cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49277840
TL;DR:
- Chinese officials say Moscow knew about the US preparations for an operation in Venezuela. Moreover, in late December, Russia began pulling diplomats and their families out of Caracas.
- Russia has not informed China about its assessment of the situation in Venezuela, however, which has caused bewilderment in Beijing and called into question the nature of relations between the two countries.
- Because of U.S. actions, China risks losing billions of dollars in oil loans to Venezuela. As a result, Beijing has found itself in an extremely disadvantageous position, yielding to Washington.
- China is discussing the version that the failure of Russian air defense systems could not be an accident, but a sign of a high level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. In this connection, Beijing is increasingly asking whether Russia can be considered a reliable ally.
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That an intervention [by the US in Venezuela] was imminent was understood by Russia, one of Venezuela’s most enthusiastic partners over the last two decades. Towards the end of last month Moscow began pulling diplomats and their families out of the capital, Caracas.
Russia’s assessment of the situation, and its withdrawal of personnel, were not shared with Beijing, according to well-placed sources in China. This has caused eyebrows to be raised about what it means for a relationship between the two countries that is supposed to be “comprehensive”, “mutually beneficial” and “eternal”.
Beijing was not simply blindsided by the US operation, it was embarrassed by it. Qiu Xiaoqi, China’s special envoy to Latin America, had arrived in Caracas and met Maduro hours before the latter was captured. Shortly before, Wang Yi and Yván Gil, the two countries’ foreign ministers, had spoken by phone to affirm China’s “solidarity and firm support for Venezuela in defending its sovereignty, independence and stability.”
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These words would serve less as a show of resolve than a measure of how limited China’s ability was to translate diplomatic language into meaningful protection or leverage on the ground.
China stands to lose out from the many billions of dollars of loans it has made to Venezuela in return for its oil. It also stands to lose the half a million barrels of oil a day it has been getting from its ally: about 4 per cent of its total oil imports. Such was Beijing’s confidence in its partnership with Maduro and his regime that it invested an estimated $9 billion in building a petrochemical plant in Jieyang, Guangdong province, capable of producing 20 million tons of refined oil a year.
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It is easy to make crass comments about the significance of losing face in Chinese culture. In this case, though, the fact that Beijing has been caught badly out of position, outmanoeuvred by the US and let down by Russia, has sparked vigorous discussion in China — and, in some quarters, speculation that the failure of Russian-built defence systems in Venezuela was not a coincidence, but evidence of high-level co-operation between Moscow and Washington.
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Over the last few years, the question of whether Russia is both a reliable and a good ally has become one of the key talking points among policymakers, advisers and thinkers in China.
Professor Jia Qingguo, former dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University and one of the most well-connected figures in Chinese strategic thinking, noted that while Russia’s isolation because of the war in Ukraine had brought economic benefits to China, these have come at a cost.
In particular, he noted in an interview just before the Maduro operation that Moscow’s dependence on China has meant that the latter’s current and future relations with Europe have been compromised. As such, he added, a solution to the war in Ukraine would be of benefit to China.
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For Chinese strategists, the problem is not simply reputational damage in Europe or the US, but the deeper risk of being tied to a partner whose way of doing things cuts directly against China’s own instincts about order, predictability and control.
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For policymakers in Beijing, the contrast is stark: one partner leans on force, disruption and intimidation; the other offers markets, rules and negotiated stability. The question increasingly being debated inside China is not whether Russia is useful in pushing back against American pressure, but whether following Russia’s example leads China towards the kind of global role it actually wants to play.
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As Charter97, an exiled Belarusian rights organization has framed it, China Has Begun To Doubt Russia.