Hotznplotzn

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49279915

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni agreed on Monday to expand cooperation in sectors such as artificial intelligence, aerospace, chips and critical minerals, according to the Blue House.

[...]

South Korea is a global leader in semiconductors and the countries signed a memorandum of understanding for chip industry cooperation, including those related to AI, Seoul's presidential Blue House said in a statement.

[...]

Meloni and Lee also discussed collaboration in joint research projects and exchanges, tourism and culture cooperation, and reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Italy is one of South Korea's four largest trading partners in the European Union, the Blue House said.

Meloni, who is on an Asian tour also taking in Japan and Oman, is on the first state visit by an Italian leader to South Korea in 19 years, it said.

[...]

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni agreed on Monday to expand cooperation in sectors such as artificial intelligence, aerospace, chips and critical minerals, according to the Blue House.

[...]

South Korea is a global leader in semiconductors and the countries signed a memorandum of understanding for chip industry cooperation, including those related to AI, Seoul's presidential Blue House said in a statement.

[...]

Meloni and Lee also discussed collaboration in joint research projects and exchanges, tourism and culture cooperation, and reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Italy is one of South Korea's four largest trading partners in the European Union, the Blue House said.

Meloni, who is on an Asian tour also taking in Japan and Oman, is on the first state visit by an Italian leader to South Korea in 19 years, it said.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49277840

TL;DR:

• Chinese officials say Moscow knew about the US preparations for an operation in Venezuela. Moreover, in late December, Russia began pulling diplomats and their families out of Caracas.
• Russia has not informed China about its assessment of the situation in Venezuela, however, which has caused bewilderment in Beijing and called into question the nature of relations between the two countries.
• Because of U.S. actions, China risks losing billions of dollars in oil loans to Venezuela. As a result, Beijing has found itself in an extremely disadvantageous position, yielding to Washington.
• China is discussing the version that the failure of Russian air defense systems could not be an accident, but a sign of a high level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. In this connection, Beijing is increasingly asking whether Russia can be considered a reliable ally.

Archived

[...]

That an intervention [by the US in Venezuela] was imminent was understood by Russia, one of Venezuela’s most enthusiastic partners over the last two decades. Towards the end of last month Moscow began pulling diplomats and their families out of the capital, Caracas.

Russia’s assessment of the situation, and its withdrawal of personnel, were not shared with Beijing, according to well-placed sources in China. This has caused eyebrows to be raised about what it means for a relationship between the two countries that is supposed to be “comprehensive”, “mutually beneficial” and “eternal”.

Beijing was not simply blindsided by the US operation, it was embarrassed by it. Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy to Latin America, had arrived in Caracas and met Maduro hours before the latter was captured. Shortly before, Wang Yi and Yván Gil, the two countries’ foreign ministers, had spoken by phone to affirm China’s “solidarity and firm support for Venezuela in defending its sovereignty, independence and stability.”

[...]

These words would serve less as a show of resolve than a measure of how limited China’s ability was to translate diplomatic language into meaningful protection or leverage on the ground.

China stands to lose out from the many billions of dollars of loans it has made to Venezuela in return for its oil. It also stands to lose the half a million barrels of oil a day it has been getting from its ally: about 4 per cent of its total oil imports. Such was Beijing’s confidence in its partnership with Maduro and his regime that it invested an estimated $9 billion in building a petrochemical plant in Jieyang, Guangdong province, capable of producing 20 million tons of refined oil a year.

[...]

It is easy to make crass comments about the significance of losing face in Chinese culture. In this case, though, the fact that Beijing has been caught badly out of position, outmanoeuvred by the US and let down by Russia, has sparked vigorous discussion in China — and, in some quarters, speculation that the failure of Russian-built defence systems in Venezuela was not a coincidence, but evidence of high-level co-operation between Moscow and Washington.

[...]

Over the last few years, the question of whether Russia is both a reliable and a good ally has become one of the key talking points among policymakers, advisers and thinkers in China.

Professor Jia Qingguo, former dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and one of the most well-connected figures in Chinese strategic thinking, noted that while Russia’s isolation because of the war in Ukraine had brought economic benefits to China, these have come at a cost.

In particular, he noted in an interview just before the Maduro operation that Moscow’s dependence on China has meant that the latter’s current and future relations with Europe have been compromised. As such, he added, a solution to the war in Ukraine would be of benefit to China.

[...]

For Chinese strategists, the problem is not simply reputational damage in Europe or the US, but the deeper risk of being tied to a partner whose way of doing things cuts directly against China’s own instincts about order, predictability and control.

[...]

For policymakers in Beijing, the contrast is stark: one partner leans on force, disruption and intimidation; the other offers markets, rules and negotiated stability. The question increasingly being debated inside China is not whether Russia is useful in pushing back against American pressure, but whether following Russia’s example leads China towards the kind of global role it actually wants to play.

[...]

As Charter97, an exiled Belarusian rights organization has framed it, China Has Begun To Doubt Russia.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49277108

Archived

[...]

In 2024, [Ahmad-Reza Radan, Iran’s police chief and a vocal supporter of employing force against protesters] visited China and signed a “memorandum on law enforcement cooperation” with China’s minister of public security, Wang XiaoHong, pledging to “upgrade law enforcement and security cooperation” and “strengthen practical collaboration in areas such as counterterrorism” to contribute to regional stability, according to China’s Xinhua state news agency. Neither Xinhua nor IRNA, Iran’s own state news agency, released the memorandum’s full text.

[...]

The People’s Public Security University of China, the country’s top police academy, has run “Advanced Iranian Police Officers Training Programs” since 2015, organized by China’s Ministry of Public Security, according to Chinese school materials and state media reports reviewed by Kharon. Such Iranian cooperation appears to have deepened since, and in 2018, Iran’s National Police University signed a formal agreement institutionalizing more exchange and training programs.

The relationship remains active. On December 25, 2025, just days before Iran’s protests erupted, its ambassador to China visited the People’s Public Security University, pledging to continue “pragmatic cooperation in law enforcement and security,” according to a school press release.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies, a Chinese provider of video surveillance tech, has built deep roots in Iran—and in China’s security establishment.

Its equipment, which flows through sales agents into a country where surveillance technology has reportedly been used to monitor the protests and track dissidents, offers one link between China’s security industry and Tehran’s monitoring capabilities.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies says on its website that it has worked in China's public security sector for more than 20 years, serving clients including the Ministry of Public Security, which awarded it a first-class science and technology award in 2018.

[...]

Tiandy Center is a subsidiary of Iran-based Ati Negar Basir Elektronik Company and a self-described “distributor of Tiandy Products.” An archived version of its website from July 2025 listed 18 offices across Iran and advertised that if a company becomes a Tiandy representative in Iran, it can also represent other Chinese video-surveillance brands, including Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd. and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd. The U.S. added both those companies to the Entity List in 2019, citing their roles in China’s repression and “high-technology surveillance” of minorities, and it later designated both as companies in China’s military industrial complex.

Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar Company is another distributor of Tiandy products in Iran. According to an archived version of its website from last month, the company listed Iranian government entities as its customers, including the Iran Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the national traffic police. In addition to Tiandy products, Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar also said it was a representative for Hangzhou Hikvision and Zhejiang Dahua.

[...]

In response to Iran’s protests and crackdown, China has staked out a clear public position: for its security and trading partner’s “stability” and against U.S. intervention.

“We hope the Iranian government and people will overcome the current difficulties and uphold stability in the country,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said at a press briefing Wednesday. China opposes, she added, “external interference in other countries’ internal affairs.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49277840

TL;DR:

• Chinese officials say Moscow knew about the US preparations for an operation in Venezuela. Moreover, in late December, Russia began pulling diplomats and their families out of Caracas.
• Russia has not informed China about its assessment of the situation in Venezuela, however, which has caused bewilderment in Beijing and called into question the nature of relations between the two countries.
• Because of U.S. actions, China risks losing billions of dollars in oil loans to Venezuela. As a result, Beijing has found itself in an extremely disadvantageous position, yielding to Washington.
• China is discussing the version that the failure of Russian air defense systems could not be an accident, but a sign of a high level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. In this connection, Beijing is increasingly asking whether Russia can be considered a reliable ally.

Archived

[...]

That an intervention [by the US in Venezuela] was imminent was understood by Russia, one of Venezuela’s most enthusiastic partners over the last two decades. Towards the end of last month Moscow began pulling diplomats and their families out of the capital, Caracas.

Russia’s assessment of the situation, and its withdrawal of personnel, were not shared with Beijing, according to well-placed sources in China. This has caused eyebrows to be raised about what it means for a relationship between the two countries that is supposed to be “comprehensive”, “mutually beneficial” and “eternal”.

Beijing was not simply blindsided by the US operation, it was embarrassed by it. Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy to Latin America, had arrived in Caracas and met Maduro hours before the latter was captured. Shortly before, Wang Yi and Yván Gil, the two countries’ foreign ministers, had spoken by phone to affirm China’s “solidarity and firm support for Venezuela in defending its sovereignty, independence and stability.”

[...]

These words would serve less as a show of resolve than a measure of how limited China’s ability was to translate diplomatic language into meaningful protection or leverage on the ground.

China stands to lose out from the many billions of dollars of loans it has made to Venezuela in return for its oil. It also stands to lose the half a million barrels of oil a day it has been getting from its ally: about 4 per cent of its total oil imports. Such was Beijing’s confidence in its partnership with Maduro and his regime that it invested an estimated $9 billion in building a petrochemical plant in Jieyang, Guangdong province, capable of producing 20 million tons of refined oil a year.

[...]

It is easy to make crass comments about the significance of losing face in Chinese culture. In this case, though, the fact that Beijing has been caught badly out of position, outmanoeuvred by the US and let down by Russia, has sparked vigorous discussion in China — and, in some quarters, speculation that the failure of Russian-built defence systems in Venezuela was not a coincidence, but evidence of high-level co-operation between Moscow and Washington.

[...]

Over the last few years, the question of whether Russia is both a reliable and a good ally has become one of the key talking points among policymakers, advisers and thinkers in China.

Professor Jia Qingguo, former dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and one of the most well-connected figures in Chinese strategic thinking, noted that while Russia’s isolation because of the war in Ukraine had brought economic benefits to China, these have come at a cost.

In particular, he noted in an interview just before the Maduro operation that Moscow’s dependence on China has meant that the latter’s current and future relations with Europe have been compromised. As such, he added, a solution to the war in Ukraine would be of benefit to China.

[...]

For Chinese strategists, the problem is not simply reputational damage in Europe or the US, but the deeper risk of being tied to a partner whose way of doing things cuts directly against China’s own instincts about order, predictability and control.

[...]

For policymakers in Beijing, the contrast is stark: one partner leans on force, disruption and intimidation; the other offers markets, rules and negotiated stability. The question increasingly being debated inside China is not whether Russia is useful in pushing back against American pressure, but whether following Russia’s example leads China towards the kind of global role it actually wants to play.

[...]

As Charter97, an exiled Belarusian rights organization has framed it, China Has Begun To Doubt Russia.

TL;DR:

• Chinese officials say Moscow knew about the US preparations for an operation in Venezuela. Moreover, in late December, Russia began pulling diplomats and their families out of Caracas.
• Russia has not informed China about its assessment of the situation in Venezuela, however, which has caused bewilderment in Beijing and called into question the nature of relations between the two countries.
• Because of U.S. actions, China risks losing billions of dollars in oil loans to Venezuela. As a result, Beijing has found itself in an extremely disadvantageous position, yielding to Washington.
• China is discussing the version that the failure of Russian air defense systems could not be an accident, but a sign of a high level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. In this connection, Beijing is increasingly asking whether Russia can be considered a reliable ally.

Archived

[...]

That an intervention [by the US in Venezuela] was imminent was understood by Russia, one of Venezuela’s most enthusiastic partners over the last two decades. Towards the end of last month Moscow began pulling diplomats and their families out of the capital, Caracas.

Russia’s assessment of the situation, and its withdrawal of personnel, were not shared with Beijing, according to well-placed sources in China. This has caused eyebrows to be raised about what it means for a relationship between the two countries that is supposed to be “comprehensive”, “mutually beneficial” and “eternal”.

Beijing was not simply blindsided by the US operation, it was embarrassed by it. Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy to Latin America, had arrived in Caracas and met Maduro hours before the latter was captured. Shortly before, Wang Yi and Yván Gil, the two countries’ foreign ministers, had spoken by phone to affirm China’s “solidarity and firm support for Venezuela in defending its sovereignty, independence and stability.”

[...]

These words would serve less as a show of resolve than a measure of how limited China’s ability was to translate diplomatic language into meaningful protection or leverage on the ground.

China stands to lose out from the many billions of dollars of loans it has made to Venezuela in return for its oil. It also stands to lose the half a million barrels of oil a day it has been getting from its ally: about 4 per cent of its total oil imports. Such was Beijing’s confidence in its partnership with Maduro and his regime that it invested an estimated $9 billion in building a petrochemical plant in Jieyang, Guangdong province, capable of producing 20 million tons of refined oil a year.

[...]

It is easy to make crass comments about the significance of losing face in Chinese culture. In this case, though, the fact that Beijing has been caught badly out of position, outmanoeuvred by the US and let down by Russia, has sparked vigorous discussion in China — and, in some quarters, speculation that the failure of Russian-built defence systems in Venezuela was not a coincidence, but evidence of high-level co-operation between Moscow and Washington.

[...]

Over the last few years, the question of whether Russia is both a reliable and a good ally has become one of the key talking points among policymakers, advisers and thinkers in China.

Professor Jia Qingguo, former dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and one of the most well-connected figures in Chinese strategic thinking, noted that while Russia’s isolation because of the war in Ukraine had brought economic benefits to China, these have come at a cost.

In particular, he noted in an interview just before the Maduro operation that Moscow’s dependence on China has meant that the latter’s current and future relations with Europe have been compromised. As such, he added, a solution to the war in Ukraine would be of benefit to China.

[...]

For Chinese strategists, the problem is not simply reputational damage in Europe or the US, but the deeper risk of being tied to a partner whose way of doing things cuts directly against China’s own instincts about order, predictability and control.

[...]

For policymakers in Beijing, the contrast is stark: one partner leans on force, disruption and intimidation; the other offers markets, rules and negotiated stability. The question increasingly being debated inside China is not whether Russia is useful in pushing back against American pressure, but whether following Russia’s example leads China towards the kind of global role it actually wants to play.

[...]

As Charter97, an exiled Belarusian rights organization has framed it, China Has Begun To Doubt Russia.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49277108

Archived

[...]

In 2024, [Ahmad-Reza Radan, Iran’s police chief and a vocal supporter of employing force against protesters] visited China and signed a “memorandum on law enforcement cooperation” with China’s minister of public security, Wang XiaoHong, pledging to “upgrade law enforcement and security cooperation” and “strengthen practical collaboration in areas such as counterterrorism” to contribute to regional stability, according to China’s Xinhua state news agency. Neither Xinhua nor IRNA, Iran’s own state news agency, released the memorandum’s full text.

[...]

The People’s Public Security University of China, the country’s top police academy, has run “Advanced Iranian Police Officers Training Programs” since 2015, organized by China’s Ministry of Public Security, according to Chinese school materials and state media reports reviewed by Kharon. Such Iranian cooperation appears to have deepened since, and in 2018, Iran’s National Police University signed a formal agreement institutionalizing more exchange and training programs.

The relationship remains active. On December 25, 2025, just days before Iran’s protests erupted, its ambassador to China visited the People’s Public Security University, pledging to continue “pragmatic cooperation in law enforcement and security,” according to a school press release.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies, a Chinese provider of video surveillance tech, has built deep roots in Iran—and in China’s security establishment.

Its equipment, which flows through sales agents into a country where surveillance technology has reportedly been used to monitor the protests and track dissidents, offers one link between China’s security industry and Tehran’s monitoring capabilities.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies says on its website that it has worked in China's public security sector for more than 20 years, serving clients including the Ministry of Public Security, which awarded it a first-class science and technology award in 2018.

[...]

Tiandy Center is a subsidiary of Iran-based Ati Negar Basir Elektronik Company and a self-described “distributor of Tiandy Products.” An archived version of its website from July 2025 listed 18 offices across Iran and advertised that if a company becomes a Tiandy representative in Iran, it can also represent other Chinese video-surveillance brands, including Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd. and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd. The U.S. added both those companies to the Entity List in 2019, citing their roles in China’s repression and “high-technology surveillance” of minorities, and it later designated both as companies in China’s military industrial complex.

Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar Company is another distributor of Tiandy products in Iran. According to an archived version of its website from last month, the company listed Iranian government entities as its customers, including the Iran Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the national traffic police. In addition to Tiandy products, Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar also said it was a representative for Hangzhou Hikvision and Zhejiang Dahua.

[...]

In response to Iran’s protests and crackdown, China has staked out a clear public position: for its security and trading partner’s “stability” and against U.S. intervention.

“We hope the Iranian government and people will overcome the current difficulties and uphold stability in the country,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said at a press briefing Wednesday. China opposes, she added, “external interference in other countries’ internal affairs.”

Archived

[...]

In 2024, [Ahmad-Reza Radan, Iran’s police chief and a vocal supporter of employing force against protesters] visited China and signed a “memorandum on law enforcement cooperation” with China’s minister of public security, Wang XiaoHong, pledging to “upgrade law enforcement and security cooperation” and “strengthen practical collaboration in areas such as counterterrorism” to contribute to regional stability, according to China’s Xinhua state news agency. Neither Xinhua nor IRNA, Iran’s own state news agency, released the memorandum’s full text.

[...]

The People’s Public Security University of China, the country’s top police academy, has run “Advanced Iranian Police Officers Training Programs” since 2015, organized by China’s Ministry of Public Security, according to Chinese school materials and state media reports reviewed by Kharon. Such Iranian cooperation appears to have deepened since, and in 2018, Iran’s National Police University signed a formal agreement institutionalizing more exchange and training programs.

The relationship remains active. On December 25, 2025, just days before Iran’s protests erupted, its ambassador to China visited the People’s Public Security University, pledging to continue “pragmatic cooperation in law enforcement and security,” according to a school press release.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies, a Chinese provider of video surveillance tech, has built deep roots in Iran—and in China’s security establishment.

Its equipment, which flows through sales agents into a country where surveillance technology has reportedly been used to monitor the protests and track dissidents, offers one link between China’s security industry and Tehran’s monitoring capabilities.

[...]

Tiandy Technologies says on its website that it has worked in China's public security sector for more than 20 years, serving clients including the Ministry of Public Security, which awarded it a first-class science and technology award in 2018.

[...]

Tiandy Center is a subsidiary of Iran-based Ati Negar Basir Elektronik Company and a self-described “distributor of Tiandy Products.” An archived version of its website from July 2025 listed 18 offices across Iran and advertised that if a company becomes a Tiandy representative in Iran, it can also represent other Chinese video-surveillance brands, including Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd. and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd. The U.S. added both those companies to the Entity List in 2019, citing their roles in China’s repression and “high-technology surveillance” of minorities, and it later designated both as companies in China’s military industrial complex.

Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar Company is another distributor of Tiandy products in Iran. According to an archived version of its website from last month, the company listed Iranian government entities as its customers, including the Iran Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the national traffic police. In addition to Tiandy products, Elm va Sanat Hafez Gostar also said it was a representative for Hangzhou Hikvision and Zhejiang Dahua.

[...]

In response to Iran’s protests and crackdown, China has staked out a clear public position: for its security and trading partner’s “stability” and against U.S. intervention.

“We hope the Iranian government and people will overcome the current difficulties and uphold stability in the country,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman said at a press briefing Wednesday. China opposes, she added, “external interference in other countries’ internal affairs.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49238904

Europas regelbasierter Handel ist laut Ökonom Achim Wambach ein Vorteil in der Weltwirtschaft. Wo Härte gegenüber China nötig wird und warum Innovation über den Wohlstand der EU entscheidet, erklärt der ZEW-Präsident im Interview.

Frage: Wir haben gemessen an der Bevölkerungszahl den größten Markt auf der Welt. 450 Millionen Menschen leben und konsumieren in Europa. In den USA sind es nur 350 Millionen. Müssen wir uns also überhaupt verstecken?

Achim Wambach: Nein, ich glaube nicht, dass wir uns verstecken müssen. Ich nehme dafür gern die Zahlen für Deutschland: Rund zehn Prozent unseres Handels machen wir mit den USA, etwa zehn Prozent mit China. Das heißt, 80 Prozent unseres Handels finden woanders statt. Das sind, finde ich, auch unsere Hausaufgaben: Jemand muss sich um diese 80 Prozent kümmern.

Rund 40 Prozent davon entfallen auf Europa - Stichwort europäischer Binnenmarkt. Die Frage ist: Wie holen wir dort noch mehr heraus? Denn es gibt immer noch viele Barrieren, die wir uns selbst gebaut haben und die wir auch selbst wieder abbauen könnten. Die anderen 40 Prozent entfallen auf den Rest der Welt.

[...]

Genau hier liegt eine Stärke Europas, die wir oft fälschlich als Schwäche interpretieren: Wir handeln regelbasiert. Beim Mercosur-Abkommen etwa müssen die südamerikanischen Partner keine Angst haben, dass sich ein Präsident hinstellt und plötzlich Strafzölle von 50 Prozent verhängt, weil ihm etwas politisch nicht passt. Das würde eine Kommissionspräsidentin wie Ursula von der Leyen gar nicht können.

Dieses regelbasierte WTO-Handelssystem schafft Verlässlichkeit. Es sorgt dafür, dass sich Investitionen in Partnerschaften mit Europa lohnen. Das ist eine echte Stärke, die Europa noch viel offensiver ausspielen könnte - gerade im Vergleich zu den USA und China, wo wir zunehmend politische Willkür erleben. Dort müssen Unternehmen ständig befürchten, dass neue Regeln den Handel von heute auf morgen gefährden. Das gibt es in Europa so nicht.

[...]

[Gegenüber den USA] müssen Grenzen klar benannt werden - positiv formuliert. Ich kann zum Beispiel aus der Wissenschaft berichten, dass sich viele Akteure derzeit stark nach Europa orientieren. Der gesellschaftliche und politische Druck in den USA ist enorm. In gewisser Weise profitiert Europa davon. Studien zeigen auch, dass Europa durch Handelsumlenkungen nicht der Verlierer ist: Unsere Zollsätze sind vergleichsweise niedrig, sodass Europa für andere Regionen einspringen kann. Das ist die amerikanische Seite.

Bei China ist die Lage deutlich problematischer. China subventioniert seine Unternehmen massiv und überflutet damit Märkte. Wir haben das bereits im Solarsektor gesehen: Europäische Unternehmen wurden verdrängt. Hier besteht eine reale Gefahr, dass sich das wiederholt - etwa bei der Elektromobilität. In solchen Fällen sprechen gute Gründe dafür, temporäre und WTO-konforme Schutzzölle einzuführen. Nicht als Abschottung, sondern um jungen, noch nicht etablierten Industrien Zeit zu geben, sich zu entwickeln.

[...]

Europa hat den Weckruf verstanden: Die Verteidigungsausgaben steigen massiv. Jetzt muss Europa zeigen, was in ihr steckt - insbesondere, dass Zusammenarbeit funktioniert und nicht jedes Land sein eigenes Süppchen kocht. Da liegt großes Potenzial. Beim aktuellen Handelsdeal hat Frau von der Leyen sehr zurückhaltend verhandelt.

Rein bei den Zöllen steht Europa vergleichsweise gut da, die effektive Belastung ist gering. Aber die Sorge ist ja, dass weitere Forderungen folgen - etwa zur Digitalregulierung oder zu geopolitischen Themen wie Grönland. Dann muss Europa klar machen: Wir haben diesen Deal geschlossen, aber wir haben auch eigene Interessen, die wir verteidigen. In solchen Punkten muss Europa künftig konfrontativer auftreten.

[...]

Die aktuelle Politik [in Europa] ist sehr defensiv und stark auf das Gestern gerichtet: Welche Industrie baut wo ab? Die entscheidende Frage lautet aber: Wo stehen wir in zehn Jahren? Technologische Souveränität bedeutet, in zehn Jahren Technologieführer zu sein. Wohlstand entsteht durch Innovationen - nicht durch austauschbare Güter. Und hier hat die EU noch einiges zu tun.

Unsere Förderprogramme sind stark auf Produktion ausgerichtet, aber zu wenig auf Innovation. Gleichzeitig legen wir Start-ups und etablierten Unternehmen immer wieder Steine in den Weg: hohe Steuerbelastung, hohe Abgaben für Fachkräfte, geringe Flexibilität im Binnenmarkt. Gute Fachkräfte gehen dann lieber in die USA oder nach Großbritannien.

Das alles bremst Innovation. Die zentrale Frage muss lauten: Wie heben wir die Innovationslandschaft in Europa auf das nächste Niveau? Das ist einer der wichtigsten Hebel für die Zukunft.

Europas regelbasierter Handel ist laut Ökonom Achim Wambach ein Vorteil in der Weltwirtschaft. Wo Härte gegenüber China nötig wird und warum Innovation über den Wohlstand der EU entscheidet, erklärt der ZEW-Präsident im Interview.

Frage: Wir haben gemessen an der Bevölkerungszahl den größten Markt auf der Welt. 450 Millionen Menschen leben und konsumieren in Europa. In den USA sind es nur 350 Millionen. Müssen wir uns also überhaupt verstecken?

Achim Wambach: Nein, ich glaube nicht, dass wir uns verstecken müssen. Ich nehme dafür gern die Zahlen für Deutschland: Rund zehn Prozent unseres Handels machen wir mit den USA, etwa zehn Prozent mit China. Das heißt, 80 Prozent unseres Handels finden woanders statt. Das sind, finde ich, auch unsere Hausaufgaben: Jemand muss sich um diese 80 Prozent kümmern.

Rund 40 Prozent davon entfallen auf Europa - Stichwort europäischer Binnenmarkt. Die Frage ist: Wie holen wir dort noch mehr heraus? Denn es gibt immer noch viele Barrieren, die wir uns selbst gebaut haben und die wir auch selbst wieder abbauen könnten. Die anderen 40 Prozent entfallen auf den Rest der Welt.

[...]

Genau hier liegt eine Stärke Europas, die wir oft fälschlich als Schwäche interpretieren: Wir handeln regelbasiert. Beim Mercosur-Abkommen etwa müssen die südamerikanischen Partner keine Angst haben, dass sich ein Präsident hinstellt und plötzlich Strafzölle von 50 Prozent verhängt, weil ihm etwas politisch nicht passt. Das würde eine Kommissionspräsidentin wie Ursula von der Leyen gar nicht können.

Dieses regelbasierte WTO-Handelssystem schafft Verlässlichkeit. Es sorgt dafür, dass sich Investitionen in Partnerschaften mit Europa lohnen. Das ist eine echte Stärke, die Europa noch viel offensiver ausspielen könnte - gerade im Vergleich zu den USA und China, wo wir zunehmend politische Willkür erleben. Dort müssen Unternehmen ständig befürchten, dass neue Regeln den Handel von heute auf morgen gefährden. Das gibt es in Europa so nicht.

[...]

[Gegenüber den USA] müssen Grenzen klar benannt werden - positiv formuliert. Ich kann zum Beispiel aus der Wissenschaft berichten, dass sich viele Akteure derzeit stark nach Europa orientieren. Der gesellschaftliche und politische Druck in den USA ist enorm. In gewisser Weise profitiert Europa davon. Studien zeigen auch, dass Europa durch Handelsumlenkungen nicht der Verlierer ist: Unsere Zollsätze sind vergleichsweise niedrig, sodass Europa für andere Regionen einspringen kann. Das ist die amerikanische Seite.

Bei China ist die Lage deutlich problematischer. China subventioniert seine Unternehmen massiv und überflutet damit Märkte. Wir haben das bereits im Solarsektor gesehen: Europäische Unternehmen wurden verdrängt. Hier besteht eine reale Gefahr, dass sich das wiederholt - etwa bei der Elektromobilität. In solchen Fällen sprechen gute Gründe dafür, temporäre und WTO-konforme Schutzzölle einzuführen. Nicht als Abschottung, sondern um jungen, noch nicht etablierten Industrien Zeit zu geben, sich zu entwickeln.

[...]

Europa hat den Weckruf verstanden: Die Verteidigungsausgaben steigen massiv. Jetzt muss Europa zeigen, was in ihr steckt - insbesondere, dass Zusammenarbeit funktioniert und nicht jedes Land sein eigenes Süppchen kocht. Da liegt großes Potenzial. Beim aktuellen Handelsdeal hat Frau von der Leyen sehr zurückhaltend verhandelt.

Rein bei den Zöllen steht Europa vergleichsweise gut da, die effektive Belastung ist gering. Aber die Sorge ist ja, dass weitere Forderungen folgen - etwa zur Digitalregulierung oder zu geopolitischen Themen wie Grönland. Dann muss Europa klar machen: Wir haben diesen Deal geschlossen, aber wir haben auch eigene Interessen, die wir verteidigen. In solchen Punkten muss Europa künftig konfrontativer auftreten.

[...]

Die aktuelle Politik [in Europa] ist sehr defensiv und stark auf das Gestern gerichtet: Welche Industrie baut wo ab? Die entscheidende Frage lautet aber: Wo stehen wir in zehn Jahren? Technologische Souveränität bedeutet, in zehn Jahren Technologieführer zu sein. Wohlstand entsteht durch Innovationen - nicht durch austauschbare Güter. Und hier hat die EU noch einiges zu tun.

Unsere Förderprogramme sind stark auf Produktion ausgerichtet, aber zu wenig auf Innovation. Gleichzeitig legen wir Start-ups und etablierten Unternehmen immer wieder Steine in den Weg: hohe Steuerbelastung, hohe Abgaben für Fachkräfte, geringe Flexibilität im Binnenmarkt. Gute Fachkräfte gehen dann lieber in die USA oder nach Großbritannien.

Das alles bremst Innovation. Die zentrale Frage muss lauten: Wie heben wir die Innovationslandschaft in Europa auf das nächste Niveau? Das ist einer der wichtigsten Hebel für die Zukunft.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49236801

The original link is in German. This is a paraphrased automated translation with minimal edits.

Europe’s rules-based trade is an advantage in the global economy. Where toughness towards China is needed and why innovation decides the prosperity of the EU, explains economist Achim Wambach, President of the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (in German: Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) in an interview.

Question: We have the largest market in the world in terms of population. 450 million people live and consume in Europe. In the US, it is only 350 million. Do we have to hide at all?

Achim Wambach: No, I don’t think we have to hide. Take the figures for Germany: About ten percent of our trade is with the US, about ten percent with China. This means that 80% of our trade takes place elsewhere. I think that is also our homework: Someone has to take care of that 80 percent.

Around 40 percent of this is accounted for by Europe - keyword European Single Market. The question is: How do we get more out of there? Because there are still many barriers that we have built ourselves and that we could also dismantle ourselves. The other 40 percent is in the rest of the world.

[...]

This is precisely Europe’s strength, which we often misinterpret as a weakness: we are rules based. With the Mercosur agreement, for example, the South American partners do not have to be afraid that a president will suddenly impose punitive tariffs of 50 percent because something politically does not suit him. A Commission President like Ursula von der Leyen would not be able to do that.

This rules-based WTO [World Trading Organization] trading system creates reliability. It ensures that investments in partnerships with Europe are worthwhile. This is a real strength that Europe could play out even more offensively - especially compared to the USA and China, where we are witnessing increasing political arbitrariness. There, companies must constantly fear that new rules will jeopardize trade overnight. This is not the case in Europe.

[...]

[Toward the U.S.], limits must be clearly defined [...] For example, I can report from science that many players are currently heavily oriented towards Europe. The social and political pressure in the US is enormous. Europe benefits from this in some way. Studies also show that Europe is not the loser through trade diversions: Our tariffs are comparatively low, so Europe can step in for other regions.

[...]

The situation in China is much more problematic. China is massively subsidizing its companies, flooding markets. We have already seen this in the solar sector: European companies have been displaced. There is a real risk that this will happen again – for example in the case of e-mobility. In such cases, there are good reasons for introducing temporary and WTO-compliant protective tariffs. Not as isolation, but to give young, not yet established industries time to develop.

[...]

[Regarding setting limits toward the USA], Europe has understood the wake-up call: defence spending is rising massively. Now Europe has to show what is in it - in particular that cooperation works and not every country cooks its own soup.

[...]

In terms of tariffs alone, Europe is doing comparatively well, the effective burden is low. But the concern is that further demands will follow – for example on digital regulation or on geopolitical issues such as Greenland. Then Europe must make it clear: We made this deal, but we also have our own interests that we defend. In future, Europe must be more confrontational on such issues. . [...]

The current [European] policy is very defensive and strongly focused on the past: which industry is becoming weaker? But the crucial question is: where do we stand in ten years? Technological sovereignty means being a technology leader in ten years. Wealth comes from innovation - not from interchangeable goods. And the EU still has a lot to do here.

Our funding programmes are strongly geared towards production, but too little towards innovation. At the same time, we keep putting obstacles in the way of start-ups and established companies: high tax burden, high levies for skilled workers, low flexibility in the internal market. Good specialists prefer to go to the USA or the UK.

All this slows down innovation. The central question must be: How do we take the innovation landscape in Europe to the next level? This is one of the most important levers for the future.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49236801

The original link is in German. This is a paraphrased automated translation with minimal edits.

Europe’s rules-based trade is an advantage in the global economy. Where toughness towards China is needed and why innovation decides the prosperity of the EU, explains economist Achim Wambach, President of the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (in German: Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) in an interview.

Question: We have the largest market in the world in terms of population. 450 million people live and consume in Europe. In the US, it is only 350 million. Do we have to hide at all?

Achim Wambach: No, I don’t think we have to hide. Take the figures for Germany: About ten percent of our trade is with the US, about ten percent with China. This means that 80% of our trade takes place elsewhere. I think that is also our homework: Someone has to take care of that 80 percent.

Around 40 percent of this is accounted for by Europe - keyword European Single Market. The question is: How do we get more out of there? Because there are still many barriers that we have built ourselves and that we could also dismantle ourselves. The other 40 percent is in the rest of the world.

[...]

This is precisely Europe’s strength, which we often misinterpret as a weakness: we are rules based. With the Mercosur agreement, for example, the South American partners do not have to be afraid that a president will suddenly impose punitive tariffs of 50 percent because something politically does not suit him. A Commission President like Ursula von der Leyen would not be able to do that.

This rules-based WTO [World Trading Organization] trading system creates reliability. It ensures that investments in partnerships with Europe are worthwhile. This is a real strength that Europe could play out even more offensively - especially compared to the USA and China, where we are witnessing increasing political arbitrariness. There, companies must constantly fear that new rules will jeopardize trade overnight. This is not the case in Europe.

[...]

[Toward the U.S.], limits must be clearly defined [...] For example, I can report from science that many players are currently heavily oriented towards Europe. The social and political pressure in the US is enormous. Europe benefits from this in some way. Studies also show that Europe is not the loser through trade diversions: Our tariffs are comparatively low, so Europe can step in for other regions.

[...]

The situation in China is much more problematic. China is massively subsidizing its companies, flooding markets. We have already seen this in the solar sector: European companies have been displaced. There is a real risk that this will happen again – for example in the case of e-mobility. In such cases, there are good reasons for introducing temporary and WTO-compliant protective tariffs. Not as isolation, but to give young, not yet established industries time to develop.

[...]

[Regarding setting limits toward the USA], Europe has understood the wake-up call: defence spending is rising massively. Now Europe has to show what is in it - in particular that cooperation works and not every country cooks its own soup.

[...]

In terms of tariffs alone, Europe is doing comparatively well, the effective burden is low. But the concern is that further demands will follow – for example on digital regulation or on geopolitical issues such as Greenland. Then Europe must make it clear: We made this deal, but we also have our own interests that we defend. In future, Europe must be more confrontational on such issues. . [...]

The current [European] policy is very defensive and strongly focused on the past: which industry is becoming weaker? But the crucial question is: where do we stand in ten years? Technological sovereignty means being a technology leader in ten years. Wealth comes from innovation - not from interchangeable goods. And the EU still has a lot to do here.

Our funding programmes are strongly geared towards production, but too little towards innovation. At the same time, we keep putting obstacles in the way of start-ups and established companies: high tax burden, high levies for skilled workers, low flexibility in the internal market. Good specialists prefer to go to the USA or the UK.

All this slows down innovation. The central question must be: How do we take the innovation landscape in Europe to the next level? This is one of the most important levers for the future.

[...]