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It's the "change your password often odyssey" 2.0. If it is safe, it is safe, it doesn't become unsafe after an arbitrary period of time (if the admin takes care and revokes compromised certs). If it is unsafe by design, the design flaw should be fixed, no?
Or am I missing the point?
The point is, if the certificate gets stolen, there's no GOOD mechanism for marking it bad.
If your password gets stolen, only two entities need to be told it's invalid. You and the website the password is for.
If an SSL certificate is stolen, everyone who would potentially use the website need to know, and they need to know before they try to contact the website. SSL certificate revocation is a very difficult communication problem, and it's mostly ignored by browsers because of the major performance issues it brings having to double check SSL certs with a third party.
That’s what OCSP is for. Only Google isn’t playing along as per that wiki entry.
I mean, are you intending to retroactively add SSL to every tool implementing SSL in the past few decades?…
Browsers aren’t the only thing that ingress SSL.
Then there’s the older way of checking CRLs which any tool of the past few decades should support.
That's what Carla are for.
How did you reply to a deleted comment?
Probably the comment has federated to lemmy.world, but the deletion of the comment hasn't yet.
Looks like autoincorrect did a s/CRLs/Carla/ for you.
And that somehow Lemmy didn't federate my deletion!
But browsers have a marker for dangerous sites - surely Cloudflare, Amazon or Google should have a report system and deliver warnings at the base
Browsers are only a (large) fraction of SSL traffic.
So is there an example of SSL certs being stolen and used nefariously. Only thing that sticks out to me is certificate authorities being bad.
Yep. https://fedia.io/m/selfhosted@lemmy.world/t/3090624/Decreasing-Certificate-Lifetimes-to-45-Days/comment/13237364#entry-comment-13237364
Short lifespans are also great when domains change their owner. With a 3 year lifespan, the old owner could possibly still read traffic for a few more years.
When the lifespan ist just 30-90 days, that risk is significatly reduced.
Only matters for LE certs.
You can still buy 1 year certs
For 3 more months or so, you can't buy them in april 2026 anymore
oh? Damn
They are going down to 200 day expiration in March 2026. You can still buy 5 year certificates today but you still need to reissue them in 365 day cadence.
Moot point!
You could still get certificates for other people's domains from Honest Ahmed 's used cars and totally trustworthy CA or so. But that's another story. (there are A LOT of trusted CAs in everybody OS and browser. Do you know and trust them all?)
The maintainers of the big web browsers have pretty strict rules for CAs in this list. If any one of them gets caught issuing only one certificate maliciously, they are out of business.
And all CAs are required to publish each certificate in multiple public, cryptographically signed ledgers.
Sure, there is a history of CAs issuing certificates to people that shouldn't have them (e.g. for espionage), but that is almost impossible now.