this post was submitted on 11 Jun 2024
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Okay dokey 👍
You're genuinely deluded with a lack of understanding. If you cannot provide sources for your dogma, please stop spilling it.
You have got to be joking.
Where are your sources, magic law firm man?
I’m not magic, do not confuse those with greater understanding than you with mystical abilities.
Im not sure what “sources” you want, that's simply how the system works. If your carrier had access to encrypted data over tcp/ip with tls you might as well give up any hope for privacy, but by open source community backed design that is not allowed. Encrypted connections are encrypted. So i guess heres some sources on iMessage, the new PQ3 cryptographic protocol they’re layering ontop of the current encryption protocol, some academic white papers describing its implementation, a link to how tls encryption works, a link to a well known public event where Apple refused to backdoor their encryption leading them to legal battles from the government even up to current day, and a link to a amicis brief dating back to 2015 (no connection to my firm) where they're unable to retrieve encrypted data from an iPhone even back then... Feel free to enlighten yourself; although I do get the feeling that aside from sitting down beside you, going over every single line of source code and design implmentation, and explaining how it all works to you that you’d change your mind. Luckily security researchers exist and im sure if you check your local scollarly database (or, le gasp, google scholar should you /trust/ it) you’ll find this information.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMessage
https://security.apple.com/assets/files/Security_analysis_of_the_iMessage_PQ3_protocol_Stebila.pdf
https://security.apple.com/assets/files/A_Formal_Analysis_of_the_iMessage_PQ3_Messaging_Protocol_Basin_et_al.pdf
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_dispute
https://epic.org/documents/apple-v-fbi-2/
Re: 1.
That's good, I laughed.
Re: everything else.
I appreciate the tech details, but it doesn't mean anything when prosecutors submit messages in trials. The government will get your messages when they want them.
Messages can be submitted to trials in a lot of cases, but that's because the underlying technology used was not configured correctly or did not offer encryption. Up until just a few years ago for example, you'd have to turn off iCloud sync to avoid your iMessage data being legally provided to the courts (since it was not E2E encrypted in your icloud backup, even though the messages themselves were sent E2E encrypted), but now with end to end encryption Apple literally does not have the keys to your data by design when you enable it and the government to the best that top researchers, investigators, and journalists can tell also lacks that capability. I don't understand why you're failing to see the nuance here. If you don't leverage proper precautions, your data is certainly exposed, but that is simply not because of some conspiracy. It's a consequence of old, poor design. Things have changed.
Don't argue with morons. Just block and move on.
A wikipedia page detailing the dispute between apple who refused to help the fbi to acces personal messages is a tech detail that doesnt mean annything in context of firms handing over data to government?
Okay dokey 👍
Your just arguing in bad faith because you lost the argument hard.
About your clearly moved goalpost. Yes if the US government wants your messages they will get them. No matter how protected, local and offline your data stored. They have the legal ability to put cameras in your bedroom. That has nothing to do with apple.