...you still need to log in with your Google account.
You don't.
To use Aurora Store, you can either login via your Google account or use an anonymous account.
...you still need to log in with your Google account.
You don't.
To use Aurora Store, you can either login via your Google account or use an anonymous account.
Do you lock your door at night? Why? Anyone could just use a fireman's axe and open it. Or they could just drive through your living room and steal everything.
For kernel-level anti-cheats its quite simple. Those in opposition to kernel-level anti-cheats likely view locking a door as a small task with minimal downsides, which could reasonably deter an opportunistic criminal, or buy you time to escape with your life or call the police.
They also likely view kernel-level anti-cheats as, for the benefits they provide, having too large of downsides. (providing a third-party company kernel-level access via a closed-source program)
If you're concerned about privacy just dual boot windows in a separate SSD to play games and use Linux and Graphene OS.
In another thread in this comment section I mention UEFI rootkits and firmware implants (kernel-level access is strong starting point for this). Your solutions do not address these issues, which could be important to someone. (Depending on their threat-model)
If you tell me that all I need to do to negate the security concern of the kernel level anticheat is to run the dualboot windows partition...
...it makes intuitive sense that installing a kernel level anticheat would only affect the windows kernel it was installed on not the linux kernel on the other drive partition.
The intuition is incorrect as the kernel-level anticheats are not necessarily trusted. Operating systems interact with low-level hardware and firmware on the system. As such, it is not self-contained.
There exists both UEFI bootkits and firmware implants. Its intuitive if you understand it like this: if there exists a communication pathway from (A) lower-privilege code -> (B) higher-privilege code, there exists the potential for vulnerabilities.
This is due to (A) now having an effect on the code execution for (B).
So, I'm not allowed to ask you for proof of your statement? And if its unrelated, then why did you post it? Its unrelated. Also, you're saying you have an absence of evidence, ergo you have no evidence. Having no evidence does not qualify as evidence
Asking for evidence wasn't the issue, believing that the truth relies solely upon a discussion providing such evidence is.
I think you are confusing having an option with something being mandatory.
You misunderstood. Some of your own statements say it matters and is used. Mandatory wasn't mentioned nor implied.
And Tor nodes are not the same thing as VPN multi-hop.
I just realized you think that Tor is built using multi-hop.
I didn't state they were the same. Tor uses "multiple hops" (you can find that string the the link I posted earlier). It is critical to the limiting of information seen by any single entity.
And again, if you connected your Firefox browser to Tor, we could still track you. You'd get cookied or localStorage() tracked. When you disconnect from Tor, that stuff is still present in your browser. Almost like the number of hops you take or the IP address used doesn't seem to really matter, huh?
All that state can be removed. And the server might not be tracking that. Situations vary, adversaries vary. If you cannot imagine a scenario in which hops or IP address would matter, I would suggest doing some research.
Its a real life Dunning-Kruger effect! I've never encountered this. You are going to do something really stupid and end up in prison.
Personal swipes mark the end of this discussion. I would suggest you to leave those out next time as It detracts focus from constructive learning.
This will be my last reply. You can also reply if you want (but I won't see it).
Evidence, or it isn't true.
Unrelated, but absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Anyways, your own statement:
Adtech relies on the OpenRTB 2.5/2.6 spec for tracking, you would have removed 1 identifier out of a hundred (one that isn't really used anyway given SSAI is so popular).
Removing an identifier that is used. (1/100 = matters, "isn't really used" != unused). This contradicts your other statements:
Yeah, multi-hop is pointless for tracking.
...IP addresses and multi-hop don't matter...
Broad statements that don't take into consideration the threat model of other users. Servers you connect to might not be using source IP in any way to track. You might be leaking so many other identifiers, that its completely useless to worry about multi-hop. But this is not true for everyone in every situation.
If its worth anything to you, the Tor Project seems to think multi-hop and IP addresses matter for protecting against tracking.
I'm unsure what evidence you are referring to.
I'm unsure what evidence you are referring to.
What specifically about multi-hop makes you think it improves your security?
I haven't mentioned security.
- You giving some marketing crap you read from a VPN provider site on their multi-hop service.
I'm sorry, but that isn't correct.
You almost had the rest of the sentence there:
That doesn't change the contradiction.
Yeah, multi-hop is pointless for tracking.
The logic to it is crazy too. People think VPNs make them anonymous (they don't), but they also think multi-hop makes them MORE anonymous.
Whether multi-hop matters to tracking is far and away a different discussion than whether multi-hop "makes you anonymous".
I too disagree with the original comment, but also believe the pendulum swung too far the other direction in your replies.
Situations differ. Threat models differ. More hops can, from direct personal experience, make the difference in tracking. Your claim of "...multi-hop is pointless for tracking." has too broad of a scope to be correct.
Possibly an old sub-domain of some sort. Here seems more correct.