Matrix

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Matrix Metadata Problem: the server sees everything except your messages (dfrws.org)

submitted 1 day ago* (last edited 5 hours ago) by verifytheposter@leminal.space to c/matrix@lemmy.ml

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Matrix Metadata Problem: the server sees everything except your messages

People pick Matrix because of end-to-end encryption. But E2EE only protects message content — everything around it is plaintext.

The server sees:

Your ID, IP, client type and version, device you use
Your presence, typing status, read receipts
Which rooms you join and when you join/leave
Who else is in those rooms → your entire social graph
Room names, topics, avatars (all plaintext state)
For every message: who sent it, which room, a millisecond timestamp, type, size

And federation copies most of that to every other server whose users are in the room. Your "social footprint" isn't one copy — it's as many as there are servers.

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[–] gary_host_laptop@lemmy.ml 3 points 23 hours ago (1 children)

without that metadata you'd get a pretty bare bones experience. encrypting metadata adds another layer of complexity, not everyone wants that.

[–] verifytheposter@leminal.space 1 points 21 hours ago (1 children)

signal done it pretty well

[–] gary_host_laptop@lemmy.ml 10 points 21 hours ago (2 children)

signal? the one that requires a phone number to registar? the one that has a centralized server that you can't self host basically?

[–] geneva_convenience@lemmy.ml 1 points 3 hours ago

Yet the vast majority of people won't be self-hosting, anyways, and using someone else's server.

[–] verifytheposter@leminal.space 1 points 10 hours ago (1 children)

Matrix can expose your device name and device details to other homeservers through federation. Profile information such as your avatar and bio can also be queried remotely. A client version is not a dedicated federation field, but it can leak through the device name. Signal at least has Sealed Sender, which hides the sender's identity from its own service in supported cases.

This is about metadata, not centralisation, self-hosting, or phone-number registration. Those are separate issues, not trade-offs.

[–] Aria@lemmygrad.ml 2 points 5 hours ago (1 children)

Those are absolutely trade-offs. Do you want the app to positively ID you and tie you to your passport, or do you want the app to broadcast your set name and set identity strings to those you opt in to share it with?

[–] verifytheposter@leminal.space 1 points 4 hours ago

You haven’t explained why I have to choose between these two trade-offs. I want neither: I want strong metadata protection without being forced to link my account to my real-world identity.