term consumption subsidies.

[...]

The polysilicon industry, a key upstream input for solar panel manufacturing, illustrates the scale of the problem. After the property collapse, in less than four years, the top four Chinese producers managed to add the capacity equal to two-thirds of the total global capacity ... It puts China as world-leading in the industry, supplying about 95% of the world’s polysilicon supply. The problem is that this is roughly double the global demand. This overload of supply drove capacity utilization below 40% in 2025, forcing producers to sell panels at prices below their variable costs.

[...]

Beijing’s “anti-involution” campaign represents a serious attempt to curb the most damaging effects of excessive competition. Measures include revisions to the Pricing Law, coordinated production cuts, and sector-specific interventions such as plans to retire excess polysilicon capacity ... However, these policies treat the symptoms rather than the cause. They reduce capacity in one sector without changing growth incentives, simply shifting overinvestment elsewhere. Indeed, while investment slows in EVs and solar, capacity expansion is accelerating in petrochemicals, another sector already facing involution.

[...]

Two reforms are essential [in China]: strengthening domestic demand and accepting lower investment-led growth ... The supply-side reforms must be paired with strong fiscal support for households. In a liquidity-trap environment, fiscal policy, not monetary easing, must play the central role in restoring confidence and consumption.

[...]

In parallel, China must reduce its reliance on manufacturing and infrastructure as primary growth engines. This would require Xi Jinping to confront an uncomfortable political trade-off: accepting lower GDP growth targets in order to pivot the economy toward services, consumption, and household income growth.

[...]

1
Involution and Overcapacity in China: Why Policy Fixes Fall Short | Research (www.mjemcgill.com)
 

Archived

A new term has entered the lexicon of Chinese economic analysis: involution. In Chinese, this term translates to “nei-juan”, a concept that refers to a state of “excessive and self-defeating competition among Chinese companies for limited resources and opportunities”. In this situation, intensifying effort yields diminishing returns for all participants [...] This phenomenon is best captured with a theatre metaphor: in a crowded theatre, one person stands to get a better view, forcing everyone else to stand as well. Ultimately, no one’s view improves, but all are exhausted from the extra effort.

[...]

China’s involution issue is ... a structural outcome [China's] supply-side, investment-driven model [that] systematically suppresses household income to subsidize production and leads to chronic overcapacity and destructive competition.

[...]

The trigger was the collapse of China’s real estate sector in 2021–2022. As property developers cut investment sharply, Beijing faced a serious threat to GDP growth. Because the growth model could not tolerate a decline in investment, the state redirected capital away from real estate and toward manufacturing. This shift was politically necessary to stabilize headline growth, but it was not driven by market demand.

[...]

[Chinese] provincial and municipal governments, under pressure to meet [Beijing's] growth targets, offered subsidies, cheap land, tax exemptions, and financing to attract investment. This led to duplicated projects and rapid oversupply.

[...]

The surge in supply collided with structurally weak [domesstic] demand. Consumer confidence deteriorated after 2020 due to job insecurity, falling property values, and rising precautionary savings. The same growth model that fuels overcapacity also depresses consumption by transferring income from households to producers. A limited social safety net further encourages precautionary saving, reducing the effectiveness of short-term consumption subsidies.

[...]

The polysilicon industry, a key upstream input for solar panel manufacturing, illustrates the scale of the problem. After the property collapse, in less than four years, the top four Chinese producers managed to add the capacity equal to two-thirds of the total global capacity ... It puts China as world-leading in the industry, supplying about 95% of the world’s polysilicon supply. The problem is that this is roughly double the global demand. This overload of supply drove capacity utilization below 40% in 2025, forcing producers to sell panels at prices below their variable costs.

[...]

Beijing’s “anti-involution” campaign represents a serious attempt to curb the most damaging effects of excessive competition. Measures include revisions to the Pricing Law, coordinated production cuts, and sector-specific interventions such as plans to retire excess polysilicon capacity ... However, these policies treat the symptoms rather than the cause. They reduce capacity in one sector without changing growth incentives, simply shifting overinvestment elsewhere. Indeed, while investment slows in EVs and solar, capacity expansion is accelerating in petrochemicals, another sector already facing involution.

[...]

Two reforms are essential [in China]: strengthening domestic demand and accepting lower investment-led growth ... The supply-side reforms must be paired with strong fiscal support for households. In a liquidity-trap environment, fiscal policy, not monetary easing, must play the central role in restoring confidence and consumption.

[...]

In parallel, China must reduce its reliance on manufacturing and infrastructure as primary growth engines. This would require Xi Jinping to confront an uncomfortable political trade-off: accepting lower GDP growth targets in order to pivot the economy toward services, consumption, and household income growth.

[...]

China’s Four-Year Energy Spree Has Eclipsed Entire US Power Grid in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 5 hours ago

This has nothing to do with America. But a nice attempt of distraction.

Europe’s imperialist powers line up behind regime change in Iran in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 4 points 16 hours ago

This headline is even for an outlet like the world socialist website - one of the worst outlets parroting Chinese propaganda and supporting its aggression against Taiwan and other neighbours - unusually disconnected. The regime in Iran is killing its own people, even the wounded are shot dead as I have read. This so-called 'article' is absolutely disgusting.

China’s Four-Year Energy Spree Has Eclipsed Entire US Power Grid in c/globalnews@lemmy.zip
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 2 points 17 hours ago

China's 'four-year spree energy spree' has not only eclipsed the entire US power grid. It is even worse: China's solar industry's capacity reached levels capable of satisfying global demand roughly twice over, according to figures from late last year.

And this is only solar. China is also the world's largest producer, importer, and consumer of coal. The country burns 56% of the world's coal, has tripled consumption since 2000 and is building coal plants at the fastest pace in the last decade.

China not only increases its coal dependence but is also building solar panels it cannot use, in part because the Chinese grid is still unfit. Issues such as curtailment, where solar energy production has to shut down due to grid limitations, have become an obstacle China hasn't yet solved.

As Morningstar reports,

China's solar-capacity factor ... stood at just 14.7% in 2023, compared with 23.3% in the United States.

And it's getting worse. In 2024, solar capacity grew by 45% while generation increased only 28%. Do the math and the implied capacity factor drops toward 11% or 12%. IEEFA data shows utilization hours collapsed from 1,030 in 2020 to just 473 in 2024.

That means that roughly five-sixths of the time China's solar installations sit there doing nothing. They are the world's most expensive decorations - a clean-energy Potemkin village stretched across the provinces.

China is building solar capacity faster than it can use it, faster than its grid can absorb, faster than any economic logic would justify. The result is panels producing power that nobody can buy, connected to a grid that cannot handle the load.

But the Chinese government has been up to sustain investment growth at any cost to compensate for the decline of the country's troubled property sector and stalling domestic consumption. So China built new factories not just in solar, but also in electric cars and batteries.

Similar as in these other industries, the policy led to fierce price wars in Chinese solar markets and to an overcapacity that is now desperately seeking its solution in export markets. But despite huge state subsidies, more than 40 Chinese solar manufacturers have already gone bankrupt or halted production since 2024. One-third of China's 121 listed solar producers are operating at a loss with China's top four solar manufacturers - Longi Green Energy, Jinki Solar, JA Sola, and Trina Solar - collectively lost $1.5 billion in the first half of 2025 alone.

Chinese solar companies have already responded by laying off a third of their workers, according to a Reuters analysis of company filings.

Yet the headline tells you of a thriving Chinese renewable energy industry.

I could continue this for a long time, but I don't want to overdo it. The linked reports make an excellent read, though, and you'll find more across the web.

Some say that exceptionally low prices help accelerate solar adoption to save the climate, but this is short-term thinking imo. In the long-term it is much better if we develop diverse suppliers working across different supply chains to reach a more stable, fast, and - above all - just energy transition.

China’s Four-Year Energy Spree Has Eclipsed Entire US Power Grid in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 17 hours ago (2 children)

China's 'four-year spree energy spree' has not only eclipsed the entire US power grid. It is even worse: China's solar industry's capacity reached levels capable of satisfying global demand roughly twice over, according to figures from late last year.

And this is only solar. China is also the world's largest producer, importer, and consumer of coal. The country burns 56% of the world's coal, has tripled consumption since 2000 and is building coal plants at the fastest pace in the last decade.

China not only increases its coal dependence but is also building solar panels it cannot use, in part because the Chinese grid is still unfit. Issues such as curtailment, where solar energy production has to shut down due to grid limitations, have become an obstacle China hasn't yet solved.

As Morningstar reports,

China's solar-capacity factor ... stood at just 14.7% in 2023, compared with 23.3% in the United States.

And it's getting worse. In 2024, solar capacity grew by 45% while generation increased only 28%. Do the math and the implied capacity factor drops toward 11% or 12%. IEEFA data shows utilization hours collapsed from 1,030 in 2020 to just 473 in 2024.

That means that roughly five-sixths of the time China's solar installations sit there doing nothing. They are the world's most expensive decorations - a clean-energy Potemkin village stretched across the provinces.

China is building solar capacity faster than it can use it, faster than its grid can absorb, faster than any economic logic would justify. The result is panels producing power that nobody can buy, connected to a grid that cannot handle the load.

But the Chinese government has been up to sustain investment growth at any cost to compensate for the decline of the country's troubled property sector and stalling domestic consumption. So China built new factories not just in solar, but also in electric cars and batteries.

Similar as in these other industries, the policy led to fierce price wars in Chinese solar markets and to an overcapacity that is now desperately seeking its solution in export markets. But despite huge state subsidies, more than 40 Chinese solar manufacturers have already gone bankrupt or halted production since 2024. One-third of China's 121 listed solar producers are operating at a loss with China's top four solar manufacturers - Longi Green Energy, Jinki Solar, JA Sola, and Trina Solar - collectively lost $1.5 billion in the first half of 2025 alone.

Chinese solar companies have already responded by laying off a third of their workers, according to a Reuters analysis of company filings.

Yet the headline tells you of a thriving Chinese renewable energy industry.

I could continue this for a long time, but I don't want to overdo it. The linked reports make an excellent read, though, and you'll find more across the web.

Some say that exceptionally low prices help accelerate solar adoption to save the climate, but this is short-term thinking imo. In the long-term it is much better if we develop diverse suppliers working across different supply chains to reach a more stable, fast, and - above all - just energy transition.

8
UK: Starmer announces deal with Chinese toy firm accused of exploiting workers (archive.ph)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50141271

At the end of his trip to China – the first by a Prime Minister in eight years – Sir Keir celebrated securing billions of pounds worth of export and investment deals for the UK.

However, his announcement of a new deal with the toy manufacturer Pop Mart threatened to overshadow his “pragmatic” new approach to Beijing.

Archived

The company makes Labubu dolls, fang-toothed gremlin characters that are popular around the world. Under the agreement, Pop Mart will make London its regional hub in Europe and open seven new stores across the UK

Earlier this month, an investigation by China Labor Watch [CLW] claimed evidence of widespread exploitation at the company’s factories.

CLW's list of workers' rights abuses include:

  • Employment of workers aged 16 without legally required special protections

  • Blank or incomplete labor contracts

  • Nominal and inadequate onboarding “training”

  • Unclear and inconsistently applied resignation procedures

  • Excessive use of labor dispatch beyond legal limits

  • Overtime far exceeding legal limits, including unpaid meetings

  • Wage deductions and lack of overtime pay for dispatched workers

  • Fines and penalties imposed for minor infractions

  • Verbal sexual harassment by management

  • Absence of paid leave, including sick leave

  • Unrealistic production targets

  • Lack of social insurance and statutory benefits

  • Unhygienic food and living conditions

  • Occupational health and safety deficiencies

  • Inadequate fire safety and emergency preparedness

  • Absence of labor union and grievance mechanisms

  • Recruitment discrimination

  • Difficulty obtaining reimbursement for pre-paid medical expenses

After the announcement, China Labor Watch expresses serious concern regarding the UK government’s recent decision to publicly engage with and endorse the Chinese designer toy company Pop Mart, including welcoming the company’s establishment of London as its European hub, the NGO says in a statement.

...

Alicia Kearns, a Tory MP who was sanctioned by China for highlighting human rights violations, said: “Starmer’s idealisation of workers’ rights ends at the airport, it seems.

“The man who wants to pay to give away the Chagos Islands and strip protections from British veterans in the name of international law just returned from China boasting Labubu will make London its regional hub.

“Will the Labubu factories accused of exploiting their workforce and using child labour also be relocating?

“Keir Starmer may well brandish a Labubu when he steps off the plane, but he should ask himself, what principles has he betrayed and at what cost?”

11
UK: Starmer announces deal with Chinese toy firm accused of exploiting workers (archive.ph)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50141271

At the end of his trip to China – the first by a Prime Minister in eight years – Sir Keir celebrated securing billions of pounds worth of export and investment deals for the UK.

However, his announcement of a new deal with the toy manufacturer Pop Mart threatened to overshadow his “pragmatic” new approach to Beijing.

Archived

The company makes Labubu dolls, fang-toothed gremlin characters that are popular around the world. Under the agreement, Pop Mart will make London its regional hub in Europe and open seven new stores across the UK

Earlier this month, an investigation by China Labor Watch [CLW] claimed evidence of widespread exploitation at the company’s factories.

CLW's list of workers' rights abuses include:

  • Employment of workers aged 16 without legally required special protections

  • Blank or incomplete labor contracts

  • Nominal and inadequate onboarding “training”

  • Unclear and inconsistently applied resignation procedures

  • Excessive use of labor dispatch beyond legal limits

  • Overtime far exceeding legal limits, including unpaid meetings

  • Wage deductions and lack of overtime pay for dispatched workers

  • Fines and penalties imposed for minor infractions

  • Verbal sexual harassment by management

  • Absence of paid leave, including sick leave

  • Unrealistic production targets

  • Lack of social insurance and statutory benefits

  • Unhygienic food and living conditions

  • Occupational health and safety deficiencies

  • Inadequate fire safety and emergency preparedness

  • Absence of labor union and grievance mechanisms

  • Recruitment discrimination

  • Difficulty obtaining reimbursement for pre-paid medical expenses

After the announcement, China Labor Watch expresses serious concern regarding the UK government’s recent decision to publicly engage with and endorse the Chinese designer toy company Pop Mart, including welcoming the company’s establishment of London as its European hub, the NGO says in a statement.

...

Alicia Kearns, a Tory MP who was sanctioned by China for highlighting human rights violations, said: “Starmer’s idealisation of workers’ rights ends at the airport, it seems.

“The man who wants to pay to give away the Chagos Islands and strip protections from British veterans in the name of international law just returned from China boasting Labubu will make London its regional hub.

“Will the Labubu factories accused of exploiting their workforce and using child labour also be relocating?

“Keir Starmer may well brandish a Labubu when he steps off the plane, but he should ask himself, what principles has he betrayed and at what cost?”

13
UK: Starmer announces deal with Chinese toy firm accused of exploiting workers (archive.ph)
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/50141271

At the end of his trip to China – the first by a Prime Minister in eight years – Sir Keir celebrated securing billions of pounds worth of export and investment deals for the UK.

However, his announcement of a new deal with the toy manufacturer Pop Mart threatened to overshadow his “pragmatic” new approach to Beijing.

Archived

The company makes Labubu dolls, fang-toothed gremlin characters that are popular around the world. Under the agreement, Pop Mart will make London its regional hub in Europe and open seven new stores across the UK

Earlier this month, an investigation by China Labor Watch [CLW] claimed evidence of widespread exploitation at the company’s factories.

CLW's list of workers' rights abuses include:

  • Employment of workers aged 16 without legally required special protections

  • Blank or incomplete labor contracts

  • Nominal and inadequate onboarding “training”

  • Unclear and inconsistently applied resignation procedures

  • Excessive use of labor dispatch beyond legal limits

  • Overtime far exceeding legal limits, including unpaid meetings

  • Wage deductions and lack of overtime pay for dispatched workers

  • Fines and penalties imposed for minor infractions

  • Verbal sexual harassment by management

  • Absence of paid leave, including sick leave

  • Unrealistic production targets

  • Lack of social insurance and statutory benefits

  • Unhygienic food and living conditions

  • Occupational health and safety deficiencies

  • Inadequate fire safety and emergency preparedness

  • Absence of labor union and grievance mechanisms

  • Recruitment discrimination

  • Difficulty obtaining reimbursement for pre-paid medical expenses

After the announcement, China Labor Watch expresses serious concern regarding the UK government’s recent decision to publicly engage with and endorse the Chinese designer toy company Pop Mart, including welcoming the company’s establishment of London as its European hub, the NGO says in a statement.

...

Alicia Kearns, a Tory MP who was sanctioned by China for highlighting human rights violations, said: “Starmer’s idealisation of workers’ rights ends at the airport, it seems.

“The man who wants to pay to give away the Chagos Islands and strip protections from British veterans in the name of international law just returned from China boasting Labubu will make London its regional hub.

“Will the Labubu factories accused of exploiting their workforce and using child labour also be relocating?

“Keir Starmer may well brandish a Labubu when he steps off the plane, but he should ask himself, what principles has he betrayed and at what cost?”

Jeffrey Epstein Reportedly Ran Kremlin’s Largest Honeytrap and Blackmail Operation in c/globalnews@lemmy.zip
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 21 hours ago (1 children)

I am not 'dense' but this is about the Russia connection. This is unrelated to any other issues.

Taiwan's Economy Grew at Fastest Pace in 15 Years in 2025 in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 0 points 21 hours ago

What makes you think that?

Jeffrey Epstein Reportedly Ran Kremlin’s Largest Honeytrap and Blackmail Operation in c/globalnews@lemmy.zip
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org -1 points 22 hours ago (3 children)

Whataboutism, the rhetorical practice of responding to an accusation or difficult question by making a counteraccusation, by asking a different but related question, or by raising a different issue altogether [...] - Source

@subversive_dev

China's factory activity grows at fastest pace since October, private survey shows, beating official reading in c/globalnews@lemmy.zip
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 1 points 1 day ago* (last edited 21 hours ago)

This is a questionable interpretation and a highly misleading title and content.

TL;DR: China's export-focused economy is doing relatively well, all other sectors fall further behind. It's another proof for Beijing's mercantilism and its increasing dependency on foreign markets.

China’s official manufacturing purchasing managers’ index fell back in contraction to 49.3. The fact that it diverges from the (private) RatingDog PMI provided by S&P (and cited in linked the article), suggests that external activity continues to be much stronger than domestic demand.

In other words: China's economy is still highly reliant on exports, it does carries over its troubles into 2026 (this interpretation is in line with several analysts, see, for example, the report by ING Bank).

Unlike China's official PMI, the private RatingDog PMI has a sample size focused on private and particularly export-oriented companies. We have seen that the gap between the two PMIs has been growing especially in the second half of 2025, and this gap is now even larger.

We also see that China’s official NBS Non-Manufacturing PMI fell back into contraction to 49.4 in January 2026 from 50.2 in December 2025, reflecting cautious consumer spending and and persistent stress in the property sector.

The consequences of China growth model are felt already by ordinary people, as one analysis reads:

[China's] The country’s growth has become increasingly expensive to maintain, and its dividends are reaching ordinary households with diminishing force.

The divergence between headline growth and household reality is now impossible to ignore. While GDP expanded by 5 percent in 2025, median per capita disposable income – a more representative measure of what typical families actually earn – rose by only 4.4 percent, slowing from the 5.1 percent gain in the previous year. Urban residents fared even worse, with median income growth of just 3.7 percent – worse than the 4.6 percent growth in 2024. The slowdown may seem modest in percentage terms, but it signals something profound: the transmission mechanism that once converted aggregate growth into broadly shared prosperity is weakening. -- (Archived)

[Edit typo.]

China's factory activity grows at fastest pace since October, private survey shows, beating official reading in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 3 points 1 day ago* (last edited 21 hours ago)

This is a questionable interpretation and a highly misleading title and content.

TL;DR: China's export-focused economy is doing relatively well, all other sectors fall further behind. It's another proof for Beijing's mercantilism and its increasing dependency on foreign markets.

China’s official manufacturing purchasing managers’ index fell back in contraction to 49.3. The fact that it diverges from the (private) RatingDog PMI provided by S&P (and cited in linked the article), suggests that external activity continues to be much stronger than domestic demand.

In other words: China's economy is still highly reliant on exports, it does carries over its troubles into 2026 (this interpretation is in line with several analysts, see, for example, the report by ING Bank).

Unlike China's official PMI, the private RatingDog PMI has a sample size focused on private and particularly export-oriented companies. We have seen that the gap between the two PMIs has been growing especially in the second half of 2025, and this gap is now even larger.

We also see that China’s official NBS Non-Manufacturing PMI fell back into contraction to 49.4 in January 2026 from 50.2 in December 2025, reflecting cautious consumer spending and and persistent stress in the property sector.

The consequences of China growth model are felt already by ordinary people, as one analysis reads:

[China's] The country’s growth has become increasingly expensive to maintain, and its dividends are reaching ordinary households with diminishing force.

The divergence between headline growth and household reality is now impossible to ignore. While GDP expanded by 5 percent in 2025, median per capita disposable income – a more representative measure of what typical families actually earn – rose by only 4.4 percent, slowing from the 5.1 percent gain in the previous year. Urban residents fared even worse, with median income growth of just 3.7 percent – worse than the 4.6 percent growth in 2024. The slowdown may seem modest in percentage terms, but it signals something profound: the transmission mechanism that once converted aggregate growth into broadly shared prosperity is weakening. -- (Archived)

[Edit typo.]

Jeffrey Epstein Reportedly Ran Kremlin’s Largest Honeytrap and Blackmail Operation in c/world@lemmy.world
[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org 13 points 1 day ago (3 children)

This is about Russia's connection. What you're doing is another distraction ... oh, .ml community ...

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