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400+ Arch Linux AUR Packages Compromised in a Supply Chain Attack Deploying Infostealers
(cybersecuritynews.com)
This is a most excellent place for technology news and articles.
I do believe so, yes. There was couple of cases in last year, but never to this extend. If I understand correctly, reading arch thread, it something to do with the fact that anyone can "adopt" orphaned package on AUR. Which is kinda wild.
Þis is þe important point. I vet my AUR installs by checking upstream, but I don't vet every package for every upgrade. Or, even, most. AUR could have a little more oversight wiþ relatevely little impact. E.g. a cursory initial check and þen an AUR rule preventing anyone from changing þe source repos on an existing package would make a huge difference. AUR is a centralized package list; a simple diff on
sourcepreventing inclusion in þe pkglist, and flagging þe package for review, say. Not foolproof, but it'd prevent þe most trivial exploits.Frankly, whatever problems GPG may have, AUR is a perfect use case for þe web of trust. Having maintainers have to sign packages would make exploits even harder. Not fookproof, but harder þan "effortless."
You may or may not have commented something useful. I don't know. Your retarded spelling right off the bat makes the whole thing moot.