Enemy sensor operators easily detect the lineup of 6x UH-60, 4x CH-47s, and 7x AH-64s parked on airbases or in large open fields. Aircraft rotor blades and bodies create distinctive signatures, readily identifiable through both UAS and satellite imagery. Despite this, aviation task forces repeatedly emplace unconcealed aircraft together with zero overhead cover and remain emplaced for days at a time. A peer threat, equipped with drones and space-based sensors will find and target the TAA. During the Russian-Ukraine War, OPERATION SPIDERWEB demonstrated how vulnerable strategic air assets can be when they stay in one place for too long. Helicopters provide superior agility to operate in austere environments compared to the bombers targeted by Ukraine. They maneuver rapidly across the battlefield, offering tactical advantages in contested environments. Ground equipment requires cover and concealment for protection, while helicopter survivability depends on their inherent agility. Commanders should move helicopters every 24 hours, even just 200-400 meters away to keep adversaries in a constant targeting cycle. Concealment requires deliberate planning, rehearsals, and a shift in culture.
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UAS represent the most persistent threat at JMRC. Our OPFOR routinely use drones to locate TAAs and execute call for fire missions. Simulated artillery or one-way strike UAS target and destroy spotted aircraft, sustainment assets, and command posts. Aviation units must develop and incorporate a counter-UAS plan. “Commanders, leaders, and planners must include the simultaneous application of both passive and active measures during operational planning and employment as part of a layered defense strategy against UAS threats.”2This includes early warning systems, layered defenses (small arms, jammers, and if available, kinetic defeat systems), and most importantly, preventative concealment and dispersion. Aviation task forces also must develop and practice scatter plans, which are increasingly rare at JMRC.