A more openly militant, internationalist China would obviously be great in theory. But politics isn’t about theory alone, it’s about material conditions (the synthesis of theory and practice). Right now China is one of the main reasons the DPRK still exists at all. That’s not nothing. Trade, energy, diplomatic cover, and softening enforcement of sanctions are what keep the DPRK from total economic strangulation. The same logic applies, though much more weakly, to Cuba.

Beyond that, China’s main global line currently isn’t exporting socialism, it’s breaking imperialist domination as a system. From a Chinese perspective, the USSR showed that trying to fight the entire imperialist bloc head-on through arms races, proxy wars, and ideological confrontation while still economically and militarily weaker is a losing strategy. It bleeds productive forces, isolates you, and eventually collapses the project altogether. China chose not to repeat that.

Instead, China is focused on building their own productive base to the point where imperialism can’t dictate terms anymore, while also creating space for the Global South through investment, infrastructure, and multipolar institutions. That doesn’t abolish capitalism, and it doesn’t directly advance revolution, but it does materially weaken U.S. unipolar power and limit how aggressively imperialism can act.

This approach is contradictory and deserves criticism. China operates inside global capitalism and often prioritizes stability over revolutionary change. But that’s an unfortunate strategic assessment based on balance of forces. They support socialist states when their collapse would clearly strengthen imperialism, but they avoid a posture that would force premature confrontation before they’ve reached parity with the imperial core.

I think a much more real and interesting question than “why doesn’t China act like Mao-era China,” is what happens once the current goals are achieved. If multipolarity stabilizes and China reaches durable parity, the material constraints shaping this cautious line change. At that point, more explicit forms of socialist solidarity become materially possible in ways they aren’t now. Whether the CPC actually takes that path is an open question, but dismissing China as “doing nothing” ignores both what it’s already doing and the historical logic behind why it’s doing it this way.