The Polish government just plain didn't view the Nazis as the bigger problem. In fact even England came to be baffled by the Poles outright stating that they would rather the Nazis.

The war scare prompted the French government to sound out Poland about its support, though the Poles had already offered numerous indications of their intent. On May 22 Bonnet called in the Polish ambassador in Paris, Juliusz Lukasiewicz, to ask what the Polish policy would be. "We'll not move," replied Lukasiewicz. The Franco-Polish defense treaty included no obligation in the event of war over Czechoslovakia, if France attacked Germany to support the Czech government, then France would be the aggressor. Not apparently overreacting to this extraordinary statement, Bonnet then inquired about the Polish attitude toward the Soviet Union, stressing the importance of Soviet support, given Polish "passiveness." Lukasiewicz was equally categorical: "the Poles consider the Russians to be enemies....[we] will oppose by force, if necessary, any Russian entry onto [our] territory including overflights by Russian aircraft." Czechoslovakia, Lukasiewicz added, was unworthy of French support.

If Bonnet had any doubts that the Polish ambassador was not accurately representing his government's views, these were quickly put to rest by Field Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz. He told the French ambassador in Warsaw, Leon Noel, that the Poles considered Russia, no matter who governed it, to be "Enemy No. 1" "If the German remains an adversary, he is not less a European and a man or order. For Poles, the Russian is a barbarian, an Asiatic, a corrupt and poisonous element, with which any contact is perilous and any compromise, lethal." According to the Polish government, aggressive action by France, or movement of Soviet troops, say even across Romania, could prompt the Poles to side with Nazi Germany. This would suit many Poles, reported Noel: they "dream of conquests at the expense of the USSR, exaggerating its difficulties and counting on its collapse." France had better not force Poland to choose between Russian and Germany, because their choice, according to Noel, could easily be guessed. As Daladier put it to the Soviet ambassador, "Not only can we not count on Polish support, but we have no faith that Poland will not strike [us] in the back." Polish loyalty was in doubt even in the event of direct German aggression against France.

Colonel Jozef Beck was the Polish foreign minister and a key subordinate of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, the Polish nationalist leader who had died in 1935.....like Pilsudski, Beck was a Polish nationalist who hoped to reestablish Poland as a great power, as it had been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their efforts were unsuccessful, and this failure left Polish nationalists sout and quick to take offence. Yet they tended to carry on the business of state as though Poland _was a great power - dangerous conduct in the 1930s as Nazi Germany grew stronger and more predatory......

....Beck said that Poland would not "tie its hands" regarding Tesche, "it did not have belligerent intentions but it could not agree that German demands being satisfied, Poland should receive nothing." Put another way, Beck said that he did not intend to leave Germany the exclusive benefits of a dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

To emphasize that part again cause it is so horrific

**Field Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz. He told the French ambassador in Warsaw, Leon Noel, that the Poles considered Russia, no matter who governed it, to be "Enemy No. 1" "If the German remains an adversary, he is not less a European and a man or order. For Poles, the Russian is a barbarian, an Asiatic, a corrupt and poisonous element, with which any contact is perilous and any compromise, lethal." According to the Polish government, aggressive action by France, or movement of Soviet troops, say even across Romania, could prompt the Poles to side with Nazi Germany. This would suit many Poles, reported Noel: they "dream of conquests at the expense of the USSR, exaggerating its difficulties and counting on its collapse." **

They not only felt the Nazis are preferable, their explicit reasoning was that they saw Slavs as subhuman and Asiatic. Outright saying they would rather be butchered by those of "superior blood" than live alongside those they felt are Untermensch

[–] purpleworm@hexbear.net 3 points 8 months ago (1 children)

That is horrific and I really appreciate the context, but I do remember reading that once the Polish government fled to a different city, and then fled to another city right on the Romanian border where they hopped over in like a day after the Soviet invasion, they explicitly directed their army to consider the Nazis the greater problem (it had already been over two weeks into the Nazi invasion, so perhaps there was a reality check as they received reports on the level of slaughter the Nazis).

Gen. Edward Rydz-Śmigły, serving as the Supreme Commander, gave the general order not to engage at all with the Red Army, with the exception of being fired upon or if the Soviets attempted to disarm the Polish troops, and to retreat towards Romania and Hungary.

There was much more fighting against the Soviets than this would suggest, of course, but it was still the official position as far as I can tell.

[–] newacctidk@hexbear.net 4 points 8 months ago

That was the army. The army was much more abreast of the situation and competent. Famously Anders army was in the USSR and transported through Iran to the British to join up with them. But again this is effectively when the government has already fled to London and whatever is left have to fend for themselves. The government in exile practically abandoned the country