Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52387625

Archived

Arriving in Rome - like it or not it is still the centre of Christianity - and lecturing on the Antichrist may at least seem eccentric, even if the city has always digested everything. But Peter Thiel has a fortune of 30 billion dollars, estimated by default, and is one of the main inspirers of Trumpism, not only technological, but deeply ideological, Maga in purity. In short, when he makes a move, he makes a noise, especially now in times of war, a conflict, the one against Iran, which is fully in Thiel's ideological wheelhouse. From today until Wednesday in Rome, the co-founder of PayPal and Palantir, the data mining company that has collaborated with the Trump administration in its campaign for the expulsion of migrants, and that has risen on the stock exchange by 500% in less than five years (he has 3% but controls it) will explain to a selected and mysterious audience what the Antichrist is for him.

[...]

Perhaps there are those who think that he will also be in Rome to do some good business in the field of defence, mixing the sacred (?) and the profane is a transversal speciality throughout the world, but which in Trumpism has reached unthinkable peaks.

[...]

[Thiel's] invitation-only conference, which runs until Wednesday, is not open to the press and its venue has not been publicly disclosed, as per Reuters. Organisers quoted in the media say participants are drawn from academia, technology and religious circles.

[...]

A co-founder of Palantir ​Technologies, an AI software company with deep ties to the U.S. defense and intelligence agencies, Thiel ​has in recent years devoted increasing attention to religious and philosophical ideas.

Last year he held a ⁠similar series of talks in San Francisco exploring the possibility that the Antichrist - a figure who opposes or ​denies Christ - could emerge on the global stage.

In particular, Thiel has said he is wary that an Antichrist will emerge ​who will create a one-world government on the promise of something like stopping nuclear, AI or climate-induced disaster.

Thiel, 58, grew up in an Evangelical Christian family and has said Christianity shapes his worldview.

[...]

Father Paolo Benanti, who advises the pope on artificial intelligence, wrote in an essay published on Saturday that Thiel operated as a "political theologian" within Silicon Valley.

"Thiel's entire action can... be read as a prolonged act of heresy against the liberal consensus: a challenge to ​the very foundations of civil ​coexistence, which he now ⁠considers outdated," Benanti wrote on Le Grand Continent website.

The piece was headlined: "American heresy: should Peter Thiel be burned at the stake?"

A newspaper owned by the Italian bishops' conference, ​L'Avvenire, also published a series of articles this past week that were highly critical ​of Thiel.

One article ⁠warned that technology leaders should not be allowed to define their own ethical limits, arguing that governments had to defend democratic oversight of digital platforms and resist the spread of disinformation.

Thiel retains close ties with figures in Washington, including Vice ⁠President JD ​Vance, himself a Catholic convert. Thiel's appearance in Rome follows a ​string of visits to Italy by prominent figures linked to the U.S. conservative movement, including Steve Bannon, Elon Musk, and Vance himself.

[...]

Archived

Arriving in Rome - like it or not it is still the centre of Christianity - and lecturing on the Antichrist may at least seem eccentric, even if the city has always digested everything. But Peter Thiel has a fortune of 30 billion dollars, estimated by default, and is one of the main inspirers of Trumpism, not only technological, but deeply ideological, Maga in purity. In short, when he makes a move, he makes a noise, especially now in times of war, a conflict, the one against Iran, which is fully in Thiel's ideological wheelhouse. From today until Wednesday in Rome, the co-founder of PayPal and Palantir, the data mining company that has collaborated with the Trump administration in its campaign for the expulsion of migrants, and that has risen on the stock exchange by 500% in less than five years (he has 3% but controls it) will explain to a selected and mysterious audience what the Antichrist is for him.

[...]

Perhaps there are those who think that he will also be in Rome to do some good business in the field of defence, mixing the sacred (?) and the profane is a transversal speciality throughout the world, but which in Trumpism has reached unthinkable peaks.

[...]

[Thiel's] invitation-only conference, which runs until Wednesday, is not open to the press and its venue has not been publicly disclosed, as per Reuters. Organisers quoted in the media say participants are drawn from academia, technology and religious circles.

[...]

A co-founder of Palantir ​Technologies, an AI software company with deep ties to the U.S. defense and intelligence agencies, Thiel ​has in recent years devoted increasing attention to religious and philosophical ideas.

Last year he held a ⁠similar series of talks in San Francisco exploring the possibility that the Antichrist - a figure who opposes or ​denies Christ - could emerge on the global stage.

In particular, Thiel has said he is wary that an Antichrist will emerge ​who will create a one-world government on the promise of something like stopping nuclear, AI or climate-induced disaster.

Thiel, 58, grew up in an Evangelical Christian family and has said Christianity shapes his worldview.

[...]

Father Paolo Benanti, who advises the pope on artificial intelligence, wrote in an essay published on Saturday that Thiel operated as a "political theologian" within Silicon Valley.

"Thiel's entire action can... be read as a prolonged act of heresy against the liberal consensus: a challenge to ​the very foundations of civil ​coexistence, which he now ⁠considers outdated," Benanti wrote on Le Grand Continent website.

The piece was headlined: "American heresy: should Peter Thiel be burned at the stake?"

A newspaper owned by the Italian bishops' conference, ​L'Avvenire, also published a series of articles this past week that were highly critical ​of Thiel.

One article ⁠warned that technology leaders should not be allowed to define their own ethical limits, arguing that governments had to defend democratic oversight of digital platforms and resist the spread of disinformation.

Thiel retains close ties with figures in Washington, including Vice ⁠President JD ​Vance, himself a Catholic convert. Thiel's appearance in Rome follows a ​string of visits to Italy by prominent figures linked to the U.S. conservative movement, including Steve Bannon, Elon Musk, and Vance himself.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52385346

Launched 11 years ago by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to combat online censorship, Operation Collateral Freedom currently enables 177 media outlets and press freedom websites that are blocked in 39 countries – more than half of them in Russia and China – to continue disseminating information online and keep reaching their public.

Archived

By duplicating censored news sites onto mirror sites hosted on the servers of major Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), it allows those living under authoritarian regimes to access their content directly from a standard web browser, without needing to install a VPN (virtual private network). No fewer than 57% of the websites protected by RSF are blocked in just two countries – Xi Jinping's China (53 blocked sites) and Vladimir Putin's Russia (49 blocked sites).

[...]

In 2025, RSF restored access to the website of Circle 19, an independent group that provides uncensored information about China. Beijing blocked its platform less than a year after it published a statement of principles denouncing state propaganda on 4 June 2024, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre [...] This initiative aims to provide resources showing that the right to information is deeply rooted in China's traditions, history and political system, contrary to Beijing's propaganda.

[...]

Voice of Tibet, an international radio station broadcasting in both Tibetan and Mandarin, was given 16 mirror sites in 2025. RSF also unblocked the Uyghur Post website, one of the few Uyghur-language media outlets reporting on abuses by the authorities in Xinjiang, the autonomous region in northwest China where most Uyghurs live, which has become an information black hole as a result of the regime’s repression.

[...]

Meduza is the leading independent Russian media outlet in exile and, in March 2022, became one of the first to benefit from Operation Collateral Freedom. However, every time Meduza created a mirror site, the Russian authorities were able to quickly block it. To counter this unprecedented threat, the generation of mirror sites was automated on an unprecedented scale using technology developed by RSF combined with the technical expertise of Meduza’s staff. As a result, 4,556 mirror sites had been created for Meduza by 2025, allowing it to receive a total of 1.9 billion content requests, making it the most visited site of all those benefitting from Operation Collateral Freedom.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52385346

Launched 11 years ago by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to combat online censorship, Operation Collateral Freedom currently enables 177 media outlets and press freedom websites that are blocked in 39 countries – more than half of them in Russia and China – to continue disseminating information online and keep reaching their public.

Archived

By duplicating censored news sites onto mirror sites hosted on the servers of major Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), it allows those living under authoritarian regimes to access their content directly from a standard web browser, without needing to install a VPN (virtual private network). No fewer than 57% of the websites protected by RSF are blocked in just two countries – Xi Jinping's China (53 blocked sites) and Vladimir Putin's Russia (49 blocked sites).

[...]

In 2025, RSF restored access to the website of Circle 19, an independent group that provides uncensored information about China. Beijing blocked its platform less than a year after it published a statement of principles denouncing state propaganda on 4 June 2024, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre [...] This initiative aims to provide resources showing that the right to information is deeply rooted in China's traditions, history and political system, contrary to Beijing's propaganda.

[...]

Voice of Tibet, an international radio station broadcasting in both Tibetan and Mandarin, was given 16 mirror sites in 2025. RSF also unblocked the Uyghur Post website, one of the few Uyghur-language media outlets reporting on abuses by the authorities in Xinjiang, the autonomous region in northwest China where most Uyghurs live, which has become an information black hole as a result of the regime’s repression.

[...]

Meduza is the leading independent Russian media outlet in exile and, in March 2022, became one of the first to benefit from Operation Collateral Freedom. However, every time Meduza created a mirror site, the Russian authorities were able to quickly block it. To counter this unprecedented threat, the generation of mirror sites was automated on an unprecedented scale using technology developed by RSF combined with the technical expertise of Meduza’s staff. As a result, 4,556 mirror sites had been created for Meduza by 2025, allowing it to receive a total of 1.9 billion content requests, making it the most visited site of all those benefitting from Operation Collateral Freedom.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52385346

Launched 11 years ago by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to combat online censorship, Operation Collateral Freedom currently enables 177 media outlets and press freedom websites that are blocked in 39 countries – more than half of them in Russia and China – to continue disseminating information online and keep reaching their public.

Archived

By duplicating censored news sites onto mirror sites hosted on the servers of major Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), it allows those living under authoritarian regimes to access their content directly from a standard web browser, without needing to install a VPN (virtual private network). No fewer than 57% of the websites protected by RSF are blocked in just two countries – Xi Jinping's China (53 blocked sites) and Vladimir Putin's Russia (49 blocked sites).

[...]

In 2025, RSF restored access to the website of Circle 19, an independent group that provides uncensored information about China. Beijing blocked its platform less than a year after it published a statement of principles denouncing state propaganda on 4 June 2024, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre [...] This initiative aims to provide resources showing that the right to information is deeply rooted in China's traditions, history and political system, contrary to Beijing's propaganda.

[...]

Voice of Tibet, an international radio station broadcasting in both Tibetan and Mandarin, was given 16 mirror sites in 2025. RSF also unblocked the Uyghur Post website, one of the few Uyghur-language media outlets reporting on abuses by the authorities in Xinjiang, the autonomous region in northwest China where most Uyghurs live, which has become an information black hole as a result of the regime’s repression.

[...]

Meduza is the leading independent Russian media outlet in exile and, in March 2022, became one of the first to benefit from Operation Collateral Freedom. However, every time Meduza created a mirror site, the Russian authorities were able to quickly block it. To counter this unprecedented threat, the generation of mirror sites was automated on an unprecedented scale using technology developed by RSF combined with the technical expertise of Meduza’s staff. As a result, 4,556 mirror sites had been created for Meduza by 2025, allowing it to receive a total of 1.9 billion content requests, making it the most visited site of all those benefitting from Operation Collateral Freedom.

[...]

Launched 11 years ago by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to combat online censorship, Operation Collateral Freedom currently enables 177 media outlets and press freedom websites that are blocked in 39 countries – more than half of them in Russia and China – to continue disseminating information online and keep reaching their public.

Archived

By duplicating censored news sites onto mirror sites hosted on the servers of major Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), it allows those living under authoritarian regimes to access their content directly from a standard web browser, without needing to install a VPN (virtual private network). No fewer than 57% of the websites protected by RSF are blocked in just two countries – Xi Jinping's China (53 blocked sites) and Vladimir Putin's Russia (49 blocked sites).

[...]

In 2025, RSF restored access to the website of Circle 19, an independent group that provides uncensored information about China. Beijing blocked its platform less than a year after it published a statement of principles denouncing state propaganda on 4 June 2024, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre [...] This initiative aims to provide resources showing that the right to information is deeply rooted in China's traditions, history and political system, contrary to Beijing's propaganda.

[...]

Voice of Tibet, an international radio station broadcasting in both Tibetan and Mandarin, was given 16 mirror sites in 2025. RSF also unblocked the Uyghur Post website, one of the few Uyghur-language media outlets reporting on abuses by the authorities in Xinjiang, the autonomous region in northwest China where most Uyghurs live, which has become an information black hole as a result of the regime’s repression.

[...]

Meduza is the leading independent Russian media outlet in exile and, in March 2022, became one of the first to benefit from Operation Collateral Freedom. However, every time Meduza created a mirror site, the Russian authorities were able to quickly block it. To counter this unprecedented threat, the generation of mirror sites was automated on an unprecedented scale using technology developed by RSF combined with the technical expertise of Meduza’s staff. As a result, 4,556 mirror sites had been created for Meduza by 2025, allowing it to receive a total of 1.9 billion content requests, making it the most visited site of all those benefitting from Operation Collateral Freedom.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357783

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

Archived

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term “social governance” (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people’s perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.

[...]

Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.

Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.

In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region’s landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.

[...]

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China’s interior.

Although China formally operates a system of “regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制),” the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

[...]

Governance in the post-violence era

The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.

Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.

For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.

The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/52357180

Taiwanese Indigenous group was booked to perform at the AFC Asia Cup semi-final match between Taiwan and China in Perth on Friday night. Their performance was cancelled at the last minute for "political reasons".