this post was submitted on 19 Dec 2024
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Religion doesn’t count. We’re on Lemmy, so neither does communism.

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[–] Tomorrow_Farewell@hexbear.net 18 points 6 months ago* (last edited 6 months ago) (10 children)

Right now, I don't have any sources ready, and I know for certain that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on idealism explicitly excludes non-recent branches of idealist schools of thought.

There are at least two definitions of ontological idealism (and two corresponding ones for ontological materialism) that I have seen. One of which characterises idealist schools of thought as positing that (some) non-material things have some sort of primacy over material things (note that non-material things are not limited to thoughts). Another definition is broader and simply requires idealist schools of thought to posit that non-material things exist (while the corresponding definition for materialism requires those schools to posit that only material things exist).

Contrary to popular perception, idealism does not require you to believe in magic, including that we can psychically change matter. Simply, for example, subscribing to the idea that math does not depend on matter is idealist.
Also, while religious idealism (most prominently Christian idealism) does require you to believe in magic, it also doesn't require one to believe that it is thoughts that have any sort of primacy over matter.

I am also pretty sure that I'm not alone in considering relevant disagreements to be at least mostly linguistic in nature. I have heard that Wittgenstein said something to the same effect, but have not checked.

[–] SweetLava@hexbear.net 7 points 6 months ago (6 children)

i personally thought the most common form of idealism was summed up as this: "humans cannot perceive reality perfectly, they perceive things to their human limit and see appearances of things"

or, alternatively: "humans have experiences that trascend humanity itself and can't be fully understood by humans"

For Marx in particular, he saw any theory divorced from practical experience as a slipperly slope towards idealism - I'm still working through this argument myself, though, and I believe I misunderstood his point. I'm not very strong on my Young Hegelian critiques, truthfully

[–] Tomorrow_Farewell@hexbear.net 9 points 6 months ago (4 children)

i personally thought the most common form of idealism was summed up as this: "humans cannot perceive reality perfectly, they perceive things to their human limit and see appearances of things" or, alternatively: "humans have experiences that trascend humanity itself and can't be fully understood by humans"

It is definitely not that. The points about imperfection of perception are not relevant to either of idealism and materialism themselves.

For Marx in particular, he saw any theory divorced from practical experience as a slipperly slope towards idealism

I have not encountered Marx saying so, but that would be silly, as idealism isn't some sort of a detachment from practice, and I would argue that there are no serious incompatibilities between idealism and Marxism (at the very least, nobody has managed to bring any of such to my attention, so far).

[–] SweetLava@hexbear.net 2 points 6 months ago

this is definitely controversial, you got that down

you're arguing for something extremely non-conventional among philosophers themselves - without sufficient arguments to make anyone believe you. That doesn't mean you're wrong, it just means people won't take you as seriously

one thing i would say, where you would likely agree, is that most people calling themselves Marxist are not well-versed enough to argue for their Marxist or Marx-influenced philosophy - if Lenin wasn't confident in his Marxism without starting to understand Hegel's Greater Logic... I think we all know what I'm implying here

What you're arguing for here sounds like something that requires several months of studying philosophers from their own works. You can go even further and argue something like Derrida, that maybe we've all been reading philosophers who misread their contemporaries who misread their contemporaries and so on and so forth.

This isn't something I myself am well-versed enough to do, so all I can do is wish you luck on this one

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