What?
Those conflicts were conventional forces being extended to achieve friendly political stability in nations with a large enough population that was hostile to be a problem to root out. Vietnam had a conventional force element with the NVA, though the issue for the U.S. was still one of creating political stability in the south for a regime that was locally unpopular.
In your suggestion the U.S. is supposed to play the role of the Viet Cong in Lebanon, and Hezbollah is supposed to play the role of a foreign occupying conventional military.
The U.S. (and the Soviets in Afghanistan) always had the option of withdrawing to their home countries. This was easily doable at any time they wished, so the calculation of these fights for the opposing side was running the occupying side out political patience. That's not really the same situation with Hezbollah. Defeat was not about racking up a body count enough to collapse the occupying military's ability to exist, but to frustrate their efforts until local politics became fed up with the war.
So, how exactly would this be done?


All of your examples were of supporting existing local insurgencies in order to help them frustrate foreign conventional occupying forces. The occupiers did not have to choose between victory or death, but could at their leisure withdraw. Having that option creates increasing political pressure to withdraw over time. The is exacerbated by military conscription to an unpopular war and a lack of ideological unity in the occupying nation. This is not the circumstance with Hezbollah.
Read 'Mao Zedong's Principles of Peoples War' to understand the dynamics of a mid-20th century insurgency, and have a foundation for how that has adapted with technology.