this post was submitted on 01 May 2026
87 points (97.8% liked)

Linux

17374 readers
27 users here now

Welcome to c/linux!

Welcome to our thriving Linux community! Whether you're a seasoned Linux enthusiast or just starting your journey, we're excited to have you here. Explore, learn, and collaborate with like-minded individuals who share a passion for open-source software and the endless possibilities it offers. Together, let's dive into the world of Linux and embrace the power of freedom, customization, and innovation. Enjoy your stay and feel free to join the vibrant discussions that await you!

Rules:

  1. Stay on topic: Posts and discussions should be related to Linux, open source software, and related technologies.

  2. Be respectful: Treat fellow community members with respect and courtesy.

  3. Quality over quantity: Share informative and thought-provoking content.

  4. No spam or self-promotion: Avoid excessive self-promotion or spamming.

  5. No NSFW adult content

  6. Follow general lemmy guidelines.

founded 2 years ago
MODERATORS
 

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a Linux local privilege escalation (LPE) flaw that could allow an unprivileged local user to obtain root.

The high-severity vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-31431 (CVSS score: 7.8) has been codenamed Copy Fail by Xint.io and Theori.

"An unprivileged local user can write four controlled bytes into the page cache of any readable file on a Linux system, and use that to gain root," the vulnerability research team at Xint.io and Theori said.

At its core, the vulnerability stems from a logic flaw in the Linux kernel's cryptographic subsystem, specifically within the algif_aead module. The issue was introduced in a source code commit made in August 2017.

Successful exploitation of the shortcoming could allow a simple 732-byte Python script to edit a setuid binary and obtain root on essentially all Linux distributions shipped since 2017, including Amazon Linux, RHEL, SUSE, and Ubuntu. The Python exploit involves four steps -

  • Open an AF_ALG socket and bind to authencesn(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))
  • Construct the shellcode payload
  • Trigger the write operation to the kernel's cached copy of "/usr/bin/su"
  • Call execve("/usr/bin/su") to load the injected shellcode and run it as root

While the vulnerability is not remotely exploitable in isolation, a local unprivileged user can get root simply by corrupting the page cache of a setuid binary. The same primitive also has cross-container impacts as the page cache is shared across all processes on a system.

top 26 comments
sorted by: hot top controversial new old
[–] snoons@lemmy.ca 37 points 4 days ago (1 children)

I suppose this is why my computer updated when I booted it up yesterday. And then I had to update and reboot. Then after I rebooted I had to logout to install extension updates. Then I I had more updates that required another reboot!

Big thanks to all the people that patched this so quickly, what a huge batch of updates!

...I am not complaining, I think it's pretty cool and a bit funny.

[–] illusionist@lemmy.zip 2 points 3 days ago* (last edited 3 days ago) (1 children)

In response to your comment, I logged into mine, ran the upgrade and saw that it was already there. Easy automatic updates for the win. Thx fedora

[–] henfredemars@infosec.pub 2 points 2 days ago

This was also my experience. I know the disclosure was handled poorly, but I’m pleased to see that my distribution (Fedora) reacted expediently to news of the security issue.

[–] Scipitie@lemmy.dbzer0.com 26 points 4 days ago (2 children)

Though this is a severe exploit, note that you need already user access to the machine to use it.

Dor like ... Everyone here who learns from it cis this need it's likely a non issue. Still good practice to fix but if you didn't share your user space this will not be the attack vector you will fall victim to - most likely.

[–] bdonvr@thelemmy.club 5 points 4 days ago (1 children)

Any one of the programs or docker containers you run has user access. Now any of them could have root access unchecked. You can't know you haven't installed an update with malicious code to any one of the hundreds of packages a desktop install has.

[–] henfredemars@infosec.pub 1 points 2 days ago

Defense in depth, indeed. There’s layers to trust, and I prefer that my containers stayed contained just in case.

[–] who@feddit.org 5 points 4 days ago

If I understand correctly, this could be exploited to escape linux namespaces, which which are the foundation of containers like Flatpak and Docker. Those were never very good security boundaries, but running untrusted code in them is now especially dangerous, until your kernel is patched.

[–] r00ty@kbin.life 13 points 4 days ago (2 children)

Just to note, if you are on an LTS version (which many people running servers will be), it's likely an upgrade will not solve this. In which case you should check your installed version and if not yet corrected, disable that module. For most people it is not used anyway.

[–] A_norny_mousse@piefed.zip 19 points 4 days ago (1 children)

Most LTS distros have security updates enabled ootb.

[–] r00ty@kbin.life 3 points 4 days ago (1 children)

I mean I updated my servers and some of them on LTS releases that were not the very latest one were still vulnerable after a reboot. Hence I disabled the module on those servers. So it's worth checking your version definitely has a fix available.

[–] sem@piefed.blahaj.zone 3 points 4 days ago (1 children)
[–] Successful_Try543@feddit.org 3 points 4 days ago* (last edited 4 days ago) (1 children)

~~It could be for example Debian 12 (Bookworm). While Debian 13 (Trixie) already got fixed, Bookworm is still vulnerable.~~

Edit: It just got fixed.

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431

[–] r00ty@kbin.life 2 points 4 days ago

Yeah one of them was Debian 12 for sure.

[–] exu@feditown.com 13 points 4 days ago (2 children)

According to comments on Lobsters, the distros weren't notified prior to publication, so any backports took longer than usual.

[–] sem@piefed.blahaj.zone 6 points 4 days ago (1 children)

I dont get it, doesn't responsible disclosure mean the distros get the packages out first?

[–] foenix@lemmy.radio 5 points 4 days ago (1 children)

Nothing about this disclosure was responsible.

[–] frongt@lemmy.zip 5 points 4 days ago (1 children)

According to Greg K-H, nobody typically gets notified by the Linux kernel team about anything, so this is not abnormal: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/01/3

Distro maintainers should be monitoring the lists and feeds and making decisions themselves, not expecting spoon-feeding from the kernel team.

[–] exu@feditown.com -1 points 4 days ago (1 children)

Yes, but the researchers should have notified the linux-distros mailing list as well per the published policy. See https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html#coordination-with-other-groups

It's unfortunate, but understandable why this didn't happen. Still, the researchers claimed in their blog post that fixes were shipping, apparently without actually checking.

[–] JackbyDev@programming.dev 2 points 3 days ago

As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the “linux-distros” mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code’s maintainers and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand the requirements that contacting “linux-distros” will impose on you and the kernel community. This also means that in general it doesn’t make sense to Cc: both lists at once, except maybe for coordination if and while an accepted fix has not yet been merged. In other words, until a fix is accepted do not Cc: “linux-distros”, and after it’s merged do not Cc: the kernel security team.

It sounds like what you're describing and what the email thread are discussing are pretty different. The email thread was asking to know about things prior to disclosure. You seem to be saying that they should have directly notified the distros list when the fix was up instead of just posting the article or whatever on their site. Two very different discussions.

[–] ZoteTheMighty@lemmy.zip 6 points 4 days ago (1 children)

If you don't have the algo_aead kernel module enabled, are you still vulnerable to this? Any systems don't show it in lsmod whenever I've tried, does that mean most computers are OK?

[–] ThunderComplex@lemmy.today 2 points 3 days ago

Yep, you’re only vulnerable if that module is currently loaded.

[–] A_norny_mousse@piefed.zip 6 points 4 days ago

Thanks, done.

uname -rmv  
6.12.85+deb13-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Debian 6.12.85-1 (2026-04-30) x86_64  
[–] ArcaneSlime@lemmy.dbzer0.com 4 points 4 days ago (1 children)
[–] frongt@lemmy.zip 10 points 4 days ago (1 children)

If that blows your mind, let me tell you about Microsoft Linux

[–] bad1080@piefed.social 2 points 4 days ago