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It has been a common assumption that the "political marriage" between Jokowi and Prabowo which ensured his presidential election victory would not last long. For Prabowo, any path had to be taken to become part of the ruling bourgeois. For Jokowi, who climbed to power not as part of the old national bourgeoisie, everything had to be done to ensure his political power could be sustained and continued. Even if it meant violating the Constitution and betraying his old allies. Essentially, in any bourgeois political union, the law of competition and conflict in the quest to be the most dominant is the iron law of their class interests. Political dominance paves the way for the accumulation and dominance of capital. This political union is no longer sustained by the stratagem of accommodating positions and money. There is not enough budget to continuously finance political accommodation, as seen in the analysis of the economic conditions.

The Prabowo-Jokowi political union has for several months shown latent cracks, including: Prabowo's inaction on the issue of accusations that Jokowi's university diploma is a fake, Prabowo's inaction on calls for Gibran's impeachment by several retired Indonesian Military (TNI) officers, Jokowi's ally and business tycoon Riza Chalid being named a corruption suspect, the limitations on State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Minister Erick Tohir's power and authority, the deployment of the TNI to back up the Attorney General's Office to confront the police, and the struggle over the portion of functions and authorities in the Draft Criminal Code (RKUHAP), are facts that must be seen as friction and cracks between the old and new rulers.

Since Prabowo-Gibran were inaugurated, two major issues have followed them to this day: first, the issue that Prabowo will be overthrown before his second year in power and replaced by Gibran; second, that Prabowo's political consolidation will be completed in the first year, followed by the removal of Jokowi's and Gibran's cronies from the government and state institutions. Both issues have become more rampant since August 25. Although the "ball" has not directed at Prabowo since August 25 and the peak of the protests and riots on August 30. Accompanied by National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo (no relation), Prabowo stated he "will not back down" and accused the week-long protests of being acts of treason and terrorism. Prabowo's statement actually strengthens public suspicion that the moment was used to point the finger at his competitors, rather than admitting his own inability to solve the problems. As a result, the suspicion about the removal of Jokowi's cronies has become even stronger…

The left-wing movement, the people's movement, and the coalition of civil society organisations can be said to have been caught off guard by the speed of the recent political escalation, which was indeed beyond their reach and control. It is clear that the events of the last week were not initiated by these movements. Although most of them intervened after August 25. However, it is clear that this political escalation was not yet able be led by the left-wing movement, the people's movements or civil society organisations.

The weakness of the left movement, especially the left that emerged from the pre-1998 spectrum, is due to mass demoralisation, divisions, ideological decline and the failure to become a political channel for the masses. The post-1998 spectrum left movement also has relatively less experience and political skill in assessing situations and facing political developments. Added to this is the massive trend of growth in radical petty-bourgeois individuals and communities who consider the led and organised struggle within left-wing parties as an outdated model of struggle. The left movement today is more diverse and fragmented. Rather than viewing this pessimistically, this diversity can be an opportunity and a strength if it can overcome the fragmentation and find minimum agreement on programs and tactics.

The growth of people's movement organisations (labour, peasant, student and urban poor) has actually become more widespread and expansive since 1998. However, due to the lack of left-wing leadership, the transformation of the people's movement from a social movement into a political movement has been hampered and slow. It has been less able to move quickly to intervene in moments and see windows of opportunity to accelerate mass consciousness and increase political escalation towards programmatic movement politics.

Civil society organisations actually have better infrastructure than the previous two movements. They are known by the media and have extensive networks although they do not have a broad mass base. Their tendency to limit their struggle to minimum demands for reform and easily achievable goals makes it difficult for them to lead and organise the revulsion and anger of the masses.

Although this position and stance can be said to be belated, it is certainly important for it to be explained as an understanding for the next dynamic. It is certainly important for us to respond to this political escalation with clarity of thought, vigilance and a clear position. And to dismiss the subjectivity that exaggerates mass consciousness and dynamics by declaring "the revolution is at the door". Such recklessness would be fatal for the organisation, unity and struggle of the people. Therefore, objectivity must always be our guiding principle.

From the explanation above, there are several things the movement must do:

First, there is a need for a leadership strategy that manifests as a centre for political consolidation among a combination of the left-wing movement, the people's movements and civil society organisations. A minimum agreement among these three elements is better than no agreement at all and no central consolidation whatsoever. Without a central consolidation, even one with a democratic-reformist character, we cannot expect there to be a democratic leadership that can become a pole of attraction, let alone hope for a revolutionary leadership.

Second, a grassroots strategy. Although social media is the fastest means to disseminate ideas and narratives to the people, the building of territorial, village and factory-level resistance committees is the best basis for establishing resistance organisations and forums for democracy, coordination and public education. The design of resistance organisations is best built physically (offline) rather than virtually (online).

Third, in the current situation, the battle between true and false narratives is very swift. An integrated and easily understood campaign is needed to counter the false narratives being spread. One that is fast, accurate, factual, engaging, easy to understand, and massive, organised collectively and integrated, is the key.

Fourth, workers must be radicalised and mobilised from both territorial and sectoral areas, and then organised systematically by continuously encouraging and training the leadership of the progressive labour movement as a more organised sector so that it is not easily infiltrated and pitted against itself.