philosophy

When i was studying philosophy, panpsychism was treated a bit like skepticism in general. Fascinating and compelling arguments, but not practicable. It is true that logic is a closed system, so you can’t really determine a priori that the sun will rise tomorrow. No one actually lives like the sun isn’t showing up. We have no idea what the cause or mechanism of consciousness is, and as such there is no reason to assume that certain types of cell or an arrangement of them are related to it.

In the literature, the idea that the exact specific cells of your body make up your consciousness or that there’s a specific pattern of cells that make it up are variants of hard materialism, with respect to consciousness. They are also wrong (One’s cells replace themselves, so if consciousness was in the specific cells you’d get ship of theseus’ed. We also don’t act like many brain injuries change a person.)

With all that above in mind, the argument that there’s no inherent reason to treat of pile of wires as different from a pile of ganglia or neurons was one of those arguments that someone came up with as a counterpoint more than a real point. The only ‘professional’ philosopher that adheres to panpsychism is David Chalmers, and some people in the field think he’s doing a long running bit.

my personal view is that panpsychism claims that elementary particles (either the normal ones we know or some new ones) have a mental or proto-mental character. This is to stay that a bunch of particles together give rise to complex forms. This is another way of taking materialism (in philosophy of consciousness, zero relation to political theory) at its word and treating consciousness as something that developed from lava-cooked, meteorite-seeded primordial soup. We already think proteins and organelles and organisms are increasingly complex combinations of these particles, so if consciousness is an organic phenomenon, why wouldn’t it follow a similar path?

i think the point of this is to demonstrate that materialism (brain is conscious experience and changing one will definitionally change the other) is at least an incomplete picture. i definitely don’t agree with it personally, but i do think it’s an interesting idea in the contemporary philosophical conversation about the mind.