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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357180

Taiwanese Indigenous group was booked to perform at the AFC Asia Cup semi-final match between Taiwan and China in Perth on Friday night. Their performance was cancelled at the last minute for "political reasons".

Taiwanese Indigenous group was booked to perform at the AFC Asia Cup semi-final match between Taiwan and China in Perth on Friday night. Their performance was cancelled at the last minute for "political reasons".

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52299302

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

Archived

After years of saying little about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, African nations are showing growing signs of irritation with Moscow for luring their citizens to fight and die on the Russian army’s front lines.

African leaders are increasingly speaking up about a clear pattern in which paid recruiters in Russia and Africa coax young men to come to Russia with promises of civilian jobs or training. Once they arrive, they are urged or forced to join the Russian army, which has run short of soldiers for its human wave assaults on Ukrainian positions.

The investigative journalism organization INPACT reported in February that 1,417 Africans had served in the Russian army or mercenary organizations, and 316 had died in combat. The highest death tolls were among citizens of Cameroon, Ghana, and Egypt.

[...]

Ghana’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, said last month that nearly 300 Ghanaians had been drawn into the fighting, many lured by job offers that became military deployments. According to Ablakwa, 55 of them had died. “They have no security background. They have no military background. They have not been ⁠trained,” he said in a news conference in Kyiv. “They were just lured and deceived ⁠and then put on the front lines.”

Similarly, a February intelligence report to Kenya’s parliament detailed that 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited to fight for Russia, and 89 were on the front lines as of that time. It further noted that one Kenyan had died, 39 were hospitalized, and 28 were missing in action. Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi called the trafficking “unacceptable and clandestine” and called for an agreement with Moscow barring the recruitment of Kenyans.

[...]

Similarly, South Africa, a BRICS member nation that has preserved strong ties with Russia, announced February 26 that two of its nationals had died fighting for Moscow. Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola visited the families of 11 citizens whose return to South Africa had been negotiated. The men had been promised security training in Russia. In November, officials had received a call for help from South Africans who said they were trapped fighting with Russian mercenaries in Donbas.

Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry likewise warned its citizens in February against fighting in foreign conflicts. The ministry did not name Russia, but said several Nigerians “were deployed to combat zones after being misled and coerced into signing military service contracts.”

[...]

Those who are deceived into fighting for Russia are recruited by local agents or directly from Russia. Kenyan police arrested a 33-year-old man after his return from Russia on charges of recruiting for the Russian military. At least five people were under investigation in South Africa, including a daughter of former President Jacob Zuma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52281603

Archived

[...]

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population, says Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

[...]

[Chinese] tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

[...]

The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

[...]

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

[...]

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

[...]

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

[...]

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

[...]