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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52177818

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Finland is facing a growing intelligence challenge as Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland continues to expand across the country’s technology sector, research institutions, and government networks. The warning comes from Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO), which released a new national security overview highlighting the persistent threat from foreign intelligence operations.

The report suggests cyber espionage against Finland is not limited to isolated incidents. Instead, it involves a combination of cyber intrusions, traditional espionage, and influence operations designed to collect sensitive information and shape political or economic decisions.

The warning about Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland reflects that countries are no longer focused only on military secrets but also targeting technology development, economic strategies, and innovation ecosystems. Russia and China Cyberespionage Targeting Finland’s Technology Sector

According to the SUPO national security overview, the most frequent intelligence operations linked to foreign states originate from Russia and China. These activities increasingly focus on Finland’s technology sector and research institutions, areas that play a key role in the country’s economic and strategic future.

The report notes that Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland often involves penetrating digital systems to access research data, proprietary technologies, and policy discussions. In several cases, state-backed actors have successfully infiltrated the networks of Finnish start-ups.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52177818

Archived

Finland is facing a growing intelligence challenge as Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland continues to expand across the country’s technology sector, research institutions, and government networks. The warning comes from Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO), which released a new national security overview highlighting the persistent threat from foreign intelligence operations.

The report suggests cyber espionage against Finland is not limited to isolated incidents. Instead, it involves a combination of cyber intrusions, traditional espionage, and influence operations designed to collect sensitive information and shape political or economic decisions.

The warning about Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland reflects that countries are no longer focused only on military secrets but also targeting technology development, economic strategies, and innovation ecosystems. Russia and China Cyberespionage Targeting Finland’s Technology Sector

According to the SUPO national security overview, the most frequent intelligence operations linked to foreign states originate from Russia and China. These activities increasingly focus on Finland’s technology sector and research institutions, areas that play a key role in the country’s economic and strategic future.

The report notes that Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland often involves penetrating digital systems to access research data, proprietary technologies, and policy discussions. In several cases, state-backed actors have successfully infiltrated the networks of Finnish start-ups.

[...]

Archived

Finland is facing a growing intelligence challenge as Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland continues to expand across the country’s technology sector, research institutions, and government networks. The warning comes from Finland’s Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO), which released a new national security overview highlighting the persistent threat from foreign intelligence operations.

The report suggests cyber espionage against Finland is not limited to isolated incidents. Instead, it involves a combination of cyber intrusions, traditional espionage, and influence operations designed to collect sensitive information and shape political or economic decisions.

The warning about Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland reflects that countries are no longer focused only on military secrets but also targeting technology development, economic strategies, and innovation ecosystems. Russia and China Cyberespionage Targeting Finland’s Technology Sector

According to the SUPO national security overview, the most frequent intelligence operations linked to foreign states originate from Russia and China. These activities increasingly focus on Finland’s technology sector and research institutions, areas that play a key role in the country’s economic and strategic future.

The report notes that Russia and China cyberespionage targeting Finland often involves penetrating digital systems to access research data, proprietary technologies, and policy discussions. In several cases, state-backed actors have successfully infiltrated the networks of Finnish start-ups.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52175874

Archived

Following Beijing’s 6 January 2026 announcement of tightened export controls on Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce published two lists on 24 February, each naming 20 Japanese firms. Firms in the first group face an immediate ban on the export of dual-use goods deemed by China to be ‘participating in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities’. The other 20 firms belong to a watchlist mandating individual export applications.

These actions constitute the most recent measures in Beijing’s campaign to punish Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her comment in November 2025 that China’s military action against Taiwan could create a ‘survival-threatening situation’ for Japan.

[...]

On one hand, China’s economic coercion has complicated Japan’s growth strategy, which is central to Takaichi’s policy goals. Supply uncertainty or price hikes in critical minerals including rare earth elements (REEs) pose significant concern for the high-tech sectors that Takaichi’s administration is eager to boost.

On the other hand, these actions do not only make conservative politicians like Takaichi gain more domestic popularity, but they also incentivise Tokyo to devise a middle-power coalition for more robust supply chains that rely less — or possibly not at all — on China.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52175933

Archived

[...]

The hacking group, attributed to China, is part of a wider cluster of hackers with the collective aim of helping China prepare for an eventual war with Taiwan, according to researchers. U.S. officials have called China’s potential invasion of Taiwan an “epoch-defining threat.” Much of the group’s efforts have focused on hacking Cisco routers at the edge of a company’s network to break in and taking control of surveillance devices that U.S. telecom companies are legally required to install to allow law enforcement to monitor calls and messages.

[...]

The hacks allowed China to obtain call records, text messages, and captured phone audio from senior U.S. officials, many of whom were considered government targets of interest. This prompted the FBI to urge Americans to switch to end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, fearing that a foreign adversary could eavesdrop on their communications.

[...]

Salt Typhoon went even further, hacking at least 200 companies around the world, according to FBI officials. The list of affected countries keeps growing.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52175874

Archived

Following Beijing’s 6 January 2026 announcement of tightened export controls on Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce published two lists on 24 February, each naming 20 Japanese firms. Firms in the first group face an immediate ban on the export of dual-use goods deemed by China to be ‘participating in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities’. The other 20 firms belong to a watchlist mandating individual export applications.

These actions constitute the most recent measures in Beijing’s campaign to punish Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her comment in November 2025 that China’s military action against Taiwan could create a ‘survival-threatening situation’ for Japan.

[...]

On one hand, China’s economic coercion has complicated Japan’s growth strategy, which is central to Takaichi’s policy goals. Supply uncertainty or price hikes in critical minerals including rare earth elements (REEs) pose significant concern for the high-tech sectors that Takaichi’s administration is eager to boost.

On the other hand, these actions do not only make conservative politicians like Takaichi gain more domestic popularity, but they also incentivise Tokyo to devise a middle-power coalition for more robust supply chains that rely less — or possibly not at all — on China.

[...]

Archived

[...]

The hacking group, attributed to China, is part of a wider cluster of hackers with the collective aim of helping China prepare for an eventual war with Taiwan, according to researchers. U.S. officials have called China’s potential invasion of Taiwan an “epoch-defining threat.” Much of the group’s efforts have focused on hacking Cisco routers at the edge of a company’s network to break in and taking control of surveillance devices that U.S. telecom companies are legally required to install to allow law enforcement to monitor calls and messages.

[...]

The hacks allowed China to obtain call records, text messages, and captured phone audio from senior U.S. officials, many of whom were considered government targets of interest. This prompted the FBI to urge Americans to switch to end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, fearing that a foreign adversary could eavesdrop on their communications.

[...]

Salt Typhoon went even further, hacking at least 200 companies around the world, according to FBI officials. The list of affected countries keeps growing.

[...]

Archived

Following Beijing’s 6 January 2026 announcement of tightened export controls on Japan, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce published two lists on 24 February, each naming 20 Japanese firms. Firms in the first group face an immediate ban on the export of dual-use goods deemed by China to be ‘participating in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities’. The other 20 firms belong to a watchlist mandating individual export applications.

These actions constitute the most recent measures in Beijing’s campaign to punish Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her comment in November 2025 that China’s military action against Taiwan could create a ‘survival-threatening situation’ for Japan.

[...]

On one hand, China’s economic coercion has complicated Japan’s growth strategy, which is central to Takaichi’s policy goals. Supply uncertainty or price hikes in critical minerals including rare earth elements (REEs) pose significant concern for the high-tech sectors that Takaichi’s administration is eager to boost.

On the other hand, these actions do not only make conservative politicians like Takaichi gain more domestic popularity, but they also incentivise Tokyo to devise a middle-power coalition for more robust supply chains that rely less — or possibly not at all — on China.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52120621

The [Chinese Communist] Party’s feared internal police organ, the CCDI (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) made its annual work report public. Like its previous reports covering 2023 and 2024, it includes data on the acknowledged number of cases in which the Liuzhi system has been employed, showing a record‑breaking 47,000 cases in 2025.

The new work report shows a staggering 24% increase in 2025 from a year earlier in the number of people placed in Liuzhi , which is essentially a system of extra‑legal black jails used to detain Party members and state functionaries for up to six months, at secret locations and without any legal remedy. The system, like the CCDI itself, exists outside the State and is not a law‑enforcement body. As the tables below show, this year’s work report contains less detailed data compared with previous years, but it does indicate an increase in the number of investigations launched (up 15.4%) and punishments issued (up 10.6%).

[...]

The number of investigations launched and punishments meted out now surpasses 5 million for the period 2018–2025, while the number of Liuzhi cases now far exceeds 200,000 (232,240). Each use of Liuzhi, as prior reporting from several groups[...] has shown, involves a high prevalence of torture inside the system. These detentions are, in effect, arrests and imprisonment at secret locations by an internal political Party organ, not a law‑enforcement entity. Every single use of Liuzhi constitutes arbitrary detention and, in most cases, enforced disappearance, with solitary confinement used as a tool to isolate the target.

[...]

CCDI — The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is tasked with ensuring compliance, political correctness, and loyalty among the Party’s 95 million members. Most of its work is carried out by Discipline Inspection Commissions (CDIs) at the provincial level and below.

Liuzhi — “Retention in custody” is part of an internal CCP system for detention and investigation and is not part of the State’s criminal justice system. While in Liuzhi, which is ordered solely by the CCDI without any external oversight or approval, the detainee must, by regulation, be held in solitary confinement, denied access to legal counsel (as this is not a legal process), and prevented from any form of communication. The target is, by design, held incommunicado. Locations vary—from custom‑built facilities to Party‑run hotels, guesthouses, and offices—and must not be disclosed, meaning the person is, by any definition, disappeared. Detention can last up to six months. There is no external appeal mechanism.

[...]

The [Chinese Communist] Party’s feared internal police organ, the CCDI (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) made its annual work report public. Like its previous reports covering 2023 and 2024, it includes data on the acknowledged number of cases in which the Liuzhi system has been employed, showing a record‑breaking 47,000 cases in 2025.

The new work report shows a staggering 24% increase in 2025 from a year earlier in the number of people placed in Liuzhi , which is essentially a system of extra‑legal black jails used to detain Party members and state functionaries for up to six months, at secret locations and without any legal remedy. The system, like the CCDI itself, exists outside the State and is not a law‑enforcement body. As the tables below show, this year’s work report contains less detailed data compared with previous years, but it does indicate an increase in the number of investigations launched (up 15.4%) and punishments issued (up 10.6%).

[...]

The number of investigations launched and punishments meted out now surpasses 5 million for the period 2018–2025, while the number of Liuzhi cases now far exceeds 200,000 (232,240). Each use of Liuzhi, as prior reporting from several groups[...] has shown, involves a high prevalence of torture inside the system. These detentions are, in effect, arrests and imprisonment at secret locations by an internal political Party organ, not a law‑enforcement entity. Every single use of Liuzhi constitutes arbitrary detention and, in most cases, enforced disappearance, with solitary confinement used as a tool to isolate the target.

[...]

CCDI — The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is tasked with ensuring compliance, political correctness, and loyalty among the Party’s 95 million members. Most of its work is carried out by Discipline Inspection Commissions (CDIs) at the provincial level and below.

Liuzhi — “Retention in custody” is part of an internal CCP system for detention and investigation and is not part of the State’s criminal justice system. While in Liuzhi, which is ordered solely by the CCDI without any external oversight or approval, the detainee must, by regulation, be held in solitary confinement, denied access to legal counsel (as this is not a legal process), and prevented from any form of communication. The target is, by design, held incommunicado. Locations vary—from custom‑built facilities to Party‑run hotels, guesthouses, and offices—and must not be disclosed, meaning the person is, by any definition, disappeared. Detention can last up to six months. There is no external appeal mechanism.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52068533

Archived

Zambia's Ministry of Labour and Social Security has announced that it will recommend the immediate cancellation of work permits for two Chinese supervisors at Zamfresh company following allegations that they assaulted a female employee at the workplace.

[...]

The two Chinese nationals have been filmed in a scuffle with a female employee, whom they pinned to the floor, another report says.

[...]

The Ministry stated that Zambia’s commitment to ending violence and harassment at work is strengthened by its ratification of the International Labour Organization Convention 190. The Convention requires governments to ensure that workplaces are free from abuse, violence and harassment. The Ministry emphasized that all foreign workers in Zambia must follow the country’s labour laws.

Employers have been advised to follow proper grievance and disciplinary procedures when handling workplace misconduct, warning that taking the law into their own hands is a serious offence that may lead to legal and administrative action.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52068533

Archived

Zambia's Ministry of Labour and Social Security has announced that it will recommend the immediate cancellation of work permits for two Chinese supervisors at Zamfresh company following allegations that they assaulted a female employee at the workplace.

[...]

The two Chinese nationals have been filmed in a scuffle with a female employee, whom they pinned to the floor, another report says.

[...]

The Ministry stated that Zambia’s commitment to ending violence and harassment at work is strengthened by its ratification of the International Labour Organization Convention 190. The Convention requires governments to ensure that workplaces are free from abuse, violence and harassment. The Ministry emphasized that all foreign workers in Zambia must follow the country’s labour laws.

Employers have been advised to follow proper grievance and disciplinary procedures when handling workplace misconduct, warning that taking the law into their own hands is a serious offence that may lead to legal and administrative action.

[...]