Wave

P2Pool v4.10 speed up the whole Monero network

If you're still mining on a normal pool like in the old days, your computer has to wait much longer to receive its work from the internet. With p2pool, it takes a fraction of the time of regular centralized pools!

How it will work with P2Pool broadcasts:

• 1. A pool or a solo miner finds a block, then submits it to their Monero node
• 2. Monero node notifies its connected P2Pool node of a new block (instantly)
• 3. P2Pool network spreads this block across all peers, spending only 2-3ms on each hop
• 4. All P2Pool peers submit this block to their respective Monero nodes
• 5. These Monero nodes verify this block in parallel - this is where the time saving comes from

As soon as enough P2Pool miners update to v4.10 or newer, block propagation times in the whole Monero network will reduce significantly.

➡️ Reddit

./monerod --zmq-pub tcp://127.0.0.1:18083 --out-peers 32 --in-peers 64 --add-priority-node=p2pmd.xmrvsbeast.com:18080 --add-priority-node=nodes.hashvault.pro:18080 --enforce-dns-checkpointing --enable-dns-blocklist

github presentation of the FCMP++ audits w.r.t. the modules in the codebase

@BitMEXResearch/status/1955254320305217726

Monero Re-org & Qubic

It seems like there may have been a delibrate 6 block re-org on Monero $XMR from Qubic mining. The target time is 2 minutes, therefore the re-org length is quite small. However, it is not clear if there was a double spend attack or if this was just selfish mining, i.e. trying to earn more of the block rewards. It seems for now that there is no evidence this was a double spend attack.

Qubic did seem to have around 20% of the Monero hashrate for a while and they may have sold some coins for USD, to rent hashrate to temporally push the hashrate up to over 30%. Qubic has significantly less than 51% of the hashrate, but perhaps it has just above the 33% theoretical threshold, where selfish mining is profitable (Assuming the coin price does not crash). It is not clear what the Qubic objective is here, but they do have a token $QUBIC and they may want to try and push up the price of it. Other than that, the endgame is unclear, but the "attack" from Qubic may not be sustainable

We have heard no reports of a double spend attack @krakenfx @bitfinex @MEXC_Official Any news on this? As for exchanges who take Monero deposits, it might be a good policy to increase the number of confs required for a deposit.

@/tuxpizza/status/1955191610410401816#m

Qubic never actually hit 51% btw. Don't fall for it.

However they do have a large enough hashrate to perform multi-block re-orgs with their selfish mining strategy.

They disabled API hashrate reporting so that they could lie about it.

Keep mining and ignore the noise.

qubic.org, a miner with very high computing power, has made no secret of wanting to ignore legitimate blocks from other pools.

Would a generally legitimate reaction of sincere miners be to ignore the blocks of this belligerent miner?

It already looks to me as if the operators of some mining pools are taking countermeasures behind the scenes.

The administrator of supportxmr.com has a lot of experience and is trustworthy and certainly knows how to take countermeasures.

Perhaps an emergency feed for mining pool operators could be introduced, in which only recommended countermeasures for pool operators are communicated.

An option to adopt an emergency block list, which is switched off by default, could be introduced. The recommendation for pool operators and node operators could be to activate this option when starting the Monero software. This list would have to be distributed by experienced pool operators or members of the Monero core team.

We already have a block list, which MRL has recommended to activate. This could be extended by IP addresses from qubic.org.

• https://files.catbox.moe/1zyri6.jpg
• https://miningpoolstats.stream/monero

This change surprised me. Unstoppableswap is also recommended and linked in other places, e.g. on monerica.com

eigenwallet is an ambitious community effort to build the Monero wallet for the future.

Activate the blocklist in the Monero GUI wallet or Monero node.

It reduces the connections to suspicious, potentially useless or even counterproductive nodes in the Monero network. It is not absolutely necessary that you make this setting, but it would support the entire Monero network. Thank you.

Monero GUI wallet

If your run your own local node through the GUI wallet, go to Settings. In the “Daemon startup flags” box, input “–ban-list ”. Then click the orange “Stop daemon” button. It will take a few seconds for the daemon to shut down. Then click the orange “Start daemon” button. If you use a remote node, whoever operates the remote node will decide if the ban list is enabled.

✋ node operators enable a ban list

The Monero Research Lab (MRL) has decided to recommend that all Monero node operators enable a ban list

https://github.com/Boog900/monero-ban-list/blob/main/ban_list.txt

Download the ban list and:

./monerod --ban-list

🧐 https://gist.github.com/Rucknium/76edd249c363b9ecf2517db4fab42e88

Clover vs Dandelion++ | Network-Layer Privacy in Monero NOTE: SEE THIS IN MONEROKON IN JUNE 21 (06/21/2025)!

I've been reading about Clover and Dandelion++, two techniques aimed at improving privacy on the network layer specifically, hiding the origin IP of a transaction in systems like Monero.

Here’s a quick comparison and breakdown:

🌼 Dandelion++

How it works:

Uses a two-phase propagation system:

Stem phase: The transaction is passed through a few nodes in a linear, random path.

Fluff phase: It’s then broadcast normally (flooded).

Privacy benefits:

Helps hide the source IP by making it harder for attackers to pinpoint the origin based on initial propagation.

Works well against local or partial adversaries (those controlling a few nodes or monitoring part of the network).

Already implemented in Monero.

Limitations:

Vulnerable to global adversaries (e.g., an attacker that can monitor large parts of the internet).

Susceptible to timing analysis and some advanced correlation attacks.

🍀 Clover

How it works:

Proposes a more advanced, probabilistic routing system.

Introduces random delays, mixing, and adaptive path selection using buffers and stochastic rules.

Makes the traffic pattern statistically indistinguishable from honest noise.

Privacy benefits:

Much stronger protection against global passive adversaries.

Defends against timing attacks and traffic analysis far better than Dandelion++.

Higher entropy in transaction routing paths.

Limitations:

More complex to implement.

Likely introduces higher latency due to delays and buffering.

Not yet implemented in Monero—still a research prototype (see more in MoneroKon).

Conclusion: Dandelion++ is a practical and effective step forward for Monero’s network privacy, but Clover shows promise for the future, especially if we want to defend against more powerful, surveillance-level attackers. It’s a trade-off between deployment complexity and stronger anonymity guarantees.

Reddit

Combining a finite supply, anti-inflationary mechanisms, and military-grade encryption strategies positions Monero as exceptional in current inflationary monetary conditions.

Monero demonstrates rising recognition based on its recent market activities.

https://www.finance-monthly.com/2025/05/xmr-vs-the-dollar-can-a-ghost-coin-outrun-inflation-in-2025/

cross-posted from: https://monero.town/post/6007844

⚠️ supportxmr.com down ⚠️ that's serious

also on miningpoolstats 😱

cross-posted from: https://monero.town/post/6006148

No worries about this one being flooded because most will not be able to figure out how to join 😅

XMR p2pool-mini meets XTM Tari

• 20 MH/s - May 5th, 2025
• 77 MH/s - May 6th, 2025

https://tari.com/

https://p2pool.io/mini/#pool

X @zachxbt zachxbt/status/1917535854085497185

Update: It is confirmed to be a social engineering theft from an elderly individual in the US.

X @zachxbt zachxbt/status/1916756932763046273

Nine hours ago a suspicious transfer was made from a potential victim for 3520 BTC ($330.7M)

Theft address

bc1qcrypchnrdx87jnal5e5m849fw460t4gk7vz55g

Shortly after the funds began to be laundered via 6+ instant exchanges and was swapped for XMR causing the XMR price to spike 50%