This is a most excellent place for technology news and articles.
I got a notification about a package that changed the maintainer that looks rather suspicious to me... So i would still be careful...
https://aur.archlinux.org/account/svantehedlund
That user doesn't seem to be blocked... So there might still be more going on.
A couple of weeks ago, some dingbat of an AUR admin orphaned a package of mine, ignoring the comment I left on it and my post to the mailing list.
Even though this package, to my knowledge, didn’t end up being attacked, I wonder if this was a potential precursor to the recent attack…
To answer your question, generally yes the package maintainer is the one who maintains the package for the current version of the distro, even if upstream is unchanged. If a package is no longer compatible and no one is making it compatible, then yes it's unmaintained and should be removed.
Does anyone know if the NixOS packages are safer from these types of attacks? As far as I know many packages are missing maintainers.
I've seen AUR warned against often, also by Arch team members.
I never thought it was a huge deal, but apparently anything that can be attacked will be attacked nowadays.
I start to wonder if we need something sitting between extra and aur, few more trusted maintainers and well secured update process that’s more than the aur Wild West
Also, some sort of yay hook to do some scanning for suspicious diffs and warning or skipping those packages…
I don’t want / need a system where I can blindly update everything, but something to help me avoid having to visually check every package diff would be nice
I feel like this could be a use for LLMs that isn’t slop. It’s not going to catch everything of course but I imagine it would be a whole lot better than nothing
Yes that would be nice, but I'm not sure that is possible.
This is what happens when a shit load of packages that just sit around basically unmaintained are allowed to sit around.
Maybe injecting the infections made it look like they were maintained? 😋
Yeah if your machine can be added to a botnet then it will be. Resistance is futile, we are Borg style.
We're currently at 1621.
I'm still missing any sort of in-depth info about all this.
Start here. https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=313892
AUR, the Arch User Repository is under an attack. The attack vector is any orphaned package that doesn't have a current maintainer. Those packages are being taken over by a malicious group. https://redlib.catsarch.com/r/archlinux/comments/1u3tn4e/tons_of_new_infected_aur_packages_were_just/ If a package maintainer quits/leaves/abandons a project, anybody can take control of the package if there's been no maintainer for a certain period of time. What we're learning now is that this process could be automated and done en masse. They're modifying PKGBUILD files to use a java script installer like npm, bun, yarn, nodejs to shove malware onto a system. So if you have a package that's marked as infected and you've updated your PC using an AUR helper like yay or paru during this time without checking the PKGBUILD you could be in trouble.
What users are advised to do is not update any AUR packages until otherwise noted. Scan your systems for any packages where the PKGBUILD reports installing an atomic-lockfile, js-digest file through npm, bun, nodejs, yarn and the like. Delete those packages.
The number of infected packages has gone from 400 to 600 to 1500 in a matter of hours last night. The AUR team has been on top of it almost the moment it got recognized. The AUR has well over 100,000 packages. Last night another user ran some numbers and at the time 718 infected packages had no users at all. The most popular package is an old Gnome dependency libgdata that was dropped years ago but could still be on systems. There's a lot of old packages using ancient python2 deps that look to be infected as well. https://redlib.catsarch.com/r/archlinux/comments/1u4fzea/according_to_pkgstats_these_are_the_most_popular/ list of infected packages https://md.archlinux.org/s/SxbqukK6IA Seems like this was caught because old maintainers started getting emails about package updates to old projects they were on. Those OGs sprung into action.
They got hacked.
Use Debian. /s
I meant something I can read.
They got hacked.
I don't think so.
I mean
Like...
Yes?
Yes, that's what happened. That is the correct word for it.
Attackers exploited vulnerabilities in a system in order to run code on other people's machines
Wouldn't even suprise me if they just did it fo the lulz.
me too
What to do if I found a package I installed to be in that list? libgdata to be specific?
Probably reinstall (all is supposed to be fixed as of over 12h ago). This time check the PKGBUILD and also whichever (git) repo the software is pulled from.
See if infected versions of npm packages atomic-lockfile and js-digest are installed.
Have a check if you updated it recently (PKGBUILD history, about June 10-12). If not you're fine.
If:
Personally I would reset everything if I got anything, to kill both any infection and my paranoia. Then reset credentials.
Was it installed from the aur? If not, you're fine
libgdata here is specifically very messy. It was an official package since it was a required dependency for older versions of GNOME, then in GNOME 50 they dropped the dependency and so did Arch from their repos. But because pacman doesn't remove dangling dependencies, you end up with libgdata still installed, until Arch Linux moves dropped packages into the AUR as an orphan, which happened in this case 5/31. This allowed it to be perfectly timed for the attackers to pick it up on 6/11. Now, you'd inadvertently update libgdata from an AUR source if you're using an AUR helper.
"I use arch btw" lmao
Arch and AUR are not really the same. To be fair AUR is the fanfiction version that fits inside the story. But you have to purposely work to use it. So it's not Arch that was compromised.
Yesterday that was 400 packages, now it's 1500.
Tomorrow 3000 ?
