3
submitted 1 week ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

Why UTXO Matters: Security, Privacy, and Scalability in BTC Ecosystem

12
submitted 2 weeks ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

🚨Honeypot Warning🚨In a thread posted on Dread in /d/Monero.. it's being discussed that the "Haveno-Reto" fork may be a honeypot.

12
Libereco.xyz (monero.town)
submitted 3 weeks ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

You can now use LIBERECO. Your new Monero homepage.

Libereco means "Freedom", or "Liberty" in Esperanto.

DASHBOARD > Network Stats, Price, News & Community feeds.

RESOURCES > A collection of all kinds of Monero information and knowledge

BLOGO > a Blog

https://x.com/DontTraceMeBruh/status/1797687175087350239

-1
submitted 1 month ago by Wave@monero.town to c/cryptocurrency@lemmy.ml

cross-posted from: https://monero.town/post/3145550

Tari XTM is the new PoW asics-resistant Privacy coin by Fluffypony. This is the link for the Airdrop game. Live since May 14, 2024.

Merge-Mining XMR has already been implemented. All you have to do is enter your Monero address with the miner.

1
submitted 1 month ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

Tari XTM is the new PoW asics-resistant Privacy coin by Fluffypony. This is the link for the Airdrop game. Live since May 14, 2024.

Merge-Mining XMR has already been implemented. All you have to do is enter your Monero address with the miner.

[-] Wave@monero.town 7 points 1 month ago

Edward Snowden,

I've been warning Bitcoin developers for ten years that privacy needs to be provided for at the protocol level. This is the final warning. The clock is ticking.

-1
submitted 1 month ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

Video: Bitcoin is πš’πš—πšœπšπš’πšπšžπšπš’πš˜πš—πšŠπš• πšπš›πšŠπšπšŽ

7
submitted 2 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

Putting their heads together https://twitter.com/SimpleXChat/status/1769457715309388172 technology trailblazer's

28
submitted 6 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

A big thanks to tevador from TorProject Proof of Work for .onion Services https://spec.torproject.org/hspow-spec/

The overall denial-of-service prevention strategies in Tor are described in the Denial-of-service prevention mechanisms in Tor document. This document describes one specific mitigation, the proof-of-work client puzzle for onion service introduction.

This was originally proposal 327, A First Take at PoW Over Introduction Circuits authored by George Kadianakis, Mike Perry, David Goulet, and tevador.

27
submitted 7 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/privacyguides@lemmy.one

cross-posted from: https://monero.town/post/1084048

SimpleX is a private encrypted messenger that creates new identities for each conversation. However, as we pointed out in a previous video, when you first install the app, it’s all the developer’s own servers. This has metadata and centralization risks. We are here to help.

SimplifiedPrivacy.com is a completely different firm than SimpleX (although we share the same first word). We just released a tutorial video with a self-host script for any Debian/Ubuntu VPS that you can use to easily self-host a SimpleX server: https://video.simplifiedprivacy.com/simplex/

In the tutorial video, we taught how to use Kyun.host a Monero focused free speech provider in Romania that we recommend! However, you can use any provider.

Here is the script on our self-hosted gitlab on Kyun with an Iceland domain: https://git.simplifiedprivacy.is/publicgroup/simplex-self-host/

If you do not wish to self-host, you can add our SimpleX servers to your app for free:

smp://BgQRXMpC_pOpm2eAWvwFAvz6o1pJMu8y6_LaxZYxAFg=@smp.simplifiedprivacy.com

xftp://YLfpIjjRjJdOHKSPHCxhHMUmB_auPkxSIkfo76cH7F8=@xftp.simplifiedprivacy.com:5443

Reach out to us if you’d like our help to setup many OTHER services or complex configurations/support at SimplifiedPrivacy.com

Join our SimpleX Group Chat, people discuss Monero and privacy in general:

https://simplex.chat/contact#/?v=1-4&smp=smp%3A%2F%2Fhpq7_4gGJiilmz5Rf-CswuU5kZGkm_zOIooSw6yALRg%3D%40smp5.simplex.im%2FXVf2UZLG2NxirJJlkO-yjU3BjbnK-QBo%23%2F%3Fv%3D1-2%26dh%3DMCowBQYDK2VuAyEAy8t1QqQ_sOovdEAfXlWvWKH9dw-7kwl5menGf4JI8hU%253D%26srv%3Djjbyvoemxysm7qxap7m5d5m35jzv5qq6gnlv7s4rsn7tdwwmuqciwpid.onion&data=%7B%22type%22%3A%22group%22%2C%22groupLinkId%22%3A%225tJ0uL-PgZB4UjSIsbnyJQ%3D%3D%22%7D

___

11
submitted 7 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

"If you use XMR, then there isn't much anyone can do (or to help you with), as far as I know. Bitcoin can be traced, but not frozen, until you send it to a CEX."

"The key point is, you have the choice."

@cz_binance said it before and he will say it again:

Bitcoin is traceable. https://monero.town/post/461435

[-] Wave@monero.town 5 points 7 months ago

01010101

In my eyes, you were a visionary with foresight and a gift for expressing yourself in the right way! For me, you were a beacon in the blockchain industry. As with a chancellor, the work doesn't stop when you no longer hold the post. On the contrary, it is more demanding, because you have to guide your successors and point out the paths you have taken. The reward comes when you only have to speak out on serious, big issues and can otherwise sit back and relax. All the best!

10101010

19
submitted 7 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

"For the sake of clarity, I am stepping down as a member of the Monero Core Team effective immediately. I have not really had any active role in the Core Team in many years, and this is in line with my stated goals since 2018.

As part of this, any remaining privileges or access I have will be handed over or revoked. It is my hope that it can be handed over to new workgroups in the coming weeks / months, instead of the Core Team continuing in a highly centralised model."

24
submitted 7 months ago by Wave@monero.town to c/monero@monero.town

fluffypony (Riccardo Spagni) Proposal: Disband Core

Currently the Monero Core Team is responsible for a number of things that are critical to Monero, and as a result there is a great level of trust implicit in them. For instance, a malicious Monero Core Team member could hijack the domain, and serve up malicious Monero downloads right after a new release. No matter how quickly this is detected, there will be many affected downloads, and could cause massive financial and privacy-related network damage. The recent CSS wallet incident is also an example of risks that the Core Team presents.

Additionally, this has been a thankless job that the Core Team has taken on (for no compensation), although even if there were compensation and constant praise it would still be a centralising force that we should try and eviscerate.

My suggestion, and I encourage us to use this thread to iterate on it in public, is to break the Core Team up into 6 self-assembling workgroups. This is not a complicated exercise, apart from the community coming to consensus as to who should form part of the workgroups. I would suggest we aim for a January 1st, 2025, cutover date for this.

Existing Core Team members can, naturally, choose to join a particular workgroup (or workgroups), if the community agrees they should. I, personally, will not be participating in any of these proposed working groups, and will use this as an opportunity to step back from any last vestiges of administrative involvement or perceived leadership in Monero.

Open questions that we should use this thread to answer is: (1) what should we use to quickly spin up some sort of loose consensus mechanism for the workgroups (eg. Strawpoll)? (2) how many members should be part of each workgroup?

Some basics that I think should be set in stone are: given the sensitivity of these workgroups, community members that do not have a long multi-year history should simply not be considered. Community members should also be familiar with secure communications platforms, GPG, and similar. Their GPG keys should preferably be a matter of public record already, or inserted into source tree as soon as possible. Many of the roles and responsibilities aren't just technical, but require building a deep relationship with service providers who are familiar with the sensitive nature of Monero's software and support the project's mission, so it would generally require individuals in those particular roles to not be abrasive, and to be warm and understanding and friendly with the individuals they deal with at those service providers. Finally, some of these workgroups simply CANNOT have any form of multisig / ACL / group access, and by definition each individual on the workgroup can exercise complete control and abuse their position (or be wrench-attacked, or be compromised). I've tried to note that below.

General Donation Fund Workgroup This workgroup can use multisig to share control.

Responsible for determining what General Donation Funds should be spent on, and dispensing them. The download server and CDN are the primary recurring costs, and we have a whole structure setup that pays those monthly via card / wire transfer and is reimbursed by the GF. They can choose to continue to use that, or they can do their own thing.

CCS Workgroup This workgroup can use multisig on the wallet, but some other aspects might inherently be more centralised.

Responsible for managing the CCS, approving proposals, managing milestones, etc. This obviously includes dispensing funds.

IP and DNS Workgroup This workgroup can democratise some aspects of it, but ultimately there will need to have a super-administrator for both domains and DNS (this can be a shared account).

Responsible for IP (as in intellectual property) which includes domains, trademarks, copyrights, service marks, anything along those lines. They're mostly going to be responsible for renewing the domains on an annual basis, ensuring the domains aren't stolen / socially engineered (I built an extremely deep relationship with our registrar, Gandi, over the last decade to prevent these attacks which occur very frequently). For multiple reasons we use Cloudflare to handle the DNS (including their embracing and facilitating Tor routing and access from Tor exit nodes, and their exceptional DDoS prevention). Of course, this workgroup is welcome to transfer the domains somewhere else, as well as move the DNS elsewhere.

Servers and CDN Workgroup This workgroup might be able to democratise some access, but as with the previous one there is a need for some super-administrator access (this can be a shared account).

Responsible for the CDN and server infrastructure. Currently there is a single, very beefy server on a 10gbps unmetered, well-peered uplink, that serves the Monero website and the downloads. We have a well architected, hardened configuration that was designed by Gus, formerly of Tari Labs, and Dan (pigeons), from Cypherstack. The CDN is one that we specifically chose because it has a network of endpoints in China, and thus bypasses the Chinese GFW to serve the Monero website and downloads. Of course, this workgroup is absolutely entitled to move the infrastructure elsewhere, switch off the CDN, etc.

Git Workgroup This workgroup likely can't democratise much at a high level (some nuance below), and will also require a super-administrator account (this can be a shared account).

Responsible for the monero-project GitHub organisation, managing GitHub issues and pull requests, managing maintainers, and managing releases. There is some democratisation in the form of individual repo access. In other words, an individual who isn't even part of the workgroup can be given write access (ie. maintainer role) on an individual repo. They are welcome to re-run the experiment we ran with self-hosted GitLab a few years ago, but I think we've demonstrated that GitHub is fine as a platform for collaboration, knowing that we will detect any malicious activity on GitHub's part really quickly as git acts almost as a blockchain, distributing the code (and its branches and history of changes) on the computers of thousands of Monero contributors and users.

Community Channels Workgroup This workgroup can democratise some individual channels, but it will require a require a super-administrator account (this can be a shared account).

Responsible for managing the various community channels, like the Telegram groups, the subreddit, the IRC channels, etc. Obviously these channels already exist, and this workgroup might choose to fold the existing moderators of the subreddit (for instance) into the workgroup. They could also exist as a distinct workgroup, working with those moderators and letting them handle changes to their moderation team. They would generally be expected to maintain some of the guidelines and standards we have for community channels (eg. no price talk in most channels / forums, there are specific places for that) and ensure that these guidelines are largely accepted and enforced where relevant. They would also be responsible for some more sensitive things like controlling the Monero namespace on Libera (the IRC server we use), which is an elevated level of access that allows the workgroup to take over any channel that starts with "monero" (useful for channels that are trying to scam or impersonate).

[-] Wave@monero.town 11 points 10 months ago

I don't know how iOS looks, so no problem for me.

[-] Wave@monero.town 7 points 10 months ago

It's really more about the eOS.

[-] Wave@monero.town 9 points 10 months ago

Yes, exactly that's the reason. To make you appear more equal to others. It is one part of how Mullvad Browser is providing you more privacy.

[-] Wave@monero.town 8 points 10 months ago

You can compare Mullvad Browser with your Firefox Browser. Just do a Fingerprint Test:

coveryourtracks.eff.org

Is your Firefox better? Does it hide more details about you? No.

Your Firefox is likely very unique. So your settings and extensions appear to be special; let's say you stick out of the others. Also your Screen-Size and if its a touchable screen and how much RAM your device has and so on.... Mullvad Browser makes all users look much more like the same user - users are less identifiable.

[-] Wave@monero.town 5 points 10 months ago

Don't get confused by the name. Mullvad has a proven trackrecord to not keep any data of their users. Even the payment process is anonymously. They partner with privacy and security advocates like TorProject, MalwareBytes, Mozilla ... 100% legit

[-] Wave@monero.town 6 points 10 months ago

It is, just like Tor Browser, based on Firefox ESR.

[-] Wave@monero.town 8 points 10 months ago

Mullvad Browser is Tor Browser without Tor. TorBrowser evolved over many years, with a very long track record and is recommended uncountable times all over the world. So, if you want the TorBrowser without all the Tor stuff: here is it.

[-] Wave@monero.town 13 points 10 months ago

github.com/mullvad/mullvad-browser Firefox ESR - it's basically Tor Browser without Tor. Mullvad gets name recognition 100%

[-] Wave@monero.town 4 points 10 months ago

Yes, it's more anonymous than firefox with mods/addons. You can do "fingerprint" tests online to compare how unique your browser is. Just use the Mullvad Browser daily - and if you need something special - than you can still use a other solution for the special case.

[-] Wave@monero.town 7 points 10 months ago* (last edited 10 months ago)

Yes, dailydrive. More anonymous than firefox with addons.

view more: next β€Ί

Wave

joined 10 months ago