They are already doing that, they even have a playbook on how to try to protect them, but apparently, “Physical protection is a set of structural measures that do not guarantee the safety of protected objects. Solutions do not exclude blast load and shrapnel impact.”

Inside Rosneft’s Secret Drone Defense Blueprint: How Russia’s Oil Giant Plans to Shield Its Refineries – and Why It Will Fail

| | Cable barriers around tanks | Cable/net mesh (40×40 cm) wrapped around storage tanks on pipe stands | “NOT resistant to UAV shrapnel”; only protects against multirotor drones | | Scaffolding cages | Modular metal scaffolding erected 5m above tank roofs | “Insufficient volume of scaffolding to protect the Company’s facilities”; “high cost” | | Shipping container walls | 20-36m high walls from stacked 20/40-ft containers with cable infill at 40 cm spacing | Not yet pilot-tested; requires thousands of containers per refinery | | “Tent” canopy over tank farms | Overhead cable-mesh tent using containers as structural supports (21m central mast) | “Difficulties during firefighting”; “high snow loads” | | Tower crane mast cages | Repurposed crane sections forming 4-pillar cage around processing units, cables at 1m spacing | Each unit requires individual engineering; relies on surface foundations or guy-wires | | Three-barrier column protection | Layer 1: cable screens 1-1.5m out from platforms; Layer 2: nets (40×40 mm mesh); Layer 3: kevlar/aramid wrapping | In case of detonation, destruction is inevitable | | Cable fencing for pump stations | 6mm cables at 500mm spacing on outrigger brackets | Only designed to destroy drone airframe — does nothing against the warhead | | Reinforced concrete panels | Reinforced Concrete wall panels replacing sheet-metal wind barriers at pump stations | Only covers pump stations — the narrowest, lowest-value target category |